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Cloud Security, For Real This Time (CloudDevelop 2014)

Cloud Security, For Real This Time (CloudDevelop 2014)

Cloud Security, For Real This Time: Homomorphic Encryption and the Future of Data Privacy (CloudDevelop 2014)

56e5c49368a2e0ab999848a8d9e3c116?s=128

Craig Stuntz

October 17, 2014
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Transcript

  1. Cloud Security, for Real This Time Homomorphic Encryption and the

    Future of Data Privacy Need to get a sense of experience in audience. Define HE? (Explain how it works? Implemented?) Will explain 1) Def 2) Why important 3) Implementation details 4) Real world.
  2. Slides https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz

  3. TLS Changed the Internet Remember? Define SSL/TLS? Changed everything.

  4. Browser Server Application TLS: Safe (mostly!), but must decrypt to

    do business TLS gives you 1) Some assurance you’re connecting to the right server, 2) some protection from MITM Good enough for shopping?
  5. What if it’s stolen? The card isn’t the end of

    the world. Your PII? Snowden?
  6. My New Business Ask for income, SSNs of your children,

    what you spend on health care, bank account passwords, etc., give you pretty charts.
  7. My New Business Ask for income, SSNs of your children,

    what you spend on health care, bank account passwords, etc., give you pretty charts.
  8. Threat Model

  9. Advanced Persistent Threats? Asking for PII. Have to consider threat

    model.
  10. Criminals? However… (click)

  11. Idiots? Most dangerous?

  12. Uh Oh. Is it even possible to build this kind

    of business? Home Depot did a lot wrong, sure, but banks who ran pretty clean shops have also suffered major data exfiltration. Need a way out.
  13. Symmetry Consumer Protect PII Zero Install Cloud Service Provider Nothing

    to Steal Frequent Site Visits Look at what customer wants, you want. Note symmetry Symmetry in software = Opportunity!
  14. What if? How can I prepare your taxes without asking

    for the data, at least not in readable form? You could encrypt and not give me the key, but then how do I perform useful computations?
  15. Homomorphic Encryption In a Nutshell Client Server Computation Data Plaintext

    Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
  16. Homomorphic Encryption In a Nutshell Client Server Data Cyphertext Computation

    Data Plaintext Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
  17. Homomorphic Encryption In a Nutshell Client Server Data Cyphertext Result

    Cyphertext Computation Data Plaintext Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
  18. Homomorphic Encryption In a Nutshell Client Server Data Cyphertext Result

    Cyphertext Computation Data Plaintext Result Plaintext Define plaintext, cyphertext, computation. (hand waving) Secure! No key exchange! Keys stay on client Cyphertext should be indistinguishable from random bits Considered maybe impossible for a long time. Changed in 2009. How? Stop me now if terms don’t make sense.
  19. Rot-13! How can this possibly work? Warm up

  20. Awesoma Powa! Plaintext top row. Cyphertext middle. Note symmetries Homomorphic

    operation doesn’t have to be the same as corresponding non-homomorphic operation, but in this case it is. We’ll look at stronger choices later, but first…
  21. Let’s launch a startup! concatenatr! Join us! New business: Cloud-based,

    privacy preserving concatenation of strings. Get the VC $$$$, foosball table… But there’s a problem with this idea. Why won’t this work? You’ll never guess…
  22. (Using Goldwasser and Micali’s algorithm developed 20 years earlier) Stupidly

    enough, it’s patented (by SAP). Cryptographers have been working on HE for a long time.Goldwasser and Micali won Turing award, but for semantic security, not HE. Chose concat example as simple/joke, found the patent later. Security industry may or may not have noticed HE, but patent lawyers have!
  23. Unpadded RSA Back to drawing board. Need a different algorithm.

    NB: Unpadded RSA is insecure! Simple, but insecure. Cryptosystem security is an end to end pipeline, not a single algorithm. Feel free to ignore the algebra, point is
  24. Pivot! multiplir! We make products Cloud-based, privacy preserving multiplication. Get

    the VC $$$, front page of Hacker News, then… Click Click. Can we do better? What do we really need?
  25. Pivot! multiplir! We make products Awesome! Now add. Cloud-based, privacy

    preserving multiplication. Get the VC $$$, front page of Hacker News, then… Click Click. Can we do better? What do we really need?
  26. Pivot! multiplir! We make products Awesome! Now add. Uhhh…. Cloud-based,

    privacy preserving multiplication. Get the VC $$$, front page of Hacker News, then… Click Click. Can we do better? What do we really need?
  27. Fully Homomorphic Encryption What are the operations I really need?

    Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
  28. Fully Homomorphic Encryption • Multiply What are the operations I

    really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
  29. Fully Homomorphic Encryption • Multiply • Add, subtract, exponents, etc.

    What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
  30. Fully Homomorphic Encryption • Multiply • Add, subtract, exponents, etc.

    • Doesn’t have to be (quite) Turing complete What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
  31. Fully Homomorphic Encryption • Multiply • Add, subtract, exponents, etc.

    • Doesn’t have to be (quite) Turing complete • Conditional branching and loops, of a sort What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
  32. Fully Homomorphic Encryption • Multiply • Add, subtract, exponents, etc.

    • Doesn’t have to be (quite) Turing complete • Conditional branching and loops, of a sort • Cannot perform conditional jumps based on (encrypted) user input What are the operations I really need? Must be able to write any program, but not necessarily execute arbitrary programs. Customer and service provider agree on service in advance. What operations give me all of the above? (Cannot perform conditional…) => Branch prediction won’t work!
  33. Functional Completeness and Universal Gates Need a new kind of

    computer. Want to compute anything, not just *! Let’s start from the basics. Logic gates! If we have homomorphic logic gates we can do what we need. Homomorphic * insufficient. Homomorphic NAND would be OK.What gates do I need to perform any computation? Define NOR. NOR via NANDS. De Morgan’s Laws. What does any of this mean?
  34. Functional Completeness and Universal Gates • NAND • NOR •

    AND and NOT • XOR and AND Need a new kind of computer. Want to compute anything, not just *! Let’s start from the basics. Logic gates! If we have homomorphic logic gates we can do what we need. Homomorphic * insufficient. Homomorphic NAND would be OK.What gates do I need to perform any computation? Define NOR. NOR via NANDS. De Morgan’s Laws. What does any of this mean?
  35. Addition, Multiplication Over GF(2) + 0 1 0 0 1

    1 1 0 * 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 Adding + multiplying a bit very simple. So are computers. Need building blocks which can work homomorphically but be built into anything we need. Start with bits. + looks like XOR. * looks like AND. Can grow from there.
  36. > def choose(first, second, choose_first): ! .. return first if

    choose_first else second ! .. ! > choose(True, False, True)! => True! > choose(True, False, False)! => False Branching hard, but: Here’s a program I wrote. Normal computers eval condition, execute selected path. …so if I have a homomorphic and, or, and not… or just nand, now I can write logic. Branching becomes a truth table. click. As a circuit. Circuits easy.
  37. > def choose(first, second, choose_first): ! .. return first if

    choose_first else second ! .. ! > choose(True, False, True)! => True! > choose(True, False, False)! => False first choose_first second Branching hard, but: Here’s a program I wrote. Normal computers eval condition, execute selected path. …so if I have a homomorphic and, or, and not… or just nand, now I can write logic. Branching becomes a truth table. click. As a circuit. Circuits easy.
  38. > def my_factorial(n): ! .. result = 1 ! ..

    while n > 1: ! .. result *= n ! .. n -= 1 ! .. return result Here’s another program I wrote. Explain factorial. Click. Here’s a really strange version. Why? Note n Program has interesting properties. Bounded loops are decidable! Security vs. efficiency.
  39. > def my_factorial(n): ! .. result = 1 ! ..

    while n > 1: ! .. result *= n ! .. n -= 1 ! .. return result > def my_factorial_less_than_20(n): ! .. result = 1; ! .. for i in range(2, 20): ! .. result *= 1 if i > n else i ! .. return result ! > my_factorial_less_than_20(4)! => 24! > my_factorial_less_than_20(100)! => 121645100408832000L! > my_factorial_less_than_20(1000)! => 121645100408832000L Here’s another program I wrote. Explain factorial. Click. Here’s a really strange version. Why? Note n Program has interesting properties. Bounded loops are decidable! Security vs. efficiency.
  40. ! Fast! Turing Complete* Strong Encryption Practical Homomorphic Encryption Would

    be awesome, but where could I find such a thing?
  41. There’s one on GitHub. But how?

  42. Craig Gentry 
 IBM Research Thesis. Refined by himself and

    others.
  43. Input Data Cyphertext Add (Lossless) Multiply (Lossy) Bootstrappable Reencryption Result

    Cyphertext Multiply (Lossy) Found strong encryption scheme with homomorphic + and lossy homomorphic *. Too many *s and can’t decrypt. We will look at bootstrapping in more detail on next slide Explain lossy multiplication here.
  44. E(E(E(plaintext), key), key2), key 3 E(E(plaintext), key), key2 E(plaintext) Plaintext

    Bootstrappable Encryption Every time you decrypt, you “reset” errors. Only a student with a thesis deadline could have thought of this. Works, but inefficient in time and space. Maybe work around? PKE is slow, but combine with SE for performance.
  45. CryptDB http://css.csail.mit.edu/cryptdb/

  46. CryptDB ❖ Query-based encryption ❖ Requires no changes to DB

    server ❖ Tested on phpBB, OpenEMR, TPC-C, etc. ❖ Only 14-26% slower than unmodified apps. http://css.csail.mit.edu/cryptdb/
  47. Encrypted BigQuery Client https://code.google.com/p/encrypted-bigquery-client/

  48. Zero Knowledge Proof Image: Wikimedia Commons / User:Dake Applications! I

    want to talk about 2 party secure computation, but… It’s often the case you want to talk about f(alice_value, bob_value) without revealing either arg. ZKPs do exist, but can be tricky.
  49. Zero Knowledge Proof Image: Wikimedia Commons / User:Dake Applications! I

    want to talk about 2 party secure computation, but… It’s often the case you want to talk about f(alice_value, bob_value) without revealing either arg. ZKPs do exist, but can be tricky.
  50. Zero Knowledge Proof Image: Wikimedia Commons / User:Dake Applications! I

    want to talk about 2 party secure computation, but… It’s often the case you want to talk about f(alice_value, bob_value) without revealing either arg. ZKPs do exist, but can be tricky.
  51. 2 Party Secure Computation Sends c = E(x) to Bob

    Computes and sends c’ = E(f(x,y)), ZKP of c’ correctness to Alice Decrypt c’, compute ZKP of valid decryption, and return both to Bob HELLO My Name Is Alice HELLO My Name Is Bob Want to compute f(aliceData, bobData). How does Alice know Bob used correct input? How does Bob know Alice didn’t lie about result?
  52. Limitations “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)

  53. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  54. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  55. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  56. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  57. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  58. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  59. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. ! Not a cure-all. Metadata and side-channels still a problem “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  60. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. ! Not a cure-all. Metadata and side-channels still a problem ! Moving target! “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  61. Limitations ! Server doesn’t have data to, e.g. hand off

    to third parties ! All “new” cryptosystems are relatively untested and security not proven. ! Space issues ! Often computationally expensive ! Client complexity and deployment ! Not always clear when to choose fully homomorphic algorithms. ! Not a cure-all. Metadata and side-channels still a problem ! Moving target! ! Patent encumbered “New” -> (Both in terms of algorithms and implementation.)
  62. Patent Encumbrance • “Nevertheless, the authors of this method to

    concede that making this scheme practical remains an open problem.” • “There exist well known solutions for secure computation of any function… It seems hard to apply these methods to complete continuous functions or represent Real numbers, since the methods inherently work over finite fields.” • “An encryption scheme with these two properties is called a homomorphic encryption scheme. The Paillier system is one homomorphic encryption scheme, but more ones [sic] exist.” Hand-waving which wouldn’t be allowed in a freshman term paper