Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Features
Speaker Deck
PRO
Sign in
Sign up for free
Search
Search
Distill: Death to Cookies
Search
Konstantin Haase
August 09, 2013
Technology
1.2k
7
Share
Distill: Death to Cookies
Konstantin Haase
August 09, 2013
More Decks by Konstantin Haase
See All by Konstantin Haase
RubyConf Philippines 2017: Magenta is a Lie
rkh
0
230
How We Replaced Salary Negotiations with a Sinatra App
rkh
17
4.3k
HTTP (RubyMonsters Edition)
rkh
5
1.2k
GCRC 2015: Abstract Thoughts on Abstract Things
rkh
1
390
Frozen Rails: Magenta - The Art Of Abstraction
rkh
3
340
RedDotRubyConf 2014: Magenta is a Lie - and other tales of abstraction
rkh
0
980
Ancient City Ruby: Hack me, if you can!
rkh
2
450
Boston I/O: Continuous Integration
rkh
3
330
Steel City Ruby: Architecting Chaos
rkh
4
970
Other Decks in Technology
See All in Technology
Oracle AI Database@AWS:サービス概要のご紹介
oracle4engineer
PRO
4
2.4k
Shipping AI Agents — Lessons from Production
vvatanabe
0
240
名刺メーカーDevグループ 紹介資料
sansan33
PRO
0
1.1k
All About Sansan – for New Global Engineers
sansan33
PRO
1
1.4k
Practical TypeProf: Lessons from Analyzing Optcarrot
mame
0
340
LLM時代の検索アーキテクチャと技術的意思決定
shibuiwilliam
3
1.2k
基盤を育てる 外部SaaS連携の運用
gamonges_dresscode
1
120
マルチプロダクトの信頼性を効率良く保っていくために
kworkdev
PRO
0
160
EBS暗号化に失敗してEC2が動かなくなった話
hamaguchimmm
2
200
レビューしきれない?それは「全て人力でのレビュー」だからではないでしょうか
amixedcolor
0
330
生成AIが変える SaaS の競争原理と弁護士ドットコムのプロダクト戦略
bengo4com
0
690
ハーネスエンジニアリングをやりすぎた話 ~そのハーネスは解体された~
gotalab555
4
1.7k
Featured
See All Featured
RailsConf & Balkan Ruby 2019: The Past, Present, and Future of Rails at GitHub
eileencodes
141
35k
Conquering PDFs: document understanding beyond plain text
inesmontani
PRO
4
2.6k
The B2B funnel & how to create a winning content strategy
katarinadahlin
PRO
1
330
Future Trends and Review - Lecture 12 - Web Technologies (1019888BNR)
signer
PRO
0
3.5k
How Fast Is Fast Enough? [PerfNow 2025]
tammyeverts
3
530
コードの90%をAIが書く世界で何が待っているのか / What awaits us in a world where 90% of the code is written by AI
rkaga
61
43k
Groundhog Day: Seeking Process in Gaming for Health
codingconduct
0
140
Measuring Dark Social's Impact On Conversion and Attribution
stephenakadiri
1
190
"I'm Feeling Lucky" - Building Great Search Experiences for Today's Users (#IAC19)
danielanewman
231
23k
Tips & Tricks on How to Get Your First Job In Tech
honzajavorek
1
490
The Language of Interfaces
destraynor
162
26k
My Coaching Mixtape
mlcsv
0
100
Transcript
Death to Cookies Konstantin Haase @konstantinhaase
story time
None
None
None
once upon a time
None
None
Recipetastic™
None
None
Bob Alice
Bob Alice
Bob Alice Eve
Bob Alice Mallet
problem solved
None
POST /login HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Content-Length: 44
[email protected]
& password=st0p%20Motion
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: user=bob <html> ...
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=bob
Guessing
None
None
None
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: user=bob Set-Cookie: pwd=... <html>
...
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=bob,pwd=...
GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=bob,pwd=... Basic Auth, just
with cookies
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: user=bob Set-Cookie: token=... <html>
...
None
XSS Cross Site Scripting
None
can read cookie and send it somewhere
None
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: user=bob; HttpOnly <html> ...
None
can read (and write) recipes
None
sanitize all user input
Content Security Policy
None
CSRF Cross Site Request Forgery
Is this awesome, y/n?
None
GET /create?… HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=alice
GET /create?… HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=alice Deadly cookies!
None
GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE PUT, DELETE, LINK, UNLINK POST, PATCH
1 2 PUT / 2 PUT / 2 Repeatable! :)
State change! :( Deterministic! :) https://speakerdeck.com/rkh/we-dont-know-http
GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE PUT, DELETE, LINK, UNLINK POST, PATCH
None
None
None
POST /create HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=alice ...
POST /create HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=alice ... Deadly cookies!
None
POST /create HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Referer: http://awesome- website.com/ Cookie: user=alice
POST /create HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Referer: http://awesome- website.com/ Cookie: user=alice
[sic]
None
None
Referer is not set for FTP or HTTPS referrers
Referer can be spoofed by outdated flash plugin
None
POST /create HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Origin: http://awesome- website.com Cookie: user=alice
None
None
Not supported by older browsers
Origin can probably be spoofed by outdated flash plugin
None
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: csrf_token=XXX
None
None
Cheating Same Origin
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json
An attacker could just load it, right?
AJAX can only load from the same origin (or CORS)
None
seems harmless
In JavaScript, you can override the array constructor.
https://github.com/rkh/json-csrf
None
Never serve JSON that has an array at top level
(or don’t use cookies)
None
VBScript did not fully implement Same Origin
None
Block Internet Explorer before IE9
Block Internet Explorer before IE9
require CSRF token for all AJAX requests
None
Are we doing good so far?
None
Can we trust a cookie?
DNS cache poisoning
Can we trust the browser?
Can we trust browser plugins?
None
None
Signed Cookies
Encrypted Cookies
None
Eaves- dropping
encrypting cookies does not help
None
None
None
attacker cannot parse cookie from stream
None
Or can they?
BEAST Browser Exploit Against SSL/ TLS
decrypts TLS 1.0 streams via injected JavaScript
None
fixed in TLS 1.1
force recent browser
don’t allow TLS 1.0
None
CRIME Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy
SSL has built-in compression
GET /?user=alice HTTP/1.1 Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=bob GET /?user=bob HTTP/1.1
Host: www.recipetast.ic Cookie: user=bob better compression
None
update your browser
turn off SSL compression
append random number of bytes to response
None
BREACH Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext
like CRIME, but for the response
attack the CSRF token, not the cookie
inject something in the response http://www.recipetast.ic/search?q=XXX
None
mask CSRF tokens differently in every response (Rails PR pending)
don’t use CSRF tokens
None
Do you think about all this when you build an
app?
Next attack vector around the corner?
None
Alternatives
IP address
Session ID in URL
None
Custom Authorization header
None
Store value in Local Storage
Needs JavaScript :(
Works well with PJAX/ Turbo Links like setups
None
New Browser Concepts?
None
@konstantinhaase
[email protected]
rkh.im