stored in text files called zones ▪ Listens on UDP port 53 for name resolution queries ▪ Listens on TCP port 53 for zone transfer queries DNS Client: ▪ Runs a service - resolver ▪ Handles interaction with DNS Server for resolving domain names and IP addresses through records
security considerations • Was initially designed for small networks with trusted hosts • No check for authenticity and integrity added • Unfortunately with growth of network DNS remained unchanged • Resulted in lots of threats because of the above issues
Leakage/DNS Footprinting 3. DNS Amplification Attack 4. DNS Client flooding 5. DNS Cache poisoning 6. DNS Vulnerabilities in Shared Host Environments 7. DNS Man in the Middle Attacks - DNS Hijacking 8. Typosquatting
Server • Command line or GUI interface provided for configuration of DNS records • In this attack, the attacker first gains direct access to the server Security measure: Restrict access to DNS server
a copy of its database (called “zone”) to another DNS Server. • Slave DNS Servers ask for zone transfer from Master DNS Server • Attacker pretends to be a Slave DNS Server • DNS records reveal about the topology of the network Security measure: Restrict zone transfers to particular IP addresses or use any other kind of authentication
DOS attack on victim host • Attacker sends DNS request packets to a genuine DNS Server with source IP spoofed as victim’s IP. • Amplified responses go to victim.
packets to the DNS server • Preferably request for invalid domains • The DNS server tries to spend all of its resources on finding the IP • Resources exhausted for legitimate requests
is confusingly similar to an existing popular brand • The attacker registers similar sounding domain names. • This threat does not target a particular victim.
IETF started a discussion to make DNS secure by adding a set of extensions to it. • Backward compatibility ensured • Performance issues kept in mind • Provides authentication and integrity to DNS • Unfortunately still not widely adopted