Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Features
Speaker Deck
PRO
Sign in
Sign up for free
Search
Search
JAWS Pankration 2024 - Achieve software supply ...
Search
Richard Fan
August 25, 2024
Technology
0
33
JAWS Pankration 2024 - Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions
Presented at JAWS Pankration 2024
Richard Fan
August 25, 2024
Tweet
Share
More Decks by Richard Fan
See All by Richard Fan
Preserving privacy on data collaboration with AWS Clean Rooms
richardfan1126
0
39
Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions
richardfan1126
0
110
When Data Collaboration Meets Privacy: Privacy-enhancing Technologies on AWS
richardfan1126
0
50
AWS Security Hub Central Configuration - An Easy way to monitor your Organization security posture
richardfan1126
0
53
Create your first AWS Nitro Enclaves application
richardfan1126
0
47
Building Security Data Lake
richardfan1126
0
16
Other Decks in Technology
See All in Technology
エンジニア向け技術スタック情報
kauche
1
260
フィンテック養成勉強会#54
finengine
0
180
登壇ネタの見つけ方 / How to find talk topics
pinkumohikan
5
510
Observability в PHP без боли. Олег Мифле, тимлид Altenar
lamodatech
0
350
MySQL5.6から8.4へ 戦いの記録
kyoshidaxx
1
260
Delegating the chores of authenticating users to Keycloak
ahus1
0
120
Welcome to the LLM Club
koic
0
190
AIの最新技術&テーマをつまんで紹介&フリートークするシリーズ #1 量子機械学習の入門
tkhresk
0
140
強化されたAmazon Location Serviceによる新機能と開発者体験
dayjournal
2
210
2025-06-26_Lightning_Talk_for_Lightning_Talks
_hashimo2
2
100
SalesforceArchitectGroupOsaka#20_CNX'25_Report
atomica7sei
0
180
あなたの声を届けよう! 女性エンジニア登壇の意義とアウトプット実践ガイド #wttjp / Call for Your Voice
kondoyuko
4
460
Featured
See All Featured
Easily Structure & Communicate Ideas using Wireframe
afnizarnur
194
16k
Reflections from 52 weeks, 52 projects
jeffersonlam
351
20k
Music & Morning Musume
bryan
46
6.6k
Producing Creativity
orderedlist
PRO
346
40k
Practical Orchestrator
shlominoach
188
11k
VelocityConf: Rendering Performance Case Studies
addyosmani
330
24k
"I'm Feeling Lucky" - Building Great Search Experiences for Today's Users (#IAC19)
danielanewman
229
22k
The Cost Of JavaScript in 2023
addyosmani
51
8.5k
Exploring the Power of Turbo Streams & Action Cable | RailsConf2023
kevinliebholz
34
5.9k
Faster Mobile Websites
deanohume
307
31k
CSS Pre-Processors: Stylus, Less & Sass
bermonpainter
357
30k
Building Better People: How to give real-time feedback that sticks.
wjessup
367
19k
Transcript
Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and
GitHub Actions Richard Fan AWS Security Hero
Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package
Consumers Dependencies
How can things go wrong? Source Developers Build Package Consumers
Dependencies Unauthorized code change Compromised repository Build from compromised source code Compromised build process Using compromised dependency Modified package Compromised package store Downloading compromised package
What is SLSA • Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts •
Framework for software integrity • Build trust between software producer and consumer • Different levels of security assurance
SLSA Provenance Birth certificate of the software Software
Achieving SLSA on GitHub Actions
What is GitHub Actions • CI/CD platform • Workflow defined
within code repo • Run on GitHub- / self-hosted runner
GitHub Actions workflow • name: Build and sign EIF •
on: [push] • permissions: • contents: read • packages: write • id-token: write • attestations: write • jobs: • build_and_sign_artifact: • runs-on: ubuntu-latest • steps: # ... Build and push artifact • - name: GitHub attest • uses: actions/
[email protected]
Generate and sign provenance
GitHub Actions workflow
SLSA provenance Built by GitHub Actions Source code version Software
build
Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package
Consumers Dependencies SLSA
The software need to run somewhere Package Server End-users Deployment
Downloading compromised package Compromised deployment process Unauthorized deployment Unauthorized access Accessing compromised API endpoint
AWS Nitro Enclaves • Isolated virtual machine • Run on
EC2 instances • No admin access • No persistent storage • No external networking
Attestation document 1. Generate by Nitro Enclave at runtime 2.
Present attestation document to client app 3. Client validates the document 4. Client validates enclave fingerprint (PCRs)
Where does the software come from? Source Build Package Fingerprint
(PCRs) Enclave application Attest Enclave End-users Attestation document Verify with attested artifact Verify source code and build process
Demo … by yourself
Demo - How high (or low) is my salary? •
This is a difficult question • I want to know how much you earn • But I don’t want you to know how much I earn
Demo - How high is my salary enclave app •
Only tell you where is your salary ranked • Source code is open • Build process is open • Run on AWS Nitro Enclave • Proved by attestation document • Data encrypted between you and the enclave
Demo - How high is my salary enclave app •
https://github.com/richardfan1126/how-high-is-my-salary-enclave-app • Easy setup (Terraform)
How to find me Richard Fan
[email protected]
20 richardfan1126