Hunting the Hackers: How Cisco Talos is Leveling Up Security

At Cisco's Talos, a traditional security analyst culture has collided with lots of data. In this talk, Kate and Samir will describe how they’ve navigated this transition using Elasticsearch to leverage data to detect bad guys – with a special look at how Talos tracked the SSHPsychos SSH brute forcing campaign.

Transcript

1. Kate Nolan Samir Sapra Research Engineer{s} February 17, 2016 Hunting the Hackers: How Talos is leveling up security
2. LET’S TALK ABOUT THE THREAT LANDSCAPE
3. THREAT LANDSCAPE 1.5 Million
4. THREAT LANDSCAPE
5. THREAT LANDSCAPE 19.7 Billion 7.2 Trillion TOTAL THREAT BLOCKS 181 Million Spyware Blocks 82 Thousand Virus Blocks 818 Million Web Blocks DAILY WEB BREAKDOWN
6. THREAT LANDSCAPE
7. Cloud to Core Coverage web requests a day 16 BILLION email messages a day 600 BILLION AMP queries a day 13 BILLION
8. THREATS DON’T GO AWAY. HOW DO WE ADDRESS IT?
9. •  WEB: Reputation, URL Filtering •  END POINT: ClamAV •  CLOUD: FireAMP & ClamAV detection content •  EMAIL: Reputation, AntiSpam, •  NETWORK: Snort Subscription Rule Set, Detection & Prevention Content Cloud to Core Coverage
10. Cloud to Core Coverage Talos is divided into 5 departments •  Data Analytics & Correlation •  Threat Actor Attribution •  Detection & Prevention Content •  Vulnerability Research •  Malware Research •  Discovery •  Triage •  Exploit Development •  Threat Reports •  Media Relations •  Intelligence Systems •  Engine Development
11. Threat Intelligence and Analytics {or how to piss off the bad guys with data}
12. Finding the needle Triaging new threats for detection Actor attribution and tracking
13. Types of data? •  file samples {over 1M a day} •  dynamic analysis {~100k runs/day} •  network related {whois, DNS, IP, etc} •  IPS/IDS telemetry •  spam •  hunting data/ actor tracking Sources of data? •  feeds {paid, customer, partner} •  customer telemetry •  self-generated intelligence •  open source intelligence •  twitter feeds •  forum postings Piles of data
14. Why Elasticsearch?
15. Sandbox data Dynamic malware analysis (ie. ThreatGrid, Cuckoo) - automated & user submitted runs - each run has a score, above a certain threshold is ‘bad’ - reports track: processes (registry, mutexes, files opened) dropped files IP addresses domains Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ES Stats: 10 nodes 3 TB 100k reports/day ~8 months of data
16. Sandbox Hunting Examples •  Domain Generating Algorithms •  Malware Family Clustering based of IOCs or WordPress domains •  Connecting runs to a CIDR netblock •  Find new samples of malware based on mutex behavior •  Detecting new Exploit Kits by behavior identified in data in elasticsearch
17. An example query to hunt for Exploit kits Used in scripts for automated detection { "query" : { "bool" : { "must" : [ ”match”:{"ioc" :"Benign windows process is dropping new PE files”} "match” :{"processes.parent_name": "iexplore.exe" }, "match": {"processes.name" : "iexplore.exe" } ], “should” : [ “range” : {“score” : {“gte” : 10, “lte” : 99}} ] }}}
18. Honeypot data Honeypots are decoy systems to gather an attackers attempts Many Types of Honeypots •  ssh •  industrial systems •  telnet •  Exploit kit •  Gas pump •  Cisco router •  Elasticsearch "_index": "logstash-telnet-sqs-2016.02.10", "_type": "telnet-sqs", "_source": { "Event.Type": "ConnectionLost", "@timestamp": "2016-02-10T23:51:10.000Z", "Event.Session": "1272f0ccd05111e5bb400242a c110001", "Net.IP.Src": "117.158.195.59", "User.Name": "admin", "User.Pass": "1234", "Net.Port.Src": 23, "@version": "1", "type": "telnet-sqs",
19. Top 10 Passwords and Usernames
20. Queries run against the elasticsearch honeypot
21. Other Elasticsearch stacks File metadata Spam corpus IPS telemetry
22. SSHPSYCHOS If it doesn’t work you’re just not using enough BRUTEFORCE
23. SSH Psychos Update SSHPsycho
24. SSH Psychos SSHPsychos •  Brute Force SSH Attacks until password guess •  300K Unique Passwords •  Login from different address space •  Drop DDoS Rootkit on server •  Accounted for 1/3 of all SSH Traffic ON THE INTERNET SSH Brute Force Attempts 1 103.41.124.0/23 2 3 23.234.60.140
25. Takedown
26. VICTORY After Action »  Engaged Level 3 and another major ISP »  Sudden Pivot »  Null Routed »  Effectively limited »  Download blocked by standard technology
27. Takedown »  http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/sshpsychos »  http://blog.level3.com/security/breaking-botnets-how-level-3-and-cisco- worked-together-to-improve-the-internets-security-and-stop-sshpsychos/ »  … or just search for “ssh psychos”
28. SSHPsychos + Elasticsearch
29. Why?
30. ChinaZ and The Donger
31. Questions?
32. talosintel.com blogs.cisco.com/talos @talossecurity