A DevOps State of Mind: Continuous Security with Kubernetes

With the rise of DevOps, containers are at the brink of becoming a pervasive technology in Enterprise IT to accelerate application delivery for the business. When it comes to adopting containers in the enterprise, Security is the highest adoption barrier. In this talk you’ll learn about:

The top container security risks and how to manage theses risks at scale
How to make your Container enabled DevOps workflow more secure without slowing down your CI/CD pipeline
Automating security vulnerability management and compliance checking for container images

Transcript

1. A DEVOPS STATE OF MIND: Continuous Security with Kubernetes Chris Van Tuin Chief Technologist, NA West / Silicon Valley cvantuin@redhat.com
2. THE DISRUPTORS
3. “Only the Paranoid Survive” - Andy Grove, 1998
4. Retail Finance Media Transportation ? ? SOFTWARE DISRUPTS BUSINESS
5. + ≠ TAXI TRANSPORTATION DISRUPTER https://goo.gl/MP7QQH Ack: Andrew Ng APP IT’S NOT JUST A… +
6. Culture of experimentation A B 20% vs. 25% Empowered organization Time Change Rapid Innovation THE DISRUPTORS = AI /
 ML Data-driven intelligence Data, Data, Data
7. WHAT CAN I.T. DO?
8. DEV QA OPS Walled off people, walled off processes, walled off technologies “THROW IT OVER THE WALL”
9. I.T. MUST EVOLVE TO ENABLE THE BUSINESS Development Model Application Architecture Deployment & Packaging Application Infrastructure Storage Waterfall Agile Monolithic N-tier Bare Metal Virtual Servers Data Center Hosted Scale Up Scale Out DevOps MicroServices Containers Hybrid Cloud Storage as a Service
12. DEV QA OPS Open organization + 
 cross-functional teams Software factory automation Linux + Containers IaaS Orchestration CI/CD Source Control Management Collaboration Build and Artifact Management Testing Frameworks Open Source CI/CD pipelines with feedback Culture Process Technology + + BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS WITH DEVOPS
13. WHAT ABOUT SECURITY?
14. DEV QA OPS SECURITY IS AN AFTERTHOUGHT | SECURITY | “Patch? The servers are behind the firewall.” - Anonymous (far too many to name), 2005 - …
15. http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
16. DEVSECOPS End to End Security + + SECURITY DEV QA OPS Linux + Containers IaaS Orchestration CI/CD Source Control Management Collaboration Build and Artifact Management Testing Frameworks Open Source Culture Process Technology
17. CONTAINERS
18. APPLICATION DELIVERY VIA CONTAINERS
19. docker.io Registry Private Registry FROM fedora:latest CMD echo “Hello” Build file Physical, Virtual, Cloud Image Container Build Run Ship CONTAINERS: BUILD, SHIP, RUN
20. CONTAINER SECURITY AT SCALE
21. Scheduling Monitoring Persistence Discovery Lifecycle & health Scaling Aggregation Security MORE THAN CONTAINERS…
22. DEVSECOPS End to End Security + + DEV QA OPS SECURITY
23. 4 • Are there known vulnerabilities in the application layer? • Are the runtime and OS layers up to date? • How frequently will the container be updated and how will I know when it’s updated? CONTENT: EACH LAYER MATTERS CONTAINER OS RUNTIME APPLICATION Are there known vulnerabilities 
 in each application layer? Are the runtime and OS layers 
 up to date? How frequently will the container be updated and how will I know when its updated? IS THE CONTAINER ENVIRONMENT SECURE? Is the image from a trusted source? Can I quickly deploy a security update at scale? Is my multi-tenant host secure?
24. Network isolation Storage API & Platform access Monitoring & Logging Federated clusters Registry Container host {} Builds CI/CD Images SECURING CONTAINERS
25. CONTAINER IMAGE SECURITY
26. 4 • Are there known vulnerabilities in the application layer? • Are the runtime and OS layers up to date? • How frequently will the container be updated and how will I know when it’s updated? CONTENT: EACH LAYER MATTERS CONTAINER OS RUNTIME APPLICATION CONTENT: EACH LAYER MATTERS AYER MATTERS CONTAINER OS RUNTIME APPLICATION JAR CONTAINER
27. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS What’s inside matters…
28. A CONVERGED SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN
29. code config data Kubernetes configmaps secrets Container image Traditional 
 data services, Kubernetes 
 persistent volumes TREAT CONTAINERS AS IMMUTABLE
30. NODE MASTER Container Distributed Store Container ! Secure mechanism for holding sensitive data e.g. ◦ Passwords and credentials ◦ SSH Keys ◦ Certificates ! Secrets are made available as ◦ Environment variables ◦ Volume mounts ◦ Interaction with external systems ! Encrypted in transit ! Never rest on the nodes SECRETS
31. IMAGE SIGNING Validate what images and version are running
32. CONTAINER REGISTRY SECURITY
33. 64% of official images in Docker Hub 
 contain high priority security vulnerabilities examples: ShellShock (bash) Heartbleed (OpenSSL) Poodle (OpenSSL) Source: Over 30% of Official Images in Docker Hub Contain High Priority Security Vulnerabilities, Jayanth Gummaraju, Tarun Desikan, and Yoshio Turner, BanyanOps, May 2015 (http://www.banyanops.com/pdf/BanyanOps-AnalyzingDockerHub-WhitePaper.pdf) WHAT’S INSIDE THE CONTAINER MATTERS
34. PRIVATE REGISTRY
35. CI WITH CONTAINERS
36. CI/CD PIPELINE Continuous Integration Continuous Build Continuous Deployment Developer -> Source -> Git Git -> RPMS -> Images-> Registry Images from 
 Registry -> Clusters
37. CI/CD with Security
38. Security CONTINUOUS INTEGRATION WITH SECURITY SCAN
39. CUSTOM SUPPLY CHAIN
40. FROM fedora:latest CMD echo “Hello” Build file Build Best Practices • Treat as a Blueprint • Don’t login to build/configure • Version control build file • Be explicit with versions, not latest • Each Run creates a new layer BUILDS
41. Compliance and Vulnerability Audits with OpenSCAP
42. AUTOMATED SECURITY SCANNING with OpenSCAP Reports Scan SCAP Security Guide for RHEL CCE-27002-5 Set Password Minimum Length Content Scan physical servers, virtual machines, docker images and containers
 for Security Policy Compliance (CCEs) and known Security Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
43. Standard Docker Host Security Profile Java Runtime Environment (JRE) Upstream Firefox STIG RHEL OSP STIG Red Hat Corporate Profile for Certified Cloud Providers (RH CCP) STIG for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, 7 Server STIG for Red Hat Virtualization Hypervisor Common Profile for General-Purpose Debian Systems Common Profile for General-Purpose Fedora Systems Common Profile for General-Purpose Ubuntu Systems Payment Card Industry – Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) v3 U.S. Government Commercial Cloud Services (C2S) CNSSI 1253 Low/Low/Low Control Baseline for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy Unclassified Information in Non-federal Information Systems and Organizations (NIST 800-171) U.S. Government Configuration Baseline (NIAP OSPP v4.0, USGCB, STIG) Security Policies in SCAP Security Guide (partial)
44. SECURITY POLICY REPORT
45. SECURITY POLICY REMEDIATION
46. SECURITY VULNERABILITY REPORT
47. RAPID INNOVATION & EXPERIMENTATION
48. ”only about 1/3 of ideas improve the metrics 
 they were designed to improve.”
 Ronny Kohavi, Microsoft (Amazon) MICROSERVICES RAPID INNNOVATION & EXPERIMENTATION
49. CONTINUOUS FEEDBACK LOOP
50. A/B TESTING USING CANARY DEPLOYMENTS
51. 50% 50% Version 1.2 Version 1 Route Version 1.2 25% Conversion Rate 30% Conversion Rate CANARY DEPLOYMENTS
52. CD WITH CONTAINERS
53. CONTINUOUS DEPLOYMENT WITH CONTAINERS
54. CD with Security
55. CONTINUOUS DELIVERY DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES • Blue / Green deployment • Rolling updates • Canary deployments • A / B testing
56. Version 1 BLUE / GREEN DEPLOYMENT Route
57. Version 1 BLUE / GREEN DEPLOYMENT Version 1.2
58. Version 1 Tests / CI BLUE / GREEN DEPLOYMENT Version 1.2
59. Version 1 Version 1.2 BLUE / GREEN DEPLOYMENT Route Version 1.2
60. Version 1 BLUE / GREEN DEPLOYMENT Rollback Route Version 1.2
61. Version 1 Version 1 Version 1 Version 1.2 ` Tests / CI ROLLING UPDATES with ZERO DOWNTIME
62. Deploy new version and wait until it’s ready… Version 1 Version 1 V1.2 Health Check: Readiness 
 Probe e.g. tcp, http, script V1
63. Each container/pod is updated one by one Version 1.2 50% Version 1 V1 V1.2
64. Each container/pod is updated one by one Version 1.2 Version 1.2 Version 1.2 100%
65. CONTAINER HOST SECURITY
66. Kernel Hardware (Intel, AMD) or Virtual Machine Containers Containers Containers Unit File Docker Image Container CLI SYSTEMD Cgroups Namespaces SELinux Drivers CONTAINERS ARE LINUX seccomp Read Only mounts
67. CGROUPS - RESOURCE ISOLATION
68. NAMESPACES - PROCESS ISOLATION
69. SELINUX - MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROLS Password Files Web Server Attacker Discretionary Access Controls 
 (file permissions) Mandatory Access Controls 
 (selinux) Internal Network Firewall Rules Password Files Firewall Rules Internal Network Web Server selinux policy
70. SECCOMP - DROPPING PRIVILEGES
71. READ ONLY MOUNTS
72. Best Practices • Don’t run as root • Limit SSH Access • Use namespaces • Define resource quotas • Enable logging • Apply Security Errata • Apply Security Context and seccomp filters http://blog.kubernetes.io/2016/08/security-best-practices-kubernetes-deployment.html CONTAINER HOST SECURITY Kernel Hardware (Intel, AMD) or Virtual Machine Containers Containers Containers Unit File Docker Image Container SYSTEM Cgroup Namespace SELinu Driver seccom Read Only
73. Network isolation Storage API & Platform access Monitoring & Logging Federated clusters Registry Container host {} Builds CI/CD Images SECURING CONTAINERS
74. NETWORK ISOLATION
75. Network Namespace 
 provides resource isolation NETWORK ISOLATION Multi-Environment Multi-Tenant
76. NETWORK POLICY example: 
 all pods in namespace ‘project-a’ allow traffic 
 from any other pods in the same namespace.”
77. STORAGE SECURITY
78. Local Storage Quota Security Context Constraints STORAGE SECURITY
79. API & PLATFORM ACCESS
80. Authentication via OAuth tokens and SSL certificate Authorization via Policy Engine checks User/Group Defined Roles API & PLATFORM ACCESS
81. MONITORING & LOGGING
82. Aggregate platform and application log access via Kibana + Elasticsearch LOGGING
83. Historical CPU and Memory usage provided by Heapster, Hawkular, Cassandra MONITORING
84. FEDERATION
85. Amazon East OpenStack FEDERATED CLUSTERS
86. Google Global Routing Amazon/Google Global API https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iscosahedral_water_cluster_100.png Java App1 Amazon East Java App1 Amazon West Java App1 FEDERATED SERVICES
87. Deployment Frequency Lead Time Deployment
 Failure Rate Mean Time to Recover 99.999 Service Availability DEVSECOPS METRICS Compliance Score
88. THANK YOU linkedin: Chris Van Tuin email: cvantuin@redhat.com twitter: @chrisvantuin