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La sécurité dans l'IoT : difficultés, failles et contre-mesures @Breizhcamp2018

La sécurité dans l'IoT : difficultés, failles et contre-mesures @Breizhcamp2018

Avec la multiplication des objets connectés dans notre quotidien, la sécurité de ces appareils électroniques, qui a été souvent négligée par le passé, devient une réelle problématique. Leur faible coût de conception, la négligence des fabricants ou même la notre, nous développeurs, en font des proies faciles pour les hackers.
Ce phénomène se constate bien dans l'actualité, où l'on parle de plus en plus d'attaques à grande échelles visant des cameras ou frigos connectés, mais également les serrures Bluetooth.
Au cours de ce talk nous verrons en détails le principe des dernières attaques qui ont fait la une. Nous parlerons ensuite des failles touchant les IoTs les plus courantes (le top 10 OWASP IoT), les solutions et contre-mesures.
Nous parlerons notamment des attaques par canaux auxiliaires pour lesquelles peu de solutions existent et qui donnent toujours du fil à retordre aux chercheurs.
Enfin, nous terminerons par une petite démo d’attaque de type Man-in-the-midle (MiTM) sur un objet Bluetooth

Alexis DUQUE

March 29, 2018
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  1. La sécurité dans l'IoT : difficultés,
    failles et contre-mesures
    Breizhcamp 2018
    Alexis DUQUE, Rtone

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  2. ALEXIS DUQUE
    ★ Embedded Software engineer & R&D leader at Rtone
    ★ PhD Student at CITI Lab, INSA de Lyon
    ★ @alexis0duque
    ★ alexisduque
    [email protected]
    ★ alexisduque.me
    ★ https://goo.gl/oNUWu6
    About Me
    2

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  3. ★ THE INTERNET OF THINGS
    ★ NEWS
    ★ VULNERABILITIES & OWASP TOP 10
    ★ BLUETOOTH LE (UN)SECURITY
    ★ DEMO: BLUETOOTH LE (UN)SECURITY
    ★ SIDE CHANNELS ATTACKS
    ★ COUNTERMEASURES
    Summary
    3

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  4. The Internet Of Things

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  5. IOT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?
    ★ [ WIKIPEDIA ] The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects or "things"
    embedded with electronics, software, sensors and connectivity to enable it to achieve
    greater value and service by exchanging data with the manufacturer, operator and/or
    other connected devices.
    ★ [ OXFORD ] A proposed development of the Internet in which everyday objects have
    network connectivity, allowing them to send and receive data.
    The Internet Of Things
    5

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  6. IOT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?
    ★ “20 billions interconnected devices by the year 2020” Gartner
    ★ IoT applications include domestic and industrial scenarios (M2M)
    The Internet Of Things
    6

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  7. SECURITY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?
    Availability
    ★ Authentication mechanism working properly
    ★ Data available on request
    Integrity
    ★ Data have not been altered
    ★ Data from a trusted device
    ★ Each device have its own identity that cannot be stolen
    ★ Unique integrity code for each message
    Confidentiality
    ★ Data are encrypted
    ★ Unauthorized party cannot have access to data
    The Internet Of Things
    7

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  8. IOT+SECURITY SPECIFIC PROPERTIES
    ★ Uncontrolled Environment
    ○ Many things travel to untrustworthy surroundings, possibly without supervision
    ★ Heterogeneity
    ○ IoT is expected to integrate a multitude of things from various manufacturer
    ★ Users and Manufacturers not aware of security risks
    ★ Surface of attacks: Hardware + Software
    ★ Scalability
    ○ The vast amount of interconnected things in the IoT demands highly scalable
    protocols
    ★ Constrained Resources
    ○ Things in the IoT will have constraints that need to be considered for security
    mechanisms
    The Internet Of Things
    8

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  9. IOT SECURITY HAPPENS ON 4 DIFFERENT LEVELS
    Device, Communications, Cloud and Lifecycle Management
    The Internet Of Things
    9

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  10. FIRMWARE UPDATES
    ★ Need to be able to update firmware
    ○ Most users don’t bother to update!
    ★ Automatic updates?
    ○ Depends on device
    ★ Needs to be tested on all hardware variants
    ○ LockState bricked some of their locks (recommended by AirBnB) with a firmware
    update
    ★ Download path needs to be secure
    ○ Out of date CA bundles, certificate loss, e.g. Logitech Harmony Link
    ★ Update path needs to be secure
    ○ Supply-side attacks becoming more common – e.g. CCleaner, MeDoc, Mint,
    Transmission
    The Internet Of Things
    10

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  11. IOT+SECURITY CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
    ★ Objects are small and everywhere and connected
    ○ Prone to environmental influences
    ○ Unprotected places (unnoticed manipulation)
    ○ Weak calculation and memory (limited for crypto)
    ★ They are autonomous
    ○ Acting without user awareness or control
    ★ Cyber attacks have real world consequences
    ○ IoT devices may control the physical world
    ○ E.g. vulnerable computer systems in car
    The Internet Of Things
    11

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  12. An Breton Attacker Dream !
    12

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  13. IOT PRIVACY CONCERNS
    ★ Data explosion!
    ★ An object can reveal information about individual
    ○ The information is often highly personal
    ★ IoT introduces new ways of collecting and processing such information from objects
    ○ Collection of data from different sources
    ○ Correlation and association
    ○ Abuse potential higher than ever
    ★ Automated/distributed decision about information
    The Internet Of Things
    13

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  14. IOT PRIVACY CHALLENGES
    ★ How to obtain informed consent?
    ★ How can individuals have overall control over data?
    ★ Who is responsible? How can rights be exercised?
    ★ How data can be safeguarded?
    ★ How do you detect attacks, damages, information leaks?
    The Internet Of Things
    14

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  15. 5 TYPES OF IOT ATTACKERS
    The Internet Of Things
    15

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  16. 16
    The Internet Of Things

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  17. ATTACK SURFACE AREA
    ★ Around 20 attack surface areas on the OWASP IoT Project
    ★ E.g. web Interfaces, physical interfaces, firmware, network, cloud, mobile, API, etc
    ★ Each attack surface has multiple potential vulnerabilities
    ★ Firmware packages use old and/or unsupported versions of 3rd party components
    ★ Ubiquiti network gear hijacked due to 20-year old PHP build
    ★ Many of the vulnerabilities discovered are years or decades old!!!
    The Internet Of Things
    17

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  18. SOUS-TITRE
    Est ut paucos caritas autem.
    News
    18

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  19. MIRAI BOTNET
    Not really new but ...
    ★ Over 200,000 devices in original botnet
    ★ 623 Gbps attack on Krebs
    ★ 1 Tbps attack on Dyn
    ★ Source code released
    ★ Default credentials
    Also Reaper (2016), Hajime, Okiru, ...
    News
    20

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  20. OTHERS BOTNETS
    Reaper (2016)
    ★ Based in part on Mirai
    ★ Includes 9 attacks affecting routers from D-Link, Netgear, and Linksys
    ★ As well as internet-connected surveillance cameras, including those sold by companies
    like Vacron, GoAhead, and AVTech
    ★ Anywhere between 10,000-20,000 and a million devices
    ★ Has not yet been used
    Hajime
    ★ More sophisticated implementation than Mirai and Reaper
    ★ Terminal message “Just a white hat, securing some systems”
    ★ 300,000 devices
    ★ Also not yet used
    Okiru (2018) “the DDoS attack going to be generated by Okiru botnet would probably be the
    biggest cyberattack ever”.
    News
    21

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  21. E-HEALTH
    The Hackable Cardiac Devices from St. Jude
    “The FDA confirmed that St. Jude Medical’s implantable cardiac devices have vulnerabilities that
    could allow a hacker to access a device. Once in, they could deplete the battery or administer
    incorrect pacing or shocks”
    ★ Vulnerability occurred in the transmitter that reads the device’s data
    ★ Hackers could control a device by accessing its transmitter
    ★ 465,000 Abbott pacemakers vulnerable to hacking
    ★ Need a firmware fix
    News
    22

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  22. BLUETOOTH VULNERABILITIES
    BlueBorne
    ★ https://www.armis.com/blueborne/
    ★ Android, Windows, iOS & Linux
    ★ Amazon Echo and Google Home
    ★ 8 vulnerabilities
    News
    23

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  23. BLUEBORNE
    ★ BNEP (Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol)
    ○ heap-based buffer overflow (CVE-2017-0781)
    ○ integer underflow (CVE-2017-0782)
    ➔ memory corruption + privilege escalation + remote code execution
    ★ L2CAP / LEAP (Low Energy Audio Protocol)
    ○ buffer overflow (CVE-2017-1000251)
    ➔ payload injection + remote code execution
    ★ SDP (Service Discovery Protocol)
    ○ CVE-2017-0785 /CVE-2017-1000250
    ➔ “heartbleed like” data leak
    ○ Amazon Echo and Google Home
    ★ BNEP service (IP connectivity)
    ○ fake IP interface + packets interception
    ➔ “wifi like” MiTM
    News
    24

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  24. BLUEBORNE
    News
    25
    OS Vulnerability CVE Id. Description
    Android Remote Code Execution CVE-2017-0781 Furtive attack
    Android Remote Code Execution CVE-2017-0782 Furtive attack
    Android Data leak CVE-2017-0785 Heartbleed like
    Android "Man-In-The-Middle" (MiTM) CVE-2017-0783 Bluetooth "Pineapple"
    Linux Remote Code Execution
    CVE-2017-
    1000251
    -
    Linux Data leak
    CVE-2017-
    1000250
    Heartbleed like
    iOS Remote Code Execution CVE-2017-14315 -
    Windows "Man-In-The-Middle" (MiTM) CVE-2017-8628 Bluetooth "Pineapple"

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  25. TOP 10 OWASP

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  26. WHAT IS OWASP?
    ★ [owasp.org] “The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a 501(c)(3)
    worldwide not-for-profit charitable organization focused on improving the security of
    software”
    ★ [owasp.org] “The OWASP Internet of Things Project is designed to help manufacturers,
    developers, and consumers better understand the security issues associated with the
    Internet of Things, and to enable users in any context to make better security decisions
    when building, deploying, or assessing IoT technologies”
    OWASP IOT Project
    28

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  27. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    Summary
    ★ Insecure Web Interface
    ★ Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
    ★ Insecure Network Services
    ★ Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification
    ★ Privacy Concerns
    ★ Insecure Cloud Interface
    ★ Insecure Mobile Interface
    ★ Insufficient Security Configurability
    ★ Insecure Software/Firmware
    ★ Poor Physical Security
    OWASP IOT Project
    29

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  28. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    1. Insecure Web Interface
    “Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text credentials or enumerates accounts to
    access the web interface.”
    ★ A1:2017 Injection
    ★ A7:2017 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
    ★ A13:2017 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
    OWASP IOT Project
    30
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business
    Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    EASY
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business
    Specific

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  29. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    2. Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
    “Attacker uses weak passwords, insecure password recovery mechanisms, poorly protected
    credentials or lack of granular access control to access a particular interface.”
    ★ A2:2017 Broken Authentication
    ★ Mirai
    OWASP IOT Project
    31
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business
    Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business
    Specific

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  30. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    3. Insecure Network Services
    “Attacker uses vulnerable network services to attack the device itself or bounce attacks off the
    device.”
    ★ Unnecessary open ports
    ★ UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) exposing ports to internet
    ★ Wifi access to network, e.g. iKettle
    OWASP IOT Project
    32
    Threat
    Agents
    Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical
    Impacts
    Business
    Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    UNCOMMON
    Detectability
    AVERAGE
    Impact
    MODERATE
    Application /
    Business
    Specific

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  31. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    4. Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification
    “Attacker uses the lack of transport encryption to view data being passed over the network.”
    ★ A5:2017 Broken Access Control
    ★ Devices not always connected to internet
    ★ Certificates expire
    ★ Complicated by need for secure inter-device/inter-manufacturer communications
    ★ Ryan Kurte – “Building a Certificate Authority with Yubikeys”, Chch HackerCon 2017
    OWASP IOT Project
    33
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  32. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    5. Privacy Concerns
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, lack of transport encryption
    or insecure network services to view personal data which is not being properly protected or is
    being collected unnecessarily.”
    ★ EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - 25th May 2018
    ○ Requirements for User Consent and Pseudonymisation.
    ○ Legal obligation to notify the Supervisory Authority of data breach without undue
    delay (72 hours?)
    OWASP IOT Project
    34
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  33. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    6. Insecure Cloud Interface
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, lack of transport encryption
    and account enumeration to access data or controls via the cloud website.”
    ★ A1:2017 Injection
    ★ A7:2017 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
    ★ A13:2017 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
    OWASP IOT Project
    35
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  34. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    7. Insecure Mobile Interface
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, lack of transport encryption
    and account enumeration to access data or controls via the mobile interface.”
    ★ Bluetooth SIG releasing “Launch Studio”, no provision for security
    ★ No best practice?
    ★ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) “Guide to Bluetooth Security”
    OWASP IOT Project
    36
    Threat Agents Attack
    Vectors
    Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  35. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    8. Insufficient Security Configurability
    “Attacker uses the lack of granular permissions to access data or controls on the device. The
    attacker could also us the lack of encryption options and lack of password options to perform
    other attacks which lead to compromise of the device and/or data.”
    OWASP IOT Project
    37
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    MODERATE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  36. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    9. Insecure Software/Firmware
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as capturing update files via unencrypted connections,
    the update file itself is not encrypted or they are able to perform their own malicious update
    via DNS hijacking.”
    OWASP IOT Project
    38
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical
    Impacts
    Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    DIFFICULT
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  37. OWASP IOT TOP TEN
    10. Poor Physical Security
    “Attacker uses vectors such as USB ports or other storage means to access the Operating
    System and potentially any data stored on the device.”
    ★ JTAG
    ★ Serial bus spy: BUS PIRATE
    ★ Oscilloscope
    OWASP IOT Project
    39
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    AVERAGE
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific

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  38. Bluetooth LE

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  39. ABOUT BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY
    In short
    ★ AKA Bluetooth 4/5, Bluetooth SMART
    ★ One of most exploding recently IoT technologies
    ★ Completely different than previous Bluetooth 2, 3 (BR/EDR)
    ★ Designed for low energy usage, simplicity rather than throughput
    BLUETOOTH LE
    42

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  40. ABOUT BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY
    In short
    ★ Peripheral / Central / Advertiser
    ○ Read - Write - Notifications - Indication
    ★ Bluetooth 4.0
    ○ Weak security mechanisms
    ★ Bluetooth 4.2
    ○ Add strong encryption
    ★ Bluetooth 5
    ○ No security update
    ○ Throughput & Range ++
    BLUETOOTH LE
    43

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  41. BLE SECURITY
    In short
    ★ Uses AES-128 with CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) encryption
    ★ Uses Key Distribution to share various keys
    ○ Identity Resolving Key is used for privacy
    ○ Signing Resolving Key provides fast authentication without encryption
    ○ Long Term Key is used
    ★ Pairing encrypts the link using a Temporary Key (TK)
    ○ Derived from passkey & then distribute keys
    ★ Asymmetric key model
    ○ Slave gives keys to master with a diversifier
    ○ Slave can then recover keys from the diversifier
    BLUETOOTH LE
    44

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  42. BLE SECURITY PAIRING
    How to determine the temporary key (TK)?
    ★ Just Works
    ○ Legacy, most common
    ○ Devices without display cannot implement other
    ○ It’s actually a key of zero, that’s why it just works...
    ★ 6-digit PIN
    ○ In case the device has a display
    ★ Out of band (OOB)
    ○ Does not share secret key over the 2.4 GHz band (used by protocol)
    ○ Makes use of other mediums (e.g. NFC)
    ○ Once secret keys are exchanged, encrypts the channel Not common (understatement
    – haven’t seen one yet)
    “None of the pairing methods provide protection against a passive eavesdropper” - Bluetooth
    Core Spec
    BLUETOOTH LE
    45

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  43. BLE SECURITY: BLE 4.2
    4.2 brings strong encryption with Elliptic Curves Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
    Numeric Comparison to determine the TK
    ★ In practice, ~80% of tested devices do not implement BLE-layer encryption
    ★ Mobile apps cannot control the pairing (OS level)
    ★ Why?
    ○ As always, security is left behind (cost, time, etc.)
    ○ Multiple users/apps using the same devices
    ○ Public access devices (e.g. cash register)
    ○ Hardware, software or even UX
    ○ Compatibilities/requirements
    BLUETOOTH LE
    46

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  44. HACKING: BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY
    Hardware
    ★ BLE USB dongle
    ○ CSR8510: most common, good enough, ~ 5 EUR
    ○ Other chips (often built in laptops)
    ★ Ubertooth
    BLUETOOTH LE
    47

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  45. HACKING: BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY
    Software: Btlejuice
    ★ https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/btlejuice
    ★ Bluetooth MiTM attacks
    BLUETOOTH LE
    48

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  46. HACKING: BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY
    MitM for BLE
    BLUETOOTH LE
    50

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  47. Side Channel Attacks

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  48. DEFINITION
    What is a “side channel”
    ★ A side channel is a source of information about secret information besides the
    actual communication channel
    ★ In most cases the source of information a consequence of the system design unintended
    hard to control
    ★ Side channels and side-channel analysis is very common – also in everyday life
    Side Channel Attacks
    53
    Personal identification system based on rotation of toilet
    paper rolls, Kurahashi et al. , IEEE PCC 2017

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  49. EXAMPLE
    A PIN code check
    ★ Consider a PIN check running on an embedded processor
    ★ The PIN check could be programmed in the following straightforward way
    Side Channel Attacks
    54
    r = strcmp(secret_pwd, typed_pwd);
    if (r==0) {
    /* grant access */
    s = access_secret_data();
    } else {
    /* deny access */
    incorrect_password();
    }
    int strcmp(const char* s1, const char* s2)
    {
    while(*s1 && (*s1 == *s2))
    {
    s1++;
    s2++;
    }
    return *(const unsigned char*)s1 - *(const unsigned char*)s2;
    }
    The execution time of strcmp() is directly proportional to the number of
    correct PIN digits at the beginning of the PIN!

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  50. EXAMPLE
    Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on AES
    Side Channel Attacks
    55

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  51. EXAMPLE
    Meltdown & Spectre
    Side Channel Attacks
    56

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  52. Countermeasures and best practises

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  53. GLOBAL LEVEL SECURITY
    Security objectives must be considered during the product life cycle
    ★ Security “by design”
    ★ Governance
    ★ Risks analysis
    ★ Technologies choices and their threat
    ★ Architecture requirements for security
    ★ Security-related operating device requirements
    ★ Integration in the project
    ★ Security review during the project
    ★ Feasibility and security measures efficiency assessment in production
    Countermeasures and best practises
    58

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  54. COVER THE MAIN RISKS
    Security Upgrade
    ★ Safe and secured, it is better !
    Communications encryption and authentication
    ★ Use standard crypto
    ★ Don’t shared key between devices!
    Local Security
    ★ Code integrity, data confidentiality
    ★ Restrict and control local access (hardware, …)
    59
    Countermeasures and best practises

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  55. WORK IN PROGRESS
    Crypto primitives and crypto protocoles
    ★ Lightweight Crypto for the IoT (LWC)
    Software Security
    ★ Code security and proof (standard, best practices, formal analysis)
    Hardware Security
    ★ Side channel-attack and fault-injection
    Runtime integrity
    ★ Secure boot
    ★ Secure firmware update
    60
    Countermeasures and best practises

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  56. FRENCH COLLABORATIVE PROJECT
    PACLIDO
    ★ Protocoles et Algorithmes Cryptographiques Légers pour l’Internet des Objets
    Consortium
    ★ Airbus, Loria-CNRS, Rtone, Université de Limoge, Trusted Object, Sophia Conseil
    Goals
    ★ Develop new and IoT compliant crypto primitives and protocols
    ★ For domotics (BLE), Smart-Cities
    61
    @fui_paclido
    paclido.fr
    Countermeasures and best practises

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  57. SECURE HARDWARE
    Secure Element
    62
    Countermeasures and best practises

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  58. SUMMARY
    IoT is going to get worse before it gets better!
    ★ 84 billion devices out there.
    ★ Devices in development still to be released
    ★ Devices deployed need to be updated
    ★ Developers are lazy
    ★ Customers are stupid
    ★ Manufacturers are skinflint
    Developers need help!
    ★ Solutions already exist
    ★ Solutions are still in development
    ★ Researchers are designing future IoT security standards
    CONCLUSION
    64

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