Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions

Presented at AWS Dev Day Hong Kong 2024

Transcript

1. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Achieve software supply chain security using AWS Nitro Enclaves and GitHub Actions Richard Fan AWS Security Hero
2. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What is Supply Chain Security Introduction to SLSA SLSA on GitHub Actions How AWS Nitro Enclaves fit in Demo Agenda
3. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What is Supply Chain Security
4. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Supply chain attacks
5. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Why supply chain security is difficult • Modern software is complex • Lack of standard • Limited visibility
6. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package Consumers Dependencies
7. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. How can things go wrong?
8. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. How can things go wrong? Source Developers Build Package Consumers Dependencies Unauthorized code change Compromised repository Build from compromised source code Compromised build process Using compromised dependency Modified package Compromised package store Downloading compromised package
9. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Introduction to SLSA
10. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What is SLSA Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts Framework for software integrity Build trust between software producer and consumer Different levels of security assurance
11. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Don’t just sign, Attest! Signing Attestation From trusted source Explicit meaning Detail about the artifact Implicit meaning Limited information From trusted source
12. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. SLSA Provenance
13. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. SLSA Security Level L1 Provenance exist Prevent trivial mistakes L2 Authentic provenance Prevent minor attacks L3 Unforgeable provenance Prevent advanced attacks
14. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Achieving SLSA L3 on GitHub Actions
15. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What is GitHub Actions CI/CD platform Workflow defined within code repo Run on GitHub- / self-hosted runner
16. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. GitHub Actions workflow name: Build and sign EIF on: [push] permissions: contents: read packages: write id-token: write attestations: write jobs: build_and_sign_artifact: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: # ... Build and push artifact - name: GitHub attest uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v1.0.0 GitHub-hosted hardened runner + Runner’s identity Generate and sign provenance Unforgeable provenance =
17. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. GitHub Actions workflow
18. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. SLSA provenance SLSA provenance Built by GitHub Actions Source code version Software output
19. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Where does the software come from? Source Developers Build Package Consumers Dependencies SLSA
20. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. The story is not over yet
21. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. The software need to run somewhere Package Server End-users Deployment Downloading compromised package Compromised deployment process Unauthorized deployment Unauthorized access Accessing compromised API endpoint
22. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. AWS Nitro Enclaves Isolated virtual machine Run on EC2 instances No admin access No persistent storage No external networking
23. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Attestation document Can be obtained within the enclave only Signed by Nitro Secure Module (NSM) Contains information about the enclave Prove the enclave’s identity
24. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Attestation document 1. Present attestation document to client 2. Client validates enclave fingerprint (PCRs) 3. Client uses the public key to encrypt data 4. Client sends encrypted data to enclave
25. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. The full story
26. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Where does the software come from? Source Build Package Fingerprint (PCRs) Enclave Image File (EIF) Attest Enclave End-users Attestation document Verify with attested artifact Verify source code and build process
27. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Demo
28. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Demo - How high (or low) is my salary? This is a difficult question I want to know how much you earn But I don’t want you to know how much I earn
29. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Demo - How high is my salary enclave app Only tell you where is your salary ranked Source code is open Build process is open Run on AWS Nitro Enclave Proved by attestation document Data encrypted between you and the enclave
30. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Wrap up • Software supply chain security: § Source code to artifact → SLSA § Artifact to end-user → AWS Nitro Enclaves • GitHub Actions can help you achieve SLSA L3 build • Don’t just sign, Attest!
31. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. What we didn’t cover • Source code security → Code scanning § Amazon CodeGuru Security § GitHub CodeQL • Security of dependencies → SBOM, dependency scanning § Amazon Inspector SBOM Generator § Amazon ECR image scanning § GitHub Dependabot
32. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Useful links Blog post series AWS Nitro Enclaves Demo app GitHub Action - AWS Nitro Enclaves EIF Build Action
33. © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Thank you! © 2024, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Richard Fan richardfan1126@gmail.com richardfan1126