Secure Applications, by Design

As presented at Stir Trek 2018

There is a lot of good security advice in the world, but checklists like the OWASP Top 10 do not tell you how to design security into your application. Where should a developer even begin? How do you design security into applications based on next week's JavaScript framework, for which no "best practices" exist? The Information Security Practice Principles, developed by Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, provide both a foundation for application security independent of specific technology decisions as well as a means for establishing a common language between designers and defenders. You'll leave this session with a process for building security in depth into your application architecture, using a human-centered user experience design, threat modeling, partitioning, defense in depth, and static analysis in continuous integration. Not yet another checklist, you'll learn how to make security the foundation on which the rest of your application is built.

Transcript

1. S E C U R E A P P L I C A T I O N S ,
   B Y D E S I G N
   Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving
   

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2. S E C U R E A P P L I C A T I O N S ,
   B Y D E S I G N
   Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving
   https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz
   

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3. A S K Q U E S T I O N S O N S L A C K
   #2018—GREEN
   (DM: @craig.stuntz)
   

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4. P R E V I E W
   • What does application security mean?
   • Some “f ixes” which don’t work
   • Security f rom f irst principles
   • Threat modeling
   • Application design guided by principles and threat
   model
   

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5. – H i p p o c r a t i c O a t h ( 1 9 6 4 L o u i s L a s a g n a v e r s i o n )
   “I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a
   cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose
   illness may affect the person’s family and economic
   stability.”
   

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7. 1. ummm… blockchain?
   2. ???
   3. prof it!
   

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8. http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/air-safety-2017-best-year-safest-airline-passengers-worldwide-to70-civil-aviation-review-
   a8130796.html
   

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9. W O U L D Y O U D E S I G N S O F T W A R E D I F F E R E N T LY I F H U M A N
   S A F E T Y W A S A LW A Y S T H E F I R S T C O N S I D E R A T I O N ?
   H O W ?
   https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25900776992/
   

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10. – A C M C o d e o f E t h i c s a n d P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t ( p r o p o s e d )
    “A computing professional should contribute to
    society and to human well-being, acknowledging
    that all people are stakeholders in computing.”
    

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11. – A l l i s o n M i l l e r
    “I don't think humans are the problem, the problem
    is that humans are the target.”
    https://www.scmagazineuk.com/news-feature-google-security-interview-human-solutions--the-way-to-go/article/701976/
    

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12. W H A T I S S E C U R I T Y , R E A L LY ?
    https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airport_Frankfurt_-_Fraport_-_Flughafen_Frankfurt_-_barbed_wire_and_fence_-_Stacheldraht_und_Zaun_-_05.jpg
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/captkodak/37054929956/
    

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13. D O M A I N S P E C I F I C Q A
    

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14. Behavior
    

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15. Behavior
    Specification
    

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16. Behavior
    Specification
    

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17. Behavior
    Specification
    

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18. Behavior
    Specification
    

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19. Behavior
    Specification
    

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20. Q A : D O E S T H E S O F T W A R E D O W H A T I T
    S H O U L D ?
    

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21. S E C U R I T Y : D O E S I T A L S O D O A N Y T H I N G
    E L S E ?
    

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22. D o We E v e n
    K n o w W h a t t h e
    S o f t w a r e I s
    S u p p o s e d t o D o ?
    

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23. QA!
    Security!
    

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24. N I S T 8 0 0 - 6 4
    Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle
    (2008)
    http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-64r2.pdf
    

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25. O W A S P S D L C
    DRAFT
    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Software_Development_Lifecycle_Project
    

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26. M I C R O S O F T S D L C
    http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/SDL
    

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27. S E C U R I T Y I N A N A G I L E P R O C E S S
    https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster
    

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28. S E C U R I T Y I N A N A G I L E P R O C E S S
    https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster
    Fundamental
    Principles
    Threat
    Model
    Automated
    Analysis
    Manual
    Review
    

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29. M y t h s
    

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30. “Security is good guys vs. bad guys.”
    https://pixabay.com/en/quietscheenten-devil-contrast-2816024/
    

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31. “You must always choose between security and
    convenience.”
    

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32. – B r u c e S c h n e i e r
    “The attacker just has to f ind one vulnerability — one
    unsecured avenue for attack — and gets to choose
    how and when to attack. It’s simply not a fair battle.”
    http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/01/the-internet-of-things-dangerous-future-bruce-schneier.html
    

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33. “In order to write secure applications, developers
    must take OWASP Top 10 training.”
    

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34. “Nobody cares about my application’s data. It’s public
    anyway.”
    

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35. “In order to write secure applications, developers
    must
    • Take OWASP Top 10 training
    • Use Veracode
    • Have application pentested
    • Use two factor authentication on source control
    and hosts
    • Use off-the-shelf crypto libraries
    • Monitor production
    • Use memory-safe languages
    • Do code review
    • HTTPS everywhere!
    

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36. T r u t h
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/library_of_congress/8470007173/
    

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37. – L e s l e y C a r h a r t
    “Regularly rethink your threat model. Know your
    threat model and that of your family before making
    any security decision.”
    https://twitter.com/hacks4pancakes/status/917952052667604993
    

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38. – M a t t Ta i t
    “The underlying problem is folks think in terms of
    ‘secure’ versus ‘insecure.’ But in reality, it's ‘in/secure
    vs. X threat in Y threat model.’”
    https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/922009773352120320
    

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39. – J e s s i c a P a y n e
    “Bugs and exploits are not the main issue in most
    breeches, operational issues and technical debt are.”
    "Your attacker thinks like my attacker: A common threat model to create better defense"
    

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40. “ Yo u r i m a g i n a t i o n
    i s f a r m o r e
    w o n d e r f u l t h a n
    a n y c o m p u t e r
    c o u l d e v e r b e . ”
    - Fred Rogers
    http://www.neighborhoodarchive.com/mrn/episodes/1746/index.html
    

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41. B U I L D A R E C I P E ,
    N O T A G R O C E R Y S T O R E
    

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42. B Y D E S I G N
    https://www.patternlanguage.com/gallery/houses.html
    

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43. H U M A N C E N T E R E D
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926671551/
    

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44. L E A R N Y O U R D O M A I N
    https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Domain,_Atrium_(Hong_Kong).jpg
    

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45. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592
    

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46. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592
    

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47. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/amazon-recalls-potentially-hazardous-solar-eclipse-glasses
    

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48. – S e n . R i c h a r d B u r r
    “You commented yesterday that
    your company’s goal is bringing
    people together. In this case,
    people were brought together to
    foment conflict, and Facebook
    enabled that event to happen.”
    https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/
    

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49. iT u n e s M o n e y
    L a u n d e r i n g
    https://www.thedailybeast.com/want-to-launder-bitcoins-how-crooks-are-hacking-itunes-and-getting-paid-by-apple
    

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50. “ I ’ m j u s t a
    t o a s t e r . N o b o d y
    w i l l e v e r t r y t o
    h a c k m e ! ”
    

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51. T H R E A T M O D E L I N G
    

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52. S I X D E G R E E S
    Who is affected by the software you create?
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388897014/
    

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53. U s e r s
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/
    

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54. C u s t o m e r s
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926791491/
    

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55. Yo u r Te a m
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25167741264/
    

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56. S t a k e h o l d e r s
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388889234/
    

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57. P a r t n e r s
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388854424/
    

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58. Yo u r
    C o m m u n i t y
    

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59. W H A T D O Y O U H A V E ?
    

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60. I n f r a s t r u c t u r e
    • Servers
    • Software
    • Clients
    • Gateways
    • Third Parties
    

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61. D a t a
    • Databases
    • Metadata
    • Logs
    • Credentials
    • Files on client
    machines
    

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62. T r u s t
    B o u n d a r i e s
    • Implicit
    • Explicit
    

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63. W H A T C O U L D G O W R O N G ?
    

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64. D O M A I N - S P E C I F I C
    R I S K S
    

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65. T a k e C a r e o f
    P e o p l e F i r s t
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926827581/
    

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66. L e a r n f r o m
    H i s t o r y
    https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maginot_line_1.jpg
    

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67. E x i s t e n t i a l
    T h r e a t s
    http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/technology/knight-expensive-computer-bug/index.html
    

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68. R e g u l a t o r y
    

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69. B A C K T O
    B A S I C S
    

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70. C O M P R E H E N S I V I T Y
    Security f rom First Principles
    Am I covering all of my bases?
    Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Agoncillo_-
    _W%C3%BCrth_Rioja%2C_Museo_30_-_Christo.JPG
    

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71. O P P O R T U N I T Y
    Security f rom First Principles
    Am I taking advantage of my environment?
    https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amazing_Bhutan_Monastery.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    

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72. R I G O R
    Security f rom First Principles
    What is correct behavior, and how am I ensuring it?
    https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turnstile_state_machine_colored.svg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    

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73. M I N I M I Z A T I O N
    Security f rom First Principles
    Can this be a smaller target?
    Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    

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74. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z A T I O N
    Security f rom First Principles
    Is this made of distinct parts with limited
    interactions?
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulkhead_(partition)#/media/
    File:Compartments_and_watertight_subdivision_of_a_ship%27s_hull_(Seaman%27s_Pocket-
    Book,_1943).jpg
    Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    

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75. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E
    Security f rom First Principles
    What happens if this fails?
    https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
    File:A_U.S._Soldier,_right,_looks_on_as_a_U.S._Army_Garrison_Ansbach_Junior_ROTC_cadet_negotia
    tes_a_high_rope_obstacle_6.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    

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76. P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y
    Security f rom First Principles
    Is this worth it?
    https://twitter.com/jwgoerlich/status/939268098699550720?s=09 Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
    

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77. T H E B A S I C P R I N C I P L E S I N A C T I O N
    

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78. B U S I N E S S P R O B L E M
    • A hotel chain needs to capture credit card numbers for
    potential incidental charges when the cardholder will
    not be present at check in
    • Example: A parent wants to authorize incidental
    charges for a traveling school sports team member
    • Current process is a paper form. Company would like to
    automate
    

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79. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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80. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E V I S I T E D
    Comprehensivity
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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81. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D
    Comprehensivity
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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82. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D
    Comprehensivity
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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83. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D
    Comprehensivity
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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84. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E - R E V I S I T E D
    Comprehensivity
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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85. T R A I N I N G
    Comprehensivity
    https://twitter.com/chrisrohlf/status/925846092184477698
    

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86. O P P O R T U N I T Y
    

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87. O P P O R T U N I T Y
    

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88. O P P O R T U N I T Y
    

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89. O P P O R T U N I T Y
    

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90. O P P O R T U N I T Y
    

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91. P A T C H A L L O F T H E T H I N G S
    Opportunity
    “Type a quote here.”
    

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92. R I G O R
    

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93. S T A T I C A N A LY S I S
    Rigor
    “The most important thing I have done as a
    programmer in recent years is to aggressively pursue
    static code analysis. Even more valuable than the
    hundreds of serious bugs I have prevented with it is
    the change in mindset about the way I view software
    reliability and code quality.”
    - J o h n C a r m a c k
    https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/128836/InDepth_Static_Code_Analysis.php
    

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95. M I N I M I Z E A T T A C K S U R F A C E
    ( a n d e v e r y t h i n g e l s e )
    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack_Surface_Analysis_Cheat_Sheet
    

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96. S T O R E L E S S
    Minimization
    “Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that
    which is required for business, legal, and/ or regulatory
    purposes, as documented in your data retention policy.
    Purge unnecessary stored data at least quarterly.”
    P C I - D S S § 3 . 1
    https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCIDSS_QRGv3_1.pdf
    

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97. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z E I T !
    

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98. D O U B L E E D G E D S W O R D
    Compartmentalization
    ““Your perimeter is not the boundary of your network
    it’s the boundary of your telemetry.”
    http://grugq.github.io/presentations/comae-blackhat-year-of-the-worm.pdf
    - T h e G r u g q
    

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99. L E A S T P R I V I L E G E
    Compartmentalization
    EncryptionServiceIAMRole:
    Type: "AWS::IAM::Role"
    Properties:
    Path: "/"
    ManagedPolicyArns:
    - "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole"
    AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
    Version: "2012-10-17"
    Statement:
    -
    Sid: "AllowLambdaServiceToAssumeRole"
    Effect: "Allow"
    Action:
    - "sts:AssumeRole"
    Principal:
    Service:
    - "lambda.amazonaws.com"
    

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100. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z E I T !
     • Networks
     • Public ingress (CloudFront), WAF rules
     • Private ingress (Jump server)
     • Roles for public, hotel staff, site admin, developer, ops
     • Restrict data by property
     • Archive old data to encrypted cold storage
     • Use key management (KMS, HSM, etc.) for secrets
     

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101. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E
     https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
     

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102. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E
     • User safety
     • Stop the exf iltration
     • Assess the scope
     • Proactively prevent further damage to users
     • Listen
     • Technical
     • Engage DF/IR professionals to assess how it happened and how to
     prevent
     • Design system for secure storage and rotation of secrets
     

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103. P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y
     

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104. L A T H E R , R I N S E , R E P E A T
     • Plan on enumerating the f irst principles at least twice
     in initial app design
     • Following f irst principles does not mean “big design
     upf ront”
     

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105. F U R T H E R R E A D I N G
     • The Information Security Practice Principles, Center for
     Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University
     • Threat Modeling, Designing for Security, by Adam
     Shostack
     

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106. C R E D I T S
     • Some stock photography f rom wocintechchat.com, CC-
     BY 2.0
     • Creative Commons photography credited on each slide
     

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107. C O N T A C T
     craig.stuntz@improving.com
     @craigstuntz
     http://paperswelove.org/chapter/columbus/
     https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz
     

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