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David Pitt: Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
New Directions
May 24, 2016
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25 slides
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Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts David Pitt California State University, Los
Angeles Conference: Non-physicalist Views of Consciousness, Cambridge University May 24, 2016 -
conceptual contents are thinkable percepts are not thinkable images are
not thinkable external objects are not thinkable these things are not conceptual contents -
thinking is a kind of experience “cognitive” (conceptual, propositional) phenomenology
to be hearable is to be auditory-phenomenological to be smellable is to be olfactory-phenomenological to be thinkable is to be cognitive-phenomenological -
smells can’t be heard sounds can’t be tasted sights can’t
be smelled none of these can be thought they can only be thought about -
conceptual content cannot be individuated by non- cognitive phenomenology there
can be no “phenomenal concepts” concepts whose contents are non-cognitively- phenomenologically individuated -
concepts can no more contain percepts or images than smells
can contain sounds, or itches can contain feelings of remorse conceptual contents (including those of indexical concepts) are not referentially individuated there can only be concepts whose referents are non-cognitively-phenomenal states -
Mary acquires no new concepts when she leaves the greyscale
room there are no new thoughts she can think in the room, she can think (falsely) this is puce of a grey patch -
this is puce thought of a grey patch this is
puce thought of a puce patch the same thought (same content) thought of different things -
when she leaves she can think this is puce (truly)
about a puce patch she sees this is knowledge by acquaintance -
a sense in which this is new knowledge: her thought
this is puce is true, and justified but there is no new thought her belief is justified by her experience -
yes she can come to know what puce looks like
without knowing it’s puce that looks like that without applying the concept PUCE without thinking at all without knowing that this is puce -
without knowing that she knows what puce looks like acquaintance
per se is a form of knowledge (Conee, “phenomenal knowledge”) -
1. knowledge by description 2. knowledge by acquaintance 3. acquaintance-knowledge
1 and 2 are conceptual 3 is non-conceptual -
being acquainted with puce experiencing puce is knowing what it’s
like to see puce -
knowing that this is puce is knowledge by acquaintance it
is knowledge about an instance of puce- experience ‘this’ refers to an instance of puce-experience -
as long as puce can be imaginatively re- experienced, the
knowledge persists (this needn’t be something you can do at will) you can forget what puce looks like if you can’t imaginatively experience it -
an experience of puce can recur even if it is
not identified as such acquaintance-knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance have different persistence conditions acquaintance-knowledge just is experience knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge that -
Swamp Mary could be equipped with a puce detector, which
causes her to believe that puce things are puce when she encounters them but reliably believing that something puce is puce is not knowing what puce looks like it is not recognizing puce knowing what puce looks like requires experiencing or having experienced puce -
acquaintance-knowing is the basic mode of knowing for phenomenal properties
knowledge by acquaintance depends upon it you can’t have it without acquaintance -
Mary does not have knowledge by acquaintance of the Taj
Mahal she’s never seen it (pictures of the Taj Mahal are not the Taj Mahal) she is not acquainted with it -
nothing metaphysically significant about acquisition of knowledge by acquaintance per
se in the room Mary cannot have knowledge by acquaintance knowledge of the Taj Mahal she hasn’t seen it she can’t know that this is the Taj Mahal -
if she leaves the room and travels to Agra, she
may come to have knowledge by acquaintance of it it doesn’t follow that the Taj Mahal is not a physical object the question of physicalism is independent -
it depends upon the nature of what one is acquainted
with the question is why Mary can’t have knowledge by acquaintance acquaintance-knowledge is immediate knowledge of experience