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IoT/M2M Security
Research presentation for IoT/M2M security
- Paper: Distributed Capability-based Access Control for the Internet of Things
- Security solution in open source IoT platform (OM2M, AllJoyn)
Yu-Hsin Hung
December 31, 2015
Transcript
42 slides
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Outline • Background • Paper: Distributed Capability-based Access Control for
the Internet of Things • Security solution in open source IoT platform • OM2M • AllJoyn • Discussion 2 -
Background • More connected devices mean more attack vectors and
more possibilities for hackers to target us • e.g. Internet-connected cars • Huge data with privacy information recorded by IoT devices • e.g. health data from health tracker 3 -
Distributed Capability-based Access Control for the Internet of Things Jose
́ L. Herna ́ndez-Ramos, Antonio J. Jara, Leandro Mar ́ın, and Antonio F. Skarmeta Department of Information and Communications Engineering Computer Science Faculty University of Murcia, 30100 Murcia, Spain 4 -
Introduction • Previous works • centralized approaches • Access control
mechanism • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) • Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 5 -
Introduction • This work • capability-based access control • principle
of least privilege • greater adaptation • distributed approach • public-key cryptography (optimized ECDSA) 6 -
Access Control architectures for IoT • Centralized approach • central
PDP (Policy Decision Point) is responsible for filtering access requests based on their authorization policies • end-devices play a role limited to as information providers 7 -
Centralized approach • Pros • access control logic is located
in an entity without constraints of resources • SAML, HTTPS for secure transportation; XACML for complex access control policies • modifications in the end-devices are not required • Cons • access control decisions are not based on contextual information related to the end-device itself • end-to-end security is compromised • single point of failure 9 -
Access Control architectures for IoT • Centralized and Contextual approach
• hybrid approach • end devices participate partially in the access control decisions • e-health case: medical emergency 10 -
Centralized and Contextual approach • Pros • use standard technologies
to perform the authorization process • Cons • trust relationship is assumed between the devices and the central entity • delay of contextual information • end-to-end security can not be achieved 12 -
Access Control architectures for IoT • Distributed approach • all
the access control logic is embedded into the end devices 13 -
Distributed approach • Pros • end-devices are no longer passive
entities • devices are able to send information just when necessary • end-to-end security • scalability, interoperability and context-awareness • Cons • RBAC and ABAC may need high computational cost • symmetric-key cryptography does not satisfy the principle of scalability for IoT scenarios 14 -
Design • Capability-based access control (CapBAC) • capability: ”token, ticket,
or key that gives the possessor permission to access an entity or object in a computer system” • tamper-proof and unequivocally identified • send a token together the request • the entity that receives the capability already knows the right level (i.e., permissions) 15 -
Capability token • Identifier (ID) • Issued-time (II) • Issuer
(IS) • Subject (SU) • Device (DE) • Signature (SI) • Access Rights (AR) • Not Before (NB) • Not After (NA) 16 -
Capability token • Identifier (ID) • Issued-time (II) • Issuer
(IS) • Subject (SU) • Device (DE) • Signature (SI) • Access Rights (AR) • Not Before (NB) • Not After (NA) • Access Rights (AR) • Action (AC) • Resource (RE) • Condition flag (F) • 0 for AND, 1 for OR • Conditions (CO) • Condition Type (T) • Condition Value (V) • Condition Unit (U) 16 -
Distributed CapBAC operation • Four steps • Issue Capability Token
• Access Request • Get Authorization Decision • Return Authorization Decision 18 -
Step 1. Issue Capability Token • Issuer issues a token
to Subject • sign the token using ECDSA algorithm 19 -
Step 2. Access Request • Subject generates a CoAP request
• sign the request using ECDSA algorithm • 6LBR only has basic routing functionalities 20 -
Step 3. Get Authorization Decision • Check that the token
is valid: II, NB, NB • Check that the action is granted: AC, RE • Check that the conditions are fulfilled: F, CO • Check that the signature is valid: SI • Check that the user is legitimate: SU 21 -
Step 3. Get Authorization Decision • Check that the token
is valid: II, NB, NB • Check that the action is granted: AC, RE • Check that the conditions are fulfilled: F, CO • Check that the signature is valid: SI • Check that the user is legitimate: SU 22 -
Step 3. Get Authorization Decision • Check that the token
is valid: II, NB, NB • Check that the action is granted: AC, RE • Check that the conditions are fulfilled: F, CO • Check that the signature is valid: SI • Check that the user is legitimate: SU 23 -
Step 3. Get Authorization Decision • Check that the token
is valid: II, NB, NB • Check that the action is granted: AC, RE • Check that the conditions are fulfilled: F, CO • Check that the signature is valid: SI • Check that the user is legitimate: SU Using Issuer’s public key 24 -
Step 3. Get Authorization Decision • Check that the token
is valid: II, NB, NB • Check that the action is granted: AC, RE • Check that the conditions are fulfilled: F, CO • Check that the signature is valid: SI • Check that the user is legitimate: SU Using Subject’s public key 25 -
Step 4. Return Authorization Decision • generate CoAP response •
Unauthorized 4.01 response 26 -
Evaluation • Test bed • JN5139 MCU with Contiki OS
• low power, low cost, suitable for IEEE802.15.4 • 96KB RAM, 192KB ROM • Subject written in Java on a common computer • 6LBR for forwarding the access requests 27 -
Evaluation • Experimental results Stage Time (ms) A, B, C
52.39 D 213.93 E 214.64 Total 480.96 capability token validation CoAP request validation parsing JSON, obtain decision 28 -
Conclusion • CapBAC with distributed approach • scalability • end-to-end
security • optimized ECDSA implementation for constrained devices based on shifting primes • requires the definition of a model for dynamic and context-based management of the conditions in order to reach a real market 29 -
OM2M • Centralized approach • Devices report data to GSCL,
act as passive units • DSCL is not released yet • Basic access control implemented on GSCL/NSCL • End-to-end security is not achieved 31 -
AllJoyn • Qualcomm lead the development, with 200+ partners •
The AllJoyn framework runs on the local network • AllJoyn Apps and AllJoyn Routers • Apps can only communicate with other Apps by going through a Router 32 -
Summary • ACL model • distributed, end-to-end security • policies
stored on device end, decisions are made locally 38 -
Discussion • [paper] access rights on token • flexible but
difficult to manage • private key leakage • [AllJoyn] access rights on device • limitation on constrained device • easy to manage • [OM2M] access rights on GSCL/NSCL • centralized approach 39 -
Reference • Why IoT Security Is So Critical, TechCrunch •
Distributed Capability-based Access Control for the Internet of Things [2013] • A decentralized approach for Security and Privacy challenges in the Internet of Things [2014] • OM2M, http://www.eclipse.org/om2m/ • AllJoyn, https://allseenalliance.org/