Don’t waste time on learning cryptography: better use it properly

#crypto #security #trust

Presented at Owasp Winter 2017, Kyiv, Ukraine and at DevExperience18 in Iasi, Romania.

1. The typical engineering workflow "we should protect the data, what shall we do", and possible mistakes.
2. What is "boring crypto", what do we want from using crypto-products.
3. Possible solutions: HSM / TPM / software crypto.
4. How to select appropriate software crypto: libs, systems, containers.
5. We want crypto to be similar to the Edison lamp: controllable and boring system.

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If you can't tap on the link inside slides, please open as pdf (button on the right).

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Crypto in our lives: why you shouldn’t spend time learning all the details of the crypto-algorithms. Typical mistakes you make using crypto in your products. How to avoid late night commits, but to code 'fast and boring' instead.

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Links to follow:

Boring crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein
https://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.10.05/slides-djb-20151005-a4.pdf

Why does cryptographic software fail?
https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/cryptobugs:apsys14.pdf

API design for cryptography
https://2017.hack.lu/archive/2017/hacklu-crypto-api.pdf

Encrypting strings in Android: Let’s make better mistakes
https://tozny.com/blog/encrypting-strings-in-android-lets-make-better-mistakes/

Awesome crypto papers
https://github.com/pFarb/awesome-crypto-papers

12 And 1 Ideas How To Enhance Backend Data Security
https://www.cossacklabs.com/backend-data-security-modern-ideas.html

Attestation and Trusted Computing
https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalprojects/bare.pdf

Transcript

1. DON’T WASTE TIME ON LEARNING CRYPTOGRAPHY: BETTER USE IT PROPERLY #devexperience18 @vixentael
2. @vixentael Product Engineer Feel free to reach me with security questions. I do check my inbox :)
4. We want to protect our users’ data
5. We want developers to protect data
6. We want to protect our users’ data HOW? We want developers to protect data
7. WE HAVE USER DATA. WHAT SHALL WE DO?
8. #devexperience18 @vixentael PROTECTING USER DATA: STEPS MISTAKES WE DO
9. 1. DEFINING THE DATA SCOPE sensitive user data GDPR / HIPAA / PCI DSS tech data (keys, logs) #devexperience18 @vixentael
10. 1. DEFINING THE DATA SCOPE sensitive user data GDPR / HIPAA / PCI DSS tech data (keys, logs) mistake 1. wrong scope definition #devexperience18 @vixentael
11. 2. SELECTING ALGORITHM twofish sha1 des md5 #devexperience18 @vixentael
12. twofish sha1 des md5 #owaspkyiv @vixentael 2. SELECTING ALGORITHM mistake 2. bad algo selection
13. THINGS TO DECIDE ON KEY LENGTH DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM #devexperience18 @vixentael
14. https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Symmetric_Encryption_and_Decryption 3. USING ALGORITHM #devexperience18 @vixentael
15. https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Symmetric_Encryption_and_Decryption 3. USING ALGORITHM #devexperience18 @vixentael
16. https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Symmetric_Encryption_and_Decryption 3. USING ALGORITHM mistake 3. wrong params #devexperience18 @vixentael
17. THINGS TO DECIDE ON PADDING KEY LENGTH MODE DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM IV #devexperience18 @vixentael
18. 4. KEY MANAGEMENT user password keys KDF #devexperience18 @vixentael
19. 4. KEY MANAGEMENT user password keys KDF mistake 4. bad key management https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Key_Management_Cheat_Sheet #devexperience18 @vixentael
20. THINGS TO DECIDE ON PADDING KEY LENGTH KEY ROTATION MODE KEY DERIVATION KEY STORAGE KEY EXCHANGE DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM IV KEY REVOCATION #devexperience18 @vixentael
21. 5. INFRASTRUCTURE #devexperience18 @vixentael
22. PADDING KEY LENGTH KEY ROTATION MODE KEY DERIVATION KEY STORAGE THINGS TO DECIDE ON KEY EXCHANGE BACKUPS PLATFORMS DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM IV KEY REVOCATION #devexperience18 @vixentael
24. https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/cryptobugs:apsys14.pdf 269 CVEs from 2011-2014 17% 83% bugs inside crypto libs misuses of crypto libs by individual apps #devexperience18 @vixentael
25. AS USERS WE WANT… more ciphers? #devexperience18 @vixentael
26. AES DES 3DES CBC CFB SEAL Salsa20 RSA DSA #devexperience18 @vixentael
27. AES DES 3DES CBC CFB SEAL Salsa20 RSA DSA OFB SHARK RC4 DSS ECB CTR SEED Blowfish #devexperience18 @vixentael
28. AES DES 3DES CBC CFB SEAL Salsa20 RSA DSA OFB Blowfish SHARK RC4 DSS ECB CTR Twofish Camelia SEED Rabbit ECDSA #devexperience18 @vixentael
29. AS USERS WE WANT… more ciphers! more vulnerabilities! more side channel attacks! more attacks! more constant time checks :) more protocols! more patches! #devexperience18 @vixentael
31. EXCITING, BUT FOR CRYPTO RESEARCHERS ONLY
32. AS USERS WE WANT… more ciphers! BORING CRYPTO #devexperience18 @vixentael
33. BORING CRYPTO — crypto that simply works, solidly resists attacks, never needs any upgrades https://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.10.05/slides-djb-20151005-a4.pdf Daniel J. Bernstein #devexperience18 @vixentael
34. BORING CRYPTO PLUG & PLAY #devexperience18 @vixentael
35. WHAT DO WE WANT? instead of adjusting our resources — SOLVE USE-CASES!
36. WHAT DO WE WANT? — HIGH-LEVEL FUNCTIONS I want to store data securely I want to send data securely I want to verify data integrity #devexperience18 @vixentael
37. WHAT DO WE WANT? store data securely send data securely verify data integrity key derivation key exchange key rotation sign/verify ephemeral keys encr / decr — HIGH-LEVEL FUNCTIONS #devexperience18 @vixentael
38. NOBODY READS DOCS #devexperience18 @vixentael
39. NOBODY READS DOCS “docs are for experts” “I just want to try” “gimme code!” #devexperience18 @vixentael
40. 1. HOW TO START? pod try BoringSSL cmake -DANDROID_ABI=armeabi-v7a \ -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../third_party/ android-cmake/android.toolchain.cmake \ -DANDROID_NATIVE_API_LEVEL=16 \ -GNinja .. https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/HEAD/BUILDING.md #devexperience18 @vixentael
41. easy, architecture-independent installation 1. HOW TO START? #devexperience18 @vixentael
42. 2. SUPPORTED PLATFORMS? *nix OSX web browsers embedded iOS Android Windows minimum expected: #devexperience18 @vixentael
43. cross-platform is not an option anymore cross-platform is a must have 2. SUPPORTED PLATFORMS? #devexperience18 @vixentael
44. OPTIONS WE HAVE
45. #owaspkyiv @vixentael HSM
46. HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE key generation provides cryptoprocessing key storage portable #devexperience18 @vixentael
47. #owaspkyiv @vixentael TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE key management disk protection trust anchor built-in remote attestation provides cryptoprimitives
48. HSM & TPM: PROS fast hardware crypto! trusted environment known security guarantees keys calculations #devexperience18 @vixentael
49. HSM & TPM: CONS vendor lock / vendor trust bad for interactive encryption complicated to maintain (install, upgrade, support, not cross-platform) #devexperience18 @vixentael
50. HSM & TPM: PRO & CONS HSM app plaintext data plaintext data is far away from the place it is used #devexperience18 @vixentael
51. SOFTWARE CRYPTO SYSTEMS https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography any kind of encryption plaintext data is closer to its usage cross-platform
52. https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography SOFTWARE CRYPTO SYSTEMS any kind of encryption plaintext data is closer to its usage cross-platform NO DEVICE TRUST
53. WEBBROWSER CRYPTO: CONS DOM, XSS, NO CODE TRUST #devexperience18 @vixentael
54. HSM/TPM + SOFTWARE CS keys calculations TPM / own software cross-platform take best from both #devexperience18 @vixentael HSM
56. cross-platform easy to install easy to use USING CRYPTO SHOULD BE LIKE.. audited open source time proven well-documented #devexperience18 @vixentael
57. crypto-libraries crypto-systems boxed solutions FORM-FACTOR STAIRS
58. #devexperience18 @vixentael
59. 1. CRYPTO-LIBS implements single or multiple security functions #devexperience18 @vixentael https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography
60. 1. CRYPTO-LIBS libsodium themis https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography implements single or multiple security functions keyczar noise #devexperience18 @vixentael
61. EXAMPLE https://github.com/cossacklabs/themis/wiki/Python-Howto secure messaging with forward secrecy #devexperience18 @vixentael
62. 2. CRYPTO-SYSTEMS combines security functions for solving exact use-case #devexperience18 @vixentael
63. 2. CRYPTO-SYSTEMS axolotl hermes combines security functions for solving exact use-case SSL/TLS ZeroKit #devexperience18 @vixentael
64. EXAMPLE https://github.com/cossacklabs/hermes-core/wiki/Python-tutorial data access control based on crypto-keys python docs/examples/python/hermes_client.py --id USER1 --config=docs/examples/python/config.json --private_key USER1.priv --doc secretfile --read #devexperience18 @vixentael
65. 3. BOXED SOLUTIONS unites crypto-systems and user functions for solving problems #devexperience18 @vixentael
66. 3. BOXED SOLUTIONS truecrypt ssh acra vault unites crypto-systems and user functions for solving problems #devexperience18 @vixentael
67. EXAMPLE https://github.com/cossacklabs/acra/wiki/Trying-Acra-with-Docker database proxy for encrypting / decrypting git clone https://github.com/cossacklabs/acra cd acra/docker docker-compose -f acra-pgsql-ssl-proxy.yml up -d #devexperience18 @vixentael
68. CAN I SOLVE MY USE-CASE USING… boxed solutions
69. CAN I SOLVE MY USE-CASE USING… crypto-libraries crypto-systems boxed solutions more pain
70. CAN I SOLVE MY USE-CASE USING… crypto-libraries crypto-systems boxed solutions more pain even more pain
71. https://www.cossacklabs.com/choose-your-ios-crypto.html
72. THE WORLD DOESN’T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH NEW CRYPTO-ALGORITHMS.
73. THE WORLD DOESN’T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH NEW CRYPTO-ALGORITHMS. PROBLEM IS THAT THEY ARE NOT BORING ENOUGH
74. #devexperience18 @vixentael
75. VS #devexperience18 @vixentael
76. make the light controllable #devexperience18 @vixentael
77. #devexperience18 @vixentael
78. make the crypto security controllable #devexperience18 @vixentael
79. make the crypto security controllable and booooring #devexperience18 @vixentael
80. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
81. LINKS 1 Boring crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein https://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.10.05/slides-djb-20151005-a4.pdf Why does cryptographic software fail? https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/cryptobugs:apsys14.pdf API design for cryptography https://2017.hack.lu/archive/2017/hacklu-crypto-api.pdf
82. LINKS 2 Encrypting strings in Android: Let’s make better mistakes https://tozny.com/blog/encrypting-strings-in-android-lets-make-better-mistakes/ Awesome crypto papers https://github.com/pFarb/awesome-crypto-papers 12 And 1 Ideas How To Enhance Backend Data Security https://www.cossacklabs.com/backend-data-security-modern-ideas.html Attestation and Trusted Computing https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalprojects/bare.pdf
83. MY OTHER SECURITY SLIDES https://github.com/ vixentael/my-talks …and more
84. @vixentael Product Engineer Feel free to reach me with security questions. I do check my inbox :)