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JAWS Pankration 2024 - Achieve software supply ...
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Richard Fan
August 25, 2024
Technology
0
41
JAWS Pankration 2024 - Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions
Presented at JAWS Pankration 2024
Richard Fan
August 25, 2024
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Transcript
Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and
GitHub Actions Richard Fan AWS Security Hero
Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package
Consumers Dependencies
How can things go wrong? Source Developers Build Package Consumers
Dependencies Unauthorized code change Compromised repository Build from compromised source code Compromised build process Using compromised dependency Modified package Compromised package store Downloading compromised package
What is SLSA • Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts •
Framework for software integrity • Build trust between software producer and consumer • Different levels of security assurance
SLSA Provenance Birth certificate of the software Software
Achieving SLSA on GitHub Actions
What is GitHub Actions • CI/CD platform • Workflow defined
within code repo • Run on GitHub- / self-hosted runner
GitHub Actions workflow • name: Build and sign EIF •
on: [push] • permissions: • contents: read • packages: write • id-token: write • attestations: write • jobs: • build_and_sign_artifact: • runs-on: ubuntu-latest • steps: # ... Build and push artifact • - name: GitHub attest • uses: actions/
[email protected]
Generate and sign provenance
GitHub Actions workflow
SLSA provenance Built by GitHub Actions Source code version Software
build
Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package
Consumers Dependencies SLSA
The software need to run somewhere Package Server End-users Deployment
Downloading compromised package Compromised deployment process Unauthorized deployment Unauthorized access Accessing compromised API endpoint
AWS Nitro Enclaves • Isolated virtual machine • Run on
EC2 instances • No admin access • No persistent storage • No external networking
Attestation document 1. Generate by Nitro Enclave at runtime 2.
Present attestation document to client app 3. Client validates the document 4. Client validates enclave fingerprint (PCRs)
Where does the software come from? Source Build Package Fingerprint
(PCRs) Enclave application Attest Enclave End-users Attestation document Verify with attested artifact Verify source code and build process
Demo … by yourself
Demo - How high (or low) is my salary? •
This is a difficult question • I want to know how much you earn • But I don’t want you to know how much I earn
Demo - How high is my salary enclave app •
Only tell you where is your salary ranked • Source code is open • Build process is open • Run on AWS Nitro Enclave • Proved by attestation document • Data encrypted between you and the enclave
Demo - How high is my salary enclave app •
https://github.com/richardfan1126/how-high-is-my-salary-enclave-app • Easy setup (Terraform)
How to find me Richard Fan
[email protected]
20 richardfan1126