Securing ASP.NET Web API (NDC Oslo 2013)

Transcript

1. Securing  ASP.NET  Web  API   based  Architectures   Dominick  Baier   h=p://leastprivilege.com   @leastprivilege   think mobile!
2. 2   @leastprivilege   Dominick  Baier   •  Security  consultant  at  thinktecture   •  Focus  on   –  security  in  distributed  applica9ons   –  iden9ty  management   –  access  control   –  Windows/.NET  security     •  MicrosoG  MVP  for  Developer  Security   •  ASP.NET  Web  API  Advisor   •  dominick.baier@thinktecture.com   •  h=p://leastprivilege.com   think mobile!
3. 3   @leastprivilege   Agenda   •  HTTP  security  &  SSL   •  ASP.NET  Web  API  architecture   •  OWIN  hosNng  &  authenNcaNon  middleware   •  The  (new)  Web  API  pipeline   •  AnN-­‐CSRF   •  CORS   •  (Token-­‐based)  authenNcaNon   •  OAuth2  
4. 4   @leastprivilege   The  big  picture   HTTPS   Host   ASP.NET  Web  API  
5. 5   @leastprivilege   Developers  &  SSL  
6. 6   @leastprivilege   Security  model  for  HTTP-­‐based   services   •  Simple  model   –  HTTP  +  content  +  SSL   •  Whenever  authenNcaNon  is  required   –  Status  code  of  401  indicates  unauthorized   –  WWW-­‐Authen0cate  response  header  indicates  preferred   authen9ca9on  method   WWW-­‐AuthenNcate:  Scheme  realm="myapp"   Status  Code:  401  unauthorized  
7. 7   @leastprivilege   Authen9ca9on  for  HTTP-­‐based   services   •  CredenNals  transmi=ed  (typically)  via  Authoriza.on   header   •  e.g.  Basic  authen9ca9on,  access  tokens…   •  some9mes  other  means  (query  string,  cookie…)   AuthorizaNon:  scheme  credenNal   GET  /service/resource  
8. 8   @leastprivilege   Authen9ca9on  &  Authoriza9on   h=p://www.asp.net/web-­‐api/overview/security/authenNcaNon-­‐and-­‐authorizaNon-­‐in-­‐aspnet-­‐web-­‐api  
9. 9   @leastprivilege   OWIN  Hos9ng   •  New  hosNng  infrastructure  for  ASP.NET   –  SignalR,  Web  API   •  Other  frameworks  (will)  use  this  infrastructure  as  well   –  e.g.  NancyFX,  FubuMVC,  ServiceStack   •  Various  hosNng  opNons   –  IIS,  self-­‐hos9ng,  Mono   •  MicrosoG  will  build  all  new  authenNcaNon  modules  as   OWIN  middleware   –  JWT,  FormsAuth,  Twicer,  LiveID,  Google,  Facebook…   h=p://www.asp.net/vnext/overview/owin-­‐and-­‐katana/an-­‐overview-­‐of-­‐project-­‐katana  
10. 10   @leastprivilege   The  new  Pipeline   Host   Web  API   OWIN   MessageHandler   (global/per-­‐route)   AuthenNcaNon   Filter   AuthorizaNon   Filter   Host/Framework   independent  concerns,     e.g.  authen9ca9on   Web  API  cross-­‐cueng   concerns,  e.g.  CORS   Web  API  specific   authen9ca9on   Authoriza9on  
11. 11   @leastprivilege   OWIN  Middleware   •  Global   public  class  AuthenticationMiddleware   {          private  readonly  Func<IDictionary<string,  object>,  Task>  _next;              public  AuthenticationMiddleware(Func<IDictionary<string,  object>,  Task>  next)          {                  _next  =  next;          }              public  async  Task  Invoke(IDictionary<string,  object>  env)          {                  //  inspect  env  and  do  credential  validation,  then  set  principal                    env["server.User"]  =  CreatePrincipal();                  await  _next(env);          }   }  
12. 12   @leastprivilege   MessageHandler   •  Web  API,  global  or  per-­‐route   public  class  MyHandler  :  DelegatingHandler   {          protected  async  override  Task<HttpResponseMessage>  SendAsync(              HttpRequestMessage  request,  CancellationToken  cancellationToken)          {                  //  inspect  request                      var  response  =  await  base.SendAsync(request,  cancellationToken);                    //  inspect  response                  return  response;          }   }  
13. 13   @leastprivilege   Thinktecture  Authen9ca9onHandler   hcp://thinktecture.github.com/Thinktecture.Iden9tyModel.45/   AuthenticationHandler : DelegatingHandler Header Query String Client Certificate Cookie incoming  credenNal   mapping  credenNal   to  token  handler   1.  AuthenNcaNon   2.  Claims  TransformaNon   3.  (Session  handling)   4.  Set  Thread.CurrentPrincipal  
14. 14   @leastprivilege   Authen9ca9on  filter   h=p://aspnetwebstack.codeplex.com/SourceControl/latest   [MySpecialAuthenticationMethod]   public  class  CustomersController  :  ApiController   {          //  actions...   }  
15. 15   @leastprivilege   Authoriza9on  filter   •  Determines  if  a  resource  needs  authenNcaNon   –  [AllowAnonymous]  to  skip  authoriza9on  for  an  ac9on   –  emits  the  401  status  code,  if  unsuccessful   //  minimum  requirement  is  successful  authentication   [Authorize]   public  DataController  :  ApiController   {          [AllowAnonymous]          public  Data  Get()            {  …  }            [Authorize(Role  =  "Foo")]          public  HttpResponseMessage  Delete(int  id)          {  …  }   }  
16. 16   @leastprivilege   Custom  authoriza9on  filter   •  Derive  from  AuthorizeA1ribute   –  decorate  controller  and  ac9ons   public  class  PremiumUsersOnlyAttribute  :  AuthorizeAttribute   {          protected  override  bool  IsAuthorized(HttpActionContext  context)          {                  ClaimsPrincipal  client  =  ClaimsPrincipal.Current;                    //  custom  authorization  logic          }              protected  override  void  HandleUnauthorizedRequest(              HttpActionContext  actionContext)          {                  //  custom  response          }   }  
17. 17   @leastprivilege   Claims-­‐based  Authoriza9on   •  Get  rid  of  the  Nght  coupling  between  applicaNon  code   and  security  requirements   –  use  .NET  4.5  ClaimsAuthoriza0onManager  to  encapsulate   authoriza9on  policy   [ClaimsAuthorize("Update",  "Customer")]   public  Customer  Put()   {  ...  }  
18. 18   @leastprivilege   Applica9on/Client  types   •  Same-­‐Domain  &  Cross-­‐Domain   •  Same  Domain   –  Web  APIs  and  clients  live  in  the  same  domain   •  AJAX  style  callbacks  from  server-­‐rendered  pages   •  simpler  SPA  applica9ons  (like  the  built-­‐in  template)   –  Ohen  cookie  based  security   •  poten9al  CSRF  problems  
19. 19   @leastprivilege   Application Login Same-­‐Domain  Scenario   •  Web  APIs  inherit  security  sebngs  of  web  host   –  e.g.  cookies,  Windows  authen9ca9on,  client  certs...   Pages Web APIs $.ajax  
20. 20   @leastprivilege   CSRF  –  The  Problem   Browser   Tab/Process   Tab/Process   Login,   get  authen9ca9on  cookie   h=p://app.com   h=p://app.com/delete/5   send  authen9ca9on  cookie  
21. 21   @leastprivilege   ASP.NET  CSRF  Protec9on   •  Part  of  the  SPA  template  in  MVC  4  (Update  2)   Server   [ValidateHcpAn9ForgeryToken]   render  page  &     an9-­‐forgery  cookie   <form>    <input  type="hidden"  value="anti-­‐forgery  token"  />   </form>     <script>…</script>   post-­‐back:   cookie  +  hidden  field   Page   web  api  call:   cookie  +  header  
22. 22   @leastprivilege   Applica9on/Client  types   •  Cross-­‐Domain   –  Web  APIs  and  clients  live  in  different  domains   •  na9ve  apps  (desktop,  mobile)   •  client  side  JavaScript  code  (browser)   •  MulNtude  of  scenarios   –  shared  secret  authen9ca9on   –  CORS  restric9ons  for  JavaScript-­‐based  clients   –  token-­‐based  authen9ca9on   •  built-­‐in  token  endpoint   •  OAuth2  authoriza9on  server  
23. 23   @leastprivilege   Shared  Secret  Authen9ca9on   •  HTTP  Basic  AuthenNcaNon   •  Shared  signature  approaches  (e.g.  hawk)   AuthorizaNon:        Basic  base64(username:password)   GET  /service/resource  
24. 24   @leastprivilege   Token-­‐based  Authen9ca9on    Client   Web  API   Security   Token   Service   1.   Request  token   2.  Send  token    Token    Authorization:  Bearer  <token>  
25. 25   @leastprivilege   Embedded  Token  Endpoint   •  Swap  credenNal  with  (long-­‐lived)  token   AuthorizaNon:        Basic  base64(username:password)   GET  /service/token   <token>   GET  /service/resource   AuthorizaNon:          Bearer  <token>  
26. 26   @leastprivilege   CORS   (Cross  Origin  Resource  Sharing)   h=p://server1/client.htm   $.ajax(  ...  )   h=p://server2/service   ?   Data  
27. 27   @leastprivilege   CORS  Sample   $.ajax(  ...  )   Service   OPTIONS  /service     Access-­‐Control-­‐Request-­‐Method:  POST   Origin:  hcp://server1   Access-­‐Control-­‐Allow-­‐Origin:  hcp://server1   POST  /service  
28. 28   @leastprivilege   CORS  in  Web  API  v2   Thinktecture.Iden9tyModel.Hcp.Cors.WebApi   System.Web.Cors   [EnableCors("origin",  "headers",  "verbs")]   public  class  CustomersController  :  ApiController   {          //  actions...   }  
29. 29   @leastprivilege   Scenario:  API  Backend  &  many  Clients   Web  API   AuthorizaNon  Server   1   2  
30. 30   @leastprivilege   OAuth2   •  Framework  that  describes  how  to  orchestrate  access   token  requests  and  usage   –  for  various  client  types   •  AuthorizaNon  server  component  factors  out   –  client  management   –  user  authen9ca9on  &  consent   –  coarse  grained  authoriza9on  
31. 31   @leastprivilege   OAuth2  Applica9on  Architecture   ApplicaNon   AuthorizaNon  Server   Scopes:  read,  write,     delete,  search…   client_id=client1,   scope=search  read   access  token   access  token   {        "iss":  "myAuthzServer",        "aud":  "applicaNon",        "exp":  192990121,        "sub":  "Bob",        "client_id":  "client1",        "scope":  [  "search",  "read"  ]   }   Bob  
32. 32   @leastprivilege   Announcing…   h=ps://github.com/thinktecture/Thinktecture.AuthorizaNonServer   AuthorizationServer
33. 33   @leastprivilege   Summary   •  HTTP  has  a  very  simple  security  model   •  Correct  handling  of  SSL  is  paramount   •  Same-­‐  vs  Cross-­‐Origin  applicaNons   •  Think  about  CSRF,  CORS   •  Token  based  (and  thus  cookie-­‐less)  authenNcaNon  is  the   way  to  go   –  embedded  issuer   –  full  blown  authoriza9on  server