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High Speed Bug Discovery with Fuzzing - Dog Food Conference

High Speed Bug Discovery with Fuzzing - Dog Food Conference

How can you find hidden defects in your code without a lot of manual analysis? You’ll leave this talk knowing when to use fuzzing to test your application, which tools you should use, how to implement a fuzzer from scratch, and when other techniques are a better choice.

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Craig Stuntz

October 05, 2017
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Transcript

  1. High Speed Bug Discovery with Fuzzing Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving

  2. Slides https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz

  3. Fuzzing Is Bad …and you should feel bad about using

    it
  4. How Do We Design Software Security? - Usability Studies (Does

    it work for human beings?) - Threat Modeling - Formal Verification - Static Analysis - Auditing - Pentesting - Throw Random Crap At It And See If It Dies
  5. Offensive Software

  6. “ Unfortunately, C and C++ are mostly taught the old

    way, as if programming in them isn’t like walking in a minefield. Nor have the books about C and C++ caught up with the current reality. These things must change. -John Regehr https://blog.regehr.org/archives/1520
  7. “Yet, despite the crippling and obvious limitations of fuzzing and

    the virtues of symbolic execution, there is one jarring discord: I'm fairly certain that probably around 70% of all remote code execution vulnerabilities disclosed in the past few years trace back to fairly “dumb” fuzzing tools, with the pattern showing little change over time. -Michał Zalewski https://lcamtuf.blogspot.com/2015/02/symbolic-execution-in-vuln-research.html
  8. let private bitMasks(bitIndex: int, bitsToFlip: int) = match bitIndex %

    8, bitsToFlip with | 0, 1 !→ 0b00000001uy, 0b00000000uy | 1, 1 !→ 0b00000010uy, 0b00000000uy | 2, 1 !→ 0b00000100uy, 0b00000000uy | 3, 1 !→ 0b00001000uy, 0b00000000uy | 4, 1 !→ 0b00010000uy, 0b00000000uy | 5, 1 !→ 0b00100000uy, 0b00000000uy | 6, 1 !→ 0b01000000uy, 0b00000000uy | 7, 1 !→ 0b10000000uy, 0b00000000uy | 0, 2 !→ 0b00000011uy, 0b00000000uy | 1, 2 !→ 0b00000110uy, 0b00000000uy | 2, 2 !→ 0b00001100uy, 0b00000000uy | 3, 2 !→ 0b00011000uy, 0b00000000uy | 4, 2 !→ 0b00110000uy, 0b00000000uy | 5, 2 !→ 0b01100000uy, 0b00000000uy | 6, 2 !→ 0b11000000uy, 0b00000000uy | 7, 2 !→ 0b10000000uy, 0b00000001uy | 0, 4 !→ 0b00001111uy, 0b00000000uy | 1, 4 !→ 0b00011110uy, 0b00000000uy | 2, 4 !→ 0b00111100uy, 0b00000000uy | 3, 4 !→ 0b01111000uy, 0b00000000uy | 4, 4 !→ 0b11110000uy, 0b00000000uy | 5, 4 !→ 0b11100000uy, 0b00000001uy | 6, 4 !→ 0b11000000uy, 0b00000011uy | 7, 4 !→ 0b10000000uy, 0b00000111uy | bit, _ !→ failwithf "Unsupported bit %d or bitsToFlip %d" bit bitsToFlip
  9. Spoilers! Why should I care? (because it’s surprisingly effective at

    finding bugs in software) What is it? (a simple, property-based randomized testing technique) When should I use it? (integration testing complex systems with infinite input values) How do I get started? (I’ll suggest a bunch of tools) Should I write my own? (yes, and I have stories!)
  10. Why?

  11. 400 Crashes, 106 Distinct Security Bugs in Adobe Flash Player

    https://security.googleblog.com/2011/08/fuzzing-at-scale.html
  12. 325 C Compiler bugs in GCC, Clang, & Others https://www.flux.utah.edu/paper/yang-pldi11

  13. “…our most prolific bug-finding tool.” Robert Guo http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?ref=rss&id=3059007

  14. “fuzzers…can be integrated into a CI environment for permanent protection

    henceforth” Guido Vranken https://guidovranken.wordpress.com/2017/06/21/the-openvpn-post-audit-bug-bonanza/
  15. DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge Mayhem, Xandra, Mechanical Phish, Galactica http://blogs.grammatech.com/the-cyber-grand-challenge

  16. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rabbit_american_fuzzy_lop_buck_white.jpg What is it?

  17. Prevent Regressions Bug Discovery Help with Code Design Meets Specifications

    Fuzzing Integration testing Unit testing Formal verification Exploratory testing
  18. How Many Cases Should We Test? One Only the Most

    Interesting Every Possible Case Unit Testing Fuzzing Formal Verification
  19. Property -Based Random Testing QuickCheck Chaos Monkey Fuzzing Scientist

  20. System Under Test Corpus (Collection of Examples) Property Magic!

  21. Corpus A few handwritten examples Fuzzing databases Harvest from test

    suites, defect reports Harvest from public Internet
  22. System Under Test A function Entire application Part of OS

    kernel
  23. Properties Does it crash? Does it hang? Is the output

    “valid”? Does execution trip an address or memory sanitizer? Does the output match some other system?
  24. Magic Mutation of corpus Coverage guidance Lots of test runs

  25. Possible Inputs Random Inputs Interesting Inputs Random Inputs with Profile

    Guidance
  26. Getting Started with afl - Compile system under test with

    instrumentation - Place corpus input(s) in a folder - Invoke afl - Wait for bugs https://fuzzing-project.org/tutorial3.html
  27. Compile with Instrumentation $ ./configure CC="afl-gcc" \ CXX="afl-g++" \ --disable-shared;

    \ make
  28. Place Corpus in Folder $ mkdir in $ cd in

    $ cat > foo.json { "a": "bc" } ^D $ cd ..
  29. Invoke afl $ afl-fuzz -i in -o out \ my_json_parser

    @@ folder containing corpus “@@“ means “the current test case” system under test findings go here
  30. None
  31. some_project ├── in └─┬ out ├── queue ├── crashes └──

    hangs
  32. afl In a Nutshell ⃗

  33. None
  34. afl Fuzz Strategies Walking bit flips (try flipping each bit

    in input individually) Walking byte flips (try flipping each contiguous set of 8 bits) Simple arithmetic (increment or decrement bytes in the file by certain small values) Known integers (or dictionaries) (replace bytes with “problematic” 8, 16, and 32 bit integers like 0 and FF) Profile-guided stacked tweaks and test case splicing (magic!) https://lcamtuf.blogspot.com/2014/08/binary-fuzzing-strategies-what-works.html
  35. Walking Bit Flip Original 01010101 Flip bit 0 01010100 Flip

    bit 1 01010111 Flip bit 2 01010001 <etc.> Walking 2 Bit Flip Original 01010101 Flip bits 0,1 01010110 Flip bits 2,1 01010011 Flip bits 3,2 01001101 <etc.>
  36. Trace Execution Paths A B D C E F ?

  37. When Should I Use It? When is it useful? https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Coniglio_ariete.JPG

  38. Unit Tests Fuzzing Useful For Preventing Regressions, Design Finding New

    Bugs Tests Functions Any Level Test Examples Hand-selected values Corpus + Mutation Execution Time Milliseconds Weeks Magic? No Yes
  39. Instrumentation for profile guidance

  40. $ ./configure CC="afl-gcc" \ CXX="afl-g++" \ --disable-shared; \ make

  41. $ pip install python-afl ——— afl.init()

  42. Properties a.k.a. Specifications https://lorinhochstein.wordpress.com/2014/06/04/crossing-the-river-with-tla/

  43. None
  44. None
  45. STJSON A JSON Parser in Swift 3 compliant with RFC

    7159 STJSON was written along with the article Parsing JSON is a Minefield. Basic usage: var p = STJSONParser(data: data) do { let o = p.parse() } catch let e { print(e) } Instantiation with options: var p = STJSON(data:data, maxParserDepth:1024, options:[.useUnicodeReplacementCharacter]) https://github.com/nst/STJSON https://github.com/CraigStuntz/Fizil/tree/master/StJson
  46. Can You Fuzz the Domain?

  47. Dumb Fuzzer Mangling Byte Arrays

  48. public byte[] ResizePng( byte[] image) {

  49. public boolean SomeFunction( SomeEnum firstArg, int secondArg) { ✗

  50. Smart Fuzzing MongoDB Expression Grammar http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?ref=rss&id=3059007

  51. public Assembly Compile( AbstractNode syntaxTree) {

  52. Worth the Wait? Results Can Take Weeks

  53. Isn’t it just for Security? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25721078480/

  54. How do I get started?

  55. How to Get Started with Fuzzing 1. Find a program

    to test 2. Find a fuzzer 3. Find a corpus 4. Choose a property 5. Let it run!
  56. Fuzzers https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Holland_Lop_with_Broken_Orange_Coloring.jpg

  57. libfuzzer Fuzz testing for LLVM compilers http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html

  58. $ cargo install cargo-fuzz $ cargo fuzz init

  59. $ gzip -c /bin/bash > sample.gz $ while true do

    radamsa sample.gz > fuzzed.gz gzip -dc fuzzed.gz > /dev/null test $? -gt 127 && break done ← Fuzz the corpus ← Execute S.O.T. ← Check a property ← Repeat a lot! https://github.com/aoh/radamsa
  60. ClusterFuzz Submit a fuzzer, win a bounty https://security.googleblog.com/2016/08/guided-in-process-fuzzing-of-chrome.html

  61. afl

  62. OSS-Fuzz Submit your project https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz

  63. “Project Springfield” https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security-risk-detection/

  64. burp, ZAP

  65. Corpus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Long_Room_Interior,_Trinity_College_Dublin,_Ire

  66. “ We didn't call it fuzzing back in the 1950s,

    but it was our standard practice to test programs by inputting decks of punch cards taken from the trash. -Gerald M. Weinberg http://secretsofconsulting.blogspot.com/2017/02/fuzz-testing-and-fuzz-history.html
  67. None
  68. Fuzzing SQLite with afl Start with a single test case:

    create table t1(one smallint); insert into t1 values(1); select * from t1; Add a list of reserved words from documentation Then extract SQL statements from SQLite unit tests (550 files at around 220 bytes each) https://lcamtuf.blogspot.com/2015/04/finding-bugs-in-sqlite-easy-way.html
  69. Properties

  70. Don’t Crash or Hang

  71. Sanitizers and Canaries https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/19OSgb1N9Ezef39Blb-5lkzycq7-tMtAvy825FofyrmY

  72. Validators

  73. End to End Input Output Same as Input? f(input) f-1(input)

  74. Legacy Code https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Blue-punch-card-front-horiz.png

  75. One of The Things …Is Not Like the Others!

  76. Should I write my own?

  77. Heck Yeah! https://github.com/CraigStuntz/Fizil

  78. Interesting Stuff I Learned While Writing a Fuzzer - Deceptive

    simplicity of fuzzing - F# bitwise operations - How to instrument .NET code - dnSpy is awesome - Same input -> Same code -> Different paths - Strong naming is painful - Unicode is also painful - Speed is everything
  79. let jsonNetResult = try JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<obj>(str) |> ignore Success with |

    :? JsonReaderException as jre -> jre.Message |> Error | :? JsonSerializationException as jse -> jse.Message |> Error | :? System.FormatException as fe -> if fe.Message.StartsWith("Invalid hex character”) // hard coded in Json.NET then fe.Message |> Error else reraise() ⃪ T est ⬑ Special case error stuff
  80. use proc = new Process() proc.StartInfo.FileName <- executablePath inputMethod.BeforeStart proc

    testCase.Data proc.StartInfo.UseShellExecute <- false proc.StartInfo.RedirectStandardOutput <- true proc.StartInfo.RedirectStandardError <- true proc.StartInfo.EnvironmentVariables.Add(SharedMemory.environmentVariableName, sharedMemoryName) let output = new System.Text.StringBuilder() let err = new System.Text.StringBuilder() proc.OutputDataReceived.Add(fun args -> output.Append(args.Data) |> ignore) proc.ErrorDataReceived.Add (fun args -> err.Append(args.Data) |> ignore) proc.Start() |> ignore inputMethod.AfterStart proc testCase.Data proc.BeginOutputReadLine() proc.BeginErrorReadLine() proc.WaitForExit() let exitCode = proc.ExitCode let crashed = exitCode = WinApi.ClrUnhandledExceptionCode ⃪ Set up ⃪ Read results ⃪ Important bit
  81. /// An ordered list of functions to use when starting

    with a single piece of /// example data and producing new examples to try let private allStrategies(dictionaryValues: byte[][])= [ bitFlip 1 bitFlip 2 bitFlip 4 byteFlip 1 byteFlip 2 byteFlip 4 arith8 arith16 arith32 dictionary dictionaryValues interest8 interest16 ]
  82. let totalBits = bytes.Length * 8 let testCases = seq

    { for bit = 0 to totalBits - flipBits do let newBytes = Array.copy bytes let firstByte = bit / 8 let firstByteMask, secondByteMask = bitMasks(bit, flipBits) let newFirstByte = bytes.[firstByte] ^^^ firstByteMask newBytes.[firstByte] <- newFirstByte let secondByte = firstByte + 1 if secondByteMask <> 0uy && secondByte < bytes.Length then let newSecondByte = bytes.[secondByte] ^^^ secondByteMask newBytes.[secondByte] <- newSecondByte yield newBytes } Fuzz one byte → ^^^ means xor ↓
  83. None
  84. None
  85. private static void F(string arg) { Console.WriteLine("f"); Console.Error.WriteLine("Error!"); Environment.Exit(1); }

  86. private static void F(string arg) { instrument.Trace(29875); Console.WriteLine("f"); Console.Error.WriteLine("Error!"); Environment.Exit(1);

    } ← Random number
  87. private static void F(string arg) { #if MANUAL_INSTRUMENTATION instrument.Trace(29875); #endif

    Console.WriteLine("f"); Console.Error.WriteLine("Error!"); Environment.Exit(1); }
  88. let stringify (ob: obj) : string = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(ob) // Method:

    System.String\u0020Program::stringify(System.Object) .body stringify { arg_02_0 [generated] arg_07_0 [generated] nop() arg_02_0 = ldloc(ob) arg_07_0 = call(JsonConvert::SerializeObject, arg_02_0) ret(arg_07_0) } // Method: System.String\u0020Program::stringify(System.Object) .body stringify { arg_05_0 [generated] arg_0C_0 [generated] arg_11_0 [generated] arg_05_0 = ldc.i4(23831) call(Instrument::Trace, arg_05_0) nop() arg_0C_0 = ldloc(ob) arg_11_0 = call(JsonConvert::SerializeObject, arg_0C_0) ret(arg_11_0) }
  89. None
  90. let private insertTraceInstruction(ilProcessor: ILProcessor, before: Instruction, state) = let compileTimeRandom

    = state.Random.Next(0, UInt16.MaxValue |> Convert.ToInt32) let ldArg = ilProcessor.Create(OpCodes.Ldc_I4, compileTimeRandom) let callTrace = ilProcessor.Create(OpCodes.Call, state.Trace) ilProcessor.InsertBefore(before, ldArg) ilProcessor.InsertAfter (ldArg, callTrace) This margin is too narrow to contain a try/finally example, so see: https://goo.gl/W4y7JH
  91. None
  92. http://www.json.org/

  93. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4627

  94. http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/#sec-15.12

  95. http://www.ecma-international.org/publications/standards/Ecma-404.htm

  96. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7158

  97. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7159

  98. https://github.com/nst/STJSON

  99. https://github.com/CraigStuntz/Fizil/blob/master/StJson/StJsonParser.fs

  100. { "a" : "bc" }

  101. None
  102. None
  103. Standard Accepts, Json.NET Rejects Value 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888

    Standard Says No limit Json.NET MaximumJavascriptIntegerCharacterLength = 380;
  104. Standard Rejects, Json.NET Accepts Value [,,,] Standard Says A JSON

    value MUST be an object, array, number, or string, or one of the following three literal names: false null true Json.NET [null, null, null, null]
  105. None
  106. let private removeStrongName (assemblyDefinition : AssemblyDefinition) = let name =

    assemblyDefinition.Name; name.HasPublicKey <- false; name.PublicKey <- Array.empty; assemblyDefinition.Modules |> Seq.iter ( fun moduleDefinition -> moduleDefinition.Attributes <- moduleDefinition.Attributes &&& ~~~ModuleAttributes.StrongNameSigned) let aptca = assemblyDefinition.CustomAttributes.FirstOrDefault( fun attr -> attr.AttributeType.FullName = typeof<System.Security.AllowPartiallyTrustedCallersAttribute>.FullName) assemblyDefinition.CustomAttributes.Remove aptca |> ignore assembly.MainModule.AssemblyReferences |> Seq.filter (fun reference -> Set.contains reference.Name assembliesToInstrument) |> Seq.iter (fun reference -> reference.PublicKeyToken <- null )
  107. “ “If marked BeforeFieldInit then the type’s initializer method is

    executed at, or sometime before, first access to any static field defined for that type.” -ECMA-335, Common Language Infrastructure (CLI), Partition I
  108. Unicode Original JSON { "a": "bc" } ASCII Bytes 7B

    20 22 61 22 20 3A 20 22 62 63 22 20 7D UTF-8 with Byte Order Mark EF BB BF 7B 20 22 61 22 20 3A 20 22 62 63 22 20 7D UTF-16 BE with BOM FE FF 00 7B 00 20 00 22 00 61 00 22 00 20 00 3A 00 20 00 22 00 62 00 63 00 22 00 20 00 7D
  109. None
  110. Resources Awesome Fuzzing: A Curated List of Fuzzing Resources https://github.com/secfigo/Awesome-Fuzzing

    OWASP Fuzzing Page https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fuzzing MongoDB’s JavaScript Fuzzer http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?ref=rss&id=3059007 afl technical details http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/technical_details.txt afl Help Email List afl-users@googlegroups.com Fizil https://github.com/CraigStuntz/Fizil WTF, ACM?
  111. Thank You! - Michał Zalewski, for afl documentation - Rehearsal

    audiences, employees of - Dynamit - Improving - Ineffable Solutions
  112. Craig Stuntz craig.stuntz@improving.com www.craigstuntz.com @craigstuntz http://www.meetup.com/Papers-We-Love-Columbus/