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Mitigating Open-source Software Supply Chain Attacks
Talk "Mitigating Open-source Software Supply Chain Attacks" presented at PackagingCon 2021.
Ashish Bijlani
November 10, 2021
Transcript
22 slides
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The state of open-source software • De-facto standard way of
developing digital products/services • Open source software makes up at least 70% of all software ◦ Source: 2020 Synopsys report “Software is eating the world” - Marc andreessen, 2011 “Open-source software is eating the world” - Everybody, 2021 -
Open-source software distribution: packages • Code is “packaged” and published
on Package Managers ◦ Example, PyPi hosts over 300K Python packages • Code is “sourced” from Package Managers by installing ◦ Example, pip3 install dateutils # Packages -
In open-source software, we trust • Anybody can publish packages
◦ Individual developers, groups, and companies • Software we use on our servers, laptops, phones, coffee makers, baby monitors, <add your favorite digital device here> is written by unknown volunteers ◦ Which we blindly TRUST? -
Bad actors capitalize on our trust by exploiting weakness in
the code we source AS WELL AS the way we source it -
Security weaknesses in the code (a.k.a. vulnerabilities) • Are programming
bugs introduced accidentally, ◦ Example, buffer overflow (due to missing bound checks) • Pose indirect threats ◦ Need an exploit to trigger the buggy code ◦ May not always have a high impact • Can be fixed by upgrading to the latest version/release -
Security weaknesses in the distribution/sourcing process • Anybody can publish
their packages using their credentials • No checks or code vetting • Packages are searched and installed using names ◦ Package Managers (e.g., PyPi, NPM) do not show source code • Bad actors exploit new attack vectors to propagate malware 7 -
Case study: mitmproxy2 - Typosquatting attack - Impersonates “mitmproxy” -
Exploits name typo during installation or dev inexperience - Removes safeguards: everyone on the same network can execute code on your machine with a single HTTP request -
Case study: rest-client RubyGems package (100M+ downloads) Under production environment,
it downloads malicious payload via patebin.com and executes via eval, which installs a Remote-Code-Execution (RCE) backdoor on web servers -
Unlike vulnerabilities, malware is • Intentionally harmful code (NOT accidental
programming bug), ◦ Example, backdoor installed to steal sensitive data • Poses direct and dangerous threats ◦ Doesn’t need an exploit - itself is an exploit (e.g., triggered on installation) ◦ Is obfuscated to avoid detection ◦ Hidden in popular packages for wider reach ◦ Evasive - may only trigger under narrow conditions (e.g. production) • Can only be fixed by yanking malicious package/dependency version -
Can we improve the sourcing process? • Today, package stability/maturity/popularity/reputation/safety
is inferred from ◦ Number of GitHub stars/forks, ◦ Number of open issues on GitHub, ◦ Number of downloads ◦ Project documentation/website, ◦ Number of recent code commits, ◦ Number of tests cases ◦ Backing companies (e.g., FB, Uber) • BUT, ◦ Stars/forks/downloads are attacker-controlled ◦ Impersonated projects have the same website/documentation/tests/commits ◦ Should we look at the package code and hundreds of dependencies? -
Our focus 1. Background 1. Malware in open-source software 1.
Our work 1. Findings -
About me Ashish Bijlani, Ph.D. Research Scientist, Ossillate, Inc. -
Graduated Dec’20, Georgia Tech - Cybersecurity/Systems research - Creator of ExtFUSE file system - eBPF + FUSE = Much faster FUSE - Created a 32-bit x86 OS (Capital) that boots from a 5.25” floppy disk -
Our work • Started as a research project at Georgia
Tech in 2019 ◦ Downloaded and analyzed over 1.3M NPM+PyPi+RubyGems packages (60TB) ◦ Detected 339 previously unknown malware (82% confirmed, 3 CVEs, many over a year old) ◦ Details in academic paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.01139.pdf • Funded by NSF to continue development • Continuous scanning of packages ◦ PyPi supported (more coming soon!) -
Our technology - Deep static analysis (Abstract Syntax Tree construction
+ API analysis) - Dynamic analysis (API monitoring during installation) - Metadata analysis (millions of data points) -
Our recent findings (malicious PyPi packages) - https://pypi.org/project/dandh811/ - https://pypi.org/project/KrisQian/
- https://pypi.org/project/dpp-client - https://pypi.org/project/defal96863 - https://pypi.org/project/idodaniel/ - and more... -
Findings: malware 1 - Homepage redirects to billibilli.com - Setup.py
downloads and executes a script with hidden output - Payload execution code is present for Windows and Linux. Commented for Darwin. MALWARE -
Findings: malware 1 -invalid email, -homepage redirects to injection.vip -
setup.py script downloads and spawns a python file (the download server is unreachable now) - comment mentions for security testing only, but the payload is unavailable MALWARE -
Announcing three FREE tools for developers (in BETA) • Smart
assistant for sourcing open-source software packages ◦ Package explorer - web app at https://ossillate.com ◦ Command Line - PyPi package (releasing later today!) ◦ GitHub Actions Plugin (coming soon!) • Flag packages that are: ◦ Malicious (malware), ◦ Suspicious (potentially malicious), ◦ Vulnerable (containing CVEs), ◦ Undesirable (possessing unwanted attributes) • Supported Package Managers ◦ PyPi, more coming soon! -
Thank you! Visit us at ossillate.com Write to us: [email protected]
Get in touch with us on Slack https://join.slack.com/t/ossillatecommunity/ shared_invite/zt-yfezeo6u- Fb5iBqODh2UJT1i8LmAjMQ