Secure Applications, by Design

Secure Applications, by Design

As presented at Stir Trek 2018

There is a lot of good security advice in the world, but checklists like the OWASP Top 10 do not tell you how to design security into your application. Where should a developer even begin? How do you design security into applications based on next week's JavaScript framework, for which no "best practices" exist? The Information Security Practice Principles, developed by Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, provide both a foundation for application security independent of specific technology decisions as well as a means for establishing a common language between designers and defenders. You'll leave this session with a process for building security in depth into your application architecture, using a human-centered user experience design, threat modeling, partitioning, defense in depth, and static analysis in continuous integration. Not yet another checklist, you'll learn how to make security the foundation on which the rest of your application is built.

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Craig Stuntz

May 04, 2018
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Transcript

  1. 1.

    S E C U R E A P P L

    I C A T I O N S , B Y D E S I G N Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving
  2. 2.

    S E C U R E A P P L

    I C A T I O N S , B Y D E S I G N Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz
  3. 3.

    A S K Q U E S T I O

    N S O N S L A C K #2018—GREEN (DM: @craig.stuntz)
  4. 4.

    P R E V I E W • What does

    application security mean? • Some “f ixes” which don’t work • Security f rom f irst principles • Threat modeling • Application design guided by principles and threat model
  5. 5.

    – H i p p o c r a t

    i c O a t h ( 1 9 6 4 L o u i s L a s a g n a v e r s i o n ) “I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person’s family and economic stability.”
  6. 6.
  7. 9.

    W O U L D Y O U D E

    S I G N S O F T W A R E D I F F E R E N T LY I F H U M A N S A F E T Y W A S A LW A Y S T H E F I R S T C O N S I D E R A T I O N ? H O W ? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25900776992/
  8. 10.

    – A C M C o d e o f

    E t h i c s a n d P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t ( p r o p o s e d ) “A computing professional should contribute to society and to human well-being, acknowledging that all people are stakeholders in computing.”
  9. 11.

    – A l l i s o n M i

    l l e r “I don't think humans are the problem, the problem is that humans are the target.” https://www.scmagazineuk.com/news-feature-google-security-interview-human-solutions--the-way-to-go/article/701976/
  10. 12.

    W H A T I S S E C U

    R I T Y , R E A L LY ? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airport_Frankfurt_-_Fraport_-_Flughafen_Frankfurt_-_barbed_wire_and_fence_-_Stacheldraht_und_Zaun_-_05.jpg https://www.flickr.com/photos/captkodak/37054929956/
  11. 13.

    D O M A I N S P E C

    I F I C Q A
  12. 14.
  13. 20.

    Q A : D O E S T H E

    S O F T W A R E D O W H A T I T S H O U L D ?
  14. 21.

    S E C U R I T Y : D

    O E S I T A L S O D O A N Y T H I N G E L S E ?
  15. 22.

    D o We E v e n K n o

    w W h a t t h e S o f t w a r e I s S u p p o s e d t o D o ?
  16. 24.

    N I S T 8 0 0 - 6 4

    Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle (2008) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-64r2.pdf
  17. 25.

    O W A S P S D L C DRAFT

    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Software_Development_Lifecycle_Project
  18. 26.

    M I C R O S O F T S

    D L C http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/SDL
  19. 27.

    S E C U R I T Y I N

    A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster
  20. 28.

    S E C U R I T Y I N

    A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster Fundamental Principles Threat Model Automated Analysis Manual Review
  21. 29.
  22. 32.

    – B r u c e S c h n

    e i e r “The attacker just has to f ind one vulnerability — one unsecured avenue for attack — and gets to choose how and when to attack. It’s simply not a fair battle.” http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/01/the-internet-of-things-dangerous-future-bruce-schneier.html
  23. 35.

    “In order to write secure applications, developers must • Take

    OWASP Top 10 training • Use Veracode • Have application pentested • Use two factor authentication on source control and hosts • Use off-the-shelf crypto libraries • Monitor production • Use memory-safe languages • Do code review • HTTPS everywhere!
  24. 37.

    – L e s l e y C a r

    h a r t “Regularly rethink your threat model. Know your threat model and that of your family before making any security decision.” https://twitter.com/hacks4pancakes/status/917952052667604993
  25. 38.

    – M a t t Ta i t “The underlying

    problem is folks think in terms of ‘secure’ versus ‘insecure.’ But in reality, it's ‘in/secure vs. X threat in Y threat model.’” https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/922009773352120320
  26. 39.

    – J e s s i c a P a

    y n e “Bugs and exploits are not the main issue in most breeches, operational issues and technical debt are.” "Your attacker thinks like my attacker: A common threat model to create better defense"
  27. 40.

    “ Yo u r i m a g i n

    a t i o n i s f a r m o r e w o n d e r f u l t h a n a n y c o m p u t e r c o u l d e v e r b e . ” - Fred Rogers http://www.neighborhoodarchive.com/mrn/episodes/1746/index.html
  28. 41.

    B U I L D A R E C I

    P E , N O T A G R O C E R Y S T O R E
  29. 43.

    H U M A N C E N T E

    R E D https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926671551/
  30. 44.

    L E A R N Y O U R D

    O M A I N https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Domain,_Atrium_(Hong_Kong).jpg
  31. 48.

    – S e n . R i c h a

    r d B u r r “You commented yesterday that your company’s goal is bringing people together. In this case, people were brought together to foment conflict, and Facebook enabled that event to happen.” https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/
  32. 49.

    iT u n e s M o n e y

    L a u n d e r i n g https://www.thedailybeast.com/want-to-launder-bitcoins-how-crooks-are-hacking-itunes-and-getting-paid-by-apple
  33. 50.

    “ I ’ m j u s t a t

    o a s t e r . N o b o d y w i l l e v e r t r y t o h a c k m e ! ”
  34. 51.
  35. 52.

    S I X D E G R E E S

    Who is affected by the software you create? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388897014/
  36. 54.

    C u s t o m e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/

    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926791491/
  37. 56.

    S t a k e h o l d e

    r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388889234/
  38. 59.
  39. 60.

    I n f r a s t r u c

    t u r e • Servers • Software • Clients • Gateways • Third Parties
  40. 61.

    D a t a • Databases • Metadata • Logs

    • Credentials • Files on client machines
  41. 62.

    T r u s t B o u n d

    a r i e s • Implicit • Explicit
  42. 63.

    W H A T C O U L D G

    O W R O N G ?
  43. 64.

    D O M A I N - S P E

    C I F I C R I S K S
  44. 65.

    T a k e C a r e o f

    P e o p l e F i r s t https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926827581/
  45. 66.

    L e a r n f r o m H

    i s t o r y https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maginot_line_1.jpg
  46. 67.

    E x i s t e n t i a

    l T h r e a t s http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/technology/knight-expensive-computer-bug/index.html
  47. 70.

    C O M P R E H E N S

    I V I T Y Security f rom First Principles Am I covering all of my bases? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Agoncillo_- _W%C3%BCrth_Rioja%2C_Museo_30_-_Christo.JPG
  48. 71.

    O P P O R T U N I T

    Y Security f rom First Principles Am I taking advantage of my environment? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amazing_Bhutan_Monastery.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  49. 72.

    R I G O R Security f rom First Principles

    What is correct behavior, and how am I ensuring it? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turnstile_state_machine_colored.svg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  50. 73.

    M I N I M I Z A T I

    O N Security f rom First Principles Can this be a smaller target? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  51. 74.

    C O M P A R T M E N

    T A L I Z A T I O N Security f rom First Principles Is this made of distinct parts with limited interactions? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulkhead_(partition)#/media/ File:Compartments_and_watertight_subdivision_of_a_ship%27s_hull_(Seaman%27s_Pocket- Book,_1943).jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  52. 75.

    F A U LT T O L E R A

    N C E Security f rom First Principles What happens if this fails? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:A_U.S._Soldier,_right,_looks_on_as_a_U.S._Army_Garrison_Ansbach_Junior_ROTC_cadet_negotia tes_a_high_rope_obstacle_6.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  53. 76.

    P R O P O R T I O N

    A L I T Y Security f rom First Principles Is this worth it? https://twitter.com/jwgoerlich/status/939268098699550720?s=09 Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  54. 77.

    T H E B A S I C P R

    I N C I P L E S I N A C T I O N
  55. 78.

    B U S I N E S S P R

    O B L E M • A hotel chain needs to capture credit card numbers for potential incidental charges when the cardholder will not be present at check in • Example: A parent wants to authorize incidental charges for a traveling school sports team member • Current process is a paper form. Company would like to automate
  56. 79.

    N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N “Type a quote here.”
  57. 80.

    N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  58. 81.

    N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  59. 82.

    N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  60. 83.

    N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  61. 84.

    N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  62. 91.

    P A T C H A L L O F

    T H E T H I N G S Opportunity “Type a quote here.”
  63. 92.
  64. 93.

    S T A T I C A N A LY

    S I S Rigor “The most important thing I have done as a programmer in recent years is to aggressively pursue static code analysis. Even more valuable than the hundreds of serious bugs I have prevented with it is the change in mindset about the way I view software reliability and code quality.” - J o h n C a r m a c k https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/128836/InDepth_Static_Code_Analysis.php
  65. 94.
  66. 95.

    M I N I M I Z E A T

    T A C K S U R F A C E ( a n d e v e r y t h i n g e l s e ) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack_Surface_Analysis_Cheat_Sheet
  67. 96.

    S T O R E L E S S Minimization

    “Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, and/ or regulatory purposes, as documented in your data retention policy. Purge unnecessary stored data at least quarterly.” P C I - D S S § 3 . 1 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCIDSS_QRGv3_1.pdf
  68. 97.

    C O M P A R T M E N

    T A L I Z E I T !
  69. 98.

    D O U B L E E D G E

    D S W O R D Compartmentalization ““Your perimeter is not the boundary of your network it’s the boundary of your telemetry.” http://grugq.github.io/presentations/comae-blackhat-year-of-the-worm.pdf - T h e G r u g q
  70. 99.

    L E A S T P R I V I

    L E G E Compartmentalization EncryptionServiceIAMRole: Type: "AWS::IAM::Role" Properties: Path: "/" ManagedPolicyArns: - "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole" AssumeRolePolicyDocument: Version: "2012-10-17" Statement: - Sid: "AllowLambdaServiceToAssumeRole" Effect: "Allow" Action: - "sts:AssumeRole" Principal: Service: - "lambda.amazonaws.com"
  71. 100.

    C O M P A R T M E N

    T A L I Z E I T ! • Networks • Public ingress (CloudFront), WAF rules • Private ingress (Jump server) • Roles for public, hotel staff, site admin, developer, ops • Restrict data by property • Archive old data to encrypted cold storage • Use key management (KMS, HSM, etc.) for secrets
  72. 101.

    F A U LT T O L E R A

    N C E https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
  73. 102.

    F A U LT T O L E R A

    N C E • User safety • Stop the exf iltration • Assess the scope • Proactively prevent further damage to users • Listen • Technical • Engage DF/IR professionals to assess how it happened and how to prevent • Design system for secure storage and rotation of secrets
  74. 103.
  75. 104.

    L A T H E R , R I N

    S E , R E P E A T • Plan on enumerating the f irst principles at least twice in initial app design • Following f irst principles does not mean “big design upf ront”
  76. 105.

    F U R T H E R R E A

    D I N G • The Information Security Practice Principles, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University • Threat Modeling, Designing for Security, by Adam Shostack
  77. 106.

    C R E D I T S • Some stock

    photography f rom wocintechchat.com, CC- BY 2.0 • Creative Commons photography credited on each slide