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"Hacking Internet of Things devices", Ivan Novikov

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December 04, 2017

"Hacking Internet of Things devices", Ivan Novikov

OWASP Russia Meetup #2

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OWASP Moscow

December 04, 2017
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  1. Internet of Things. Story #1 • Take any device •

    Find serial port (buttons + display) • Connect “WiFi to serial” module • Profit • What about this connecter cost? • What about this device cost?
  2. Internet of Things. Story #2 • Take your exists device

    (wifi router) • Make /dev/something with magic • Profit • What about this device cost?
  3. AP at IoT device to configure • Encryption and credentials

    (defaults) • Make sure that configuration interface disabled after initial setup How to connect IoT to your WiFi
  4. Magic way (have a special name): • Enter your WiFi

    SSID and password to app • Press ENTER • Profit • How it works? How to connect IoT to your WiFi
  5. SSID+password encoding to $SP Find a network with this SSID

    = $SP Catch broadcast packet Decode $SP to SSID and password Profit Connection magic
  6. Hardcoded IP address Using as NTP service Firewalls legitimates Count

    devices remotely Memory corruption vulnerability in response parsing function? Backdoor stories $ strings IoT-6235571.bin | egrep '[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' 208.67.222.222 10.10.100.254 10.10.100.100 255.255.255.0 http://10.10.100.100/ 10.10.10.3 =DHCP,0.0.0.0,0.0.0.0,0.0.0.0 61.ZZZ.YYY.XXX netname: SHANGHAI-JIAOTONG-UNIVERSITY country: CN descr: Shanghai Jiaotong University mnt-by: MAINT-CN-CHINANET-ZJ-HZ role: CHINANET-ZJ Hangzhou address: No.352 Tiyuchang Road,Hangzhou,Zhejiang.310003 country: CN person: Zhihao Zhou nic-hdl: ZZ1073-AP
  7. 5/5 devices hacked (3 vendors) 3/5 backdoors found (2 vendors)

    0/5 physical damage through IoT device Our stats
  8. External from Internet (CSRF+) WiFi guest (server-side) Neighbor (WiFi w/o

    password) Vendor (backdoors) Retailer (firmware modifications after manufacturing) Attackers