OWASP Projects: beyond Top 10

OWASP Projects: beyond Top 10

OWASP Poland

8b92dd9cdb06779f63c8747f3a3a2401?s=128

Alexander Antukh

February 17, 2017
Tweet

Transcript

  1. OWASP Projects: beyond Top 10 OWASP Poland Wroclaw Meetup #5

    17.02.2017
  2. About us • Alexander Antukh • OWASP Poland Board Member

    • Head of Product Security at • @c0rdis
  3. About us • Marek Puchalski • OWASP Poland member •

    Developer and Security Consultant at Capgemini • https://marek.puchal.ski
  4. About us • Pawel Rzepa • Security Engineer in Intive

    • Contributor in OWASP MSTG (Mobile Security Testing Guide)
  5. About us • Andrii Sygida • OWASP Poland almost member

    • Application security specialist at
  6. About us • Daniel Ramirez • OWASP Member • Security

    Specialist in EY • Hands-on VA experience in the different kinds of apps.
  7. Thank you for the support!

  8. Motivation • Top 10 is a de-facto standard in Webappsec

    world • OWASP is mostly associated with it … • but there are many more! As of 2016, there are 133 different projects, which can help you whether you are on attacker’s or defender’s parts of the barricades!
  9. Program for today ZAP WebGoat OWTF

  10. Program for today (M)ASVS CheatSheets Cornucopia SKF Pipeline Testing Guides

  11. Let the fun begin!

  12. Agenda • Problem 1: efficient security training • Solution: WebGoat

    • Problem 2: efficient management of multiple penetration testing tasks • Solution: Offensive Web Testing Framework
  13. Problem of efficient security training …and XSS allows you injecting

    such horrifying pop up windows!!! Security awareness trainings for developers are quite common, but reality shows they are still ineffective :(
  14. Problem of efficient security training

  15. What about… Finally a security training which isn’t an online

    course to fly through and forget! Internal course that is free and isn’t a corpo- bullshit?! Cannot believe that… …arranging internal hands- on labs for developers and testers, where they can deeply understand vulnerabilities by finding and fixing them?
  16. None
  17. WebGoat: few words about • A deliberately insecure Java-based application,

    which allows you to test common vulnerabilities • 50+ lessons • After finding a vulnerability, learn to fix it! • Easy manageable lessons via plugins • You can create your own lessons and easily customize a content and language …or .Net-based: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ WebGoatFor.Net WebGoat: few words about • A deliberately insecure Java-based (or .Net based: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/WebGoatFor.Net) application, which allows you to test common vulnerabilities • 50+ lessons • After finding a vulnerability, learn to fix it! • Easy manageable lessons via plugins • You can create your own lessons and easily customize a content and language
  18. Not only web apps… • Ruby on Rails: OWASP Rails

    Goat Project • PHP: OWASP WebGoatPHP • Node.js: OWASP Node_js Goat Project • Android: OWASP GoatDroid Project • iOS: OWASP iGoat Project
  19. WebGoat: how to run? • Prerequisites: Java VM 1.8 •

    To start just follow these commands: $> wget https://github.com/WebGoat/WebGoat/releases/download /7.0.1/webgoat-container-7.0.1-war-exec.jar $> java -jar java -jar webgoat-container-7.0.1-war-exec.jar • Open in you browser: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/ • That’s all!
  20. WebGoat: first view

  21. WebGoat: lessons & labs

  22. WebGoat: creating your own lesson • Plugin = lesson •

    Create NewLesson.java: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ How_to_write_a_new_WebGoat_les son • Plugin is just a folder, which follows this format 
  23. WebGoat: useful links • Project: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebGoat _Project • Documentation: https://github.com/WebGoat/WebGoat

  24. Problem: how to efficiently manage outputs from many different applications?

    • Each pentester uses many different applications (vuln scanner, web crawler, SSL/TLS tests, session management tests) • Running each of those tests consumes time, right? • It’s easy to automate those tasks, but analysing a consolidated output is much more difficult :( • And finally you have to form a readable report from all those tests… • …oooh… :(
  25. Typical penetration testing process <which generates lots of output> <cpy/pst

    interesting parts> …of course in notepad ;) (…) <runs a lot of tests>
  26. None
  27. • A goal of OWTF is to use penetration testing

    time as efficient as possible. It’s done by: • Running different tools (Nikto/Arachni/w3af/etc) • Running direct tests (header searches/session tests/etc) • Knowledge repository (OWASP mapping/resource links) • Helping human analysis (flag severity/manage output) • In other words OWTF provides optimal balance between automation and human analysis OWTF: Idea of the project
  28. • Want to quickly start? Follow this one-liner: $> wget

    -N https://raw.githubusercontent.com/owtf /bootstrap-script/master/bootstrap.sh; bash bootstrap.sh OWTF: Installation
  29. OWTF

  30. OWTF: Set a target

  31. sends normal traffic to target active vulnerability probing probing services

    (e.g. FTP/SMB ) assist manual testing searches on HTTP transactions test via 3rd parties (no traffic to target) Testing web apps Testing network services OWTF: Choose plugins and run!
  32. None
  33. OWTF: Useful links • Project: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_OWTF • Documentation: http://docs.owtf.org/en/latest/ •

    Online passive scanner: https://owtf.github.io/online-passive-scanner
  34. • Use OWASP WebGoat to provide efficient security trainings in

    your company. • Use OWASP OWTF to automate your penetration testing tasks. It allows you for easy test’s output analyse and create reports in a fast way. Summary
  35. None
  36. OWASP ASVS (Application Security Verification Standard)

  37. SANS Institute, May 2015, State of Application Security: Closing the

    Gap https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/2015-state-application-security-closing-gap-35942 Application Security Standards in use
  38. OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) is a list of

    application security requirements or tests that can be used by architects, developers, testers, security professionals, and even consumers to define what a secure application is. In short
  39. Example requirements

  40. Example requirements • Architecture and design • Input handling •

    Data protection • Session management • Error handling • Business logic • Configuration • Web services • 19 sections in total • Every chapter has control objective, reqs and references
  41. First introduced: June 2008 ASVS v1.0: 2009 ASVS v2.0: 2014

    ASVS v3.0: 2015 Current version: v3.0.1 (July 2016) History
  42. Idea behind • Use as a metric - provide application

    developers and application owners with a yardstick with which to assess the degree of trust that can be placed in their Web applications • Use as guidance - provide guidance to security control developers as to what to build into security controls in order to satisfy application security requirements • Use during procurement - provide a basis for specifying application security verification requirements in contracts
  43. Application Security Verification Levels • ASVS Level 3 – for

    applications that „shoot missiles” ;) • ASVS Level 2 – for applications that contain sensitive data • ASVS Level 1 – for all software
  44. Benefits for you • Helps you to develop and maintain

    secure applications • Contains clear and ready-to-use high level checklists and use cases • Allows you as well as security services, vendors, and consumers to align requirements and offerings
  45. More ideas • Train your developers in AppSec • Take

    your standard software architecture and prepare standard security solutions Open Application Standard Platform (OASP) https://oasp.github.io/
  46. Projects based on ASVS • Secure Knowledge Framework - training

    developers in writing secure code and providing a knowledge base of secure design patterns • Zed Attack Proxy - easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications, both automatically and manually • Cornucopia - mechanism in the form of a card game to assist software development teams identify security requirements in Agile, conventional and formal development processes. It is language, platform and technology agnostic.
  47. Useful links • Project: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Sec urity_Verification_Standard_Project • Excel checklist: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/ASVS-excel-v3.0.1.xlsx

    • OWASP ASVS mailing list https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-application-security- verification-standard
  48. OWASP MASVS (Mobile Application Security Verification Standard)

  49. Mobile web usage overtakes desktop for first time http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/11/01/mobile-web-usage-overtakes-desktop-for-first-time/ Current

    state
  50. In short • There is a significant difference between security

    assurance of web and mobile applications • MASVS is to mobiles, what ASVS is to web • The project is work in progress (v0.9.2 is currently available)
  51. Example

  52. Mobile Security Verification Levels Following assurance levels are possible: L1,

    L1 + L2, but also L1 + R and L1 + L2 + R.
  53. Requirements • Architecture, Design and Threat Modelling • Data Storage

    and Privacy • Cryptography • Authentication and Session Management • Network Communication • Environmental Interaction • Code Quality and Build Setting • Resiliency Against Reverse Engineering
  54. Useful links • Homepage: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Te sting_Guide • Github: https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-masvs

  55. None
  56. OWASP Cornucopia

  57. OWASP Cornucopia is a mechanism in the form of a

    card game to assist software development teams identify security requirements in Agile, conventional and formal development processes. It is language, platform and technology agnostic. Cornucopia is based on the concepts and game ideas from Microsoft SDL EoP game and OWASP Secure Coding Practices Guide. OWASP Cornucopia Ecommerce Website Edition is in the current Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council information supplement PCI DSS E-commerce Guidelines v2, January 2013 In short
  58. Idea behind • Help development teams to identify application security

    requirements and develop security-based user stories • Aimed at first place at Agile-based methodologies • Gamification approach to threat modeling
  59. Suite Rank Threat References: - Secure Coding Practices - ASVS

    - AppSensor project - Common Attack Pattern (CAPEC) - Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code (SAFECode) Cornucopia card
  60. Cornucopia rules • Prepare everything (deck, cards, data flow diagram,

    prizes…) • Deal all the cards • Play a round – every player has to utilize one card of the selected suit. Highest played card in the suit wins and starts next round until all cards are played • Count points and define the winner • Closure: review all threats and matching security requirements https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cornucopia#tab=How_to_Play
  61. Cornucopia rules Playing a card: • each player reads it

    out loud • explains how the threat could apply (or not) to his application • player gets a point for attacks that work, and the group thinks it is an actionable bug At this point we don’t think of mitigations and don’t exclude a threat just because it is believed it is already mitigated – the card should be recorded on the score sheet anyway
  62. Cornucopia rules

  63. Cornucopia deck • Clear who said what • Exact descriptions

    of threats • Actionable items • Developers know precisely what functionality is affected
  64. Benefits for you • Teaching developers on how to identify

    and assess vulnerabilities on every sprint • Training sessions for developers • Raising awareness in application security field in your organization
  65. Useful links • Project: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cornucopia • Rules explained on Youtube:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5Y0akWj31k • Presentation from OWASP EEE (Hungary): http://www.slideshare.net/OWASPEEE/hungary-i-play-jack- of-information-disclosure
  66. OWASP SKF (Security Knowledge Framework)

  67. OWASP SKF is a fully open-source Python-Flask expert system web-application

    that uses the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard and code examples and can be used to support developers in pre-development (security by design) as well as after code is released (OWASP ASVS Level 1-3) „we decided to develop a proof of concept framework in order to create a guide system available for all developers so they can develop applications secure by design” In short http://secureby.design
  68. Idea behind The 4 Core usage of SKF: • Security

    Requirements ASVS for development and third party vendor applications • Security knowledge reference (code examples/ knowledge base items) • Security is part of design with the pre-development functionality in SKF • Security post-development functionality in SKF for verification with the ASVS
  69. Installation Super-easy! Supported ways to install it: • Automated installation

    with Chef • AWS by using CloudFormation • … or manually as you would do with any other Python project: sudo pip install owasp-skf https://github.com/blabla1337/skf-flask#installing
  70. https://demo.securityknowledgeframework.org admin : test-skf Overview

  71. SKF: Projects That’s what you start with for the very

    beginning
  72. SKF: Pre-development stage Definition of a technology stack Adding different

    functionalities to the system: • Access controls / login systems • Registration • Submit forms • External XML files • File uploads • SQL commands…
  73. SKF: Pre-development stage First assessment and security recommendations for selected

    functionality
  74. SKF: Post-development stage • Double-check your app by means of

    pre-defined or custom checklists • ASVS-based checklists for different levels of criticality of the application are auto-generated after pre- development stage! • After providing answers to clear and simple questions, reports with failed items are ready to be downloaded and prioritized
  75. SKF: Post-development stage Failed items and recommendations can be viewed

    in the application, or exported for further processing
  76. SKF: Knowledge Base • „Use info, do not get hacked,

    profit!” • Multiple options of secure design patterns with examples • Gives a good understanding for developers not only about what to fix but also why to do so
  77. SKF: Knowledge Base Descriptions, solutions and many different language-agnostic patterns

  78. SKF: Code examples • We were talking about generic secure

    patterns so far • Code examples with extensive comments provide ready-to-use solutions on how to do things right! • Currently supported languages: PHP, .NET and Java (soon ☺)
  79. SKF: Code examples Can be reused directly, and have extensive

    comments to know how and why to fix an issue
  80. SKF: Improve yourself! • Cherry on top of a pie:

    you can easily add your use-cases and adjust it as you like! • Checklists, knowledge base and code examples must follow the markdown and appear immediately in your panel Directory/path traversal <-- name as seen in the drop-down head ------- **Example:** <-- Bold separator telling where the example starts /* Your code has to indent the 4 spaces(tab) in order for the markdown engine to know it has to interpreted this as written code */
  81. Benefits for you • Guide to secure programming • Secuity

    by design, not implementing afterwards • Security awareness • Will inform about threats even before one wrote a single line of code • Central place for security reference • Provides information applicable for specific needs on the spot
  82. Useful links • Project: http://secureby.design • Source code: https://github.com/blabla1337/skf-flask •

    SKF workshop (DevOpsDays 2015): https://www.owasp.org/images/5/54/Skf-design- workshop.pptx.pdf
  83. None
  84. Appsec Pipeline

  85. Software development lifecycle today

  86. The AppSec pipeline project • Place to gather together information,

    techniques and tools to create your own AppSec pipeline • Right now: AppSec pipeline patterns and tools https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSec_Pipeline
  87. Example of workflow - Code written - Code committed to

    repository - Unit test the code - Package the code for deployment - Integration testing - Deploy code in production
  88. Pipeline design patterns

  89. Pipeline design patterns

  90. Security tools evaluation criteria • API is the first •

    Pipeline position • Cloud scalable • Runs as a service • Client libraries • CI/CD plugins
  91. None
  92. What is OWASP ZAP? • Webapp security testing tool •

    Free and open source • Written in Java → cross platform https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ZAP
  93. OWASP ZAP Features • GUI, headless and REST API •

    Intercepting proxy • Classic and AJAX spiders • Passive and active scanning • … and of course can be extended via addons!
  94. Addons

  95. How can it all help me???

  96. ZAP for pentests • Configure your browser to use ZAP

    as a proxy • Explore the application manually • Use the spider to find other content and input points • See what security issues the passive scanner has found • Use the active scanner to find vulnerabilities • Do manual pentesting
  97. ZAP as a part of your appsec pipeline The baseline

    scan • Simple inline security control • Mass scan of big number of targets • Post release (production) control Full scan • Regular heavy asynchronous scan • More power and integration into your infrastructure and processes
  98. The baseline scan • Uses Docker • Only passive scanning

    • Time limited spider of target • By default warns on all issues: – Missing / incorrect security headers like CSP – Cookie problems – Information / error disclosure – Missing CSRF tokens etc.
  99. The baseline scan example $ docker run -t owasp/zap2docker-weekly zap-baseline.py

    -t https://oxdef.info ... Total of 81 URLs PASS: Cookie No HttpOnly Flag [10010] ... WARN: Web Browser XSS Protection Not Enabled [10016] x 52 https://oxdef.info ... FAIL: 0 WARN: 5 INFO: 0 IGNORE: 0 PASS: 21
  100. None
  101. 1 n33d m0re p0w3r! • REST API is your choice

    • zap.sh -daemon -host 0.0.0.0 -port 8080 • http(s)://zap/<format>/<component>/<operation>/< op name>[/?<params>] • Also available in Docker image owasp/zap2docker-* • Maps closely to the UI / code • JSON, HTML and XML formats • Clients in: Java, Python, NodeJS, .Net, PHP, Go ...
  102. Simple scan using API and client in Python target =

    'http://some-target.com' zap = ZAPv2() scanid = zap.spider.scan(target) while(int(zap.spider.status(scanid)) < 100): print 'Spider progress %: ' + zap.spider.status(scanid) scanid = zap.ascan.scan(target) while(int(zap.ascan.status(scanid)) < 100): print 'Scan progress %: ' + zap.ascan.status(scanid) pprint(zap.core.alerts())
  103. Cheat Sheet Series

  104. Cheat Sheet Series

  105. Cheat Sheet Series • «The OWASP Cheat Sheet Series was

    created to provide a concise collection of high value information on specific web application security topics» • You can browse it online or get as PDF book • Mostly fresh and actual topics https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
  106. 3rd party JavaScript management The invocation of 3rd party JS

    code in a web application requires consideration for 3 risks in particular: • The loss of control over changes to the client application • The execution of arbitrary code on client systems • The disclosure or leakage of sensitive information to 3rd parties https://www.owasp.org/index.php/3rd_Party_Javascript_ Management_Cheat_Sheet
  107. XSS Prevention RULE #3 - JavaScript Escape Before Inserting Untrusted

    Data into JavaScript Data Values Except for alphanumeric characters, escape all characters less than 256 with the \xHH format to prevent switching out of the data value into the script context or into another attribute. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scrip ting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
  108. XXE Prevention Libxml2: the Enum xmlParserOption should not have the

    following options defined: • XML_PARSE_NOENT: Expands entities and substitutes them with replacement text • XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD: Load the external DT https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_ (XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
  109. Featured cheat sheets • Clickjacking Defense • Cross-Site Request Forgery

    (CSRF) Prevention • Deserialization • DOM based XSS Prevention • REST Security • Virtual Patching
  110. Summary • OWASP AppSec Pipeline helps you with choosing suitable

    tools and building your own AppSec pipeline • OWASP ZAP is one of such tools. Using it you can make manual pentest of web app or automate web app security testing in SDL • OWASP Cheat Sheets helps you in specific areas of application security
  111. None
  112. Testing Guide

  113. OWASP Testing Guide Versions • V1 – December 2004 •

    V2 – 25th December 2005 • V3 – 15th September 2008 – Configuration Management and Authorization Testing sections • V4 – 2014 – Identity Management Testing – Error Handling – Cryptography – Client Side Testing
  114. Purpose • The OWASP Testing Guide includes a "best practice"

    penetration testing framework which users can implement in their own organizations and • a "low level" penetration testing guide that describes techniques for testing most common web application and services security issues.
  115. Typical Testing Guide chapter • Summary • How to test

    • Tools • Remediation • References Fingerprint Web Application Framework
  116. Why to test • The steps that need to be

    undertaken to build and operate a testing program on web apps. • Effective testing program: – People – Process – Technology • Testing just the technical implementation of an application will not uncover management or operational vulnerabilities that could be present
  117. When to test • Don’t test software until it has

    already been created and is in the deployment phase of its life cycle  ineffective and cost-prohibitive practice • One of the best methods to prevent security bugs from appearing in production applications is to improve the SDLC by including security in each of its phases
  118. Example Testing guide XXE

  119. Summary • Constant work in progress • Anybody is welcome

    to collaborate • Best practice for web penetration tests
  120. OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide

  121. OWASP MSTG Leaders • MSTG was initiated by Milan Singh

    Thakur in 2015. The original document was hosted on Google Drive  Github • Bernhard Mueller (2016) • Sven Schleier (2016)
  122. OWASP MSTG • MSTG is a manual for testing the

    security of mobile apps. It describes technical processes for verifying the controls listed in the MASVS • MSTG is meant to provide a baseline set of test cases for black-box and white-box security tests, and to help ensure completeness and consistency of the tests
  123. MSTG Structure • High-Level Guides – Mobile Platforms Overview –

    Security Testing Processes, Tools and Techniques • Complementary – Security Testing in the Application Development Lifecycle – Tools
  124. MSTG Structure

  125. Typical MSTG chapter • Summary • White-box testing / Black-box

    testing • Remediation • References • Tools
  126. Typical MSTG chapter Practical examples of how to test it

    right, with tools, samples and references
  127. Summary  • Constant work in progress • Anybody is

    welcome to collaborate • Best practice for mobile penetration tests
  128. References • https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_T esting_Guide_v4_Table_of_Contents • https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg

  129. Foreword

  130. Foreword • There are many projects happening right now (very

    good examples are MASVS and MSTG) • Due to a huge front of work every small help is valuable • Do something good today – contribute to OWASP Projects 
  131. None