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Help the hackers get your data

Help the hackers get your data

In May 2018 something happened to the internet, GDPR came online,
and suddenly users in the EU had a lot more rights to their digital privacy,
which is awesome. But on the flip side the implementation of the GDPR and
procedures regarding it, are very vague and were meant to be written as
we go along, with whatever comes up as best practices.
Books and talks have been written and given about the data encryption, problems
encountered with event sourcing systems, questionaries about the purposes of
collecting user data... So many words and hours of many lives spent...
Yet, something has been overlooked, something so basic, we do not even notice it.
If you are working on an enterprise-class project or on other large projects,
you might have an infra team that would deal with this and tell you what you need
to do to be secure (at least good ones will)
But... if you are working on smaller projects, and you have mom and pop shops
to support, you deserve the same level of security bigger projects have...
I am talking about secrets and credentials management for your application, the most
overlooked aspect of any application.
This talk gives you a look at secrets management and security from the business side of things and tries to give you actionable information on how to talk to your clients, and bosses about this subject

Vranac Srdjan

October 22, 2019
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  1. HELP THE HACKERS GET YOUR DATA
    @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  2. WHOAMI
    Srdjan Vranac
    Founder/Team Lead @ Code4Hire
    Architecture/Software consultant
    I make developers uncomfortable and engineers happy
    2 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  3. WHOAMI
    3 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  4. HELP THE HACKERS GET YOUR DATA
    IF YOU WANT TO EXPERIENCE SOME
    VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY
    UNPLEASANT THINGS AND DEPENDING
    ON WHOSE DATA THEY GOT EVEN FACE
    JAIL TIME
    4 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  5. SECURITY IS IMPORTANT
    M'KAY
    5 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  6. TOO MANY SECRETS
    6 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  7. Good software engineer has
    technical skills,
    communications skills
    AND business skills
    — Antonio Peric-Mazar (Locastic CEO)
    7 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  8. Take off your developers hat
    Focus on the business goals
    less on academics
    — David Cramer (Sentry CEO)
    from "Mastering Duct Tape" PyCon balkan 2018
    8 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  9. COST OF NOT HANDLING SECURITY
    9 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  10. COST AND SECURITY
    ARE
    AFTERTHOUGHT
    10 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  11. BY THINKING IN TERMS OF
    COST AND EXPENSES
    SECURITY STARTS TO CLIMB MORE AND
    MORE ON THE PRIORITY LIST
    11 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  12. LOW HANGING FRUIT
    12 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  13. 13 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  14. DATA BREACHES EXPOSED
    4.1 BILLION RECORDS
    IN FIRST SIX MONTHS OF
    2019
    14 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  15. It's a s#1t show,
    but you front row
    — Lil Wayne, "Uproar"
    15 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  16. COMMON WAYS OF
    REVEALING YOUR
    SECRETS?
    16 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  17. MALICIOUS PARTY
    GAINING ACCESS TO YOUR
    INFRASTRUCTURE
    17 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  18. 18 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  19. 19 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  20. 20 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  21. You don't store your users passwords in your database,
    yet the access-credentials to said database are written
    down in cleartext in a file on your server.
    — Andreas Heigl
    21 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  22. 22 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  23. 15 MINUTES
    OF PUBLIC AVAILABLITY
    23 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  24. LESSON IN CHAOS
    ENGINEERING
    24 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  25. HEY LOOK, IT'S GONE...
    25 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  26. LESSON IS ACTUALLY A MASTERCLASS
    26 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  27. AN EMAIL A DAY KEEPS
    THE CHAOS MONKEY AWAY
    27 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  28. SCORCHED EARTH POLICY
    28 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  29. 29 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  30. ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
    30 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  31. 31 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  32. 32 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  33. CONTAINERS!!!111
    33 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  34. 34 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  35. DOCKER SECRETS!!!
    35 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  36. IF OPS TEAM ALLOWS THIS!
    PLEASE HAVE A TALK WITH THEM!
    36 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  37. CONSEQUENCES
    37 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  38. LIABILITY
    &
    CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
    38 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  39. 39 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  40. CERTIFICATION
    40 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  41. SECRETS MANAGEMENT
    COST/DAMAGE CONTROL
    41 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  42. HOW CAN THIS SITUATION
    BE IMPROVED?
    42 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  43. SECRETS MANAGEMENT
    APPLICATIONS
    43 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  44. EASE OF SETUP AND
    OPERATION
    44 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  45. SECRET ROTATION
    45 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  46. DYNAMIC SECRETS
    {{ USERNAME }}:{{ password }}@tcp({{ mysql_server }}:3306)/{{ DATABASE }}
    46 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  47. ENCRYPTION
    IN TRANSPORT AND AT
    REST
    47 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  48. CHOICES OF BACKENDS
    48 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  49. COST
    49 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  50. Ansible Vault, Barbican, Chef Data Bags, Chef Vault,
    Citadel, Confidant, Configuration Storage Systems
    (Consul, etcd, Zookeeper), Conjur, Crypt, EJSON, Keywhiz,
    Knox, Red October, Trousseau, Vault (Hashicorp)
    50 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  51. AWS SECRETS MANAGER
    51 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  52. EXAMPLE 1: PRODUCTION-SCALE WEB APPLICATION
    Cost Dimensions
    - 2 SSH keys per server and 5 database credentials per database.
    - 2 API calls per SSH key per day. 24 API calls per database credential per day.
    - 7 API calls per database credential per week to rotate credentials safely.
    15 secrets (2 SSH keys * 1 load balancer
    + 2 SSH keys * 2 web servers
    + 2 SSH keys * 2 app servers
    + 5 database credentials * 1 database)
    @ $0.40 / secret / month
    4,040 API calls (2 SSH keys/server * 5 servers * 1 API call/day * 30 days
    + 5 database credentials * 1 database * 24 API calls/day * 30 days
    + 5 database credentials * 1 database * 7 API calls/week * 4 weeks) @ $0.05/10,000 calls
    $6.02 TOTAL (PER MONTH)
    52 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  53. EXAMPLE 2: USING EPHEMERAL SECRETS TO
    AUTHENTICATE MICRO SERVICES
    Cost Dimensions
    5M secrets (each valid for 1 hour).
    2 API calls per secret per month.
    Note: Since these secrets are stored in Secrets Manager for an hour,
    the price per secret is calculated as
    $0.40 * 1 hour / (30 days * 24 hours) = $0.00056 / secret/ hour
    $2,800.00 5M secrets @ $0.00056 / secret/ hour
    $50.00 10M API calls (5M secret * 2 API calls) @ $0.05/10,000 calls
    $2,850.00 TOTAL (PER MONTH)
    53 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  54. HASHICORP VAULT
    54 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  55. GOOD FIT?
    55 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  56. SHAMIR'S SECRET
    SHARING ALGORITHM
    56 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  57. VAULT OPERATES
    EXCLUSIVELY IN A
    WHITELIST MODE
    57 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  58. EVERYTHING IS AWESOME? RIGHT?
    > sealing/unsealing
    > http calls
    58 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  59. HOW DOES IT ALL FIT TOGETHER:
    > vault token goes into config (ironic, I know)
    > token gets sent to the vault server, and client token is
    returned
    > only retrieval of secrets granted by the ACL assigned is
    possible
    > when lease on client token expires, vault token is used
    to obtain new one
    59 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  60. IN CASE OF BREACH:
    > your tripwire system is triggered
    > your files are downloaded (possibly config as well)
    > you remove server from public
    > you rotate the token generated
    > you update the config
    > you make server publicly available
    60 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  61. BUT DO YOU USE SECRET MANAGEMENT ON EVERY
    PROJECT?
    > user data, maybe PII, maybe not? yes
    > any kind of sensitive data? yes
    > any kind of payments on the system? definitely yes
    61 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  62. FINAL WORDS
    62 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  63. average cost of a large data breach (in which more than
    one million records are lost) in 2018 was
    $3.9 MILLION DOLLARS
    63 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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  64. THE END
    64 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

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