Step by step AWS Cloud Hacking

Step by step AWS Cloud Hacking

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andresriancho

October 07, 2019
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  1. Step by Step AWS Cloud Hacking SecTor 2019 @AndresRiancho

  2. The most common attack Using publicly available tools, widely known

    techniques and no zero days. This is how one of your AWS accounts will eventually get compromised.
  3. Storing AWS credentials Most applications running in EC2 instances need

    credentials to consume the AWS API. Developers can provide these in multiple ways: • Hard-coded into the application • Environment variables • Provided via an instance profile
  4. EC2 instance metadata AWS and other cloud service providers attach

    a virtual HTTP server to each compute instance This server stores information about the instance such as host name, IP address, and instance profile credentials
  5. Permissions and least privilege Instance profile credentials have a set

    of IAM permissions that grant access AWS services such as S3, DynamoDB or EC2. Least privilege principle should be used when configuring these permissions, but...
  6. Metadata URLs The instance metadata server lives at: The following

    paths are used to gain access to the instance profile credentials: The first one returns the role name, which is required to perform the second HTTP request. The second HTTP response yields a JSON document containing the credentials. http://169.254.169.254/ /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/{role-name}
  7. Server-Side Request Forgery

  8. Web application vulnerable to SSRF from urllib.request import urlopen from

    flask import request @app.route('/ssrf') def handler(): url = request.args.get('url') return urlopen(url).read()
  9. SSRF Instance metadata Compromised S3 buckets

  10. The attacker's view

  11. None
  12. Enumerate IAM permissions In the AWS cloud there are two

    ways to enumerate permissions for a given credential set: • Use the IAM service to get the role permissions. In most cases this will fail because the role itself has no permission for the IAM API. • Call each AWS API and analyze the response: Brute-force
  13. Read only calls Enumerate Get* / List* / Describe*. Try

    anything else and you might change (break) the target AWS account and generate an undesired denial of service attack. There are thousands of API calls
  14. Pacu permission enumeration The iam__bruteforce_permissions module implements enumeration for only

    two services: SUPPORTED_SERVICES = [ 'ec2', 's3' ]
  15. Permission enumeration enumerate-iam.py

  16. The attacker's view

  17. WebApplicationRole Policy { "Statement":[ { "Effect":"Allow", "Action":[ "s3:*", "lambda:*", "..."

    ], "Resource":"*" } ] } After permission enumeration the attacker knows that he's able to run all read-only API actions for S3 and Lambda. The most common scenario is that all API calls for S3 and Lambda are allowed. Even after permission enumeration there are many things the attacker doesn't know.
  18. Escalating IAM privileges Most attackers will try to elevate privileges

    to a principal with full access to the AWS account There are 28 well known privilege escalation techniques. Most of them are implemented in Pacu. { "Statement":[ { "Effect":"Allow", "Action":[ "*", ], "Resource": "*" } ] }
  19. Lambda function and privileged role A commonly exploited privilege escalation

    method: • Identify an existing IAM role with high privileges • Create a new Lambda and associate the role • Run the lambda function The Lambda function will have access to the IAM role, just like EC2 instances have access to EC2 instance profile credentials.
  20. Privilege escalation Getting * on *

  21. None
  22. Hiding the attack There is a small chance of being

    detected when a new lambda function is created and removed. Another alternative is to change the source code for an existing lambda function to include our exploit.
  23. Persistence via trust policies Trust policies limit which principals are

    allowed to iam:AssumeRole. In the compromised AWS account there is an existing trust policy in the AdminRole which allows all principals in the SSO AWS account to assume role.
  24. Persistence via trust policies

  25. { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": ["arn:aws:iam::925877178748:root", "arn:aws:iam::320222540496:root"] }, "Action":

    "sts:AssumeRole" } Trust policy modification { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::925877178748:root" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole" }
  26. Backdooring IAM Role Trust policies

  27. Backdoor notifications Each time the backdoor lambda function runs, the

    attacker receives the ARN for the backdoored role:
  28. None
  29. The Private VPC At this point the attacker was able

    to gain access to most resources in the AWS account. The accounts payable EC2 instance remains out of reach. The VPC is completely isolated from the Internet.
  30. None
  31. Pivoting into VPC networks vpc-vpn-pivot automates the process of creating

    a VPN between the attacker's workstation and a VPC.
  32. Pivoting into VPC networks The permissions required to create a

    VPN connection using vpc-vpn-pivot depend on the technique being exploited. When no permissions are limiting the attack the default technique with AWS Client VPN is used
  33. Connecting to private VPCs vpc-vpn-pivot

  34. None
  35. Attack summary From SSRF to complete pwn

  36. None
  37. Top #3 Countermeasures Blue team tips

  38. AWS credential compromise AWS credentials for your company accounts will

    be eventually compromised by an evil third-party. SSRF is the most common attack vector but others such as credentials hard-coded in applications, misconfigured AWS Cognito instances, phishing and developer workstation compromise also exist. The following countermeasures focus on reducing blast radius and threat detection.
  39. 1# Least privilege principle Implement least privilege principle for all

    IAM principals. Restricted permissions on the web server role WebApplicationRole will prevent S3 bucket access and privilege escalation Restricted permissions on MonitoringRole would have reduced the impact of the privilege escalation.
  40. 2# Use multiple AWS accounts Reduce the blast radius of

    any breach by using different AWS accounts to host your company workloads. The accounts payable application should have been deployed in a different AWS account within the same AWS Organization.
  41. 3# Monitoring Every action performed during this attack created a

    log entry in CloudTrail, but nobody watches the logs. Use StreamAlert and GuardDuty to identify threats in your AWS accounts.
  42. Closing thoughts

  43. Key takeaways These are the three most important things to

    remember: • It is possible to enumerate AWS credential permissions in a fast, safe and in-depth manner using enumerate-iam • Cloud exploitation can be automated using pacu • Private VPC networks can be breached using vpc-vpn-pivot Follow @AndresRiancho on twitter for more interesting cloud security content
  44. Thanks!

  45. For hire Does your company or startup need these services?

    • Cloud Security Assessment • Intro to AWS Hacking training • Application Penetration Test • Source Code Review Let me know, I can help you deliver secure web applications.