Funky Malware Formats

Presented at SAS 2019: https://sas.kaspersky.com/#wednesday-april-10-2019-conference-day-2-sas
Video #1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ndK-Az0RO4
Video #2 (extended version): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fvKeV5oJMnc
Additional materials: https://github.com/hasherezade/funky_malware_formats

Transcript

2. INTRODUCTION What is this talk about? • Custom PE loaders are typical in malware nowadays • How common are custom formats? • We set out to answer this very question • Much like searching for new forms of life • We bring you some of our findings in this talk • But before so…
3. ABOUT US Meet the special agents Mark Lechtik Aleksandra Doniec @_marklech_ Check Point Research @hasherezade Malwarebytes
5. HIDDEN BEE
6. • Distributed by Underminer EK • Chinese miner • High and low-level elements: including a bootkit • We will focus on the high-level part: loaders in custom format HIDDEN BEE Profile
7. 23 JULY 2018 MALWAREBYTES SLACK CHANNEL HIDDEN BEE Story
8. • bin/i386/core.sdb bin/i386/core.sdb 52he3kf2g2rr6l5s1as2u0198k.wasm glfw.wasm HIDDEN BEE Story
9. ? This is not how the WASM file looks like... ? HIDDEN BEE Story
10. ? UFO… UNIDENTIFIED FILE OBJECT FOUND HIDDEN BEE Story
11. • We don’t have: the initial loader • We have: 2 files with a consistent format • Let’s try to analyze the headers and guess what each field means • Let’s write our own loader HIDDEN BEE Story
12. typedef struct { WORD func_count; char name; } t_dll_name; ntdll.dll HIDDEN BEE Imports 0x13 0x18
13. 0x0d827481 0x60 HIDDEN BEE IAT
14. DWORD checksum(char *func_name) { DWORD result = 0x1505; while ( *func_name ) result = *func_name++ + 33 * result; return result; } 0x60 0x0d827481 ntdll.dll HIDDEN BEE IAT 0x13
15. DWORD checksum(char *func_name) { DWORD result = 0x1505; while ( *func_name ) result = *func_name++ + 33 * result; return result; } 0x0d827481 778b81e0 0x0d827481 = checksum("memchr") GetProcAddress(mod, "memchr") 778b81e0 HMODULE mod = LoadLibraryA("ntdll"); HIDDEN BEE IAT 0x60 ntdll.dll 0x13
16. 0x60 0x0d827481 0x13 HIDDEN BEE IAT ntdll.dll 0x13
17. 0x2a62 HIDDEN BEE Entry Point
18. 0x509c HIDDEN BEE File Size . . .
19. offset (0x4D78) size (0x0324) 0x0324 0x0284 HIDDEN BEE Relocations 0x0284: field to be relocated
20. https://github.com/hasherezade/bee_parser HIDDEN BEE Profile
21. OCEAN LOTUS
22. • Known as a Vietnamese APT32 group • Distributed mainly by phishing and waterholing attacks • Payloads of various types, often composed of multiple files OCEAN LOTUS Profile
23. 49a2505d54c83a65bb4d 716a27438ed8f065c709 OCEAN LOTUS Sample *sample provided by @MinhTrietPT
24. The Alien Files What is this mysterious „blob”? Both files seem to be in the same format... But what are they really? SPORDER.cab It doesn’t look like a CAB format! SPORDER.blob OCEAN LOTUS
25. SPORDER.cab SPORDER.blob XOR key? OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files
26. SPORDER.cab SPORDER.blob OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files
27. SPORDER.cab <assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" manifestVersion="1.0"> <trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3"> <security> <requestedPrivileges> <requestedExecutionLevel level="asInvoker" uiAccess="false"></requestedExecutionLevel> </requestedPrivileges> </security> </trustInfo> We can find artefacts indicating that this format was converted from a PE file OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files
28. SPORDER.cab OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files
29. SPORDER.blob Sections: • not in the same order as typical PE • virtual format same as raw • custom headers - stripped in the virtual format OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files
30. Raw format Header 1 The executable part (shuffled sections, converted from a PE file) Header 2 Padding The executable part (shuffled sections, converted from a PE file) Loaded imports Virtual format OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files
31. SPORDER.dll sporder.exe SPORDER.cab SPORDER.blob hp6000.dll OCEAN LOTUS The Alien Files The loader All executables are used as a loading chain
32. We are lucky: we have the loader Let’s just look inside and see how it works! hp6000.dll One loading function for both: confirmed consistent format OCEAN LOTUS Approach
33. Header 1: before the executable part val + 0x2000 size of executable area XOR OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Allocation of executable area: Key[1] Key[0]
34. Header 2: after the executable part val * 8 + 0x400 space for loading imports OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Allocation of imports area:
35. Relocations? Imports? Exports? Entry Point? All together? Header 2: after the executable part OCEAN LOTUS Format Details What do we have here?
36. Header 2: records OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Type 1: Relocation
37. Relocation Field (0x3cab5) Header 2: records typedef struct { DWORD reloc_field; } reloc_t; Type (1) OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Type 1: Relocation
38. Header 2: records Type 2: Entry Point/Export OCEAN LOTUS Format Details
39. Header 2: records typedef struct { DWORD count; DWORD func_rva; DWORD name_rva; } entry_point_t; OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Type 2: Entry Point/Export Count (1) Function RVA (0x4900) Name RVA (0x10ad9f) IsValidLinkInfo Type (2)
40. Header 2: records Type 3: Import OCEAN LOTUS Format Details
41. Header 2: records typedef struct { DWORD type; DWORD dll_rva; DWORD func_rva; DWORD iat_rva; } import_t; OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Type 3: Import Type (3) IAT RVA (0x1000) Import By Name (2) DLL RVA (0x10a8c8) Function RVA (0x10a8aa) RegOpenKeyExW ADAVAPI32.DLL
42. OCEAN LOTUS Format Details Header 2: records Type 3: Import
44. GOZI PE Like never seen before
45. GOZI PE Like never seen before Overview • A popular banking Trojan • Also known as: ISFB, Ursnif • Source code has been leaked and reused across multiple variants • We are going to discuss Gozi version 3 • Paper by Maciek Kotowicz’s (@maciekkotowicz): https://lokalhost.pl/txt/isfbv3.pdf
46. GOZI Unpacking atypical payload Added Header PE-sieve unpacks malware by dumping the payload from memory. But unpacking Gozi v3 turned a bit problematic...
47. • In the dumped PE, we are still missing: • The Entry Point • Imports • Exports • Relocations • Let’s see how this PE looks in the memory, before it is mapped to the virtual format... GOZI
48. GOZI PE Like never seen before Load Sequence EXE EXE 1st stage loader 2nd stage loader ?
49. GOZI PE Like never seen before Modified Format Modified DOS Header Modified Section Table Original Sections Original NT Headers Original Section Table Modified Data Directories Modified PE Header Modified Headers Original PE Fields
50. GOZI PE Like never seen before Modified Format Modified DOS Header Modified Section Table Original Sections Original NT Headers Original Section Table Modified Data Directories Modified PE Header
51. GOZI PE Like never seen before Magic Checksum NT Header Offset Image Size Modified Format Magic NT Header Offset “PX” = Portable Xecutable? Modified PE Size Modified DOS Header Modified Section Table Original Sections Original NT Headers Original Section Table Modified Data Directories Modified PE Header Nt Header Size Example: Pointer to the original PE header Original NT Headers 0x958
52. GOZI PE Like never seen before Modified DOS Header Modified Format Modified Section Table Original Sections Original NT Headers Original Section Table Import Directory Header Export Directory Header Import Address Table Header Security Directory Header Unknown Directory Header Modified Data Directories Relocation Directory Header Modified PE Header Entry Point Machine ID Sections Count Original Format
53. GOZI PE Like never seen before Modified DOS Header Modified Format Modified Section Table Original Sections Original NT Headers Original Section Table Import Directory Header Export Directory Header Import Address Table Header Security Directory Header Unknown Directory Header Modified Data Directories Relocation Directory Header Modified PE Header Entry Point Machine ID Sections Count Original Format Modified Directory Headers • PX format contains only subset of the PE format directory headers • Order of appearance of directory headers is different
54. GOZI PE Like never seen before Original RVA Current RVA Modified DOS Header Modified Format Modified Section Table Original Sections Original NT Headers Original Section Table Size Import Directory Header Export Directory Header Import Address Table Header Security Directory Header Unknown Directory Header Modified Data Directories Relocation Directory Header Modified PE Header Original RVA Size Current RVA Entry Point Machine ID Sections Count Entry Point Machine ID Sections Count Example: RVA of directory in original PE (0xBD10) Size of directory (0x41) RVA in PX format (0x3B0) IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
55. GOZI PE Like never seen before • Attempt to revive the PE format with a new “flavor” • To recover the original PE, we need to dump the PX format, and use the converter https://github.com/hasherezade/funky_malware_parsers/ tree/master/isfb_parser EXE PX
56. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist Overview • Banking malware revealed by ESET at May 2018 • Known to target banks in Poland, Spain and Czech Republic • Derivative of the Tinba banking malware • Known to use innovative techniques to avoid detection • Comes in an executable that diverts execution to a weird blob
57. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist Bitmap Header Pixel Data File Header BMP format outline
58. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist File Header signature size padding data start ‘B’‘M’ 00 00 00 00 76 00 00 00 FF004000
59. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist File Header signature size padding data start ‘B’ 00 00 00 00 76 00 00 00 FF004000 ‘M’ It is possible to modify the size field so that it will represent a jump instruction!
60. DE 54 E9 42 4D BACKSWAP BMP with a twist File Header signature size padding data start INC EDX DEC EBP 00 00 00 00 76 00 00 00 00 00 JMP offset It is possible to modify the size field so that it will represent a jump instruction!
61. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist Loader Code section Custom import table resolve decode Function Address Hash Function Address Hash Function Address Hash Function Address Hash Function Address Hash Bitmap Header Pixel Data File Header jump Malware format outline
62. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist Loader Code section Custom import table Bitmap Header Pixel Data File Header When we try to visualize the BMP, we realize it’s a polyglot polyglot binary represented by several formats, depending on how you look at it @angealbertini
63. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist Loader Code section Custom import table Bitmap Header Pixel Data File Header Malware Payload
64. BACKSWAP BMP with a twist Loader Code section Custom import table Bitmap Header Pixel Data File Header Malware Payload Eric Cartmen
66. ALIENS AMONG US Binary Format you Never Heard of • Typical format in AIX • IBM proprietary Unix OS • AIX is Deployed on various platforms, usually as a server • Example: Payment Switch Servers • Transaction processing and routing decisions Auxiliary Header File Header .text .bss Section Raw Data Section Headers .text relocations .loader relocations Relocation data … XCOFF (Extended Common Object File Format) .data .loader Line Number Info Symbol Table String Table
67. ALIENS AMONG US Operation Fast Cash Payment Switch Server Payment Switch Application Injected XCOFF Implant XCOFF Malware Hooks (send, recv) Install Compare Request Response applist.dat Encrypted list of attacker controlled Primary Account Numbers Fraudulent Cash Withdrawal Attempt Courtesy of Lazarus Money Mule Credit Card Very nice analysis of the XCOFF malware by Frank Boldewin (@r3c0nst)!
69. FINAL NOTES Funky formats are a spectrum
70. FINAL NOTES Funky formats are a spectrum
71. FINAL NOTES Custom formats make static detection problematic....
72. FINAL NOTES What does it take to make a custom format? What do we need to make code run? • Imports • Relocation If you can make a custom PE loader, you can take a step forward and make a custom format loader
73. THANK YOU Questions? Mark Lechtik Aleksandra Doniec @_marklech_ @hasherezade
74. APPENDIX • Malware analysis of Hidden Bee’s custom format, by Aleksandra (@hasherezade): • https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/08/reversing-malware-in-a- custom-format-hidden-bee-elements/ • Paper by Maciek Kotowicz’s (@maciekkotowicz) on Gozi custom format: https://lokalhost.pl/txt/isfbv3.pdf • Backswap publication by Itay Cohen (@megabeets_): • https://research.checkpoint.com/the-evolution-of-backswap/ • Analysis of Lazarus XCOFF malware (Operation Fast Cash) by Frank Boldewin: • https://github.com/fboldewin/FastCashMalwareDissected/blob/master/Operation %20Fast%20Cash%20- %20Hidden%20Cobra%E2%80%98s%20AIX%20PowerPC%20malware%20dissected. pdf • Github repository with tools for analyzing the discussed formats: https://github.com/hasherezade/funky_malware_parsers