Future of Data Privacy Need to get a sense of experience in audience. Define HE? (Explain how it works? Implemented?) Will explain 1) Def 2) Why important 3) Implementation details 4) Real world.
Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
Data Plaintext Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
Cyphertext Computation Data Plaintext Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
Cyphertext Computation Data Plaintext Result Plaintext Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
operation doesn’t have to be the same as corresponding non-homomorphic operation, but in this case it is. We’ll look at stronger choices later, but first…
privacy preserving concatenation of strings. Get the VC $$$$, foosball table… But there’s a problem with this idea. Why won’t this work? You’ll never guess…
enough, it’s patented (by SAP). Cryptographers have been working on HE for a long time.Goldwasser and Micali won Turing award, but for semantic security, not HE. Chose concat example as simple/joke, found the patent later. Security industry may or may not have noticed HE, but patent lawyers have!
NB: Unpadded RSA is insecure! Simple, but insecure. Cryptosystem security is an end to end pipeline, not a single algorithm. Feel free to ignore the algebra, point is
Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
• Doesn’t have to be (quite) Turing complete What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
• Doesn’t have to be (quite) Turing complete • Conditional branching and loops, of a sort What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
• Doesn’t have to be (quite) Turing complete • Conditional branching and loops, of a sort • Cannot perform conditional jumps based on (encrypted) user input What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
computer. Want to compute anything, not just *! Let’s start from the basics. Logic gates! If we have homomorphic logic gates we can do what we need. Homomorphic * insufficient. Homomorphic NAND would be OK.What gates do I need to perform any computation? Define NOR. NOR via NANDS. De Morgan’s Laws. What does any of this mean?
AND and NOT • XOR and AND Need a new kind of computer. Want to compute anything, not just *! Let’s start from the basics. Logic gates! If we have homomorphic logic gates we can do what we need. Homomorphic * insufficient. Homomorphic NAND would be OK.What gates do I need to perform any computation? Define NOR. NOR via NANDS. De Morgan’s Laws. What does any of this mean?
1 1 0 * 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 Adding + multiplying a bit very simple. So are computers. Need building blocks which can work homomorphically but be built into anything we need. Start with bits. + looks like XOR. * looks like AND. Can grow from there.
choose_first else second ! .. ! > choose(True, False, True)! => True! > choose(True, False, False)! => False Branching hard, but: Here’s a program I wrote. Normal computers eval condition, execute selected path. …so if I have a homomorphic and, or, and not… or just nand, now I can write logic. Branching becomes a truth table. click. As a circuit. Circuits easy.
choose_first else second ! .. ! > choose(True, False, True)! => True! > choose(True, False, False)! => False first choose_first second Branching hard, but: Here’s a program I wrote. Normal computers eval condition, execute selected path. …so if I have a homomorphic and, or, and not… or just nand, now I can write logic. Branching becomes a truth table. click. As a circuit. Circuits easy.
while n > 1: ! .. result *= n ! .. n -= 1 ! .. return result Here’s another program I wrote. Explain factorial. Click. Here’s a really strange version. Why? Note n Program has interesting properties. Bounded loops are decidable! Security vs. efficiency.
while n > 1: ! .. result *= n ! .. n -= 1 ! .. return result > def my_factorial_less_than_20(n): ! .. result = 1; ! .. for i in range(2, 20): ! .. result *= 1 if i > n else i ! .. return result ! > my_factorial_less_than_20(4)! => 24! > my_factorial_less_than_20(100)! => 121645100408832000L! > my_factorial_less_than_20(1000)! => 121645100408832000L Here’s another program I wrote. Explain factorial. Click. Here’s a really strange version. Why? Note n Program has interesting properties. Bounded loops are decidable! Security vs. efficiency.
Cyphertext Multiply (Lossy) Found strong encryption scheme with homomorphic + and lossy homomorphic *. Too many *s and can’t decrypt. We will look at bootstrapping in more detail on next slide Explain lossy multiplication here.
Bootstrappable Encryption Every time you decrypt, you “reset” errors. Only a student with a thesis deadline could have thought of this. Works, but inefficient in time and space. Maybe work around? PKE is slow, but combine with SE for performance.
want to talk about 2 party secure computation, but… It’s often the case you want to talk about f(alice_value, bob_value) without revealing either arg. ZKPs do exist, but can be tricky.
want to talk about 2 party secure computation, but… It’s often the case you want to talk about f(alice_value, bob_value) without revealing either arg. ZKPs do exist, but can be tricky.
want to talk about 2 party secure computation, but… It’s often the case you want to talk about f(alice_value, bob_value) without revealing either arg. ZKPs do exist, but can be tricky.
Computes and sends c’ = E(f(x,y)), ZKP of c’ correctness to Alice Decrypt c’, compute ZKP of valid decryption, and return both to Bob HELLO My Name Is Alice HELLO My Name Is Bob Want to compute f(aliceData, bobData). How does Alice know Bob used correct input? How does Bob know Alice didn’t lie about result?
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. ! Not a cure-all. Metadata and side-channels still a problem “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. ! Not a cure-all. Metadata and side-channels still a problem ! Moving target! “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. ! Not a cure-all. Metadata and side-channels still a problem ! Moving target! ! Patent encumbered “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
concede that making this scheme practical remains an open problem.” • “There exist well known solutions for secure computation of any function… It seems hard to apply these methods to complete continuous functions or represent Real numbers, since the methods inherently work over finite fields.” • “An encryption scheme with these two properties is called a homomorphic encryption scheme. The Paillier system is one homomorphic encryption scheme, but more ones [sic] exist.” Hand-waving which wouldn’t be allowed in a freshman term paper
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