the optimist tradition and the challenge of ideological recognition (2) The failure of pessimism as a model of critique (3) Hegelian replies (4) A new start: ideology as a second-order feature of subjectivating practices of recognition
a vocabulary for reconstructing the justiﬁcation of social and political demands and struggles. Model of critique: Social-historical immanent critique - employing the “normative surplus” of spheres of recognition to reconstruct justiﬁcation of demands for progress.
for normative, discursive practices and for the possibility of there being subjects (subject as a normative status). (Implicit) model of critique: All normative demands, in virtue of their claims to justiﬁcation, depend in their force on practices of recognition.
dependent on a prior submission to speciﬁc norms of recognition, a model of critique which reconstructs the demands of critique as expressing normative claims put forward by subjects constitutively cannot go beyond the norms of recognition.
epistemic skepticism. Normative skepticism: Normative dependence of critique on subjectivating recognition might require a normative legitimization of a violation the subject experiences in the project of being recognized as such. Epistemic skepticism: By drawing on recognized demands of subject, critique might be systematically unable to account for the conditions of existence of these subjects.
validity of claims instituted in practices of recognition, the following question arises: Is such a model still suﬃciently capable of subjecting these practices themselves to a radical critique? Or is the whole perspective of normative critique so dependent on the existing practices of recognition that these practices eﬀectively succeed in immunizing themselves against criticism?
individual is a subject is not a description of some self-standing properties or capacities of that individual, but rather of the social status of that individual within a speciﬁc discursive practice wherein it is treated as such. (P2) This practice is itself governed by a set of rules R˜1 specifying who may legitimately be treated as a subject.
who counts as a subject, there may be rules that specify that, in order to count as a subject, an individual must accept responsibility for her actions according to a set of rules R˜2. Example: in order to count as a discursive subject, you must accept (but not necessarily always follow) the rules of logical consistency as valid for you. (C1) Thus, in order to be treated as a subject, an individual must accept the legitimacy of these rules R˜2.
a judgement about this practice which expresses a justiﬁed demand of persons who are aﬀected in some way by this practice. (P4) “To be justiﬁed” is a social status which only discursive subjects can have. (C2) Thus, engaging in a normative critique presupposes that there are discursive subjects and that their demands and their perspective are a valid reference point for this critique.
ontologically or normatively presupposes the normative validity of either R1 or R2 or is epistemically unable to recover the conditions under which R1 or R2 have acquired their normative force. (C4) Thus, the uncritical assumption that recognition is a valid foundation for social critique legitimizes the domination which these rules exert upon individuals or the violation which the imposition of these rules constitutes for these individuals.
of recognition seem to be either based upon some claim of a subject which it is justiﬁed to make in virtue of having a legitimate claim to some form of recognition. But the fact that some subject has a legitimate claim either is true in virtue of the social status of that subject - then we are back within the optimist model of critique. Or this claim is true independently of social practices: Then we must be committed to some form of moral realism which makes a critique of recognition unnecessary.
bound to some institutionally conditioned self-understanding, constituted by our relations of recognition. (2) Each such self-understanding includes standards of justiﬁcation which can be used to critically evaluate that self-understanding. (3) From within a discursive order, we can employ the resources of this order to determine which of its rules we can reﬂectively endorse according to its own standards. Consequence: We can draw a diﬀerence between normatively justiﬁable and normatively unjustiﬁable rules of recognition according to a standard of reﬂective acceptibility.
It evaluates practices as justiﬁed which are reﬂexively acceptable to their members (“only”) in virtue of the fact that they produce forms of subjectivity that are necessarily unable to criticize the constitutive rules of their subjectivation.
rules R of recognition / subjectivation of a practice P are warranted iﬀ those individuals who count as subjects within P due to their acceptance of its rules R are, according to R, justiﬁed in having an aﬃrmative second-order attitude towards R.
constitutive rules mandate constraints on potentially critical second-order attitudes towards the very same rules / if its constitutive rules limit the scope of aspects in relation to which the justiﬁcation of its constitutive rules can be challenged.
only if individuals can only become recognized as discursive subjects within that practice by accepting limitations upon the scope of their second-order attitudes. Example: Gender as ideology (recognition as a discursive subject depends on acceptance of an understanding of gender norms as natural)
practice of subjectivation is only an apt object for critique if we assume that constraining second-order attitudes of persons violates a claim they have. Most plausible candidate: autonomy. Critique of ideological subjectivation thus presupposes a standpoint of a practice of mutual recognition of persons as entitled to autonomy.