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Healthcare Threat Modeling Vignettes
Application threat modeling with risk-centric approaches for the healthcare industry.
ISC2/ASIS International 2015 Security Conference - Anaheim, CA
Monday, September 28, 2015
VerSprite, Inc
September 28, 2015
Transcript
35 slides
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Healthcare Threat Modeling Vigne2es Current threats , a2ack pa2erns,
& risk based countermeasure development for the healthcare industry. 2 -
Speaker Bio » Tony UcedaVélez (“Tony UV”) •
CEO, VerSprite – Global Security ConsulNng Firm • Chapter Leader – OWASP Atlanta (past 7 years) • Author, “Risk Centric Threat Modeling – Process for A2ack SimulaNon & Threat Analysis”, Wiley June 2015 • HHS, Symantec, Dell-‐Secureworks, HIPAA ConsulNng since 2002 3 -
What is a Vigne&e? » (noun) – a brief
evocaNve, descripNon, account or episode 5 -
Importance of Risk based Threat Modeling » CollaboraNve
» EducaNonal » Impact led remediaNon » Builds Security-‐In earlier » SubstanNve (no FUD) 6 -
Threat Modeling MisconcepNons » DFDs are DFDs, not threat
models » An a2ack surface isn’t the full extent of a threat model » Risk & Impact are actually 2 different things » Threats & A2acks are not synonyms » You can’t threat model what you don’t know – know how your app env works and what components exists -
Threat vs. A2acks » Threat /Thret/ • a
statement of an intenNon to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hosNle acNon » A2ack /əˈtak/ • aggressive acNon against (a place or enemy forces) with weapons or armed force -
Process for A2ack SimulaNon & Threat Analysis 1.
Define Business ObjecNves Revenue Compliance (Data Security) Market growth OperaNonal goals Privacy (Data Use, RetenNon) 2. Technology EnumeraNon List server side tech List client side tech List 3rd party technology List frameworks List infrastructure layer tech 3. ApplicaNon DecomposiNon Map out internal/ external APIs IdenNfy calls to data repositories IdenNfy actors IdenNfy data flows Enumerate protocols 4. Threat Analysis IdenNfy threat actors, moNves Threat Data Threat Intel Threat Tabletops 5. Vuln Analysis IdenNfy system vulnerabiliNes IdenNfy sokware/ architecture weaknesses IdenNfy Process Gaps 6. A2ack Modeling IdenNfy Abuse Cases Build A2ack Trees Exploit vulnerabiliNes ProbabilisNc Analysis 7. Residual Risk Analysis Correlate tech risk to biz risk IdenNfy business impact Develop countermeasures -
HC Threat Modeling Benefits » Healthcare Sokware Makers
• Fosters Building Security In or SDL principles • Non-‐intrusive security analysis • CollaboraNve exercises (Dev,Architecture,InfoSec) • Compliments various SDLC methodologies -
HC Threat Modeling Benefits (cont.) » Healthcare EnNNes (HC
Systems, Clinics, Private PracNce) • Provides network & architectural security review • IntrospecNve look at data flow security • Supports ‘living’ threat models that conNnue to evolve • Provides greater security visibility • Non-‐intrusive security analysis -
Healthcare Sokware Maker – Vigne2e #1 » Mobile CareStream
App (iOS) » Used by Primary Care Physicians » Convenient paNent EMR lookup » Clinical Trial/ PharmaceuNcal IntegraNon -
Threat Analysis (Stage IV) » Enumerate threat scenarios
• Threat Data (internal network | system | app logs) • Threat Intel (external DBIR, threat feeds, security advisories) -
Threat Intel Scenarios » Claims Fraud (FDA Reports)
• Performing medically unnecessary services solely for the purpose of generaNng insurance payments (Source: FDA Reports) • MisrepresenNng non-‐covered treatments as medically necessary covered treatments for purposes of obtaining insurance payments » Clinical Drug Trials Fraud (Unique Cases, News) • Faking ‘paNents’ in order to falsify clinical trial parNcipaNon numbers -
Threat Sources for Healthcare » Threat Intel: •
h2ps://hitrustalliance.net/cyber-‐threat-‐xchange • Cyber ThreatXchange – Exchange of cyber related events/ incidents affecNng healthcare • Free and Fee Based SubscripNon (SIEM IntegraNon) • Cyber Discovery Study – Ongoing study of persistence threats in healthcare -
Generic Threat Sources » www.us-‐cert.gov US-‐CERT » www.dhs.gov/about-‐naNonal-‐cybersecurity-‐
communicaNons-‐integraNon-‐center DHS » MulNple commercial opNons • Relate threat intel to threat model -
Vulnerability & Weakness Analysis (Stage V) » ExisNng vulnerability
detecNon efforts can be leveraged » Find vulns|weaknesses that support threat claims » Map CVEs (vulns),CWEs (weaknesses) to CAPEC (a2acks) » A2ack tree now emerges with assets, threats, and vulns on branches -
Stage VI: A2ack & Model » Leveraging Stage II
understanding of your healthcare applicaNon env -‐> build your a2ack surface » A2ack Trees help to speak on the viability of a2acks and mapping to weaknesses (CWEs)/ vulns (CVEs) -
A2ack Tree on CareStream A2acks Sequence & req
around account creaNon A2ack exisNng accounts; social eng implicaNons A2ack accounts that have been idenNfied as valid Weakness exists in app to not control brute forces Abuse use cases to see how sessions are created and maintained Abuse role creaNon use cases A2ack to derive elevate authenNcated sessions Vuln idenNfied during manual tesNng around session mgt Seek support response with session in support link -
Build Trees for the Right Surface q IdenNfy relevant
hosts, networks q Leverage exisNng scan results (< 3 months) q Metadata searches map relaNonship mappings q Build a2ack trees that relate to right targets q Rights targets are those where greatest intel and impact exists -
Healthcare Product Manufacturer – Vigne2e #2 » Manufacturer of
healthcare wearables, implantables » Cyber murder threat moNve against person of interest » Impact 1: Poor PR. Media a2enNon around death of person of interest, celebrity, poliNcian, etc. » Impact 2: MarkeNng Costs. MarkeNng dollars would be needed in order to rebuild product placement. » Impact 3: Sales Loss. Drops in product sales would be a operaNonal impact to a realized a2ack in the threat model. -
Business ObjecNves of
enabled devices (Stage I) » Record paNent EKG (electrocardiogram) » Validate if paNent is having a heart a2ack by trending EKG levels » Medical device can send SMS to hospitals via paNent cell phone » Saves paNent & doctor Nme -
Threat Analysis is Key to Threat Model (Stage IV)
» What is the threat moNve? » Who are the threat actors? » What threat pa2erns affect known vulns/ weaknesses in the environment? » Good threat intel makes risk based decisioning a lot easier. -
A2ack Tree for Implantables q A2acks support
unique threats q Threats against People of Interest (high value targets) q PHI used as intel for more subtle a2acks q Bluetooth capabiliNes for cyber murder q Which of the last slide’s HC threats could realize an a2ack node on this -
33 33 Users Request Responses DMZ (User/Web
Server Boundary) Message Call Account/ Transaction Query Calls Web Server Application Server Application Calls Encryption + Authentication Encryption + Authentication Financial Server Authentication Data Restricted Network (App & DB Server/Financial Server Boundary) Database Server Application Responses Financial Data Auth Data Message Response SQL Query Call Customer Financial Data Internal (Web Server/ App & DB Server Boundary) <SCRIPT>alert(“Cookie”+ document.cookie)</ SCRIPT> Injec*on flaws CSRF, Insecure Direct Obj. Ref, Insecure Remote File Inclusion ESAPI/ ISAPI Filter Custom errors OR ‘1’=’1—‘, Prepared Statements/ Parameterized Queries, Store Procedures ESAPI Filtering, Server RBAC Form Tokeniza*on XSS, SQL Injec*on, Informa*on Disclosure Via errors Broken Authen*ca*on, Connec*on DB PWD in clear Hashed/ Salted Pwds in Storage and Transit Trusted Server To Server Authen*ca*on, SSO Trusted Authen*ca*on, Federa*on, Mutual Authen*ca*on Broken Authen*ca*on/ Impersona*on, Lack of Synch Session Logout Encrypt Confiden*al PII in Storage/Transit Insecure Crypto Storage Insecure Crypto Storage "../../../../etc/passwd %00" Cmd=%3B+mkdir +hackerDirectory http://www.abc.com? RoleID Phishing, Privacy ViolaNons, Financial Loss IdenNty Thek System Compromise, Data AlteraNon, DestrucNon -
PASTA Risk Take Aways » Don’t boil the ocean
or fall vicNm to FUD à Strategize security measures based upon a clear threat model » Impact, Threat, and A2ack viability are key variables » Encompasses more than than just the OSI model; human and process based hacks also