The Internet of Things: We've Got to Chat

Transcript

1. 1.

   The Internet Of Things
 We’ve Got To Chat

2. 2.

   Introduction Mark Stanislav Security Evangelist Zach Lanier Sr. Security Researcher

3. 3.

   The Internet of Things

4. 4.

   About The Internet Of Things “The Internet of Things is

   the network of physical objects that contain embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the external environment.”, Gartner IT Glossary1 “Machine to machine (M2M) refers to technologies that allow both wireless and wired systems to communicate with other devices of the same type.”, Wikipedia2
 IoT Growth Estimates * Gartner: 26 billion units by 20203 * ABI Research: 30 billion units by 20204 4. https://www.abiresearch.com/press/more-than-30-billion-devices-will-wirelessly-conne 3. http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2636073 1. http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/internet-of-things/ 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_Things
5. 5.

   There’s A Shift Underway You Should Know About • The

   IoT growth that we’re all expecting won’t just be from large vendors like Belkin, TRENDnet, Cisco, and Ericsson • Postscapes1 and Wolfram Alpha2 list a few hundred IoT-related companies, most of which you’ve likely never heard of • Crowd-funding web sites are going to produce many of the newest IoT devices we all want to use • Entrepreneurs likely have no experience with information security, nor the budget to afford help • They also won’t know what a “security researcher” is or why you’re contacting them… 1. http://postscapes.com/companies/ 2. http://devices.wolfram.com
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   The Internet of Things “Line of Insanity”TM Sane Reasonable Insane

   Questionable Egg Tray IP Camera Door Lock Door Bell
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   Cheap Hardware, Unlimited Possibilities Electric Imp ($25) Gumstix ($169) Arduino

   ($75) Raspberry Pi ($35) Intel Quark ($?)
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   Plenty Of Choices, How Do You Determine Security? Philips ($60)

   LimitlessLED ($23) INSTEON ($30) Vendors could each use different hardware, software, APIs, third-party service providers, and patching mechanisms
9. 9.

   The Government Is Watching January 8th, 2014 FTC Commissioner Maureen

   Ohlhausen sits on panel at CES about IoT3 November 21st, 2013 Internet of Things - Privacy and Security in a Connected World Workshop2 February 7th, 2014 FTC approves final order settling charges against TRENDnet, Inc.4 June 3rd, 2013 Software & Information Industry Association asks FTC to be careful with IoT1 1. https://www.siia.net/blog/index.php/2013/06/siia-to-ftc-internet-of-things-requires-technology-neutral-policies-and-flexible-privacy-framework/ 3. http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/will-washington-move-quickly-regulate-internet-things-154863 2. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/11/internet-things-privacy-and-security-connected-world 4. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc February 18th, 2014 US CERT works with IOActive to resolve Belkin WeMo vulnerabilities5 5. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/656302
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    A Case Study in IoT Failure - IZON

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    IoT Ecosystem

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    CrowdFunding & IoT Pinoccio Wunderbar KoolThings Twine Knut Tessel Canary

    Piper
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    Challenges Faced

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    What’s Better Than One Vulnerable Device? Interconnected Vulnerable Devices! •

    If-This-Then-That (IFTTT) supports over 80 platforms, services, and devices • Allows for event-based actions across disparate technologies • If the CO2 in this room is unsafe, change my lightbulb to be red to warn me • This behavior will become a consumer expectation rather than merely a “nice to have”
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    Challenges •Hardware security •Software security •Comms/Network security •Platform security •User

    awareness & behavior •Vulnerability handling & disclosure awareness
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    Challenges: Hardware Security • Many devices use generic SoCs/boards •

    Quick development, few security features • i.e. “HW hacking made easy” - serial consoles, FW dumping/ JTAGs, etc. • HW-based trusted execution and HSMs are practically nil • Prevalence/distribution of same components, firmware, etc. means one bug could affect many products • Little expertise required to design, build, and ship an “IoT Product”
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    Challenges: Hardware Security (Cont’d…) + = + Least common denominator:

    Logic analyzer Bus Pirate UART headers Console!
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    Challenges: Software Security • Development environments don’t necessarily make security

    controls/options “clear” • Selected platform may drive/ restrict language choices % grep -Er "\s(mem|str)cpy\(" .
 …
 ./apps/http-post-auth/http-post-auth.c: strcpy(s->message, "status=");
 ./apps/http-post-auth/http-post-auth.c: strcpy(&s->message[7], msg);
 ./apps/irc/irc.c: memcpy(log, &log[LOG_WIDTH], LOG_WIDTH * (LOG_HEIGHT - 1));
 ./apps/irc/irc.c: memcpy(log, &log[LOG_WIDTH], LOG_WIDTH * (LOG_HEIGHT - 1));
 ./apps/ping6/ping6.c: memcpy(command, (void *)"ping6", 5);
 ./apps/rest-coap/coap-common.c: memcpy(
 ./apps/rest-coap/coap-common.c: memcpy((char*)&buffer[index], option->value, option->len);
 ./apps/rest-coap/coap-common.c: memcpy(&buffer[index], packet->payload, packet->payload_len);
 ./apps/rest-coap/coap-server.c: memcpy(option->value, value, len);
 ./apps/rest-common/buffer.c: memcpy(buffer, data, len);
 ./apps/rest-common/buffer.c: strcpy(buffer, text);
 ./apps/rest-common/rest-util.c: memcpy(p + 4 - size, buf, size);
 ./apps/rest-common/rest-util.c: memcpy(buf, ((char*)(&data)) + 4 - size, size);
 ./apps/rest-common/rest.c: memcpy(temp_etag, etag, size);
 ./apps/rest-http/http-server.c: strcpy(current_header->value, value);
 ./apps/rest-http/http-server.c: strcpy(current_header->value, buffer);
 ./apps/rest-http/http-server.c: memcpy(buffer + index, response->payload, response->payload_len); • “Me write Python/Ruby/ Node/… pretty one day” (or worse, C) • History repeating…? Quick grep for potentially dangerous functions in someone’s Contiki project
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    Challenges: Software Security (Cont’d…) • Selected platform often locks dev/

    vendor into given OS choice • Proprietary OSes (such as ElectricImp) - don’t peek inside the black box! • Linux, Contiki, QNX, et. al (all with their own issues) • Little consideration given to least- priv, mitigations, hardening, etc. • Third-party dependencies • Inherited bugs/attack surface Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute. © 2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Bro, do you even PIE? Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute. © 2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Bro, do you even PIE? Bro, do you even randomize?
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    Challenges: Software Security Cont’d • iOS/Android/other mobile apps with their

    own security issues • See also “OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks” • Developer naïveté:
 “HOW COULD/WHY WOULD YOU DO THIS? IT WASN’T SHOWN IN THE MOBILE APP USER INTERFACE!” “Relayr says that developers can have their first Internet of Things App up and running in less than 10 minutes”
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    Challenges: Comms/Network Security • WiFi goofiness (“device as AP”, no

    WPA, exploitable behavior, etc.) • Plaintext protocols or poor crypto at transport layer • …or lack of cert pinning where SSL/TLS actually used • Unprotected FW updates/downloads • Otherwise seemingly unnecessary services listening • Telnet, SSH, FTP, you name it… • Shared accounts/auth material for “support” or updates • Use of technologies such as ZigBee and cellular introduce additional security considerations
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    Example: Sparqee Cell "Cellular made easy"

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    Wat? TRUST US WITH CREDENTIALS TO YOUR CLEARTEXT PROTOCOL SERVERS

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    Example: GoPro WiFi Remote • Remote acts as access point,

    camera acts as mobile station • Remote/AP does not use any security - totally open • Camera scans for HERO-RC- XXXXXX (where XX... are the last three octets of the BSSID/ MAC of the remote) • Prefers known BSSID, but can be configured to “pair” with new remote Proprietary and Confidential. Do Not Distribute. © 2013 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 8484/udp OO se lc lc lc + bitmap se lc lc + bitmap ... sh sh Conversation Scan for "HERO-RC-XXXXXX" HERO-RC-123456 HERO-RC-123456 WiFi RC Fake AP/Evil twin GoPro Camera
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    Example: “Home Automation Gateway” Magical cloud service/site M ZigBee ZigBee

    ZigBee HTTPS HTTPS HTTPS Mobile app Web browser "Gateway" Lights Pool pump Automated cat entertainment toy XSS, CSRF, auth bugs, etc. Key extraction, replay, injection, etc. Unfettered console access, no priv sep for services, same "support" creds on multiple devices Linux-based gateway talks RESTful HTTP to “cloud”-based service, receives commands (schedules, metering data, etc.), relays commands to smart plugs/meters via ZigBee
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    Challenges: Platform* Security • Everything that uses an HTTP GET/POST

    has become an “API” to the average developer • Authentication? Signed requests? Unlikely. • Input manipulation is a less obvious concern when developers do mobile and embedded • Yup… OWASP {Mobile,Web} Top 10 • Leveraging third-party service providers introduce exponential complexities and further increases potential attack surface • Quick & Dirty cloud infrastructure yields poor accessibility and potentially confidentiality * for our purposes “Platform” also includes supporting infrastructure, services, frameworks, etc.
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    Real-World IoT Failures TRENDnet, January 20121 Various IP camera products

    would allow anyone with a generic URL to access the camera’s live feed without requiring authentication Belkin, July 20122 The WeMo Switch allowed for UPnP actions (e.g. power cycle) that didn’t require authentication to be performed to do so Philips, August 20133 The Hue Lighting System utilized the MD5 hash of the MAC address of an authorized system as a “secret token” to control the platform 1. http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2012/01/trendnet-cameras-i-always-feel-like.html 2. http://www.issackelly.com/blog/2012/07/30/wemo-hacking/ 3. http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2013/08/hacking-lightbulbs.html
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    Real-World IoT Failures, cont’d IZON, October 20131 Video clips of

    “alerts” were saved in an AWS S3 bucket unencrypted, with no access control preventing someone from viewing the file [Redacted], December 20132
 API call to purchase in-app credits for service was done without purchase verification and via clear-text HTTP calls Belkin, February 20143 The WeMo Home Automation API allowed XML injection (XXE) allowing for the potential revealing of filesystem contents 1. https://speakerdeck.com/mstanislav/eyes-on-izon-surveilling-ip-camera-security 3. http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2013/08/hacking-lightbulbs.html 2. [Redacted] =)
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    User Awareness & Behavior • Users may not know (let

    alone care) how to update device firmware or apps • Disparity in management: web console v. mobile app v. physical “update” button • Also they just want to use the !@#$ thing now! • Lack of feedback or notification for updates or errors • How does a user know their IoT device was updated or, worse, compromised?
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    Vulnerability Handling & Disclosure Awareness • Small vendors (and some

    big ones) fail to get it, or just simply don’t know • “But, why would anyone want to hack this device? And why would they want to tell us or talk about it publicly?” • Few-to-no resources for small vendors to handle this • Nascency of “IoT” means some researchers may not know either • And we’d like for them to stay out of jail
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    A New Initiative

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    Announcing BuildItSecure.ly Our Mission 
 • Provide resources, guidance, community

    for small IoT developers/builders to make informed security decisions • Incentivize vulnerability research and reporting for these devices ! Our Goal
 Help secure the "Internet of Things” ! This ISN’T…
 • “saving the world” • something that’s happening tomorrow
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    BuildItSecure.ly Phase 1 - Build Out • Establish a core

    team of advisors and content contributors • Curate secure development documents and disclosure guidelines • Build new diagrams, flow charts, info graphics to transfer knowledge • Form relationships with crowd-funding sites, IoT-centric hardware vendors/platform providers, and other relevant organizations Gather Advisors & Contributors Collect/build and share resources Establish relationships w/vendors, funding sites
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    BuildItSecure.ly Phase 2 - Rewards/Incentives • Build a reporting and

    reward/ incentive program • Partnering with Bugcrowd on this • Rewards could include: • Recognition • Monetary reward • Device reward • Schwag!
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    Conclusion

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    Conclusion • Very few green fields in infosec to impact

    early on • IoT at this level is still malleable • Much work to be done, but we can leverage lessons learned in the past • BuildItSecure.ly could help keep IoT from spinning any further out of control • Plus, it’ll be fun!
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    Thanks! Questions? Mark Stanislav mstanislav@duosecurity.com
 @markstanislav
 Zach Lanier zach@duosecurity.com
 @quine

    http://BuildItSecure.ly/ @BuildItSecurely