Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Sign up for free
Menu
Search
Features
All features
Private URLs
Password Protection
Custom URLS
Scheduled publishing
Remove Branding
Restrict embedding
Deck Collections
Notes
Features
All features
Private URLs
Password Protection
Custom URLS
Scheduled publishing
Remove Branding
Restrict embedding
Deck Collections
Notes
Explore
Featured decks
Featured speakers
Programming
Technology
Storyboards
Explore
Featured decks
Featured speakers
Programming
Technology
Storyboards
Pricing
Search
Sign in
Sign up for free
Building an automated DDoS mitigation pipeline
Search
Sponsored
·
SiteGround - Reliable hosting with speed, security, and support you can count on.
→
majek04
January 23, 2016
Programming
1.4k
5
Share
Embed
Copy iframe code
Copy JS code
Copy link
Start on current slide
Building an automated DDoS mitigation pipeline
majek04
January 23, 2016
More Decks by majek04
See All by majek04
Keeloq_AD_2025__1_.pdf
majek04
0
55
BPF programmable socket lookup
majek04
0
690
Linux at Cloudflare
majek04
3
8.9k
DDoS Landscape
majek04
0
450
Inside Cloudbleed
majek04
3
3.1k
Golang sucks
majek04
21
53k
Gatelogic - Somewhat functional reactive framework in Python
majek04
1
5.4k
How Cloudflare deals with largest DDoS attacks?
majek04
2
3.7k
Why we chose Service Worker API
majek04
0
3k
Other Decks in Programming
See All in Programming
A2UI for Android: Safely Rendering AI-Generated UI with Jetpack Compose - DroidKaigi 2026
itsmedreamwalker
0
120
高専キャリア LT 発表内容
crysta1221
6
5.7k
[GoCon2026] When Goroutines Are Not Enough: Runtime Locality in High-Throughput Go
takehaya
6
2.1k
スマート反転とウェブアクセシビリティ
camiha
0
200
巨大モノリシックアプリ モダン化大作戦
ktcryomm
0
980
市販E-Readerを乗っ取れ 〜Embedded Swiftで電子ペーパーガジェットを制御する〜
trickart
0
190
標準パッケージに uuid が追加された 背景から見る Go らしい意思決定 / go_127_uuid_decision
convto
5
6.7k
GKE で Pod の見方を変えたら、スケールアウト時の挙動を真に捉えられた話
stkk
0
110
AgentCore CLI で進化した AWS での AI エージェントの作り方 : 必要な機能を必要な時に
icoxfog417
PRO
3
340
技術的負債の返済は、AI時代の複利で効く投資 — 経営としての意思決定とその遂行
curekoshimizu
0
780
WebMCP Challenge に星空観察アプリで参加した話
okajun35
0
160
Security issues being discussed on Web Platforms
petamoriken
0
880
Featured
See All Featured
Dealing with People You Can't Stand - Big Design 2015
cassininazir
367
27k
Side Projects
sachag
456
43k
Effective software design: The role of men in debugging patriarchy in IT @ Voxxed Days AMS
baasie
0
520
Why Mistakes Are the Best Teachers: Turning Failure into a Pathway for Growth
auna
0
280
Build The Right Thing And Hit Your Dates
maggiecrowley
39
3.4k
What the history of the web can teach us about the future of AI
inesmontani
PRO
1
690
The SEO identity crisis: Don't let AI make you average
varn
0
560
WENDY [Excerpt]
tessaabrams
13
39k
Are puppies a ranking factor?
jonoalderson
2
3.9k
What’s in a name? Adding method to the madness
productmarketing
PRO
24
4.2k
The Power of CSS Pseudo Elements
geoffreycrofte
82
6.6k
Everyday Curiosity
cassininazir
0
320
Transcript
Building an automated DDoS Mitigation Pipeline Marek Majkowski
2 "Help Build a Better Internet"
Content neutral 3
DDoS is a threat 4
5 Malicious Attacker Internet Provider Origin Server CloudFlare Server trust
& safety team w orking w ith operators public outreach Big effort im proving our infrastructure
6 Automated DDoS Mitigations Malicious Attacker Internet Provider Origin Server
CloudFlare Server autom ating m itigations
7 attack volume CloudFlare network capacity >
BGP Nullroute and move on 8 ! route 1.2.3.4/32 {!
discard;! community [ 13335:666 13335:668 13335:36006 ];! }!
attack volume CloudFlare network capacity < 9
10 BGP Nullrouting Router firewall Server firewall Application Less damage
Reducing damage
11 BGP Nullrouting IP Router firewall IP, port, packet length
Server firewall all above + stateless DPI parameters Application all above + application logic More precision Reducing damage
12 Operator Precision Speed
13
14 Automation Precision Speed
15 Gatebot Precision Speed Automatic attack handling
Attack Detection Automatic attack handling 16 Mitigation Reactive Automation
The attack 17
High volume packet floods 18 Packets per second
DNS packet flood 19 ! $ tcpdump -ni eth2 inbound
and port 53 -c 100! ! IP 202.194.181.95.15443 > 1.2.3.4:53: 63476% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 221.12.236.115.6570 > 1.2.3.4:53: 11406% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.94.134.43.18473 > 1.2.3.4:53: 8559% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.196.66.75.32573 > 1.2.3.4:53: 47971% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 124.240.198.136.2333 > 1.2.3.4:53: 61152% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 218.247.70.185.11679 > 1.2.3.4:53: 16360% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 202.109.218.98.27549 > 1.2.3.4:53: 17829% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.148.240.82.21825 > 1.2.3.4:53: 22590% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 211.167.108.67.25782 > 1.2.3.4:53: 17663% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.209.60.18.20221 > 1.2.3.4:53: 38257% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.81.181.168.12749 > 1.2.3.4:53: 53492% [1au] A? example.com. (50)!
1 in 10k packets is "real" 20
Finding attack parameters 21 ! IP 202.194.181.95.15443 > 1.2.3.4:53: 63476%
[1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 221.12.236.115.6570 > 1.2.3.4:53: 11406% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.94.134.43.18473 > 1.2.3.4:53: 8559% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.196.66.75.32573 > 1.2.3.4:53: 47971% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 124.240.198.136.2336 > 1.2.3.4:53: 61152% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 218.247.70.185.11679 > 1.2.3.4:53: 16360% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 202.109.218.98.27549 > 1.2.3.4:53: 17829% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.148.240.82.21825 > 1.2.3.4:53: 22590% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 211.167.108.67.25782 > 1.2.3.4:53: 17663% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.209.60.18.20221 > 1.2.3.4:53: 38257% [1au] A? example.com. (50)! IP 203.81.181.168.12749 > 1.2.3.4:53: 53492% [1au] A? example.com. (50)!
Mitigation 22 Mitigation Operator
Where to DROP? 23 Application iptables Router
Traffic matching with BPF 24 ! iptables -A INPUT \!
--dst 1.2.3.4 \! -p udp --dport 53 \! -m bpf --bytecode "14,0 0 0 20,177 0 0 0,12 0 0 0,7 0 0 0,64 0 0 0,21 0 7 124090465,64 0 0 4,21 0 5 1836084325,64 0 0 8,21 0 3 56848237,80 0 0 12,21 0 1 0,6 0 0 1,6 0 0 0" \! -j DROP!
25 ! ldx 4*([14]&0xf)! ld #34! add x! tax! lb_0:!
ldb [x + 0]! add x! add #1! tax! ld [x + 0]! jneq #0x07657861, lb_1! ld [x + 4]! jneq #0x6d706c65, lb_1! ld [x + 8]! jneq #0x03636f6d, lb_1! ldb [x + 12]! jneq #0x00, lb_1! ret #1! lb_1:! ret #0! BPF bytecode
26
Deployment 27 iptables Mitigation Database
Mitigation database 28 ! $ gatekeeper dnsbpf list! --ip=1.2.3.4 *.example.com!
--ip=4.3.2.1 www.test.de *.www.test.de! --ip=4.3.4.4 *.cloudflare.com --except=www.** --except=ns1.**! --ip=2.3.1.4 www.onedomain.com,wwww.seconddomain.com! --ip=1.2.3.0/24 test.com! ! $ gatekeeper dnsbpf add -- --ip=4.3.2.1 *.newattack.com!
Detection 29 Attack Detection
Sflow 30 Sflow Central Aggregation
What is an "attack"? 31
"Attack" is large 32 Large attacks Small attacks Packets per
second
33 Attacks Mitigation "Attack" can be mitigated Attack Detection Mitigation
Database Attack Description = Mitigation 33 iptables Sflow
34 ! Mpps Descr! 3.878 --ip=141.245.59.191/32! 2.878 --ip=141.245.59.192/32! 1.878 --ip=141.245.59.193/32!
1.878 --ip=141.245.59.194/32! 1.878 --ip=141.245.59.195/32! 1.878 --ip=141.245.59.196/32! 1.878 --ip=141.245.59.197/32! 1.878 --ip=141.245.59.198/32! 1.878 --ip=141.245.59.199/32! ...! ! Mpps Descr! 35.878 --ip=141.245.59.0/24! vs "Attacks" shall be aggregated
35 An attack-finding algorithm
Top N / Heavy hitters • Fixed memory size; Algorithm:
Space Saving • https://github.com/cloudflare/golibs 36 pps IP 12.2M 1.2.3.4 2.4M 42.1.2.4 0.01M 2.4.3.1 0.01M 192.168.1.1
Multiple dimensions 37 pps IP:port 12.2M 1.2.3.4:53 2.4M 42.1.2.4:80 0.01M
2.4.3.1:80 0.01M 192.168.1.1:443 pps IP 12.2M 1.2.3.4 2.4M 42.1.2.4 0.01M 2.4.3.1 0.01M 192.168.1.1 pps subnet 12.2M 1.2.3.0/24 2.4M 42.1.2.0/24 0.01M 2.4.3.0/24 0.01M 192.168.1.0/24
Multiple dimensions 38 pps IP:port 12.2M 1.2.3.4:53 2.4M 42.1.2.4:80 0.01M
2.4.3.1:80 0.01M 192.168.1.1:443 pps IP 12.2M 1.2.3.4 2.4M 42.1.2.4 0.01M 2.4.3.1 0.01M 192.168.1.1 pps subnet 12.2M 1.2.3.0/24 2.4M 42.1.2.0/24 0.01M 2.4.3.0/24 0.01M 192.168.1.0/24 incoming sample: 42.1.2.4:80
Multiple dimensions 39 pps IP:port 12.2M 1.2.3.4:53 2.4M 42.1.2.4:80 0.01M
2.4.3.1:80 0.01M 192.168.1.1:443 pps IP 12.2M 1.2.3.4 2.4M 42.1.2.4 0.01M 2.4.3.1 0.01M 192.168.1.1 pps subnet 12.2M 1.2.3.0/24 2.4M 42.1.2.0/24 0.01M 2.4.3.0/24 0.01M 192.168.1.0/24 reporting threshold: 1M
Attack report 40 ! Mpps Descr! 12.2 --ip=1.2.3.4 --port=53! 2.4
--ip=42.1.2.4 --port=80! 12.2 --ip=1.2.3.4! 2.4 --ip=42.1.2.4! 12.2 --ip=1.2.3.0/24! 2.4 --ip=42.1.2.0/24!
Multiple dimensions 41 pps IP:port 12.2M 1.2.3.4:53 2.4M 42.1.2.4:80 0.01M
2.4.3.1:80 0.01M 192.168.1.1:443 pps IP 0.1M 1.2.3.4 0M 42.1.2.4 0.01M 2.4.3.1 0.01M 192.168.1.1 pps subnet 0.1M 1.2.3.0/24 0M 42.1.2.0/24 0.01M 2.4.3.0/24 0.01M 192.168.1.0/24 incoming sample: 42.1.2.4:80
Attack report 42 ! Mpps Descr! 12.2 --ip=1.2.3.4 --port=53! 2.4
--ip=42.1.2.4 --port=80!
Scales well 43
Reactive automation 44 Reactive Automation
Connecting the pieces 45 sflow iptables Attack Detection Mitigation Database
?
46 ! --ip=1.2.3.4 example.com! ! --ip=1.2.3.4 example.com --qps=100! Reactive Rule
47 ! --ip=1.2.3.4 example.com --qps=500! ! example.com = FREE |
PAID! Reactive Rule ! --ip=1.2.3.4 example.com!
48 ! --ip=1.2.3.4 example.com --except www,n1,ns2 --qps=500! Reactive Rule !
example.com subdomains:! (www, ns1, ns2)! ! --ip=1.2.3.4 example.com! ! example.com = FREE | PAID!
49 Input Steam extra stream extra stream Output Stream Reactive
Rule
Chain of transformations 50 ! def dns_mitigation(attack, plan, subdomains):! domain
= attack['domain']! ! qps = 100! if plan[domain] == 'business':! qps = 500! ! mitigation =! attack['description'] + \! ' --qps=%s' % qps + \! ' --except=%s'.join(subdomains[domain])! ! return mitigation!
Fully composable 51
Putting it all together 52
Putting it all together 53 Mitigation Database sflow iptables Attack
Detection Reactive Automation 53
Gatebot: frequency 54 Gatebot actions per day 3 months
Gatebot: volume 55 1 week
Summary 56
The fight goes on 57 Malicious Attacker Internet Provider Origin
Server CloudFlare Server trust & safety team w orking w ith operators public outreach im proving our infrastructure
! ! • https://blog.cloudflare.com • https://github.com/cloudflare 58 marek@cloudflare.com @majek04 Thanks!
and good luck! @cfgatebot