justiﬁcatory basis: “Internal critique”: justiﬁcation of critique by reference to explicitly accepted standards “External critique”: justiﬁcation of critique by reference to acceptance-independent, objective standards Two reasons for overcoming this distinction: It is not exhaustive Both models are normatively unattractive
standards which are internal to social practices but which nevertheless transcend explicitly accepted standards. Three questions: social ontological (what does it mean that there exists a standard “in” a practice?) epistemic (how can we have knowledge about it?) justiﬁcatory (why should anyone care?)
in social reality in virtue of the rationality of a certain structure of human self-understanding. goes beyond mere empirical self-understanding but must make presupposition of process of rationalization strong notion of contradiction
Basic idea: Within our self-understandings, there are normative resources, recoverable through interpretation, which always potentially transcend any given form of that self-understanding Ontology: Meaning implicit in our self-understanding Epistemology: Interpretation Justiﬁcation: Drawing on shared commitment to own self-understanding
force of self-understandings Problem of conservatism: Seemingly no criticism of self-understanding from the outside Problem of presupposition of unity: No place for conﬂicts within self-understandings Problem of progress: How to distinguish better from worse interpretations?
critique as reconstruction of normative contents implicit within a fundamental practice of social integration (communication, recognition) Ontology: Immanence of norms in practices Epistemology: Reconstruction of practical norms (Habermas: formal-pragmatic analysis) Justiﬁcation: Constitutive commitments
of mutual ascriptions of authority. Start from normative reactions in a practice; but each particular reaction has only a default authority, its legitimacy can be defeated by non-acceptance. Towards a recognition model of immanent critique.
in a practice if there is a group of persons, each of whoms stands in relationships of recognition to other persons within that group which entail that she accepts the standard authority of those others over the question whether some token of behaviour exhibited by her counts correct according some presupposed, collectively accepted standard.
practices takes up the implicit standards contained in the recognition-based mutual attribution of standard authority between participants of that practice, in order to evaluate both the actual behaviour and the explicit normative beliefs of those participants. IC is therefore both immanent and transformative.
persons standing in relationships of recognition of a speciﬁc sort. Epistemology: Immanent norms of a community can be discovered through an interpretation of their intersubjective tendencies to evaluate each other’s behaviour Justiﬁcation: Critical demands can refer to the implicit commitments of persons which are instituted in mutual ascriptions of authority
norms but the very form of normativity are ideological. Form of institution of norms presupposed by the recognition model assumes that the recognition of others expresses a capacity for normative self-legislation Background assumption of the capacity of subjects to reﬂexively evaluate the own norms These capacities, however, become questionable if we assume that the capacity to institute norms might itself be a product of relationships of power
mutual recognition between participants in that practice. Within the very structure of institution of such norms, thus, there is an inbuilt commitment of participants that exercises of the authority of participants, on each level, are always potentially subject to further normative evaluations. This entails an implicit commitment to a structure of normativity that allows for critique.
such that it not only covers evaluations of a practice according to its immanent norms, but also evaluations of the structure of normativity through which such norms are instituted according to the claim of all participants in each social practice to accept or reject normative evaluations, we can also provide an immanent critique of subjectivating and ideological practices.