Hide Yo' Kids: Hacking Your Family's Connected Things

This presentation will cover security research on Internet-connected devices targeting usage by, or for, children. Mark will discuss the vulnerabilities he found during this research, including account takeovers, device hijacking, backdoor credentials, unauthorized file downloading, and dangerously out-of-date protocols & software. Devices discussed will include Internet-connected baby monitors, a GPS-enabled platform to track children, and even a Wi-Fi & Bluetooth-connected stuffed animal.

Details about mobile reverse engineering, hardware hacking, network traffic analysis, and other research techniques will be presented to help others learn about methods to perform their own research.

Transcript

1. Hide Yo’ Kids
 Hacking Your Family's Connected Things Mark Stanislav - Manager, Security Advisory Services
2. OR… HOW IOT IS JUST A LOT OF INSECURE WEB SERVICES
3. A Mess of Dependencies and Attack Surface • Many IoT devices leverage third-party services, firmware, and software • Some vendors put a lot of trust in their supply chain without testing security • Implementation errors or failure to comply with best practices also occurs
 • Complex ecosystems means that there are plenty of ways to screw up: • Mobile applications, cloud services, backend services, web applications, firmware, hardware, network protocols, wireless protocols, & cryptography • It’s difficult for a single IoT vendor to be proficient in security across all of it
 • The frameworks, protocols, and design patterns of IoT are still very much in flux
4. SO, HOW DO WE HACK THESE THINGS?
5. Via Dumping Firmware Pomona SOIC Clip + Bus Pirate flashrom to Dump Flash binwalk to Extract Filesystems
6. Hash Cracking with cudaHashcat Scouring Google for Useful Details Via Brute Force of Various Means
7. JTagulator
 (or Bus Pirate, Shikra, etc.) U-Boot Configuration UART Scan & Connect Via Serial Console (UART)
8. Via JTAG (e.g. Dumping Memory via GDB)
9. Acquire Firmware with dex2jar + JD-GUI for Android View API Calls with mitmproxy (esp. SSL/TLS) Find API End-Points with Clutch + strings for iOS Via Mobile Applications
10. View Protocol Details with wireshark Uncover Network Services with nmap Via Network Analysis
11. XSS on Camera Cloud Web Service Hidden Administrative Web Interface Via Web Applications
12. THE BABY MONITORS
13. Thanks for nothing, CSI:Cyber
14. A Variety of Vendors, Styles, Costs, & Features Vendor Model Price Amazon
 Rank* / Stars Two-Way Audio Pan Tilt Zoom Wi-Fi Ethernet Gynoii GCW-1010 $89.34 #56 / 3.8 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ iBaby M3S $169.95 #243 / 3.4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ iBaby M6 $199.95 #31 / 3.7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ Lens LL-BC01W $54.99 #149 / 2.8 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ Philips B120/37 $77.54 #N/A / 2.2 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ Summer 28630 $199.99 #64 / 3.1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC $69.99 #N/A / 3.5 ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ WiFiBaby WFB2015 $259.99 #156 / 3.2 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ Withings WBP01 $204.60 #101 / 2.9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ * Amazon Ranking Based on Category “Baby > Safety > Monitors”, Which Includes Non-IoT Baby Monitors
15. Withings WBP01 - $204.60
16. Disabled Doesn’t Quite Mean What it Used To After a stream exists, “disabling” it via the app doesn’t actually stop it… 20 Minutes Later…
 The Stream Still Works!
17. When Obfuscation Goes Wrong, or, Not at All? At first, this looks like a really poor attempt at an obfuscation method to “hide” the password for this web service account.
 
 On further review, however, the mchunk method simply returns at the start of the for loop, yielding the output from the input to be a concatenation of “ff” and the integer passed as a parameter.
 
 Was this obfuscation intended to be enabled? Did someone give up on their dream of confusing reverse engineers? The world may never know…
18. WiFi Baby WFB2015 - $259.99
19. UPnP RCE Bugs, CVE-2012-5958 & CVE-2012-5959 UPnP Bugs: Alive and Well in Baby Monitoring
20. Lens Peek-A-View (LL-BC01W) - $54.99
21. If You Needed Some Free Cloud Storage An FTP Account Per Camera, Apparently Used for Configuration Backups 


 [redacted]
22. Backdoor Credentials Galore Hidden Web Interface Credentials Cracking the Linux ‘admin’ Password This account has functional ‘root’ privilege due to ugly permissions The Live Stream Passes Credentials in URL over HTTP
23. Gynoii GCW-1010 - $89.34
24. Unencrypted Web Services - Local and Cloud Local Administrative API Calls Vendor Cloud API Calls Hidden Device Web Interface Third-Party Streaming Service None of these services or APIs use any encryption and often pass sensitive credentials and keys
25. TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC - $69.99
26. 2-for-1 — Unencrypted Web Service + XSS Either MITM a User or Just BYOJS to their DOM:) [redacted]
27. Telnet Available, Just Not Default A Remote Shell Waiting to Happen… Pro Tip: Remove Remote Access Services, Don’t Just Disable Them! Username: root Password: admin
28. iBaby M3S - $169.95
29. Uncovering Backdoor Linux Accounts & Access An nmap Scan Reveals Telnet :) Password is “Protected” by UNIX Crypt Username: admin Password: admin * FYI, there is no ‘root’ on here, only ‘admin’
30. iBaby M3S - A Historical Look at Software? ✦ U-Boot: 1.1.3, released August 14th, 2005 ✦ OpenSSL: 0.9.8e, released February 23rd, 2007 ✦ Linux Kernel: 2.6.21, released April 26th, 2007 ✦ BusyBox: 1.12.1, released September 28th, 2008
 ✦ UNIX Crypt: First appeared in 1979, limited to 8-character passwords ✦ Telnet: Developed in 1968 — SSH-1 came out in 1995…
31. Encryption! Just Not Great Choices For it :) Stream Encryption… with XXTEA? Encrypted Backups… with a Hardcoded Password?
32. iBaby M6 - $199.95
33. Cryptography? Naw, They Are Just Babies… Unencrypted Web Service Login Telnet & Unencrypted HTTP on Device Unencrypted Mobile API Calls
34. This is the iBaby Cloud Web Site Today… Login for Camera Owners …and What is Now Returned on Login…
35. But a Few Months Ago, Direct Object Reference! <—Proper Account “Attacker” Account—> No Authorization/Privilege Given to Our “Attacker” Account
36. Full Access to All Audio & Motion Alert Videos View Source -> Find AVI Filename -> Access Static CloudFront URL “Attacker” Account—> Don’t let the broken images fool you… there’s live data ready to be viewed! [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
37. Unauthenticated Access to Unencrypted Videos Example AVI Thumbnail File Video Downloads via Amazon CloudFront ✦ URLs are not requested via HTTPS ✦ No IAM credentials or signed URLs Mobile API Call for Alert Video Retrieval [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
38. Philips In.Sight B120/37
39. Everything Old is New Again… My IZON Research - 2013 My InSight Research - 2015 The question is… Did security issues fixed by one camera manufacturer ever trickle into devices also leveraging the same firmware?
40. Shout out to Paul Price for his research into the In.Sight M100 which shares a few issues from my old Stem Innovation IZON research and subsequent research into the In.Sight B120. Check out his site detailing this and other research at ifc0nfig.com! A Quick Look at “Old” Security Issues Still There No SSL on Backend Web Service Telnet Enabled by Default (Until Recently) Multiple Hardcoded Linux Accounts Insecure Firmware Upgrade Process
41. A Few Newer Issues. But Wait, There’s More! :) Multiple XSS on Web Service Portal Backdoor Telnet Enablement Script Predictable ‘admin’ Web Service Password Username: root Password: b120root
42. Unauthenticated Administrative Camera Access Camera Home Network Internet User Web Service
 HTTP/80 Clear Text Clear Text Clear Text HTTP Reverse Proxy When a remote end user requests their camera’s stream, an HTTP reverse proxy is opened on a public host & port number, directly to the camera’s backend web service, allowing for a remote attacker to achieve the following: ✦ Unauthenticated and unencrypted video/audio stream access to the user’s camera ✦ Full administrative access to the camera’s powerful backend web service ✦ This includes manipulating camera configuration or even re-enabling Telnet
43. Finding Exposed Cameras on the Internet The reverse proxy is setup by the stream provider, Yoics, and has a finite number of enumerable hostnames, each with about ~30,000 possible ports that may be utilized.
 
 While this may seem like a lot, an attacker could test this entire range every minute to look for exposed cameras with a simple script or perhaps something powerful like zmap. Unencrypted, Unauthenticated Remote Camera Access Now “Friends” Can Remotely Enable Telnet For You! :) Take David Adrian’s Word For It :)
44. Baby Monitors — Now With 100% More Track Suit …Because Car Hacking…
45. Summer Infant Baby Zoom (28630) - $199.99
46. Oh, Be Sure to Change Your Password… Default New User Passwords == Last name (truncated to 8 characters) + Group ID
 
 This is not required to be changed on first login and could be enumerated if someone
 knows that you have this device — simply iterate over group ID integers!
47. Adding a Privileged User to Any & All Cameras Before… After! This HTTP call could be ran against all possible IDs
48. Coordinated Disclosure Timeline Initial Vendor Disclosure
 July 4th, 2015 — Because America! CERT Disclosure
 July 21st, 2015 — 17 Days After Vendor Disclosure Public Disclosure
 September 2nd, 2015 — 60 Days After Vendor Disclosure
49. A Modest Baby Monitor Security Checklist Vendor Model Local API 
 HTTP SSL Cloud API HTTP SSL No Remote Shell No Hidden Accounts No Known Vulns No UART Access All Streams Encrypted Gynoii GCW-1010 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ iBaby M3S N/A ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ iBaby M6 ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ Lens LL-BC01W ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ Philips B120/37 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ Summer 28630 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ WiFiBaby WFB2015 ✗ N/A ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ Withings WBP01 N/A ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
50. Scoring Baby Monitors for Overall Security Security Concern Description of Concern Penalty for Missing Local API HTTP SSL All local web service/API calls should be encrypted, regardless of being on a LAN. -20 Points Cloud API HTTP SSL All Internet-facing web service/API calls should be encrypted, including registration. -30 Points No Remote Shell The presence of a remote shell (e.g. Telnet, SSH) create additional attack surface. -50 Points No Hidden Accounts All accounts, whether web services or shell access should be known to customers. -30 Points No Known Vulns All portions of the camera’s supply chain should be free of serious vulnerabilities. -75 Points No UART Access Devices should disable direct serial access and definitely not drop to a root shell. -10 Points All Streams Encrypted All video/audio streams, whether live or recorded, should be encrypted end-to-end. -35 Points All Cameras Start With 250 Points and Receive Deductions
51. Baby Monitor by Security Score & Grade Vendor Model Price Amazon
 Rank / Stars Score Grade* Gynoii GCW-1010 $89.34 #56 / 3.8 75 F iBaby M3S $169.95 #243 / 3.4 160 D iBaby M6 $199.95 #31 / 3.7 0 F Lens LL-BC01W $54.99 #149 / 2.8 125 F Philips B120/37 $77.54 #N/A / 2.2 30 F Summer 28630 $199.99 #64 / 3.1 100 F TRENDnet TV-IP743SIC $69.99 #N/A / 3.5 50 F WiFiBaby WFB2015 $259.99 #156 / 3.2 80 F Withings WBP01 $204.60 #101 / 2.9 95 F * Grading Scale Based on Points:
 F: < 150 (<60%) ; D: 150 - 174 (60-69%) ; C: 175 - 199 (70-79%) ; B: 200 - 224 (80-89%) ; A: 225 - 250 (90-100%) Baby is Unsatisfied
52. CONNECTED CHILDREN
53. Fisher-Price Smart Toy® - $85
54. Smart Toy® - Features and Function ✦ An Android-based connected stuffed animal that features Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, a (poor) camera, and two-way audio functionality ✦ Allows for interaction between a child and the stuffed animal to play games of both educational and entertainment focuses ✦ Features a mobile application for parents that includes setting up a profile for the child and controlling the actions of the device
55. Getting Inside the Device… Not So Carefully
56. Android Meets IoT, 1 of 2 USB for Charging USB for Shenanigans Running Android!
57. Android Meets IoT, 2 of 2 File Transfer Filesystem via adb pull “I Have a Shell” Commands
58. API = Always Poorly Implemented API Call Capabilities /api/parent-toy-interface/getToys?customerId=%s Retrieve any chosen customer’s toy details, e.g. profileID, toyID, toyName, toyType /api/customer-get-profiles Retrieve any chosen child’s profile details, e.g. birthday, name, gender & deviceID /api/get-parent-online-status?deviceID= Determine if any chosen toy’s owner (parent) is actively using the mobile application /api/get-toy-online-status?token=%s&deviceID=%s Determine if any chosen toy is currently connected & active /api/customer-edit-profile Alter any chosen child’s birthday, name, and gender /api/parent-toy-interface/updateToys Alter any chosen toy’s assignment to any chosen child’s profile (i.e. hijack the toy) /api/customer-create-profile Create a custom profile that is associated to any chosen customer account /api/customer-delete-profile Delete a profile that is associated to any chosen customer account Important API Calls Found to Be Vulnerable ✦ 12 mobile-API calls were determined to not properly authorize that the requesting session was appropriate to create, read, update, and/or delete aspects of customer accounts, profiles, and toys ✦ Outcome? Information leaks, toy hijacking, and account alteration
59. What’s the Actual Result of This? ✦ Steal every child’s profile data, which includes their name, date of birth, gender, spoken language, and associated toys ✦ Hijack every child’s toy and make the toy perform built-in activities on demand, without the parent or child’s consent ✦ Create, alter, or delete profiles under a customer’s account, which associates to toys and will appear in the mobile app ✦ Leak information about the current activity of the child and/or parent through status indicators provided via the device & app
60. Altering a Profile’s Details via the Mobile API Mostly Harmless, But Really Disconcerting to a Parent
61. Coordinated Disclosure Timeline Initial Vendor Disclosure
 November 23rd, 2015 CERT Disclosure
 December 8th, 2015 — 15 Days After Vendor Disclosure Public Disclosure
 February 2nd, 2016 — 71 Days After Vendor Disclosure
62. hereO - $179 (Watch) / $0 (Mobile App)
63. hereO - Features and Function ✦ Both a mobile application and ‘smart watch’ (made for children) tie into a platform allowing for GPS tracking of family members ✦ Features geo-fencing with alerts + full location history ✦ Provides a text message function + ‘panic alarm’ mode ✦ Funded through Indiegogo ($215k) + outside investment ($2M) ✦ The mobile app has been in the iOS store since March, 2014 ✦ Beta versions of the smart watch have been reported in use ✦ I didn’t have one, so, the mobile app was my entire world :)
64. Thinking Like a Developer… for Bad Things Sending My User’s Session and ID? Red flag! User Account Creation <- My User ID User Session Creation <- My Session <- My User ID <- My Session Inviting a New User to my ‘Family’ via the API <- My User ID
65. What’s Wrong, Exactly? ✦ It’s at least weird that an API request with a user’s session (token) would also send that user’s ID — it’s pretty redundant ✦ If we have a session, the backend already knows the user ID ✦ Often when a request is sent with redundant information, it may mean that the developer is trusting a user-specified parameter that should otherwise be determined by the authorized session ✦ May be a simple developer mistake of using user-controlled data (e.g. $post.userId) versus service-controlled (e.g. $session.userId)
66. Understanding the Attack Workflow
67. Email, Email, What-What, the Email The Attacker is Invited by Pawn Pawn is Told the Attacker Accepted Target is Told Attacker was Added Worried about that last email? We control the user’s name….
 “THIS IS A SYSTEM TEST, PLEASE IGNORE, joined your family as a friend” :)
68. Seeing is Believing… Before Attack Now Tracking After Attack <-Attacker Only <-Target, Too! Pawn Sends a UserInvite Request Attacker Accepts the Pawn’s Invitation Attack Executed Against The Target’s Account Owned. The Attacker is now part of the Target’s “family” with full privileges!
69. Coordinated Disclosure Timeline Initial Vendor Disclosure
 October 24th, 2015 CERT Disclosure
 November 23rd, 2015 — 30 Days After Vendor Disclosure Public Disclosure
 February 2nd, 2016 — 101 Days After Vendor Disclosure
70. Not All Hope is Lost, However :) BuildItSecure.ly: Initiative targeted at sharing technical resources with IoT engineering teams and pairing IoT vendors with pro-bono security researchers. OWASP IoT Top 10: Provides vendors a list of the top 10 areas of IoT security that should be focused on during development to ensure a secure ecosystem. Online Trust Alliance: Currently devising the IoT Trust Framework, aimed at providing vendors with clear guidance around IoT privacy and security needs.
 Google Projects: Brillo is a hardened, stripped-down version of Android for IoT, while secure Weave is a secure solution for inter-device communication.
71. …AND REMEMBER…
72. Thanks! Questions? Mark Stanislav mstanislav@rapid7.com @markstanislav