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Securing ASP.NET Web API based Architectures Dominick Baier
h=p://leastprivilege.com @leastprivilege think mobile! -
2 @leastprivilege Dominick Baier • Security consultant
at thinktecture • Focus on – security in distributed applica9ons – iden9ty management – access control – Windows/.NET security • MicrosoG MVP for Developer Security • ASP.NET Web API Advisor • [email protected] • h=p://leastprivilege.com think mobile! -
3 @leastprivilege Agenda • HTTP security &
SSL • ASP.NET Web API architecture • OWIN hosNng & authenNcaNon middleware • The (new) Web API pipeline • AnN-‐CSRF • CORS • (Token-‐based) authenNcaNon • OAuth2 -
4 @leastprivilege The big picture HTTPS
Host ASP.NET Web API -
6 @leastprivilege Security model for HTTP-‐based services
• Simple model – HTTP + content + SSL • Whenever authenNcaNon is required – Status code of 401 indicates unauthorized – WWW-‐Authen0cate response header indicates preferred authen9ca9on method WWW-‐AuthenNcate: Scheme realm="myapp" Status Code: 401 unauthorized -
7 @leastprivilege Authen9ca9on for HTTP-‐based services
• CredenNals transmi=ed (typically) via Authoriza.on header • e.g. Basic authen9ca9on, access tokens… • some9mes other means (query string, cookie…) AuthorizaNon: scheme credenNal GET /service/resource -
9 @leastprivilege OWIN Hos9ng • New hosNng
infrastructure for ASP.NET – SignalR, Web API • Other frameworks (will) use this infrastructure as well – e.g. NancyFX, FubuMVC, ServiceStack • Various hosNng opNons – IIS, self-‐hos9ng, Mono • MicrosoG will build all new authenNcaNon modules as OWIN middleware – JWT, FormsAuth, Twicer, LiveID, Google, Facebook… h=p://www.asp.net/vnext/overview/owin-‐and-‐katana/an-‐overview-‐of-‐project-‐katana -
10 @leastprivilege The new Pipeline Host
Web API OWIN MessageHandler (global/per-‐route) AuthenNcaNon Filter AuthorizaNon Filter Host/Framework independent concerns, e.g. authen9ca9on Web API cross-‐cueng concerns, e.g. CORS Web API specific authen9ca9on Authoriza9on -
11 @leastprivilege OWIN Middleware • Global
public class AuthenticationMiddleware { private readonly Func<IDictionary<string, object>, Task> _next; public AuthenticationMiddleware(Func<IDictionary<string, object>, Task> next) { _next = next; } public async Task Invoke(IDictionary<string, object> env) { // inspect env and do credential validation, then set principal env["server.User"] = CreatePrincipal(); await _next(env); } } -
12 @leastprivilege MessageHandler • Web API, global
or per-‐route public class MyHandler : DelegatingHandler { protected async override Task<HttpResponseMessage> SendAsync( HttpRequestMessage request, CancellationToken cancellationToken) { // inspect request var response = await base.SendAsync(request, cancellationToken); // inspect response return response; } } -
13 @leastprivilege Thinktecture Authen9ca9onHandler hcp://thinktecture.github.com/Thinktecture.Iden9tyModel.45/ AuthenticationHandler
: DelegatingHandler Header Query String Client Certificate Cookie incoming credenNal mapping credenNal to token handler 1. AuthenNcaNon 2. Claims TransformaNon 3. (Session handling) 4. Set Thread.CurrentPrincipal -
14 @leastprivilege Authen9ca9on filter h=p://aspnetwebstack.codeplex.com/SourceControl/latest [MySpecialAuthenticationMethod]
public class CustomersController : ApiController { // actions... } -
15 @leastprivilege Authoriza9on filter • Determines if
a resource needs authenNcaNon – [AllowAnonymous] to skip authoriza9on for an ac9on – emits the 401 status code, if unsuccessful // minimum requirement is successful authentication [Authorize] public DataController : ApiController { [AllowAnonymous] public Data Get() { … } [Authorize(Role = "Foo")] public HttpResponseMessage Delete(int id) { … } } -
16 @leastprivilege Custom authoriza9on filter • Derive
from AuthorizeA1ribute – decorate controller and ac9ons public class PremiumUsersOnlyAttribute : AuthorizeAttribute { protected override bool IsAuthorized(HttpActionContext context) { ClaimsPrincipal client = ClaimsPrincipal.Current; // custom authorization logic } protected override void HandleUnauthorizedRequest( HttpActionContext actionContext) { // custom response } } -
17 @leastprivilege Claims-‐based Authoriza9on • Get rid
of the Nght coupling between applicaNon code and security requirements – use .NET 4.5 ClaimsAuthoriza0onManager to encapsulate authoriza9on policy [ClaimsAuthorize("Update", "Customer")] public Customer Put() { ... } -
18 @leastprivilege Applica9on/Client types • Same-‐Domain &
Cross-‐Domain • Same Domain – Web APIs and clients live in the same domain • AJAX style callbacks from server-‐rendered pages • simpler SPA applica9ons (like the built-‐in template) – Ohen cookie based security • poten9al CSRF problems -
19 @leastprivilege Application Login Same-‐Domain Scenario •
Web APIs inherit security sebngs of web host – e.g. cookies, Windows authen9ca9on, client certs... Pages Web APIs $.ajax -
20 @leastprivilege CSRF – The Problem Browser
Tab/Process Tab/Process Login, get authen9ca9on cookie h=p://app.com h=p://app.com/delete/5 send authen9ca9on cookie -
21 @leastprivilege ASP.NET CSRF Protec9on • Part
of the SPA template in MVC 4 (Update 2) Server [ValidateHcpAn9ForgeryToken] render page & an9-‐forgery cookie <form> <input type="hidden" value="anti-‐forgery token" /> </form> <script>…</script> post-‐back: cookie + hidden field Page web api call: cookie + header -
22 @leastprivilege Applica9on/Client types • Cross-‐Domain
– Web APIs and clients live in different domains • na9ve apps (desktop, mobile) • client side JavaScript code (browser) • MulNtude of scenarios – shared secret authen9ca9on – CORS restric9ons for JavaScript-‐based clients – token-‐based authen9ca9on • built-‐in token endpoint • OAuth2 authoriza9on server -
23 @leastprivilege Shared Secret Authen9ca9on • HTTP
Basic AuthenNcaNon • Shared signature approaches (e.g. hawk) AuthorizaNon: Basic base64(username:password) GET /service/resource -
24 @leastprivilege Token-‐based Authen9ca9on Client Web
API Security Token Service 1. Request token 2. Send token Token Authorization: Bearer <token> -
25 @leastprivilege Embedded Token Endpoint • Swap
credenNal with (long-‐lived) token AuthorizaNon: Basic base64(username:password) GET /service/token <token> GET /service/resource AuthorizaNon: Bearer <token> -
26 @leastprivilege CORS (Cross Origin Resource Sharing)
h=p://server1/client.htm $.ajax( ... ) h=p://server2/service ? Data -
27 @leastprivilege CORS Sample $.ajax( ... )
Service OPTIONS /service Access-‐Control-‐Request-‐Method: POST Origin: hcp://server1 Access-‐Control-‐Allow-‐Origin: hcp://server1 POST /service -
28 @leastprivilege CORS in Web API v2
Thinktecture.Iden9tyModel.Hcp.Cors.WebApi System.Web.Cors [EnableCors("origin", "headers", "verbs")] public class CustomersController : ApiController { // actions... } -
29 @leastprivilege Scenario: API Backend & many Clients
Web API AuthorizaNon Server 1 2 -
30 @leastprivilege OAuth2 • Framework that describes
how to orchestrate access token requests and usage – for various client types • AuthorizaNon server component factors out – client management – user authen9ca9on & consent – coarse grained authoriza9on -
31 @leastprivilege OAuth2 Applica9on Architecture ApplicaNon
AuthorizaNon Server Scopes: read, write, delete, search… client_id=client1, scope=search read access token access token { "iss": "myAuthzServer", "aud": "applicaNon", "exp": 192990121, "sub": "Bob", "client_id": "client1", "scope": [ "search", "read" ] } Bob -
33 @leastprivilege Summary • HTTP has a
very simple security model • Correct handling of SSL is paramount • Same-‐ vs Cross-‐Origin applicaNons • Think about CSRF, CORS • Token based (and thus cookie-‐less) authenNcaNon is the way to go – embedded issuer – full blown authoriza9on server