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How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem
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Neil Matatall
September 12, 2014
Programming
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160
How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem
More ramblings about how awesome csp and how it solves all of your problems.
Neil Matatall
September 12, 2014
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Transcript
How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem Neil Matatall
OWASP SD 4/17/2014
Me • Twitter appsec engineer • I’m actually just a
developer • In the business of going out of business • Sick and tired of fixing XSS
XSS is so 1998
So is XSS prevention
What is XSS <input name=“id” value=“<%=id%>”>
What is XSS ”><script>badStuff()</script>
What is XSS <input name=“id” value=“”> <script>badStuff()</script> ”>
What is XSS <script> var id=<%=id%>; </script>
What is XSS 0;badStuff();
What is XSS <script> var id=0; badStuff() </script>
What is XSS <script> setInterval(1000, ‘<%=todo%>’) </script>
What is XSS badStuff();
What is XSS <script> setInterval(1000, ‘badStuff()’) </script>
What is XSS <input name=“id” onBlur=“doStuff(<%=id %>)”>
What is XSS ); badStuff(
What is XSS <input name=“id” onBlur=“doStuff(); badStuff()”>
What is XSS <a href=“<%=link%>”>Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS javascript:badThings()
What is XSS <a href=“javascript:badThings()”> Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick=“doThing(‘<%=link%>’)”> Hi Mom! </a>
What is XSS ');badStuff('
What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick= “doThing(‘');badStuff('’)” > Hi Mom!
</a>
What is XSS <a href=“#” onClick= “doThing(‘’);badStuff(‘’)”> Hi Mom! </a>
What is DOM XSS <script> document.body.innerHTML = document.getElementById(‘name’).value; </script>
What is DOM XSS
What is DOM XSS <body> <img src=x onError=badThings()> </body>
What is DOM XSS <script> var name = $(‘#name’).val $(‘body’).html(name)
</script>
What is DOM XSS
What is DOM XSS <body> <img src=x onError=badThings()> </body>
jQuery is XSS $(data)
What is XSS <style> a { color: <%=usersFavoriteColor%>; } </style>
What is XSS I dunno, something with SVG, CSS Expressions,
etc. The list grows.
Because Dr. Mario
Because Dr. Mario
Why do those crazy things?
CODE != DATA “select * from table where id =
“ + id “<a href=“ + link + “>text</a>”
But we don’t do stupid things
I will religiously escape content
I will religiously escape content part 2
JSFuck - Write any JavaScript with 6 Characters: []()!+ I
will religiously escape content part 3
None
I’ll sanitize / validate input
I’ll use a scanner
I’ll perform periodic assessments
Security is about layers
None
Thermos? Koozie?
<script>goodStuff()</script> <script>badStuff()</script> How does the browser know?
What is dangerous? • inline javascript • <script>…</script> • <input
onBlur=“…”> • <a href=“javascript:…”> • on-the-fly code generation • setTimeout, eval, new Function(“…”)
What’s a CSP??? default-src ‘self’; connect-src ‘self’; font-src ‘self’ data:;
frame-src ‘self’ about: javascript:; frame-ancestors https://twitter.com; img-src https://mycdn.xom data:; media-src ‘https://mycdn.xom; object-src ‘none’; script-src https://mycdn.xom; style-src 'unsafe-inline' https://mycdn.xom; report-uri https://twitter.com/scribes/csp_report
CSP is more than XSS protection
Nothing is free
Report-Only mode
Techniques for removing inline javascript
Removing the dangerous stuff
CSP 1.1 • Whitelisting inline <script> in a safe way
Inline code <script> stuff() </script>
Nonces <script nonce=“34298734…”> stuff() </script>
Hashes <script> stuff() </script>
Hashes are more secure, and more limited than nonces
What you still can’t do • Inline event handlers •
<input onBlur=“doGoodThing()”> • <a href=“javascript:…”> • Dynamic javascript • <script> var id=<%=id%> </script> • Hash values won’t match • Nonce provides absolutely no security
Automatic CSP Protection (Silverish bullet)
Whitelisting javascript • Find all javascript • Compute all hash
values • Whitelist scripts with corresponding hashes
Assume: Sane web framework • Do a regular expression search
over all templates, capture all inline javascript • Store a map of the hash(es) in each individual file • Each time the file is rendered, add the corresponding hashes to the header
Developer productivity • Serve dynamic hash values in (!production), serve
hardcoded hash values in production
None