occur at the border • The majority of individuals pass • Comfort and speed should not be equated with freedom • Surveillance and tracking are increasingly becoming the norm – Before the border – After the border 1|2
it is supposed to be” • Territorial sovereignty is largely a myth • Contemporary practices of power are not bound by territorial borders • “Ban-opticon” one possibility of capturing contemporary processes 2|2
Charlie Hebdo newspaper – 11 killed / 11 injured • 9 January 2015 – Amedy Coulibaly – 4 killed • 9 January 2015 – All attackers killed by the police in two interventions 7-9 January 2015 Attacks in Paris
Farid Benyettou at the Parc des Buttes Chaumont. Fighters to Iraq • 2005 Chérif arrested but released (Iraq recruitment) – Meets Amedy Coulibaly in Prison – Meets Djamel Beghal • Travels to Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen 2005
Ali Belkacem to escape. Freed. – Amedy condemned to 5 years • 2011 US authorities alert French intelligence of travel in Yemen. • 2014 French surveillance of brothers ends 2010 2011 2014
Hebdo • January 8 Coulibaly shoots a policewoman • January 9 Jewish supermarket hostage taking / Kouachi brothers & Coulibaly shot dead by French police 2015
violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators. (Wardlaw 1982: 16) Defining terrorism (2)
merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the target protected, or both” (Higgins, Judge in the International Court of Justice). Defining terrorism (3)
consensus in the UN – No consensus among scholars or practitioners • Difference between definition (1) and (2): “state terrorism”? – USSR 1930s, China 1960s – Argentina, Chile in the 1970s • Debate: “terrorist” or “freedom fighter”? – Irish Republican Army (IRA)? – African National Congress (Nelson Mandela)? “Terrorism”
or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal; 2) Broader sense of radicalization: emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals. Two definitions of radicalization:
in 2004-2005 – Shock of “homegrown” terrorism – Allows talking about “root causes” of terror without justifying it • A contested term – Generated a huge literature – Does it exist as a social phenomenon? – Emerging consensus to critique the term “Radicalization”
objects are seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance” (Tilly 1978: 176). Political violence, then, is the use of physical force to damage a political adversary. If we leave aside state or state- sponsored violence, oppositional political violence therefore consists of “collective attacks within a political community against a political regime” (Gurr 1970: 3–4). “Political Violence” (Della Porta)
separate phenomenon from protest movements and political mobilization – Focused on the choice to go underground • The focus on violence as a repertoire of contention – It is a means to obtain political profits – Not an essential feature of groups or individuals – Collective dimension of violence Della Porta: “Clandestine Political violence”
to civil wars or revolutions – Media attention – “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” • Secrecy of the actors Specificity of clandestine political violence
Madrid ‘04: 191 dead – London ‘05: 52 dead • A minority of Islamic- related terrorism • Most attacks and most deadly attacks occur outside the West A numerically limited phenomenon
hate our freedoms”: freedom of religion, speech, assemble and disagree • “Drive Israel out of the Middle East, as well as Christian and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa”
the 1990s, 3,000 in the 2000s – 20% of publications bring new data • Mainly influenced by policy concerns – Links to governments and counter- terrorism – “Terrorology” legitimizes a conservative agenda by a narrow view on the problem Limits of traditional terrorism studies
Mentally ill – Do not share psychological profile • Personal experiences – Response to traumas – Need for “cognitive closure” (preference for order, stable knowledge) Personal Characteristics & Experiences
– No control groups • Statistical discrimination – Numbers are not enough representatives (NL: 0.3% of the Muslim population sympathizes with Salafi ideas) Problem of the “stages” approaches
in Vietnam, Algeria, etc. – Military tactic – Rational “weapon of the weak” • 1980s: Terrorism as Cold War – Leftist movements, Iran hostages – Reagan: rhetoric of war between the Free world and the Soviet Union Terrorism as a war tactic
Suicide terrorism: strategic objective – Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Chechnya – Establish or maintain political self-determination – By compelling democratic power to withdraw from territory • Majority of suicide terrorism = US Occupation – 98.5% of 1,833 suicide terrorist attacks (’04-’09) Robert Pape
the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of state interests. If we focus on terrorism directed against gov- ernments for purposes of political change, we are considering the premedi- tated use or threat of symbolic, low-level violence by conspiratorial organiza- tions. Terrorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go be- yond damaging an enemy's material resources.' The victims or objects of terrorist attack have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a larger human audience whose reaction the terrorists seek. Violence charac- terized by spontaneity, mass participation, or a primary intent of physical de- struction can therefore be excluded from our investigation. The study of terrorism can be organized around three questions: why ter- rorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are. Here the objective is to outline an approach to the anal- ysis of the causes of terrorism, based on comparison of different cases of ter- rorism, in order to distinguish a common pattern of causation from the histori- cally unique. The subject of terrorism has inspired a voluminous literature in recent years. However, nowhere among the highly varied treatments does one find a general theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism. This may be because terrorism has often been approached from historical perspectives, which, if we take Laqueur's work as an example, dismiss explanations that try to take into account more than a single case as "exceedingly vague or altogether wrong." Certainly existing general accounts are often based on assumptions that are neither explicit nor factually demonstrable. We find judgments cen- tering on social factors such as the permissiveness and affluence in which Western youth are raised or the imitation of dramatic models encouraged by television. Alternatively, we encounter political explanations that blame rev- olutionary ideologies, Marxism-Leninism or nationalism, governmental weakness in giving in to terrorist demands, or conversely government oppres- 0070-4159'87'0715-0007W500 7 % 1981 The Clty University of New York • Martha Crenshaw 1981 • Root causes • Trigger causes – Violence between groups – Police brutality – Contested elections • E.g.. – Danish Cartoons – Fitna (film) Catalysts & Trigger events (Crenshaw)
in protest organizations • Repertoire on a continuum: marches, boycotts, petitions, occupations, roadblocks, etc. • Objective: de-exceptionalize violence and locate it in broader political context Why is SMT relevant for study of T?
– Interaction with competing organizations • Constructivist – External opportunities are not sole factor – Framing and emotions are key • Emergent conception of violence – Violence develops in action + logic of its own – Reinforces group cohesion, individual commitment and strategies Donatella Della Porta
Subject to violence: Ali Rezgui (friend of Coulibaly, killed in 2000) • Militant networks – Recruitment: Networks from the Algerian war: Groupes Islamiques Armés (GIA) – Failure of the GIA project in Algeria Revisiting the Kouachi’s Radicalization
(Kouachi / Coulibaly) • Action militarization, known repertoires – New repertoires: Training camps – Known repertoires: Steal cars, procure firearms – Bad repertoires: Bad reconnaissance, no getaway plan • Ideological encapsulation – Simple worldview Jews, Americans vs. Muslims – Turn to the anarchist’s tactic of propaganda by the deed Revisiting the Kouachi’s Radicalization
does not hold • Stage methods are diffused but problematic • Root causes and relative deprivation models provide interesting insights • They must be completed by relational models that emphasize the escalation processes and mobilization 0|0
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