after UA173 in 1978 • Trained to use all available resources to improve safety • 1900s and 2000s • CRM rolled out to emerging markets • Fly-by-wire • Better data, warning systems, and training
No mechanical connection between controls and flight surfaces Photo by Chandler Cruttenden on Unsplash • Computer acts as middleman for pilot’s instructions • Computer-interpreted instructions delivered “by wire”
to fullest extent • Normal, Alternate and Direct Law • Pilot can’t choose the law • Computer-centric approach • Boeing • Pilot-centric approach • Mix of fly-by-wire (777,787) and mechanical controls (737)
airspeed • Autopilot disconnects, Captain absent • Abundance of alerts about consequence rather than origin of the problem • Failed to diagnose the situation and apply appropriate checklist
• The human element increases as a technology matures Weigh extra safety against the cognitive load put on users Shift from making technology better to understanding users better Start thinking of yourself as a user of the systems you build • We have significant shortcomings Simply because we are human. Work with it, not against it! But it’s the way we approach these problems that matters • Rapid adoption = problems • More redundancy is not always better