Safety first

Best practices in app security presentation held at the 360AnDev conference in Denver, CO

Transcript

1. Safety first Best practices in app security ANA BAOTIĆ TECHNICAL MANAGER, MOBILE BANKING @ INFINUM
 @ABAOTIC
2. We're an independent design & development agency.
4. HOW TO INCREASE SECURITY
5. BUILD INTEGRITY
6. ADD A RELEASE KEYSTORE TO YOUR PROJECT
7. KEYSTORE Can be used for ALL build types You should NEVER lose it No one should EVER acquire it
8. KEEP IT SECRET, KEEP IT SAFE
9. signingConfigs { release { storeFile file("myapp.keystore") storePassword "password123" keyAlias "keyAlias" keyPassword "password789" } } DO NOT!
10. ONE ALTERNATIVE local.properties KEYSTORE_PASSWORD=password123 KEY_PASSWORD=password789
11. try { storeFile file("myapp.keystore") storePassword KEYSTORE_PASSWORD keyAlias "keyAlias" keyPassword KEY_PASSWORD } catch (ex) { throw new InvalidUserDataException(“…”) }
12. ENABLE OBFUSCATION
13. release { 
 minifyEnabled true proguardFiles getDefaultProguardFile( 'proguard-android.txt'), ‘proguard-rules.txt' 
 signingConfig signingConfigs.release
 } PROGUARD
14. DOWNSIDES Disliked*
 Builds fail Staging vs Production
15. OTHER OPTIONS DexGuard DexProtector
17. public abstract class e {
 private int a = -1;
 private String b = null;
 protected boolean k = false;
 
 public abstract void a(Intent var1);
 
 protected final void a(String var1) {
 this.b = var1;
 }
 public final void c() {
 this.a = -1;
 this.b = null;
 }
 public final boolean d() {
 return this.k;
 }
 }
18. WILL THIS KEEP THE APK SAFE?
20. ADD TAMPERING DETECTION
21. Verify signing certificate at runtime Verify the installer context.getPackageManager() .getInstallerPackageName(context.getPackageName()) .startsWith("com.android.vending") Check if app is debuggable (or run on emulator)
22. DATA PRIVACY
23. MY PRECIOUS
24. WAYS TO STORE (AND RETRIEVE) DATA Internal storage External storage Content providers*
25. INTERNAL STORAGE Is (generally) sufficiently safe Private to your app
26. SHARED PREFERENCES Useful for primitive key-value based data
27. EXTERNAL STORAGE Globally readable and writable
28. CONTENT PROVIDERS Structured storage mechanism Can be exported (accessed by other apps)
29. <provider android:name="com.example.android.datasync.provider.StubProvider" android:authorities="com.example.android.datasync.provider" android:exported=“false"/> android:protectionLevel="signature"
30. private readable safe Internal storage yes yes yes External storage no yes no Content providers depends yes yes Shared prefs. yes yes yes
31. SO EVERYTHING IS FINE?
32. NOPE.
34. USE LIBRARIES Bouncy Castle Spongy Castle Keyczar AeroGear Crypto Conceal
35. ENCRYPT USING A PIN/PASSWORD
36. BCRYPT Slow
 Key derivation function
 Cost of hash function → work factor
37. CAN DATA REMAIN PRIVATE?
38. Rooting your device allows access Not encrypting allows (mis)use
39. NETWORK SECURITY
41. HTTP
42. HTTPS
43. MAN IN THE MIDDLE
45. CERTIFICATE PINNING Defines which CAs are trusted Reduces effectiveness of the attack
46. okhttpbuilder
 .pinClientCertificate(resources, R.raw.client_cert, "pass".toCharArray(), “PKCS12”) .pinServerCertificates(resources, 
 R.raw.server_cert, "pass".toCharArray(), "BKS")
 .build(); return new OkClient(client);

47. WHAT IF (WHEN) THE CERTIFICATES CHANGE?
48. INFORM YOUR USERS Implement a mechanism for notifying users (GCM) and forcing updates
49. PLAN AHEAD Check server security’s impact on devices https://www.ssllabs.com/
51. USE THE PLATFORM TO YOUR ADVANTAGE
52. android:usesCleartextTraffic="false" ANDROID M StrictMode.setVmPolicy( new StrictMode.VmPolicy.Builder() .detectCleartextNetwork() .penaltyLog().build());
53. FINGERPRINTS
54. APP LINKING HTTPS://DOMAIN[:OPT_PORT]/.WELL-KNOWN/ASSETLINKS.JSON [{ "relation": ["delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"], "target": { "namespace": "android_app", "package_name": "com.example", "sha256_cert_fingerprints": ["14:6D:E9:...44:E5"] } }]
55. ANDROID N Network Security Configuration feature
56. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <manifest ... > <application android:networkSecurityConfig=" @xml/network_security_config" ... > ... </application> </manifest> ADD A SECURITY CONFIG FILE
57. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <network-security-config>
 <domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false"> <domain includeSubdomains="true">example.com</domain> 
 <trust-anchors> <certificates src="@raw/my_ca"/> </trust-anchors> <pin-set expiration="2018-01-01"> <pin digest="SHA-256">7HIpa...BCoQYcRhJ3Y=</pin> <!-- backup pin --> <pin digest="SHA-256">fwza0...gO/04cDM1oE=</pin> </pin-set> </domain-config> </network-security-config> CONFIGURE IT
58. INCLUDE YOUR CLIENTS IN THE PROCESS Keep them up-to-date Help them understand risks and advise them Insist on updates and security patches
59. THINGS TO REMEMBER Use internal storage if applicable Encrypt data Use HTTPS Pin certificates Be aware of the update cycle
60. ANDROID IS NOT SECURE
61. BUT YOU CAN MAKE IT LESS EASY TO ABUSE
62. REFERENCES • Gradle configuration • http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/data/data- storage.html#db • https://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/ • http://www.developereconomics.com/android- cryptography-tools-for-beginners/ • https://www.airpair.com/android/posts/adding- tampering-detection-to-your-android-app
63. REFERENCES • https://www.ssllabs.com/ • http://developer.android.com/preview/features/security- config.html • https://www.ionic.com/mitm-attacks-ssl-pinning-what- is-it-and-why-you-should-care/
64. REFERENCES • Android fingeprint security • Infinum security articles • Infinum Android newsletter • Keeping secrets in a Vault
65. Thank you! Visit www.infinum.co or find us on social networks: infinum.co infinumco infinumco infinum ANA@INFINUM.CO @ABAOTIC