Presented at the Swedish Congress of Philosophy, june 2026
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Active Inference (AIF) is a comprehensive, normative framework that offers a unified perspective on how living organisms, including humans, interact with their environment. Since it offers a novel way to explain the neural and cognitive processes underlying sentient behavior, it has gained a lot of traction in fields such as neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology. In essence, it describes organisms as inference engines that minimize prediction error through an internal generative model.
But where do phenomenal experiences fit into all this? While AIF is currently the most structurally ambitious framework linking action, inference, and cognition, it faces an explanatory "Simulation Gap": It characterizes mental states as probabilistic descriptions like "precision-weighted beliefs" without accounting for the first-person nature of phenomenal experiences. Current accounts often identify conscious content with "higher-level posterior beliefs", yet these remain abstract mathematical descriptions rather than explanations of phenomenology. This opens up a gap to the phenomenologically structured experience of consciousness, and a comprehensive theory would need a clear explanation of how this gap is to be bridged.
I argue that this Simulation Gap arises because AIF characterizes beliefs at the level of probabilistic state description without specifying their representational format. One way to bridge this gap is to understand conscious experience as policy-indexed, egocentric generative simulations, thereby giving phenomenal structure to otherwise abstract belief states. That would provide AIF the first-person perspective that objective state descriptions lack and turn AIF into a full-fledged explanation of brain, mind, and consciousness.