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How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem

Avatar for Neil Matatall Neil Matatall
September 12, 2014
Programming
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How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem

More ramblings about how awesome csp and how it solves all of your problems.

Avatar for Neil Matatall

Neil Matatall

September 12, 2014
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Transcript

  1. How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem Neil Matatall

    OWASP SD 4/17/2014

  2. Me • Twitter appsec engineer • I’m actually just a

    developer • In the business of going out of business • Sick and tired of fixing XSS

  3. XSS is so 1998

  4. So is XSS prevention

  5. What is XSS <input name=“id” value=“<%=id%>”>

  6. What is XSS ”><script>badStuff()</script>

  7. What is XSS <input name=“id” value=“”> <script>badStuff()</script> ”>

  8. What is XSS <script> var id=<%=id%>; </script>

  9. What is XSS 0;badStuff();

  10. What is XSS <script> var id=0; badStuff() </script>

  11. What is XSS <script> setInterval(1000, ‘<%=todo%>’) </script>

  12. What is XSS badStuff();

  13. What is XSS <script> setInterval(1000, ‘badStuff()’) </script>

  14. What is XSS <input name=“id” onBlur=“doStuff(<%=id %>)”>

  15. What is XSS ); badStuff(

  16. What is XSS <input name=“id” onBlur=“doStuff(); badStuff()”>

  17. What is XSS <a href=“<%=link%>”>Hi Mom!</a>

  18. What is XSS javascript:badThings()

  19. What is XSS <a href=“javascript:badThings()”> Hi Mom!</a>

  20. What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick=“doThing(‘<%=link%>’)”> Hi Mom! </a>

  21. What is XSS &#39;);badStuff(&#39;

  22. What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick= “doThing(‘&#39;);badStuff(&#39;’)” > Hi Mom!

    </a>

  23. What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick= “doThing(‘’);badStuff(‘’)”> Hi Mom! </a>

  24. What is DOM XSS <script> document.body.innerHTML = document.getElementById(‘name’).value; </script>

  25. What is DOM XSS

  26. What is DOM XSS <body> <img src=x onError=badThings()> </body>

  27. What is DOM XSS <script> var name = $(‘#name’).val $(‘body’).html(name)

    </script>

  28. What is DOM XSS

  29. What is DOM XSS <body> <img src=x onError=badThings()> </body>

  30. jQuery is XSS $(data)

  31. What is XSS <style> a { color: <%=usersFavoriteColor%>; } </style>

  32. What is XSS I dunno, something with SVG, CSS Expressions,

    etc. The list grows.

  33. Because Dr. Mario

  34. Because Dr. Mario

  35. Why do those crazy things?

  36. CODE != DATA “select * from table where id =

    “ + id “<a href=“ + link + “>text</a>”

  37. But we don’t do stupid things

  38. I will religiously escape content

  39. I will religiously escape content part 2

  40. JSFuck - Write any JavaScript with 6 Characters: []()!+ I

    will religiously escape content part 3
  41. None

  42. I’ll sanitize / validate input

  43. I’ll use a scanner

  44. I’ll perform periodic assessments

  45. Security is about layers

  46. None

  47. Thermos? Koozie?

  48. <script>goodStuff()</script> <script>badStuff()</script> How does the browser know?

  49. What is dangerous? • inline javascript • <script>…</script> • <input

    onBlur=“…”> • <a href=“javascript:…”> • on-the-fly code generation • setTimeout, eval, new Function(“…”)

  50. What’s a CSP??? default-src ‘self’; connect-src ‘self’; font-src ‘self’ data:;

    frame-src ‘self’ about: javascript:; frame-ancestors https://twitter.com; img-src https://mycdn.xom data:; media-src ‘https://mycdn.xom; object-src ‘none’; script-src https://mycdn.xom; style-src 'unsafe-inline' https://mycdn.xom; report-uri https://twitter.com/scribes/csp_report

  51. CSP is more than XSS protection

  52. Nothing is free

  53. Report-Only mode

  54. Techniques for removing inline javascript

  55. Removing the dangerous stuff

  56. CSP 1.1 • Whitelisting inline <script> in a safe way

  57. Inline code <script> stuff() </script>

  58. Nonces <script nonce=“34298734…”> stuff() </script>

  59. Hashes <script> stuff() </script>

  60. Hashes are more secure, and more limited than nonces

  61. What you still can’t do • Inline event handlers •

    <input onBlur=“doGoodThing()”> • <a href=“javascript:…”> • Dynamic javascript • <script> var id=<%=id%> </script> • Hash values won’t match • Nonce provides absolutely no security

  62. Automatic CSP Protection (Silverish bullet)

  63. Whitelisting javascript • Find all javascript • Compute all hash

    values • Whitelist scripts with corresponding hashes

  64. Assume: Sane web framework • Do a regular expression search

    over all templates, capture all inline javascript • Store a map of the hash(es) in each individual file • Each time the file is rendered, add the corresponding hashes to the header

  65. Developer productivity • Serve dynamic hash values in (!production), serve

    hardcoded hash values in production
  66. None