An overview of the evolutionary research useful for understanding the emergence and survival and changes in cooperatives over time, with a special case study on informal food buying clubs.
School of Economics, Mitchell Center for Sustainability Solutions University of Maine The Evolution of Cooperation in Food Buying Clubs University of Missouri Evolution and the Social Sciences March 12, 2018 Photo by David Vázquez on Unsplash
2007 Mathew, S. and Perreault, C. (2015) Behavioural varia,on in 172 small-scale socie,es indicates that social learning is the main mode of human adapta,on, Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 282 (1810), p. 61.
Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Humans change the game Payoffs to ( A , B ) Coordination Game Stag Hunt Player B Stag Hare Player A Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1
• technology • conformity • reputation • social marking • ethnocentrism • xenophobia Biological adaptations to life in social groups }negative factors e.g. see: Choi, Bowles, 2007. The coevolution of parochial altruism and war. Science 318, 636–640.
"an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise" International Cooperative Alliance, 2016
• cooperation central to human uniqueness • cooperatives fundamentally depend cooperation • positive social externalities • emerge in harsh economic conditions
• Free-riding should be observable. • Free-riding should some=mes cause failure (organiza=onal death). • Successful coopera=ves should exhibit more coopera=on than equivalent ‘non-coop’ organiza=ons. • Successful coopera=ves will some=mes hold ins=tu=onal adapta=ons which stabilize coopera=on.
‣ 1863 - North of England Co-opera=ve Wholesale Industrial and Provident Society ‣ 1872 - Co-opera=ve Wholesale Society ‣ 2001 - The Co-opera=ve Group The Co-operative Group One Angel Square, CCBY2.0, wikimedia commons
arrangements for the benefit of its members… • …for the promotion of sobriety, a temperance hotel be opened in one of the Society’s houses as soon as convenient. bits... Fairbairn, 1994
3. Limited return on equity. 4. Surplus belongs to members. 5. Education of members, officers, public. 6. Cooperation between cooperatives. Fairbairn, B. (1994). The Meaning Of Rochdale: The Rochdale Pioneers And The Co- Operative Principles (Occasional Papers No. 31778). University of Saskatchewan, Centre for the Study of Co-operatives institutional descent with modification
for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Elinor Ostrom Courtesy of Indiana University Institutional Design Principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collective-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanctions 6. Conflict resolution 7. Self determination 8. Nested governance Wilson, Ostrom, & Cox, 2013. Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 90, 21– S32. are group cultural adaptations:
• Free-riding should be observable. • Free-riding should some=mes cause failure (organiza=onal death). • Successful coopera=ves should exhibit more coopera=on than equivalent ‘non-coop’ organiza=ons. • Successful coopera=ves will some=mes hold ins,tu,onal adapta,ons which stabilize coopera=on.
entrepreneur ! Internet Farmer - Marketing & online ordering for local food. ! BuyingClubSoftware.com ! Buying Clubs - groups of people who join together to purchase food in bulk, for price savings and access special foods. Jeremy Bloom Founder, BuyingClubSoftware.com
club (using buyingclubsoeware) • club lasted: 2009 - 2015 • she remained leader, 4-6 hrs/wk • 3 roles grew to 15 jobs, more coopera=on with larger size • open door policy too costly • “had to make joining harder” -> caused club to shrink • personality fric=on, differing visions, bending of rules • kids, space -> Natasha leaves, 1yr later it’s dead 1-Free-riding is observable. 2-Free-riding might have caused failure.
purchases were local - 50% of coordinators believe more sharing would benefit the group Preferences - 33% joined to save money on food - 84% joined to support local producers Demographics - Mean HH income: 65,000, HH size: 3 - 63% bachelor’s or higher - 95% female
• Free-riding should be observable. • Free-riding should some=mes cause failure (organiza=onal death). • Successful coopera=ves should exhibit more coopera,on than equivalent organiza,ons. • Successful coopera=ves will oeen hold ins=tu=onal adapta=ons which stabilize coopera=on.
from typical (Engel, 2011) Mean public goods donation: 66% of endowment 74% increase from typical (Zelmer, 2003) Elevated levels of cooperation when compared to other study populations
• Free-riding should be observable. • Free-riding should some=mes cause failure (organiza=onal death). • Successful coopera=ves should exhibit more coopera=on than equivalent ‘non-coop’ organiza=ons. • Successful coopera=ves will oeen hold ins=tu=onal adapta=ons which stabilize coopera=on.
between members on shared purchases (splits) ! Preferences vary, requires cooperation. ! Agents record the ratio of the help they’ve received versus given. ! Use ratio to determine two choices: help/don’t, and stay/leave Buying Club Simulations
diversifica=on, adapta=on). 2. All organiza=ons rely on coopera=on & human prosocial ins=ncts. 3. Coopera=ves are a good model organiza=on because they are vulnerable to the challenge of coopera=on. 4. Coopera=ves may be considered the ancestral human organiza=on. Evolu,on of organiza,ons
organiza=on. 2. Free-riding is a perpetual problem for coopera=ves. 3. Successful coopera=ves have ins=tu=onal adapta=ons which help solve the free-rider problem. 4. The coopera=ve principles are (were?) and example of such an adapta=on. 5. Coopera=ves tend to be out-competed by compe=tors with fewer internal challenges. 6. Coopera=ves tend to emerge in harsh economic environments because that’s how humans solve problems. Evolu,on of coopera,ves
Tim Waring
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reverentgeek
rmw
skipperchong
carmenhchung
keathley
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clairelew
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jcasabona
