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Security Analysis of End-to-End Encryption in Chat Applications

Security Analysis of End-to-End Encryption in Chat Applications

Presentation of the talk I delivered at BSides Delhi Security Conference

Ashutosh Ahelleya

October 11, 2019
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  1. $whoami 1. Core member and team lead @teambi0s 2. Final

    year undergraduate @ Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Kerala 3. Crypto(graphy) enthusiast Author: Crypton - open source library to learn offensive and defensive crypto Twitter: @ashutosha_
  2. Overview 1. What is encryption? 2. Security in E2E communication

    3. Encryption in chat applications before E2EE 4. TLS’ limitations and what can go wrong 5. Snowden revelations 6. E2E encryption and its benefits 7. MTProto - version, components, types 8. Case Study - MTProto v1.0 secret chats 9. Widespread adoption of E2EE 10. E2EE myths and challenges 11. Trade-offs 12. QnA
  3. Security in E2E communication 1. Transport security to the service

    2. Security of the service itself 3. End-to-End security 4. [Ideal] Sender and Recipient untraceability Need for perfect forward secrecy
  4. TLS’ limitations for E2E communication 1. Cannot protect if the

    service is itself compromised 2. Cannot protect against malicious service providers a. Corporate espionage!
  5. TLS - what can go wrong? 1. Return of Coppersmith’s

    Attack (ROCA) 2. Bleichenbacher’s attack (ROBOT) 3. Logjam - downgrading TLS connection parameters to 512-bit 4. Practical invalid curve point attacks 5. Forbidden attack on AES-GCM [source]
  6. Snowden revelations - June 2013 1. NSA accused of injecting

    a backdoor in Dual EC DRBG 2. Large scale surveillance of
  7. Benefits of E2EE 1. Reduces need to trust provider’s infrastructure

    2. Added assurance against malicious service providers and attackers
  8. Telegram 1. Gains widespread attraction for their custom cryptographic protocol

    - MTProto 2. Claims to have the safest and the most secure encryption infrastructure Initial release: 14th August, 2013 [Source]
  9. Components of MTProto protocol 1. High level component - API

    2. Transport component - HTTPS, TCP, HTTP 3. Cryptographic layer - encryption/decryption [Source]
  10. Other privacy/security issues around Telegram Previous: 1. Replay attack vulnerability

    [source] 2. Availability exploit [source] Existing: 1. End-to-end encryption not enabled by default [source] 2. Uses SHA-1 instead of SHA-256 in some parts of the protocol [source]
  11. E2EE challenges 1. Key distribution in group chats is still

    a difficult problem 2. Protection against state-level backdoors 3. Untraceability - metadata unencrypted? On ghost users and messaging backdoors - Dr. Matthew Green