Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Features
Speaker Deck
PRO
Sign in
Sign up for free
Search
Search
駭客看 Django
Search
Sponsored
·
SiteGround - Reliable hosting with speed, security, and support you can count on.
→
Orange
May 26, 2013
Technology
13k
25
Share
Embed
Copy iframe code
Copy JS code
Copy link
Start on current slide
駭客看 Django
Taiwan Python Conference 2013
Orange
May 26, 2013
More Decks by Orange
See All by Orange
Best Practices - The Upload
p8361
0
340
Security in PHP 那些在滲透測試的小技巧
p8361
0
470
網頁安全 Web Security 入門
p8361
0
500
Bug Bounty 獎金獵人甘苦談 - 那些年我回報過的漏洞
p8361
13
37k
那些 Web Hacking 中的奇技淫巧
p8361
16
15k
關於 HITCON CTF 的那些事 之 Web 狗如何在險惡的 CTF 世界中存活?
p8361
6
13k
PHPConf 2013 - 矛盾大對決
p8361
53
29k
0-Day 輕鬆談 - Happy Fuzzing Internet Explorer
p8361
15
13k
Other Decks in Technology
See All in Technology
Claude Teamプランの コスト最適化を考える
rfdnxbro
1
830
いかに伝えるか 〜新卒エンジニアの教育のための、ライトノベル活用の一例
ikedon
1
110
All About Sansan – for New Global Engineers
sansan33
PRO
1
1.5k
アクセスキー流出時の対応で再認識した攻撃側と防御側の非対称性について
kazzpapa3
1
460
サーバー常駐型の 簡易障害調査AI エージェントを作ってみた話
masayoshi
1
460
マイナンバーカード本人確認の実装比較(OAuth/OIDC Numa (Immersion) Workshop 2026) / 20260825 numa-12
oidfj
PRO
0
360
書籍『生成AIの安全性入門』の入門
wataoka
0
140
全社に広がるMCPサーバーを、 どう安全に管理するか MCPass開発の舞台裏
mtpooh
3
200
あなたの知らないバージョン命名規則
sat
PRO
2
870
hookで自作する Claude Code の「実況ボード」
shinyasaita
2
250
NANDでも描画したい!
nichica906
3
830
AI駆動開発を組織で促すために
lycorptech_jp
PRO
7
8.8k
Featured
See All Featured
What the history of the web can teach us about the future of AI
inesmontani
PRO
1
670
JavaScript: Past, Present, and Future - NDC Porto 2020
reverentgeek
52
6.1k
Primal Persuasion: How to Engage the Brain for Learning That Lasts
tmiket
0
440
エンジニアに許された特別な時間の終わり
watany
108
250k
Visualization
eitanlees
152
17k
brightonSEO & MeasureFest 2025 - Christian Goodrich - Winning strategies for Black Friday CRO & PPC
cargoodrich
3
790
Imperfection Machines: The Place of Print at Facebook
scottboms
270
14k
The Limits of Empathy - UXLibs8
cassininazir
1
620
Context Engineering - Making Every Token Count
addyosmani
9
1.1k
Mind Mapping
helmedeiros
PRO
1
340
More Than Pixels: Becoming A User Experience Designer
marktimemedia
3
510
Speed Design
sergeychernyshev
33
2k
Transcript
駭客看 DJANGO 2013/05/26 @ PyCon <
[email protected]
>
本場演講「四不一沒有」
四不一沒有 • 四不 – 我不是駭客 – 我不會寫 django – 不會有 django 新漏洞( 請洽七月台灣駭客年會
) – 這場演講不難,真的很簡單 • 沒有 – 這場演講沒有梗,有笑點的話拜託笑一下
About Me • 蔡政達 aka Orange • 2009 台灣駭客年會競賽 冠軍
• 2011, 2012 全國資安競賽 金盾獎冠軍 • 2011 東京 AVTOKYO 講師 • 2012 香港 VXRLConf 講師 • 台灣 PHPConf, WebConf 講 師 • 專精於 – 駭客攻擊手法 – Web Security – Windows Vulnerability Exploitation
About Me • CHROOT Security Group 成員 • NISRA 資訊安全研究會
成員 • Disclosed – Windows MS12-071(CVE-2012-4775) – Django (CVE-2013-0305) • Blog – http://blog.orange.tw/
2013 年 X 月 O 日 天氣晴,今天是寒假的第一天… 幹, Rails 爆遠端執行代碼漏洞欸
None
Django 會不會有同樣的問題呢? 學生什麼都沒有, 最多的就是時間。 來研究個 Open Source 專案很正常吧!
Vulnerabilities by Year Django
Vulnerabilities by Year Django 同樣情境跟 Rails 比較...
包含至少 8 個 Remote Code Execution
......
其實我今天是來推廣 Rails 開玩笑的啦我沒有要戰語言 T_T
Django 現有的保護機制 Django Security Overview
Security Overview • Built-in XSS protection • Built-in SQL Injection
protection – ORM ( Q Object ) • Built-in CSRF protection – django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware – Check REFERER header – Compare CSRF token
Security Overview • Clickjacking protection – django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware – Optional in settings.py – X-Frame-Options:
SAMEORIGIN
Security Overview • Password hashing is more and more stronger
– Default is PBKDF2 hasher – django.contrib.auth.hahsers – 10000 iterators makes attackers say fuck … $ time python pbkdf2.py mypassword real 0m0.401s user 0m0.260s sys 0m0.074s
攻擊手法 Some Attacking Vectors
Some Attacking Vectors • VERY VERY BASIC attacking way •
Weak admin password • Debug mode on – Leakage URL pattern – Leakage database password
Some Attacking Vectors • Cross-Site Scripting – HttpResponse( html ) – {{
output|safe }} – {% autoescape off %} • Bad HTML style is always vulnerable – <a href="{{ url }}"> # safe – <a href={{ url }}> # unsafe – <a href=xxx onload=alert(/xss/)>
Some Attacking Vectors • SQL Injection in Django ORM – raw(
sql ) is injectable – extra( select=…, where=… ) is also injectable • String concatenate and format string are vulnerable in any case
Some Attacking Vectors • Third-party module security • Py-bcrypt #
CVE-2013-1895 – Authentication bypass • Python Image Library # CVE-2012-3443 – Denied-of-Service • Python XML.sax # CVE-2013-1664 & 1665 – XXE & XEE Injection
XML eXternal Entity Injection Parsing XML Document Type Definition issue
<?xml encoding='utf-8' ?> <!DOCTYPE account[ <!ENTITY output SYSTEM '/etc/passwd'>]> <account> &output; </account>
XML Entity Expansion Injection <?xml encoding='utf-8' ?> <!DOCTYPE account[ <!ENTITY
a "ooo"> <!ENTITY b "&a; &a; &a; &a; &a;"> <!ENTITY c "&b; &b; &b; &b; &b;"> ... <!ENTITY z "&y; &y; &y; &y; &y;"> ]> <account> &z; </account>
Secret Key Leakage Issue (1/3) • Django SECRET_KEY use in
– get_random_string() using in csrf and hash generating – Django session_data encryption – Django signed cookie encryption – ……
Secret Key Leakage Issue (2/3) • Signed cookie store python
object using Pickle – > HTTP_COOKIE – > decode with secret_key – > pickle.loads( … )
Pickle & cPickle • A module that serializing and De-serializing
python objects • Execute command >>> import pickle >>> pickle.loads( "cos\nsystem\n(S'/bin/sh'\ntR." ) • You can observe by using pickletools >>> import pickletools >>> pickletools.dis( "cos\nsystem\n(S'/bin/sh'\ntR." )
Secret Key Leakage Issue (3/3) • Signed_cookie is encoded by
Pickle – > HTTP_COOKIE # malicious cookie – > decode with secret_key – > pickle.loads( … ) # code execution • Protect your SECRET_KEY ( ex .gitignore )
Conclusion • I think Django is a secure framework •
More and more wrapper make the attack difficult • People is always the most dangerous things
Reference • Django Weblog – https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/ • Security in Django – https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/topics/security/
• CVE Details – http://www.cvedetails.com/
Any Questions ? Whatever can be asked
Thanks. <
[email protected]
>