Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Features
Speaker Deck
PRO
Sign in
Sign up for free
Search
Search
JAWS Pankration 2024 - Achieve software supply ...
Search
Sponsored
·
Your Podcast. Everywhere. Effortlessly.
Share. Educate. Inspire. Entertain. You do you. We'll handle the rest.
→
Richard Fan
August 25, 2024
Technology
0
46
JAWS Pankration 2024 - Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions
Presented at JAWS Pankration 2024
Richard Fan
August 25, 2024
Tweet
Share
More Decks by Richard Fan
See All by Richard Fan
Preserving privacy on data collaboration with AWS Clean Rooms
richardfan1126
0
49
Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions
richardfan1126
0
140
When Data Collaboration Meets Privacy: Privacy-enhancing Technologies on AWS
richardfan1126
0
55
AWS Security Hub Central Configuration - An Easy way to monitor your Organization security posture
richardfan1126
0
67
Create your first AWS Nitro Enclaves application
richardfan1126
0
59
Building Security Data Lake
richardfan1126
0
17
Other Decks in Technology
See All in Technology
SREのプラクティスを用いた3領域同時 マネジメントへの挑戦 〜SRE・情シス・セキュリティを統合した チーム運営術〜
coconala_engineer
2
770
FinTech SREのAWSサービス活用/Leveraging AWS Services in FinTech SRE
maaaato
0
130
Tebiki Engineering Team Deck
tebiki
0
24k
Context Engineeringが企業で不可欠になる理由
hirosatogamo
PRO
3
660
ブロックテーマ、WordPress でウェブサイトをつくるということ / 2026.02.07 Gifu WordPress Meetup
torounit
0
200
マーケットプレイス版Oracle WebCenter Content For OCI
oracle4engineer
PRO
5
1.6k
20260204_Midosuji_Tech
takuyay0ne
1
160
OWASP Top 10:2025 リリースと 少しの日本語化にまつわる裏話
okdt
PRO
3
840
プロポーザルに込める段取り八分
shoheimitani
1
630
Greatest Disaster Hits in Web Performance
guaca
0
290
~Everything as Codeを諦めない~ 後からCDK
mu7889yoon
3
490
Agile Leadership Summit Keynote 2026
m_seki
1
670
Featured
See All Featured
Git: the NoSQL Database
bkeepers
PRO
432
66k
The #1 spot is gone: here's how to win anyway
tamaranovitovic
2
950
Scaling GitHub
holman
464
140k
Distributed Sagas: A Protocol for Coordinating Microservices
caitiem20
333
22k
Six Lessons from altMBA
skipperchong
29
4.2k
Done Done
chrislema
186
16k
BBQ
matthewcrist
89
10k
The Success of Rails: Ensuring Growth for the Next 100 Years
eileencodes
47
7.9k
jQuery: Nuts, Bolts and Bling
dougneiner
65
8.4k
Building Adaptive Systems
keathley
44
2.9k
Producing Creativity
orderedlist
PRO
348
40k
Build The Right Thing And Hit Your Dates
maggiecrowley
39
3k
Transcript
Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and
GitHub Actions Richard Fan AWS Security Hero
Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package
Consumers Dependencies
How can things go wrong? Source Developers Build Package Consumers
Dependencies Unauthorized code change Compromised repository Build from compromised source code Compromised build process Using compromised dependency Modified package Compromised package store Downloading compromised package
What is SLSA • Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts •
Framework for software integrity • Build trust between software producer and consumer • Different levels of security assurance
SLSA Provenance Birth certificate of the software Software
Achieving SLSA on GitHub Actions
What is GitHub Actions • CI/CD platform • Workflow defined
within code repo • Run on GitHub- / self-hosted runner
GitHub Actions workflow • name: Build and sign EIF •
on: [push] • permissions: • contents: read • packages: write • id-token: write • attestations: write • jobs: • build_and_sign_artifact: • runs-on: ubuntu-latest • steps: # ... Build and push artifact • - name: GitHub attest • uses: actions/
[email protected]
Generate and sign provenance
GitHub Actions workflow
SLSA provenance Built by GitHub Actions Source code version Software
build
Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package
Consumers Dependencies SLSA
The software need to run somewhere Package Server End-users Deployment
Downloading compromised package Compromised deployment process Unauthorized deployment Unauthorized access Accessing compromised API endpoint
AWS Nitro Enclaves • Isolated virtual machine • Run on
EC2 instances • No admin access • No persistent storage • No external networking
Attestation document 1. Generate by Nitro Enclave at runtime 2.
Present attestation document to client app 3. Client validates the document 4. Client validates enclave fingerprint (PCRs)
Where does the software come from? Source Build Package Fingerprint
(PCRs) Enclave application Attest Enclave End-users Attestation document Verify with attested artifact Verify source code and build process
Demo … by yourself
Demo - How high (or low) is my salary? •
This is a difficult question • I want to know how much you earn • But I don’t want you to know how much I earn
Demo - How high is my salary enclave app •
Only tell you where is your salary ranked • Source code is open • Build process is open • Run on AWS Nitro Enclave • Proved by attestation document • Data encrypted between you and the enclave
Demo - How high is my salary enclave app •
https://github.com/richardfan1126/how-high-is-my-salary-enclave-app • Easy setup (Terraform)
How to find me Richard Fan
[email protected]
20 richardfan1126