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Whoami • Steve Borosh ◦ Penetration Tester / Red Teamer
◦ Blogger https://www.rvrsh3ll.net/ • Jeff Dimmock ◦ Penetration Tester / Red Teamer ◦ Blogger https://bluescreenofjeff.com/ -
Agenda ▪ Introduction ▪ “Standard” Infrastructure ▪ Weaknesses ▪ “Advanced”
Infrastructure ▪ For The Reds: Tips for a Strong Infrastructure ▪ For The Blues: Tips and Tradecraft ▪ Questions -
Purpose ▪ Infrastructure design ▫ Build a resilient infrastructure ▫
Stay hidden ▫ Separation of resources ▪ Secure the infrastructure ▫ Prevent “hack-back” ▫ Prevent data leakage ▪ Train both Blue and Red -
Props to prior research ▪ blog.cobaltstrike.com - Raphael Mudge ▫
“A Vision for Distributed Red Team Operations” ▫ “Advanced Threat Tactics: Course and Notes” ▪ Cybersyndicates.com - Alex Rymdeko-Harvey ▫ “6 Red Team Infrastructure Tips” -
Design ▪ One (or few) hosts handle all functionality ▫
Payloads/C2/Phishing/etc ▪ Quick to deploy ▪ Simple hardening -
Components ▪ Single-server C2 + SMTP ▪ Originates all attacks
▪ Default traffic profiles ▪ Open to entire Internet -
Use Cases ▪ Tests w/o active incident response ▪ Fully
whitebox ▪ Functional testing ▫ Click tracking ▫ Egress testing -
Weaknesses ▪ Hosted payloads are easily enumerated by defenders ▪
C2 may be easily blocked by IP, netblock, or domain name ▪ No redundancy in case of outages ▪ Susceptible to Internet-wide probing or exploitation -
Weaknesses (cont.) ▪ Blue team probing hits backend servers ▪
Lack of adequate protections against ‘hacking back’ or probing -
Design ▪ Based on “Infrastructure for Ongoing Red Team Operations”
by Raphael Mudge ▪ Segregate assets based on function, minimize overlap ▪ Place redirectors in front of every host -
Components ▪ Four teamservers ▫ Phishing & payloads ▫ Long-term
DNS C2 ▫ Short-term DNS C2 ▫ Short-term HTTP C2 ▪ Four redirectors (VPS hosts) ▫ Two for DNS C2 via socat/iptables ▫ HTTP C2 via Apache ▫ HTTP payloads via Apache ▪ SMTP server (VPS host) ▪ Four domains -
Domains ▪ expireddomains.net ▫ Old first registered age ▫ High
SimilarWeb score ▫ High number of backlinks ▪ Register pre-used domains ▪ Register domains in same category ▪ Finance/Healthcare usually have firewall exceptions for SSL -
Domains ▪ Check categorization ▫ Bluecoat ▫ McAfee (TrustedSource) ▫
Fortiguard ▪ Senderbase Score ▫ http://www.senderbase.org/ ▪ Check blacklists (web and email) ▫ http://multirbl.valli.org/ -
SMTP ▪ Use “redirector” for sending ▪ Remove previous server
headers ▪ Catch-all address to receive bounce-backs or responses ▪ Use third-party SMTP servers ▫ Read the TOS first! -
Apache mod_rewrite ▪ Redirect unwanted requests ▫ Invalid URIs ▫
IR useragents ▫ Blacklisted IPs ▪ OS-specific payload delivery ▪ Payload extension hiding ▪ Filter non-C2 requests to C2 domains -
DNS ▪ socat vs. iptables ▪ Modify query results ▫
Typical default of 0.0.0.0 ▫ Nslookup = google,opendns ▪ Modify DNS request lengths ▫ Max domain name, 253 text characters ▫ MRZGS3TLEBWW64TFEBXXM.dns.example.com -
DNS Redirecting Socat http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/offensive/redir ecting-cobalt-strike-dns-beacons/ IPTables ▪ Forward UDP port
53 to teamserver from redirector -
Modified C2 Signatures ▪ Changes how C2 looks on the
wire ▪ Impersonate adversary or internal applications ▪ Malleable C2 -> Cobalt Strike ▪ Communication Profile -> Empire ▪ Use custom profiles on every server! -
Example Profiles ▪ amazon.profile ▪ bingsearch_getonly.profile ▪ cnnvideo_getonly.profile ▪ gmail.profile
▪ googledrive_getonly.profile ▪ microsoftupdate_getonly.profile ▪ msnbcvideo_getonly.profile ▪ onedrive_getonly.profile ▪ oscp.profile ▪ pandora.profile ▪ rtmp.profile ▪ safebrowsing.profile ▪ webbug.profile ▪ webbug_getonly.profile ▪ wikipedia_getonly.profile -
Domain Fronting ▪ Utilize high-trust domains ▫ Cloudfront ▫ AWS
▫ Google ▪ Implementation varies per provider ▪ Uses same infrastructure legitimate apps/sites use -
Domain Fronting (cont.) ▪ Resources “High-reputation Redirectors and Domain Fronting”
-Raphael Mudge “Domain Fronting via Cloudfront Alternate Domains” -Vincent Yiu “Escape and Evasion Egressing Restricted Networks” -Chris Patten and Tom Steele -
Watching the watchers ▪ ‘Pre-phish’ with a weak phish to
fingerprint response ▫ Easy-to-spot, but not Nigerian Prince ▫ Use completely different infrastructure ▫ Perform far in advance ▪ WATCH ALL LOGS ▫ Look for CURL/WGET/Python requests ▫ Geolocate IPs ▫ ID appliances ▫ ID incident response actions -
Watching the watchers ▪ Monitor domain/IP categorization/blacklisting ▪ Monitor emails,
if possible ▫ Compromised accounts ▫ Bouncebacks ▪ Roll infrastructure as needed -
Logistics ▪ Document the setup ▫ Know what points where
▪ Split hosts amongst providers ▫ (Pay attention to terms of service!) ▪ Keep elements as independent as possible ▪ Forward all logs to central server via rsyslog -
Securing the Infrastructure ▪ Attackers can be attacked too! ▫
Metasploit* ▫ Empire** ▫ Cobalt Strike*** ▪ RCE on unprotected attack infrastructure *https://github.com/justinsteven/advisories/blob/master/2016_metasploit_rce_static_key_deserialization.md *https://github.com/justinsteven/advisories/blob/master/2017_metasploit_meterpreter_dir_traversal_bugs.md **http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/empire/empire-fails/ ***http://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2016/10/03/cobalt-strike-3-5-1-important-security-update/ -
Securing the Teamserver ▪ Chattr cron directories ▪ iptables ▫
Restrict resources to only needed IPs ▪ Lock down SSH ▫ PKI auth only ▫ Limited user rights -
Securing the Teamserver (cont.) ▪ Block non-target country IPs ▪
Keep your C2 updated! -
Identifying malicious DNS traffic ▪ Request length ▪ Same domain
with many subdomains ▫ Entropy in subdomains ▪ DNS Server resolves to 0.0.0.0 If you start looking for DNS C2 traffic, it’s easy to spot! -
Identifying other malicious traffic ▪ SSL Certs ▫ Let’s Encrypt
Certs ▫ Self-Signed ▪ Consistent URL patterns ▫ /admin.php etc.. ▫ Repeated intervals with Bro ▪ Research common C2 platforms ▫ (low hanging fruit for defenders) ▫ Stagers are easy to spot -
Identifying other malicious traffic (cont.) ▪ Process monitoring ▫ Why
is x process talking to the Internet? ▫ Example Tools ▪ Sysmon/Procmon ▪ Carbon Black -
Identifying Malicious traffic (cont.) ▪ Analyze network captures ▫ Beacon
intervals (jitter) ▫ Filter out known-good ▪ VPS address ranges -
Thanks! ANY QUESTIONS? You can contact us at: @424f424f (Steve
Borosh) @bluscreenofjeff (Jeff Dimmock) http://www.rvrsh3ll.net https://www.bluescreenofjeff.com