Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Features
Speaker Deck
PRO
Sign in
Sign up for free
Search
Search
How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem
Search
Neil Matatall
September 12, 2014
Programming
160
0
Share
How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem
More ramblings about how awesome csp and how it solves all of your problems.
Neil Matatall
September 12, 2014
More Decks by Neil Matatall
See All by Neil Matatall
Twubhubbook - It's like appsec, but for startups (with notes)
oreoshake
0
140
Twubhubbook - it's like appsec, but for startups (without notes)
oreoshake
0
130
Automatic Application Security v2
oreoshake
0
160
JRubyFX For Web Developers
oreoshake
0
260
Automatic Application Security
oreoshake
0
160
Putting your robots to work: Security Automation @Twitter
oreoshake
2
190
BSidesLA Managing Content Security Policy
oreoshake
3
1.1k
Other Decks in Programming
See All in Programming
Codex CLIのSubagentsによる並列API実装 / Parallel API Implementation with Codex CLI Subagents
takatty
2
820
2026-03-27 #terminalnight 変数展開とコマンド展開でターミナル作業をスマートにする方法
masasuzu
0
290
Redox OS でのネームスペース管理と chroot の実現
isanethen
0
520
SkillがSkillを生む:QA観点出しを自動化した
sontixyou
5
2.4k
RSAが破られる前に知っておきたい 耐量子計算機暗号(PQC)入門 / Intro to PQC: Preparing for the Post-RSA Era
mackey0225
3
120
メッセージングを利用して時間的結合を分離しよう #phperkaigi
kajitack
3
550
「速くなった気がする」をデータで疑う
senleaf24
0
130
Goの型安全性で実現する複数プロダクトの権限管理
ishikawa_pro
2
1.4k
AI-DLC 入門 〜AIコーディングの本質は「コード」ではなく「構造」〜 / Introduction to AI-DLC: The Essence of AI Coding Is Not “Code” but “Structure”
seike460
PRO
0
210
仕様漏れ実装漏れをなくすトレーサビリティAI基盤のご紹介
orgachem
PRO
8
4.4k
AI時代の脳疲弊と向き合う ~言語学としてのPHP~
sakuraikotone
1
1.8k
Claude Codeログ基盤の構築
giginet
PRO
7
3.9k
Featured
See All Featured
brightonSEO & MeasureFest 2025 - Christian Goodrich - Winning strategies for Black Friday CRO & PPC
cargoodrich
3
150
GraphQLの誤解/rethinking-graphql
sonatard
75
12k
Max Prin - Stacking Signals: How International SEO Comes Together (And Falls Apart)
techseoconnect
PRO
0
140
DevOps and Value Stream Thinking: Enabling flow, efficiency and business value
helenjbeal
1
160
The Straight Up "How To Draw Better" Workshop
denniskardys
239
140k
GraphQLとの向き合い方2022年版
quramy
50
14k
StorybookのUI Testing Handbookを読んだ
zakiyama
31
6.7k
ReactJS: Keep Simple. Everything can be a component!
pedronauck
666
130k
The AI Revolution Will Not Be Monopolized: How open-source beats economies of scale, even for LLMs
inesmontani
PRO
3
3.3k
Code Review Best Practice
trishagee
74
20k
Templates, Plugins, & Blocks: Oh My! Creating the theme that thinks of everything
marktimemedia
31
2.7k
Understanding Cognitive Biases in Performance Measurement
bluesmoon
32
2.8k
Transcript
How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem Neil Matatall
OWASP SD 4/17/2014
Me • Twitter appsec engineer • I’m actually just a
developer • In the business of going out of business • Sick and tired of fixing XSS
XSS is so 1998
So is XSS prevention
What is XSS <input name=“id” value=“<%=id%>”>
What is XSS ”><script>badStuff()</script>
What is XSS <input name=“id” value=“”> <script>badStuff()</script> ”>
What is XSS <script> var id=<%=id%>; </script>
What is XSS 0;badStuff();
What is XSS <script> var id=0; badStuff() </script>
What is XSS <script> setInterval(1000, ‘<%=todo%>’) </script>
What is XSS badStuff();
What is XSS <script> setInterval(1000, ‘badStuff()’) </script>
What is XSS <input name=“id” onBlur=“doStuff(<%=id %>)”>
What is XSS ); badStuff(
What is XSS <input name=“id” onBlur=“doStuff(); badStuff()”>
What is XSS <a href=“<%=link%>”>Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS javascript:badThings()
What is XSS <a href=“javascript:badThings()”> Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick=“doThing(‘<%=link%>’)”> Hi Mom! </a>
What is XSS ');badStuff('
What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick= “doThing(‘');badStuff('’)” > Hi Mom!
</a>
What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick= “doThing(‘’);badStuff(‘’)”> Hi Mom! </a>
What is DOM XSS <script> document.body.innerHTML = document.getElementById(‘name’).value; </script>
What is DOM XSS
What is DOM XSS <body> <img src=x onError=badThings()> </body>
What is DOM XSS <script> var name = $(‘#name’).val $(‘body’).html(name)
</script>
What is DOM XSS
What is DOM XSS <body> <img src=x onError=badThings()> </body>
jQuery is XSS $(data)
What is XSS <style> a { color: <%=usersFavoriteColor%>; } </style>
What is XSS I dunno, something with SVG, CSS Expressions,
etc. The list grows.
Because Dr. Mario
Because Dr. Mario
Why do those crazy things?
CODE != DATA “select * from table where id =
“ + id “<a href=“ + link + “>text</a>”
But we don’t do stupid things
I will religiously escape content
I will religiously escape content part 2
JSFuck - Write any JavaScript with 6 Characters: []()!+ I
will religiously escape content part 3
None
I’ll sanitize / validate input
I’ll use a scanner
I’ll perform periodic assessments
Security is about layers
None
Thermos? Koozie?
<script>goodStuff()</script> <script>badStuff()</script> How does the browser know?
What is dangerous? • inline javascript • <script>…</script> • <input
onBlur=“…”> • <a href=“javascript:…”> • on-the-fly code generation • setTimeout, eval, new Function(“…”)
What’s a CSP??? default-src ‘self’; connect-src ‘self’; font-src ‘self’ data:;
frame-src ‘self’ about: javascript:; frame-ancestors https://twitter.com; img-src https://mycdn.xom data:; media-src ‘https://mycdn.xom; object-src ‘none’; script-src https://mycdn.xom; style-src 'unsafe-inline' https://mycdn.xom; report-uri https://twitter.com/scribes/csp_report
CSP is more than XSS protection
Nothing is free
Report-Only mode
Techniques for removing inline javascript
Removing the dangerous stuff
CSP 1.1 • Whitelisting inline <script> in a safe way
Inline code <script> stuff() </script>
Nonces <script nonce=“34298734…”> stuff() </script>
Hashes <script> stuff() </script>
Hashes are more secure, and more limited than nonces
What you still can’t do • Inline event handlers •
<input onBlur=“doGoodThing()”> • <a href=“javascript:…”> • Dynamic javascript • <script> var id=<%=id%> </script> • Hash values won’t match • Nonce provides absolutely no security
Automatic CSP Protection (Silverish bullet)
Whitelisting javascript • Find all javascript • Compute all hash
values • Whitelist scripts with corresponding hashes
Assume: Sane web framework • Do a regular expression search
over all templates, capture all inline javascript • Store a map of the hash(es) in each individual file • Each time the file is rendered, add the corresponding hashes to the header
Developer productivity • Serve dynamic hash values in (!production), serve
hardcoded hash values in production
None