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Help the hackers get your data

Help the hackers get your data

In May 2018 something happened to the internet, GDPR came online,
and suddenly users in the EU had a lot more rights to their digital privacy,
which is awesome. But on the flip side the implementation of the GDPR and
procedures regarding it, are very vague and were meant to be written as
we go along, with whatever comes up as best practices.
Books and talks have been written and given about the data encryption, problems
encountered with event sourcing systems, questionaries about the purposes of
collecting user data... So many words and hours of many lives spent...
Yet, something has been overlooked, something so basic, we do not even notice it.
If you are working on an enterprise-class project or on other large projects,
you might have an infra team that would deal with this and tell you what you need
to do to be secure (at least good ones will)
But... if you are working on smaller projects, and you have mom and pop shops
to support, you deserve the same level of security bigger projects have...
I am talking about secrets and credentials management for your application, the most
overlooked aspect of any application.
This talk gives you a look at secrets management and security from the business side of things and tries to give you actionable information on how to talk to your clients, and bosses about this subject

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Vranac Srdjan

October 22, 2019
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Transcript

  1. HELP THE HACKERS GET YOUR DATA @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  2. WHOAMI Srdjan Vranac Founder/Team Lead @ Code4Hire Architecture/Software consultant I

    make developers uncomfortable and engineers happy 2 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  3. WHOAMI 3 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  4. HELP THE HACKERS GET YOUR DATA IF YOU WANT TO

    EXPERIENCE SOME VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY UNPLEASANT THINGS AND DEPENDING ON WHOSE DATA THEY GOT EVEN FACE JAIL TIME 4 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  5. SECURITY IS IMPORTANT M'KAY 5 — @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  6. TOO MANY SECRETS 6 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  7. Good software engineer has technical skills, communications skills AND business

    skills — Antonio Peric-Mazar (Locastic CEO) 7 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  8. Take off your developers hat Focus on the business goals

    less on academics — David Cramer (Sentry CEO) from "Mastering Duct Tape" PyCon balkan 2018 8 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  9. COST OF NOT HANDLING SECURITY 9 — @vranac - IPC

    Munich 2019
  10. COST AND SECURITY ARE AFTERTHOUGHT 10 — @vranac - IPC

    Munich 2019
  11. BY THINKING IN TERMS OF COST AND EXPENSES SECURITY STARTS

    TO CLIMB MORE AND MORE ON THE PRIORITY LIST 11 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  12. LOW HANGING FRUIT 12 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  13. 13 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  14. DATA BREACHES EXPOSED 4.1 BILLION RECORDS IN FIRST SIX MONTHS

    OF 2019 14 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  15. It's a s#1t show, but you front row — Lil

    Wayne, "Uproar" 15 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  16. COMMON WAYS OF REVEALING YOUR SECRETS? 16 — @vranac -

    IPC Munich 2019
  17. MALICIOUS PARTY GAINING ACCESS TO YOUR INFRASTRUCTURE 17 — @vranac

    - IPC Munich 2019
  18. 18 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  19. 19 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  20. 20 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  21. You don't store your users passwords in your database, yet

    the access-credentials to said database are written down in cleartext in a file on your server. — Andreas Heigl 21 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  22. 22 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  23. 15 MINUTES OF PUBLIC AVAILABLITY 23 — @vranac - IPC

    Munich 2019
  24. LESSON IN CHAOS ENGINEERING 24 — @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  25. HEY LOOK, IT'S GONE... 25 — @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  26. LESSON IS ACTUALLY A MASTERCLASS 26 — @vranac - IPC

    Munich 2019
  27. AN EMAIL A DAY KEEPS THE CHAOS MONKEY AWAY 27

    — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  28. SCORCHED EARTH POLICY 28 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  29. 29 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  30. ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES 30 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  31. 31 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  32. 32 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  33. CONTAINERS!!!111 33 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  34. 34 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  35. DOCKER SECRETS!!! 35 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  36. IF OPS TEAM ALLOWS THIS! PLEASE HAVE A TALK WITH

    THEM! 36 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  37. CONSEQUENCES 37 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  38. LIABILITY & CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 38 — @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  39. 39 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  40. CERTIFICATION 40 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  41. SECRETS MANAGEMENT COST/DAMAGE CONTROL 41 — @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  42. HOW CAN THIS SITUATION BE IMPROVED? 42 — @vranac -

    IPC Munich 2019
  43. SECRETS MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS 43 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  44. EASE OF SETUP AND OPERATION 44 — @vranac - IPC

    Munich 2019
  45. SECRET ROTATION 45 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  46. DYNAMIC SECRETS {{ USERNAME }}:{{ password }}@tcp({{ mysql_server }}:3306)/{{ DATABASE

    }} 46 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  47. ENCRYPTION IN TRANSPORT AND AT REST 47 — @vranac -

    IPC Munich 2019
  48. CHOICES OF BACKENDS 48 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  49. COST 49 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  50. Ansible Vault, Barbican, Chef Data Bags, Chef Vault, Citadel, Confidant,

    Configuration Storage Systems (Consul, etcd, Zookeeper), Conjur, Crypt, EJSON, Keywhiz, Knox, Red October, Trousseau, Vault (Hashicorp) 50 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  51. AWS SECRETS MANAGER 51 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  52. EXAMPLE 1: PRODUCTION-SCALE WEB APPLICATION Cost Dimensions - 2 SSH

    keys per server and 5 database credentials per database. - 2 API calls per SSH key per day. 24 API calls per database credential per day. - 7 API calls per database credential per week to rotate credentials safely. 15 secrets (2 SSH keys * 1 load balancer + 2 SSH keys * 2 web servers + 2 SSH keys * 2 app servers + 5 database credentials * 1 database) @ $0.40 / secret / month 4,040 API calls (2 SSH keys/server * 5 servers * 1 API call/day * 30 days + 5 database credentials * 1 database * 24 API calls/day * 30 days + 5 database credentials * 1 database * 7 API calls/week * 4 weeks) @ $0.05/10,000 calls $6.02 TOTAL (PER MONTH) 52 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  53. EXAMPLE 2: USING EPHEMERAL SECRETS TO AUTHENTICATE MICRO SERVICES Cost

    Dimensions 5M secrets (each valid for 1 hour). 2 API calls per secret per month. Note: Since these secrets are stored in Secrets Manager for an hour, the price per secret is calculated as $0.40 * 1 hour / (30 days * 24 hours) = $0.00056 / secret/ hour $2,800.00 5M secrets @ $0.00056 / secret/ hour $50.00 10M API calls (5M secret * 2 API calls) @ $0.05/10,000 calls $2,850.00 TOTAL (PER MONTH) 53 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  54. HASHICORP VAULT 54 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  55. GOOD FIT? 55 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  56. SHAMIR'S SECRET SHARING ALGORITHM 56 — @vranac - IPC Munich

    2019
  57. VAULT OPERATES EXCLUSIVELY IN A WHITELIST MODE 57 — @vranac

    - IPC Munich 2019
  58. EVERYTHING IS AWESOME? RIGHT? > sealing/unsealing > http calls 58

    — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  59. HOW DOES IT ALL FIT TOGETHER: > vault token goes

    into config (ironic, I know) > token gets sent to the vault server, and client token is returned > only retrieval of secrets granted by the ACL assigned is possible > when lease on client token expires, vault token is used to obtain new one 59 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  60. IN CASE OF BREACH: > your tripwire system is triggered

    > your files are downloaded (possibly config as well) > you remove server from public > you rotate the token generated > you update the config > you make server publicly available 60 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  61. BUT DO YOU USE SECRET MANAGEMENT ON EVERY PROJECT? >

    user data, maybe PII, maybe not? yes > any kind of sensitive data? yes > any kind of payments on the system? definitely yes 61 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  62. FINAL WORDS 62 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019

  63. average cost of a large data breach (in which more

    than one million records are lost) in 2018 was $3.9 MILLION DOLLARS 63 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019
  64. THE END 64 — @vranac - IPC Munich 2019