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Social Contract Theory

Social Contract Theory

The seventh in a series of slideshows for an ethics course.

GeorgeMatthews

June 22, 2016
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  1. Social Contract Theory ethics by agreement George Matthews CC 2016

    Creative Commons, attribution. CC Llaboo via http://morguefile.com/
  2. demands of traditional morality ! Conform to the norms of

    your culture! ! Do what the priests say God tells you to do!
  3. demands of traditional morality ! Conform to the norms of

    your culture! ! Do what the priests say God tells you to do! ! Accept your place in the social order!
  4. demands of traditional morality ! Conform to the norms of

    your culture! ! Do what the priests say God tells you to do! ! Accept your place in the social order! The “Modern Age” arose as such demands were met with increasingly skeptical questioning.
  5. who am I? What a piece of work is a

    man! How noble in reason! how infi- nite in faculty! in form, in mov- ing, how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?
  6. who am I? What a piece of work is a

    man! How noble in reason! how infi- nite in faculty! in form, in mov- ing, how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust? Shakespeare, Hamlet 1602
  7. who am I? ! Absent the rules imposed on me

    by culture, society, religion and other people, I am . . .
  8. who am I? ! Absent the rules imposed on me

    by culture, society, religion and other people, I am . . . a free agent,
  9. who am I? ! Absent the rules imposed on me

    by culture, society, religion and other people, I am . . . a free agent, with my own needs and desires,
  10. who am I? ! Absent the rules imposed on me

    by culture, society, religion and other people, I am . . . a free agent, with my own needs and desires, and the ability to think for myself.
  11. who am I? ! Absent the rules imposed on me

    by culture, society, religion and other people, I am . . . a free agent, with my own needs and desires, and the ability to think for myself. ! I alone can decide what’s best for me.
  12. social contract theory ! There is no such thing as

    “society,” only individuals.
  13. social contract theory ! There is no such thing as

    “society,” only individuals. ! Social rules are conventional, not natural or God-given.
  14. social contract theory ! There is no such thing as

    “society,” only individuals. ! Social rules are conventional, not natural or God-given. ! Morality can be based on individual self-interest, otherwise it’s impossible.
  15. social contract theory ! There is no such thing as

    “society,” only individuals. ! Social rules are conventional, not natural or God-given. ! Morality can be based on individual self-interest, otherwise it’s impossible. ! Morality must be based on individual self-interest, otherwise nobody will follow it.
  16. the state of nature ! Imagine a world with no

    laws, no customs, no morality.
  17. the state of nature ! Imagine a world with no

    laws, no customs, no morality. ! What would life be like?
  18. the state of nature ! Imagine a world with no

    laws, no customs, no morality. ! What would life be like? Hobbes (1600-1650): Life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short . . . a war of all against all.”
  19. the state of nature ! Imagine a world with no

    laws, no customs, no morality. ! What would life be like? Hobbes (1600-1650): Life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short . . . a war of all against all.” Locke (1700-1770): There would be no way to settle conflicts peacefully even though we have a sense of morality.
  20. the state of nature ! Imagine a world with no

    laws, no customs, no morality. ! What would life be like? Hobbes (1600-1650): Life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short . . . a war of all against all.” Locke (1700-1770): There would be no way to settle conflicts peacefully even though we have a sense of morality. ! In such a world rational agents would come up with some rules of their own – a Social Contract.
  21. The Social Contract ! In exchange for the setting up

    of a legitmate state authority empowered to settle disputes, enforce contracts and maintain order . . .
  22. The Social Contract ! In exchange for the setting up

    of a legitmate state authority empowered to settle disputes, enforce contracts and maintain order . . . ! We freely give up the liberty to decide everything for ourselves, and agree to be bound by the law, and to respect everybody else’s life, liberty and property.
  23. The Social Contract ! In exchange for the setting up

    of a legitmate state authority empowered to settle disputes, enforce contracts and maintain order . . . ! We freely give up the liberty to decide everything for ourselves, and agree to be bound by the law, and to respect everybody else’s life, liberty and property. sign here  .............................
  24. the case for social contract theory p1 We need binding

    social and moral rules to escape the anarchy of the state of nature.
  25. the case for social contract theory p1 We need binding

    social and moral rules to escape the anarchy of the state of nature. p2 We can all agree that such rules are a good idea.
  26. the case for social contract theory p1 We need binding

    social and moral rules to escape the anarchy of the state of nature. p2 We can all agree that such rules are a good idea.
  27. the case for social contract theory p1 We need binding

    social and moral rules to escape the anarchy of the state of nature. p2 We can all agree that such rules are a good idea. c So the rules we have that govern our social lives are in fact based on a social contract.
  28. questions ! How can the basic rules governing our social

    lives be based on a contract when I never signed one?
  29. questions ! How can the basic rules governing our social

    lives be based on a contract when I never signed one? ! Can social rules even be based on a contract? Don’t contracts depend on pre-existing rules?
  30. questions ! How can the basic rules governing our social

    lives be based on a contract when I never signed one? ! Can social rules even be based on a contract? Don’t contracts depend on pre-existing rules? ! If this contract is only hypothetical why should I stick to it?
  31. questions ! How can the basic rules governing our social

    lives be based on a contract when I never signed one? ! Can social rules even be based on a contract? Don’t contracts depend on pre-existing rules? ! If this contract is only hypothetical why should I stick to it? ! More generally, why shouldn’t I cheat on any agreement when cheating is in my best interests?
  32. the prisoner’s dilemma Your partner and you have been arrested

    for robbing a gas station. The police have some evidence that you two also robbed a bank, which you did, but not enough to convict you.
  33. the prisoner’s dilemma Your partner and you have been arrested

    for robbing a gas station. The police have some evidence that you two also robbed a bank, which you did, but not enough to convict you. They take you each into separate rooms and make the following offer:
  34. the prisoner’s dilemma Your partner and you have been arrested

    for robbing a gas station. The police have some evidence that you two also robbed a bank, which you did, but not enough to convict you. They take you each into separate rooms and make the following offer: If you rat on your partner for the bank job, and she stays quiet, you go free, your partner gets 5 years in jail.
  35. the prisoner’s dilemma Your partner and you have been arrested

    for robbing a gas station. The police have some evidence that you two also robbed a bank, which you did, but not enough to convict you. They take you each into separate rooms and make the following offer: If you rat on your partner for the bank job, and she stays quiet, you go free, your partner gets 5 years in jail. If you both rat on each other for the bank job, you each get 3 years in jail.
  36. the prisoner’s dilemma Your partner and you have been arrested

    for robbing a gas station. The police have some evidence that you two also robbed a bank, which you did, but not enough to convict you. They take you each into separate rooms and make the following offer: If you rat on your partner for the bank job, and she stays quiet, you go free, your partner gets 5 years in jail. If you both rat on each other for the bank job, you each get 3 years in jail. If you both keep quiet, you each get 1 year in jail.
  37. the prisoner’s dilemma Your partner and you have been arrested

    for robbing a gas station. The police have some evidence that you two also robbed a bank, which you did, but not enough to convict you. They take you each into separate rooms and make the following offer: If you rat on your partner for the bank job, and she stays quiet, you go free, your partner gets 5 years in jail. If you both rat on each other for the bank job, you each get 3 years in jail. If you both keep quiet, you each get 1 year in jail. What should you do?
  38. the rational solution you keep quiet you rat partner keeps

    quiet 1 year each you go free 10 years for partner partner rats 10 years for you partner goes free 5 years each
  39. the rational solution you keep quiet you rat partner keeps

    quiet 1 year each you go free 10 years for partner partner rats 10 years for you partner goes free 5 years each Either your partner will rat on you or not, you do not know which.
  40. the rational solution you keep quiet you rat partner keeps

    quiet 1 year each you go free 10 years for partner partner rats 10 years for you partner goes free 5 years each Either your partner will rat on you or not, you do not know which. If she keeps quiet, it is better for you to rat – freedom is better than 1 year in jail for you.
  41. the rational solution you keep quiet you rat partner keeps

    quiet 1 year each you go free 10 years for partner partner rats 10 years for you partner goes free 5 years each Either your partner will rat on you or not, you do not know which. If she keeps quiet, it is better for you to rat – freedom is better than 1 year in jail for you. If she rats, it is better to rat – 5 years in jail is better than 10 for you.
  42. the rational solution you keep quiet you rat partner keeps

    quiet 1 year each you go free 10 years for partner partner rats 10 years for you partner goes free 5 years each Either your partner will rat on you or not, you do not know which. If she keeps quiet, it is better for you to rat – freedom is better than 1 year in jail for you. If she rats, it is better to rat – 5 years in jail is better than 10 for you. So whatever she does, it is better for you to rat.
  43. the rational solution you keep quiet you rat partner keeps

    quiet 1 year each you go free 10 years for partner partner rats 10 years for you partner goes free 5 years each Either your partner will rat on you or not, you do not know which. If she keeps quiet, it is better for you to rat – freedom is better than 1 year in jail for you. If she rats, it is better to rat – 5 years in jail is better than 10 for you. So whatever she does, it is better for you to rat. Too bad you can’t both keep your mouths shut!
  44. the roomate’s dilemma you clean you don’t clean they clean

    house is clean you get a free ride they don’t clean you are a sucker house is a wreck
  45. the roomate’s dilemma you clean you don’t clean they clean

    house is clean you get a free ride they don’t clean you are a sucker house is a wreck Either your roommates will clean up or not, you do not know which.
  46. the roomate’s dilemma you clean you don’t clean they clean

    house is clean you get a free ride they don’t clean you are a sucker house is a wreck Either your roommates will clean up or not, you do not know which. If they clean up, you should not – you get a clean house with no effort.
  47. the roomate’s dilemma you clean you don’t clean they clean

    house is clean you get a free ride they don’t clean you are a sucker house is a wreck Either your roommates will clean up or not, you do not know which. If they clean up, you should not – you get a clean house with no effort. If they don’t clean up, you should not – it’s better not to be stuck cleaning up after them.
  48. the roomate’s dilemma you clean you don’t clean they clean

    house is clean you get a free ride they don’t clean you are a sucker house is a wreck Either your roommates will clean up or not, you do not know which. If they clean up, you should not – you get a clean house with no effort. If they don’t clean up, you should not – it’s better not to be stuck cleaning up after them. So whatever they do, it is better for you not to clean up.
  49. the roomate’s dilemma you clean you don’t clean they clean

    house is clean you get a free ride they don’t clean you are a sucker house is a wreck Either your roommates will clean up or not, you do not know which. If they clean up, you should not – you get a clean house with no effort. If they don’t clean up, you should not – it’s better not to be stuck cleaning up after them. So whatever they do, it is better for you not to clean up. Too bad you can’t all help out!
  50. the fisherman’s dilemma you limit catch you overfish they limit

    catch fishing far into the future you catch more they overfish you lose out no more fish
  51. the fisherman’s dilemma you limit catch you overfish they limit

    catch fishing far into the future you catch more they overfish you lose out no more fish Either the other fishermen overfish or not, you do not know which.
  52. the fisherman’s dilemma you limit catch you overfish they limit

    catch fishing far into the future you catch more they overfish you lose out no more fish Either the other fishermen overfish or not, you do not know which. If they limit their catch, you should overfish – you catch more fish.
  53. the fisherman’s dilemma you limit catch you overfish they limit

    catch fishing far into the future you catch more they overfish you lose out no more fish Either the other fishermen overfish or not, you do not know which. If they limit their catch, you should overfish – you catch more fish. If they overfish, you should – that’s better than being left out.
  54. the fisherman’s dilemma you limit catch you overfish they limit

    catch fishing far into the future you catch more they overfish you lose out no more fish Either the other fishermen overfish or not, you do not know which. If they limit their catch, you should overfish – you catch more fish. If they overfish, you should – that’s better than being left out. So whatever they do, you should overfish.
  55. the fisherman’s dilemma you limit catch you overfish they limit

    catch fishing far into the future you catch more they overfish you lose out no more fish Either the other fishermen overfish or not, you do not know which. If they limit their catch, you should overfish – you catch more fish. If they overfish, you should – that’s better than being left out. So whatever they do, you should overfish. Too bad you can’t all limit your catch!
  56. escaping prisoner’s dilemmas ! Prisoner’s dilemmas are widespread problems. !

    How do we stick to even voluntary agreements when we have an incentive to cheat?
  57. escaping prisoner’s dilemmas ! Prisoner’s dilemmas are widespread problems. !

    How do we stick to even voluntary agreements when we have an incentive to cheat? ! Hobbes: only an absolute authority can keep us in line.
  58. escaping prisoner’s dilemmas ! Prisoner’s dilemmas are widespread problems. !

    How do we stick to even voluntary agreements when we have an incentive to cheat? ! Hobbes: only an absolute authority can keep us in line. ! Can social pressure help?
  59. escaping prisoner’s dilemmas ! Prisoner’s dilemmas are widespread problems. !

    How do we stick to even voluntary agreements when we have an incentive to cheat? ! Hobbes: only an absolute authority can keep us in line. ! Can social pressure help? ! What makes ethical rules binding if self-interest won’t?
  60. escaping prisoner’s dilemmas ! Prisoner’s dilemmas are widespread problems. !

    How do we stick to even voluntary agreements when we have an incentive to cheat? ! Hobbes: only an absolute authority can keep us in line. ! Can social pressure help? ! What makes ethical rules binding if self-interest won’t? ! Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics attempt to answer this question. Stay tuned . . .
  61. summary: social contract theory claims ! Ethics can be based

    on rational self-interest. ! Ethics must be based on rational self-interest.
  62. summary: social contract theory claims ! Ethics can be based

    on rational self-interest. ! Ethics must be based on rational self-interest. consequences " Ethical rules are conventional. " They are rationally justifiable. " They have a naturalistic explanation.
  63. summary: social contract theory claims ! Ethics can be based

    on rational self-interest. ! Ethics must be based on rational self-interest. consequences " Ethical rules are conventional. " They are rationally justifiable. " They have a naturalistic explanation. arguments O Argument from self-interest.
  64. summary: social contract theory claims ! Ethics can be based

    on rational self-interest. ! Ethics must be based on rational self-interest. consequences " Ethical rules are conventional. " They are rationally justifiable. " They have a naturalistic explanation. arguments O Argument from self-interest. evaluation  Argument begs the question.  We have no reason not to cheat on rules when it is in our interest.