Shifting Application Security Left

Shifting Application Security Left

(Central Ohio InfoSec Summit version)
Many people agree the best way to avoid security problems in an application is to design security into the architecture from the beginning instead of doing blackbox testing after development is finished. But what does that actually look like in a real-world application development lifecycle? Checklists like the OWASP Top 10 do not tell architects how to best work with infosec professionals or singlehandedly build an application on a secure foundation. Where should a developer even begin? How do you design security into applications based on next week's JavaScript framework, for which no "best practices" exist? The Information Security Practice Principles, developed by Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, provide both a foundation for application security independent of specific technology decisions as well as a means for establishing a common language between designers and defenders. We will work through an example of how to apply the principles build a threat model and an application design, and what this looks like in an "agile" software development lifecycle. Security teams can be an enabler for good design, not just a gateway to block mistakes!

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Craig Stuntz

May 14, 2018
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Transcript

  1. S H I F T I N G A P

    P L I C A T I O N S E C U R I T Y L E F T Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving
  2. S H I F T I N G A P

    P L I C A T I O N S E C U R I T Y L E F T Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz
  3. 2 0 1 2

  4. 2 0 1 7

  5. 2 0 1 7

  6. 2 0 1 8

  7. P R E V I E W • What does

    application security mean? • Developer checklists don’t work • Threat modeling & security f rom f irst principles • Security as a f irst class part of the software design & development lifecycle
  8. – H i p p o c r a t

    i c O a t h ( 1 9 6 4 L o u i s L a s a g n a v e r s i o n ) “I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person’s family and economic stability.”
  9. None
  10. 1. ummm… blockchain? 2. ??? 3. prof it!

  11. http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/air-safety-2017-best-year-safest-airline-passengers-worldwide-to70-civil-aviation-review- a8130796.html

  12. W H A T W O U L D S

    O F T W A R E D E V E L O P M E N T L O O K L I K E I F H U M A N S A F E T Y W A S A LW A Y S T H E F I R S T C O N S I D E R A T I O N ? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25900776992/
  13. – A C M C o d e o f

    E t h i c s a n d P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t ( p r o p o s e d ) “A computing professional should contribute to society and to human well-being, acknowledging that all people are stakeholders in computing.”
  14. – A l l i s o n M i

    l l e r “I don't think humans are the problem, the problem is that humans are the target.” https://www.scmagazineuk.com/news-feature-google-security-interview-human-solutions--the-way-to-go/article/701976/
  15. W H A T I S S E C U

    R I T Y , R E A L LY ? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airport_Frankfurt_-_Fraport_-_Flughafen_Frankfurt_-_barbed_wire_and_fence_-_Stacheldraht_und_Zaun_-_05.jpg https://www.flickr.com/photos/captkodak/37054929956/
  16. D O M A I N S P E C

    I F I C Q A
  17. Behavior

  18. Behavior Specification

  19. Behavior Specification

  20. Behavior Specification

  21. Behavior Specification

  22. Behavior Specification

  23. Q A : D O E S T H E

    S O F T W A R E D O W H A T I T S H O U L D ?
  24. S E C U R I T Y : D

    O E S I T A L S O D O A N Y T H I N G E L S E ?
  25. D o We E v e n K n o

    w W h a t t h e S o f t w a r e I s S u p p o s e d t o D o ?
  26. “In order to write secure applications, developers must • Take

    OWASP Top 10 training • Use Veracode • Have application pentested • Use two factor authentication on source control and hosts • Use off-the-shelf crypto libraries • Monitor production • Use memory-safe languages • Do code review • HTTPS everywhere!
  27. B U I L D A R E C I

    P E , N O T A G R O C E R Y S T O R E
  28. L E A R N Y O U R D

    O M A I N https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Domain,_Atrium_(Hong_Kong).jpg
  29. – M a t t Ta i t “The underlying

    problem is folks think in terms of ‘secure’ versus ‘insecure.’ But in reality, it's ‘in/secure vs. X threat in Y threat model.’” https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/922009773352120320
  30. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/amazon-recalls-potentially-hazardous-solar-eclipse-glasses

  31. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592

  32. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592

  33. iT u n e s M o n e y

    L a u n d e r i n g https://www.thedailybeast.com/want-to-launder-bitcoins-how-crooks-are-hacking-itunes-and-getting-paid-by-apple
  34. “ I ’ m j u s t a t

    o a s t e r . N o b o d y w i l l e v e r t r y t o h a c k m e ! ”
  35. – S e n . R i c h a

    r d B u r r “You commented yesterday that your company’s goal is bringing people together. In this case, people were brought together to foment conflict, and Facebook enabled that event to happen.” https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/
  36. QA! Security!

  37. F O U N D A T I O N

    S Secure Design Secure Lifecycle Empowered Developers Threat Model Security Fundamentals Human Safety Priority Domain Knowledge Safer Applications and Infrastructure
  38. Define Design Develop QA Security Deploy

  39. N I S T 8 0 0 - 6 4

    Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle (2008) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-64r2.pdf
  40. C I S C O S E C U R

    E D E V E L O P M E N T L I F E C Y C L E https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/doing_business/trust-center/docs/building-trustworthy-systems-with-CSDL.pdf
  41. M I C R O S O F T S

    D L C http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/SDL
  42. O W A S P S D L C DRAFT

    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Software_Development_Lifecycle_Project
  43. None
  44. https://twitter.com/petecheslock/status/595617204273618944?lang=en

  45. G R E A T I D E A S

    … O N T H E R I G H T
  46. G R E A T I D E A S

    … O N T H E R I G H T Bug Bounties Canaries Full Packet Capture Fuzzing Asset Identification Attack Simulation
  47. S L A C K S L C https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBwluaTaenI

  48. S L A C K S L C https://github.com/slackhq/goSDL

  49. S E C U R I T Y I N

    A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster
  50. S E C U R I T Y I N

    A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster Fundamental Principles Threat Model Automated Analysis Manual Review
  51. T H R E A T M O D E

    L I N G
  52. S I X D E G R E E S

    Who is affected by the software you create? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388897014/
  53. U s e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/

  54. C u s t o m e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/

    https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926791491/
  55. Yo u r Te a m https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25167741264/

  56. S t a k e h o l d e

    r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388889234/
  57. P a r t n e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388854424/

  58. Yo u r C o m m u n i

    t y
  59. W H A T D O Y O U H

    A V E ?
  60. I n f r a s t r u c

    t u r e • Servers • Software • Clients • Gateways • Third Parties
  61. D a t a • Databases • Metadata • Logs

    • Credentials • Files on client machines
  62. T r u s t B o u n d

    a r i e s • Implicit • Explicit
  63. W H A T C O U L D G

    O W R O N G ?
  64. D O M A I N - S P E

    C I F I C R I S K S
  65. T a k e C a r e o f

    P e o p l e F i r s t https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926827581/
  66. L e a r n f r o m H

    i s t o r y https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maginot_line_1.jpg
  67. E x i s t e n t i a

    l T h r e a t s http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/technology/knight-expensive-computer-bug/index.html
  68. R e g u l a t o r y

  69. B A C K T O B A S I

    C S
  70. C O M P R E H E N S

    I V I T Y Security f rom First Principles Am I covering all of my bases? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Agoncillo_- _W%C3%BCrth_Rioja%2C_Museo_30_-_Christo.JPG
  71. O P P O R T U N I T

    Y Security f rom First Principles Am I taking advantage of my environment? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amazing_Bhutan_Monastery.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  72. R I G O R Security f rom First Principles

    What is correct behavior, and how am I ensuring it? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turnstile_state_machine_colored.svg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  73. M I N I M I Z A T I

    O N Security f rom First Principles Can this be a smaller target? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  74. C O M P A R T M E N

    T A L I Z A T I O N Security f rom First Principles Is this made of distinct parts with limited interactions? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulkhead_(partition)#/media/ File:Compartments_and_watertight_subdivision_of_a_ship%27s_hull_(Seaman%27s_Pocket- Book,_1943).jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  75. F A U LT T O L E R A

    N C E Security f rom First Principles What happens if this fails? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:A_U.S._Soldier,_right,_looks_on_as_a_U.S._Army_Garrison_Ansbach_Junior_ROTC_cadet_negotia tes_a_high_rope_obstacle_6.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  76. P R O P O R T I O N

    A L I T Y Security f rom First Principles Is this worth it? https://twitter.com/jwgoerlich/status/939268098699550720?s=09 Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
  77. T H E B A S I C P R

    I N C I P L E S I N A C T I O N
  78. B U S I N E S S P R

    O B L E M • A hotel chain needs to capture credit card numbers for potential incidental charges when the cardholder will not be present at check in • Example: A parent wants to authorize incidental charges for a traveling school sports team member • Current process is a paper form. Company would like to automate
  79. N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N “Type a quote here.”
  80. N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  81. N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  82. N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  83. N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  84. N A Ï V E S O L U T

    I O N , R E - R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
  85. D E S I G N E D I N

    T O P R O C E S S Comprehensivity https://jeremylong.github.io/DependencyCheck/
  86. T R A I N I N G Comprehensivity https://twitter.com/chrisrohlf/status/925846092184477698

  87. O P P O R T U N I T

    Y
  88. O P P O R T U N I T

    Y
  89. O P P O R T U N I T

    Y
  90. O P P O R T U N I T

    Y
  91. O P P O R T U N I T

    Y
  92. P A T C H A L L O F

    T H E T H I N G S Opportunity “Type a quote here.”
  93. R I G O R

  94. S T A T I C A N A LY

    S I S Rigor “The most important thing I have done as a programmer in recent years is to aggressively pursue static code analysis. Even more valuable than the hundreds of serious bugs I have prevented with it is the change in mindset about the way I view software reliability and code quality.” - J o h n C a r m a c k https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/128836/InDepth_Static_Code_Analysis.php
  95. None
  96. M I N I M I Z E A T

    T A C K S U R F A C E ( a n d e v e r y t h i n g e l s e ) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack_Surface_Analysis_Cheat_Sheet
  97. S T O R E L E S S Minimization

    “Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, and/ or regulatory purposes, as documented in your data retention policy. Purge unnecessary stored data at least quarterly.” P C I - D S S § 3 . 1 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCIDSS_QRGv3_1.pdf
  98. C O M P A R T M E N

    T A L I Z E I T !
  99. D O U B L E E D G E

    D S W O R D Compartmentalization “Your perimeter is not the boundary of your network it’s the boundary of your telemetry.” http://grugq.github.io/presentations/comae-blackhat-year-of-the-worm.pdf - T h e G r u g q
  100. L E A S T P R I V I

    L E G E Compartmentalization EncryptionServiceIAMRole: Type: "AWS::IAM::Role" Properties: Path: "/" ManagedPolicyArns: - "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole" AssumeRolePolicyDocument: Version: "2012-10-17" Statement: - Sid: "AllowLambdaServiceToAssumeRole" Effect: "Allow" Action: - "sts:AssumeRole" Principal: Service: - "lambda.amazonaws.com"
  101. C O M P A R T M E N

    T A L I Z E I T ! • Networks • Public ingress (CloudFront), WAF rules • Private ingress (Jump server) • Roles for public, hotel staff, site admin, developer, ops • Restrict data by property • Archive old data to encrypted cold storage • Use key management (KMS, HSM, etc.) for secrets
  102. F A U LT T O L E R A

    N C E https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
  103. F A U LT T O L E R A

    N C E • User safety • Stop the exf iltration • Assess the scope • Proactively prevent further damage to users • Listen • Technical • Engage DF/IR professionals to assess how it happened and how to prevent • Design system for secure storage and rotation of secrets
  104. P R O P O R T I O N

    A L I T Y
  105. L A T H E R , R I N

    S E , R E P E A T • Plan on enumerating the f irst principles at least twice in initial app design • Enumerate again in sprint planning for each sprint • Following f irst principles does not mean “big design upf ront”
  106. C O N T I N U O U S

    S E C U R I T Y Initially •Human safety review •Review principles at least twice •Begin threat modeling •Security controls in CI Periodically •Pentest •Regulatory review •Incident response plan Continuously •Use principles in backlog grooming •Update threat model •Usability testing •Static/dynamic analysis •Training •Patch All of the Things
  107. F U R T H E R R E A

    D I N G • The Information Security Practice Principles, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University • Threat Modeling, Designing for Security, by Adam Shostack
  108. C R E D I T S • Some stock

    photography f rom wocintechchat.com, CC- BY 2.0 • Creative Commons photography credited on each slide
  109. C O N T A C T craig.stuntz@improving.com @craigstuntz http://paperswelove.org/chapter/columbus/

    https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz