Lecture 8 - IS - Terrorism, Radicalisation and Political Violence

Transcript

1. lecture #8 political violence, radicalisation and terrorism International Security #8 FRANCESCO RAGAZZI
2. Key points Transformations at the European border • Stopping, violence occur at the border • The majority of individuals pass • Comfort and speed should not be equated with freedom • Surveillance and tracking are increasingly becoming the norm – Before the border – After the border 1|2
3. Key points Implications for theory • Europe is not “where it is supposed to be” • Territorial sovereignty is largely a myth • Contemporary practices of power are not bound by territorial borders • “Ban-opticon” one possibility of capturing contemporary processes 2|2
5. • 7 January 2015 – Saïd and Chérif Kouachi – Charlie Hebdo newspaper – 11 killed / 11 injured • 9 January 2015 – Amedy Coulibaly – 4 killed • 9 January 2015 – All attackers killed by the police in two interventions 7-9 January 2015 Attacks in Paris
6. • “Je Suis Charlie” • International mobilization • Broader Context – Van Gogh 2004 – London 2005 – Boston 2013 7-9 January 2015 Attacks in Paris
7. The Kouachi’s Bio • 1980s childhood in Paris • 1994/1995 Death of parents • 1990s childhood in orphanage in center of France • 2000 back to Paris, living from odd jobs 1941 1994 2000 1995
8. The Kouachi’s Bio • 2000s Mosque Adda’wa – meeting with Farid Benyettou at the Parc des Buttes Chaumont. Fighters to Iraq • 2005 Chérif arrested but released (Iraq recruitment) – Meets Amedy Coulibaly in Prison – Meets Djamel Beghal • Travels to Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen 2005
9. Adult years • 2010 Chérif suspect of helping Smain Ait Ali Belkacem to escape. Freed. – Amedy condemned to 5 years • 2011 US authorities alert French intelligence of travel in Yemen. • 2014 French surveillance of brothers ends 2010 2011 2014
10. Attacks: 2015 • January 7 Kouachi brothers shooting at Charlie Hebdo • January 8 Coulibaly shoots a policewoman • January 9 Jewish supermarket hostage taking / Kouachi brothers & Coulibaly shot dead by French police 2015
11. – What is terrorism? – Why is terrorism used as a method? – Why do people radicalize? – What can be done to prevent the next attack? Several questions
12. I. TERRORISM IN CONTEXT 1. “Terrorism”, “radicalization” or political violence? 2. Political violence, anything new? 3. The current evolutions of political violence
13. “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non- combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (US Department of State 2001) Defining terrorism (1)
14. Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators. (Wardlaw 1982: 16) Defining terrorism (2)
15. “terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the target protected, or both” (Higgins, Judge in the International Court of Justice). Defining terrorism (3)
16. • A phenomenon that is hard to define – No consensus in the UN – No consensus among scholars or practitioners • Difference between definition (1) and (2): “state terrorism”? – USSR 1930s, China 1960s – Argentina, Chile in the 1970s • Debate: “terrorist” or “freedom fighter”? – Irish Republican Army (IRA)? – African National Congress (Nelson Mandela)? “Terrorism”
17. 1) Violent radicalization: emphasis is put on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal; 2) Broader sense of radicalization: emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals. Two definitions of radicalization:
18. • From a “static” to a “dynamic” definition – Appeared in 2004-2005 – Shock of “homegrown” terrorism – Allows talking about “root causes” of terror without justifying it • A contested term – Generated a huge literature – Does it exist as a social phenomenon? – Emerging consensus to critique the term “Radicalization”
19. “Any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance” (Tilly 1978: 176). Political violence, then, is the use of physical force to damage a political adversary. If we leave aside state or state- sponsored violence, oppositional political violence therefore consists of “collective attacks within a political community against a political regime” (Gurr 1970: 3–4). “Political Violence” (Della Porta)
20. • The importance of politics – Terrorism is not a separate phenomenon from protest movements and political mobilization – Focused on the choice to go underground • The focus on violence as a repertoire of contention – It is a means to obtain political profits – Not an essential feature of groups or individuals – Collective dimension of violence Della Porta: “Clandestine Political violence”
21. • ≠ armed resistance – Targets non- combatants • ≠ to civil wars or revolutions – Media attention – “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” • Secrecy of the actors Specificity of clandestine political violence
22. I. TERRORISM IN CONTEXT 1. “Terrorism”, “radicalization” or political violence? 2. Political violence, anything new? 3. The current evolutions of political violence
23. • Anarchist movements in Russia and Europe • Assassination of Tsar Alexander II (1881) • The Galleanists Bombings (1919) 1880s: Anarchism
24. • Overthrow of colonial rulers • 1931-1948 Israel/Palestine (Irgun) • 1954-1962 Algeria (FLN) • 1954-1975 Vietnam (Viet Cong) 1920s -1960s: Decolonization movements
25. • Class struggle and support for decolonization • Rote Armee Fraktion/ Baader-Meinhof Group (Germany) 1970-98 • Brigate Rosse (Italy) 1970-1988 • Weathermen Underground (USA) 1969 1960’s-1970s The radical Left
26. • First Wave: 1980s Afghan Fighters • Second Wave: 1990s Al Qaeda • Third Wave: London, Madrid, Paris, Copenhagen 1980’s-now Islamic- inspired Movements
27. I. TERRORISM IN CONTEXT 1. “Terrorism”, “radicalization” or political violence? 2. Political violence, anything new? 3. The current evolutions of political violence
28. • Very few deaths apart from 9/11in the West – Madrid ‘04: 191 dead – London ‘05: 52 dead • A minority of Islamic- related terrorism • Most attacks and most deadly attacks occur outside the West A numerically limited phenomenon
29. • 5% suicide bombing • 75% Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) • Suicide bombing 5 times more lethal Techniques
30. • Stereotype: young single Muslim man • Many “terrorists” are women – 1/3 of suicide bombers in Iraq – 40% female: LTTE (Hindu, not Muslim) • Profiling gets it wrong: e.g.. Muriel Degauque (2005) Profiles
31. II. “STAGES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A PERSONAL PROCESS 1. The War on Terror and Terror Studies: “Terrorism” as irrationality 2. Stages models, the example of PET 3. Limits of the model
32. “Why do they hate us?” (George W. Bush) • “They hate our freedoms”: freedom of religion, speech, assemble and disagree • “Drive Israel out of the Middle East, as well as Christian and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa”
33. “New Terrorism” (Walter Laqueur) • Motivations: fanaticism, rage, sadism, paranoia • Terrorists: irrational and incapable of negotiation • Loose, networked structures make it more dangerous
34. • Huge but poor academic production – 50 books in the 1990s, 3,000 in the 2000s – 20% of publications bring new data • Mainly influenced by policy concerns – Links to governments and counter- terrorism – “Terrorology” legitimizes a conservative agenda by a narrow view on the problem Limits of traditional terrorism studies
35. II. “STAGES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A PERSONAL PROCESS 1. The War on Terror and Terror Studies: “Terrorism” as irrationality 2. Stages models, the example of PET 3. Limits of the model
36. The 4 phases of radicalization (Source: PET, 2009)
37. Promises of the “phase models” (Source: PET, 2009)
38. • Prevention – Prevent influence of radicalizers – Strengthen vulnerable individuals and communities • Detection – Spotting “signs” of radicalization • Surveilling – Social environment: mosque, school, gym, Internet • Prediction – Stop individuals in “advanced stages” • Intervention – De-radicalization Promises of the “phase models”
39. • Consensus that terrorists are not: – Narcissist personalities – Mentally ill – Do not share psychological profile • Personal experiences – Response to traumas – Need for “cognitive closure” (preference for order, stable knowledge) Personal Characteristics & Experiences
40. II. “STAGES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A PERSONAL PROCESS 1. The War on Terror and Terror Studies: “Terrorism” as irrationality 2. Stages models, the example of PET 3. Limits of the model
41. • “Sample on the dependent variable” – Only successful cases – No control groups • Statistical discrimination – Numbers are not enough representatives (NL: 0.3% of the Muslim population sympathizes with Salafi ideas) Problem of the “stages” approaches
42. • Deterministic / No free will – Many people change behavior but are not violent – Many people are outraged by are not violent (ex. Cartoons) Problem of the “stages” approaches
43. • In sum: – No attention to social context – No explanation of individual behavior • Models have concrete consequences – Ex. Sentence of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Two main issues
44. III. “ROOT CAUSES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1. Cold War and Decolonization: “Terrorism” as war 2. Structural factors 3. Individual factors 4. Limits of the model
45. • Dominant framing in the 1970s – Context of War in Vietnam, Algeria, etc. – Military tactic – Rational “weapon of the weak” • 1980s: Terrorism as Cold War – Leftist movements, Iran hostages – Reagan: rhetoric of war between the Free world and the Soviet Union Terrorism as a war tactic
46. • Little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. • Suicide terrorism: strategic objective – Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Chechnya – Establish or maintain political self-determination – By compelling democratic power to withdraw from territory • Majority of suicide terrorism = US Occupation – 98.5% of 1,833 suicide terrorist attacks (’04-’09) Robert Pape
47. The “root causes” model (Source: Veldhuis & Staun, 2009)
48. III. “ROOT CAUSES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1. Cold War and Decolonization: “Terrorism” as war 2. Structural factors (macro level) 3. Individual factors (micro level) 4. Limits of the model
49. • Foreign policy • Western States in the Middle East – Perceived as a “crusade” – Support dictatorships – Kill indiscriminately (Drones) – Torture (Abu Ghraib, CIA) 1. International Relations
50. • Social integration (work, unemployment) • Racism • Muslims in the West – Discrimination – Unemployment Political underrepresentation 2. Poor Integration
51. Deprivation: – Terrorism can become rational and attractive for marginalized groups 3. Poverty
52. • Competition on the global market • Wiktorowicz: Transnational diffusion of ideologies via internet (social media, Skype, www) 4. Globalization & Communications
53. The Causes of Terrorism Martha Crenshaw* Terrorism occurs both in the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of state interests. If we focus on terrorism directed against gov- ernments for purposes of political change, we are considering the premedi- tated use or threat of symbolic, low-level violence by conspiratorial organiza- tions. Terrorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go be- yond damaging an enemy's material resources.' The victims or objects of terrorist attack have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a larger human audience whose reaction the terrorists seek. Violence charac- terized by spontaneity, mass participation, or a primary intent of physical de- struction can therefore be excluded from our investigation. The study of terrorism can be organized around three questions: why ter- rorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are. Here the objective is to outline an approach to the anal- ysis of the causes of terrorism, based on comparison of different cases of ter- rorism, in order to distinguish a common pattern of causation from the histori- cally unique. The subject of terrorism has inspired a voluminous literature in recent years. However, nowhere among the highly varied treatments does one find a general theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism. This may be because terrorism has often been approached from historical perspectives, which, if we take Laqueur's work as an example, dismiss explanations that try to take into account more than a single case as "exceedingly vague or altogether wrong." Certainly existing general accounts are often based on assumptions that are neither explicit nor factually demonstrable. We find judgments cen- tering on social factors such as the permissiveness and affluence in which Western youth are raised or the imitation of dramatic models encouraged by television. Alternatively, we encounter political explanations that blame rev- olutionary ideologies, Marxism-Leninism or nationalism, governmental weakness in giving in to terrorist demands, or conversely government oppres- 0070-4159'87'0715-0007W500 7 % 1981 The Clty University of New York • Martha Crenshaw 1981 • Root causes • Trigger causes – Violence between groups – Police brutality – Contested elections • E.g.. – Danish Cartoons – Fitna (film) Catalysts & Trigger events (Crenshaw)
54. III. “ROOT CAUSES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1. Cold War and Decolonization: “Terrorism” as war 2. Structural factors (macro level) 3. Individual factors (micro level) 4. Limits of the model
55. • In group / Out group • Identity crisis: – Cognitive Opening (Wiktorowicz) – Sense of belonging – Mutual support 1. Social Identity
56. • Shared demographics (self-selection) – Experiences – Worldviews 2. Group Processes
57. • Social influence and peer pressure – “Bunch of friends” (Sageman) – Authority figures justify violence – Internet (anonymous friendships) – Prisons 2. Group Processes
58. • Ted Gurr: relative deprivation • “Why men Rebel” (1970) • Frustration related to expectations • Irrespective of basic needs 3. Relative deprivation
59. • Role of recruiters: A top down (Kepel) – E.g.. Murielle Degauque • Self-recruitment: bottom up (Sageman, Colsaet) – E.g.. 9/11 Hamburg Cell Catalysts & Triggers
60. III. “ROOT CAUSES” MODELS: TERRORISM AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 1. Cold War and Decolonization: “Terrorism” as war 2. Structural factors (macro level) 3. Individual factors (micro level) 4. Limits of the model
61. • Focuses mostly on groups and individuals: state is overlooked • A-historical model of radicalization • Not “Why Men Rebel?” (Gurr) but “Why don’t men rebel more often?” (Tilly) Limits of the model
62. IV. MOBILIZATION MODELS: TERRORISM AS ESCALATION 1. Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilization 2. A relational approach: “Terrorism” as escalation
63. Social Movement Theory: Mobilization Source: Della Porta (2013)
64. • Clandestine political violence & waves of protest • Members in protest organizations • Repertoire on a continuum: marches, boycotts, petitions, occupations, roadblocks, etc. • Objective: de-exceptionalize violence and locate it in broader political context Why is SMT relevant for study of T?
65. • Relational approach – Interaction with state authorities (police, etc.) – Interaction with competing organizations • Constructivist – External opportunities are not sole factor – Framing and emotions are key • Emergent conception of violence – Violence develops in action + logic of its own – Reinforces group cohesion, individual commitment and strategies Donatella Della Porta
66. IV. MOBILIZATION MODELS: TERRORISM AS ESCALATION 1. Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilization 2. A relational approach: “Terrorism” as escalation
67. Mechanisms : Escalation Source: Della Porta (2013)
68. • Escalating policing – A common history of exclusion – Subject to violence: Ali Rezgui (friend of Coulibaly, killed in 2000) • Militant networks – Recruitment: Networks from the Algerian war: Groupes Islamiques Armés (GIA) – Failure of the GIA project in Algeria Revisiting the Kouachi’s Radicalization
69. • Organizational compartmentalization & enclosure – Separate and small units (Kouachi / Coulibaly) • Action militarization, known repertoires – New repertoires: Training camps – Known repertoires: Steal cars, procure firearms – Bad repertoires: Bad reconnaissance, no getaway plan • Ideological encapsulation – Simple worldview Jews, Americans vs. Muslims – Turn to the anarchist’s tactic of propaganda by the deed Revisiting the Kouachi’s Radicalization
70. Key points • Terrorism and radicalization are contested concepts • Clandestine political violence provides a more accurate definition • Political violence can be analyzed through regular social scientific methods 0|0
71. Key points • Political violence is nothing new: “new terrorism” does not hold • Stage methods are diffused but problematic • Root causes and relative deprivation models provide interesting insights • They must be completed by relational models that emphasize the escalation processes and mobilization 0|0