As we move towards architectures designed to cope with changing requirements, and eternal services that go live and iterate, how can we manage change in a secure way? How can we possibly build secure systems in this environment?
If you work in a governmental or regulated industry, then you’ll already be familiar with the hollow promises of accreditation. That’s commonly the thing left until the end, about the same time as the testing, and gives rise to the concept that security is the team that just says No.
What if it could be different? What if a service could be continually accredited, continually tested against a baseline of security tests, and that the team was able to own and manage the risk register?
In this tutorial, I will talk through how government is changing its approach to accreditation, to building secure services. We’ll cover things from continuous security testing through to living risk registers, team threat assessments, and security embracing the entire service design.
bruntonspall
kzsuzuki
yositosi
aiandrox
minorun365
.png){kind=icon}
pharma_x_tech
lycorptech_jp
magisystem0408
shotashiratori
bitkey
fujisawaryohei
rayuron
oniak3ibm
tenderlove
holman
eileencodes
gr2m
nonsquared
afnizarnur
tammyeverts
philnash
mraible
brad_frost
keavy
jcasabona
