Cracking JWT tokens: a tale of magic, Node.js and parallel computing - FullStack London, 11 July 2018

Learn how you can use some JavaScript/Node.js black magic to crack JWT tokens and impersonate other users or escalate privileges. Just add a pinch of ZeroMQ, a dose of parallel computing, a 4 leaf clover, mix everything applying some brute force and you'll get a powerful JWT cracking potion!

Transcript

1. Cracking JWT tokens Cracking JWT tokens a tale of a tale of magic magic, , Node.js Node.js and and parallel computing parallel computing London - 11 JUL 2018 Luciano Mammino ( Luciano Mammino ( ) ) @loige @loige loige.link/jwt-crack-london 1
2. loige.link/jwt-crack-london @loige 2
3. Luciano... who? Luciano... who? Visit my castles: - (@loige) - (lmammino) - - (loige.co) Twitter GitHub Linkedin Blog Solution Architect at with @mariocasciaro with @andreaman87 with @ Podgeypoos79 3
4. Based on prior work Based on prior work Chapters 10 & 11 in (book) 2-parts article on RisingStack: " " Node.js design patterns ZeroMQ & Node.js Tutorial - Cracking JWT Tokens github.com/lmammino/jwt-cracker github.com/lmammino/distributed-jwt-cracker @loige 4
5. Agenda Agenda What's JWT What's JWT How it works How it works Testing JWT tokens Testing JWT tokens Brute-forcing a token! Brute-forcing a token! @loige 5
6. — RFC 7519 — RFC 7519 is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. JSON Web Token (JWT) JSON Web Token (JWT) @loige 6
7. eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJtZX eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJtZX NzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvcGxlIn0.II7XQbjvDC NzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvcGxlIn0.II7XQbjvDC Hkt3UOh6weHY6tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A Hkt3UOh6weHY6tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A @loige 7
8. OK OK Let's try to make it Let's try to make it simpler... simpler... @loige 8
9. JWT is... An URL safe, stateless protocol for transferring claims @loige 9
10. @loige 10
11. URL safe? @loige 10
12. URL safe? stateless? @loige 10
13. URL safe? stateless? claims? @loige 10
14. URL Safe... URL Safe... It's a string that can be safely used as part of a URL It's a string that can be safely used as part of a URL (it doesn't contain URL separators like " (it doesn't contain URL separators like "= =", " ", "/ /", " ", "# #" or " " or "? ?") ") unicorntube.pl/?token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9... @loige 11
15. Stateless? Stateless? Token validity can be verified without having to interrogate a Token validity can be verified without having to interrogate a third-party service third-party service (Sometimes also defined as "self-contained") @loige 12
16. What is a claim? What is a claim? @loige 13
17. some information to transfer some information to transfer identity identity (login session) (login session) authorisation to perform actions authorisation to perform actions (api key) (api key) ownership ownership (a ticket belongs to somebody) (a ticket belongs to somebody) @loige 14
18. also... also... validity constraints validity constraints token time constraints token time constraints (dont' use before/after) (dont' use before/after) audience audience (a ticket only for a specific concert) (a ticket only for a specific concert) issuer identity issuer identity (a ticket issued by a specific reseller) (a ticket issued by a specific reseller) @loige 15
19. also... also... protocol information protocol information Type of token Type of token Algorithm Algorithm @loige 16
20. In general In general All the bits of information transferred with the token All the bits of information transferred with the token @loige 17
21. eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJtZX eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJtZX NzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvcGxlIn0.II7XQbjvDC NzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvcGxlIn0.II7XQbjvDC Hkt3UOh6weHY6tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A Hkt3UOh6weHY6tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A @loige 18
22. eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9. .eyJtZX eyJtZX NzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvcGxlIn0 NzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvcGxlIn0. .II7XQbjvDC II7XQbjvDC Hkt3UOh6weHY6tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A Hkt3UOh6weHY6tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A 3 parts 3 parts separated by "." separated by "." @loige 19
23. @loige 20
24. HEADER HEADER: : eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp XVCJ9 XVCJ9 @loige 20
25. HEADER HEADER: : eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp XVCJ9 XVCJ9 PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : eyJtZXNzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvc eyJtZXNzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvc GxlIn0 GxlIn0 @loige 20
26. HEADER HEADER: : eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp XVCJ9 XVCJ9 PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : eyJtZXNzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvc eyJtZXNzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvc GxlIn0 GxlIn0 SIGNATURE SIGNATURE: : II7XQbjvDCHkt3UOh6weHY6tRcem II7XQbjvDCHkt3UOh6weHY6tRcem T0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A T0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A @loige 20
27. Header Header and and Payload Payload are are encoded encoded let's decode them! let's decode them! Base64Url Base64Url @loige 21
28. @loige 22
29. HEADER HEADER: : @loige 22
30. HEADER HEADER: : eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 @loige 22
31. HEADER HEADER: : {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} @loige 22
32. HEADER HEADER: : PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} @loige 22
33. HEADER HEADER: : PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} eyJtZXNzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvc eyJtZXNzYWdlIjoiaGVsbG8gcGVvc GxlIn0 GxlIn0 @loige 22
34. HEADER HEADER: : PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"message":"hello people"} {"message":"hello people"} @loige 22
35. HEADER HEADER: : The decoded info is JSON! The decoded info is JSON! PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"message":"hello people"} {"message":"hello people"} @loige 22
36. HEADER HEADER: : {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"} alg: alg: the kind of algorithm used the kind of algorithm used "HS256" "HS256" HMACSHA256 Signature HMACSHA256 Signature (secret based hashing) (secret based hashing) " "RS256 RS256" RSASHA256 Signature " RSASHA256 Signature (public/private key hashing) (public/private key hashing) " "none none" NO SIGNATURE! " NO SIGNATURE! (This is " (This is " ") ") infamous infamous @loige 23
37. PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : {"message":"hello people"} {"message":"hello people"} Payload can be anything that Payload can be anything that you can express in JSON you can express in JSON @loige 24
38. PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : "registered" (or standard) claims: "registered" (or standard) claims: iss: issuer ID ("auth0") sub: subject ID ("johndoe@gmail.com") aud: audience ID ("https://someapp.com") exp: expiration time ("1510047437793") nbf: not before ("1510046471284") iat: issue time ("1510045471284") @loige 25
39. PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: : "registered" (or standard) claims: "registered" (or standard) claims: { "iss": "auth0", "sub": "johndoe@gmail.com", "aud": "https://someapp.com", "exp": "1510047437793", "nbf": "1510046471284", "iat": "1510045471284" } @loige 26
40. So far it's just metadata... So far it's just metadata... What makes it safe? What makes it safe? @loige 27
41. SIGNATURE SIGNATURE: : II7XQbjvDCHkt3UOh6weHY6 II7XQbjvDCHkt3UOh6weHY6 tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A tRcemT0gxRVmA6W6uZ8A A A Base64URL Base64URL encoded encoded cryptographic cryptographic signature signature of the header and the payload of the header and the payload @loige 28
42. With HS256 With HS256 signature = HMACSHA256( base64UrlEncode(header) + "." + base64UrlEncode(payload), secret ) header payload secret SIGNATURE + + = @loige 29
43. If a system knows the If a system knows the secret secret It can verify the authenticity It can verify the authenticity of the token of the token With HS256 With HS256 @loige 30
44. Let's create a token from scratch Let's create a token from scratch runkit.com/lmammino/create-jwt-token @loige 31
45. Playground for JWT Playground for JWT JWT.io JWT.io @loige 32
46. An example An example Session token @loige 33
47. Classic implementation Classic implementation cookie/session based cookie/session based @loige 34
48. 35 @loige
49. Browser 35 Server Sessions Database @loige
50. Browser 1. POST /login user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 35 Server Sessions Database @loige
51. Browser 1. POST /login 2. generate session id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 35 Server Sessions Database id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" @loige
52. Browser 1. POST /login 2. generate session id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 3. session cookie SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 35 Server Sessions Database id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" @loige
53. Browser 1. POST /login 2. generate session id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 3. session cookie SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 4. GET /profile 35 Server Sessions Database id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" @loige
54. Browser 1. POST /login 2. generate session id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 3. session cookie SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 4. GET /profile 5. query id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 35 Server Sessions Database id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" @loige
55. Browser 1. POST /login 2. generate session id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 3. session cookie SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 4. GET /profile 5. query id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 6. record id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" 35 Server Sessions Database id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" @loige
56. Browser 1. POST /login 2. generate session id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 3. session cookie SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 4. GET /profile 5. query id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" 6. record id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" 7. (page) <h1>hello luciano</h1> 35 Server Sessions Database id:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" user:"luciano" SID:"Y4sHySEPWAjc" @loige
57. JWT implementation JWT implementation @loige 36
58. @loige 37
59. Browser Server @loige 37
60. Browser 1. POST /login user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" Server @loige 37
61. Browser 1. POST /login user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" Server Create Token for "luciano" Add signature 2. create JWT @loige 37
62. Browser 1. POST /login 3. JWT Token {"sub":"luciano"} user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" Server eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 Create Token for "luciano" Add signature 2. create JWT @loige 37
63. Browser 1. POST /login 3. JWT Token {"sub":"luciano"} user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" Server eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 4. GET /profile eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 Create Token for "luciano" Add signature 2. create JWT @loige 37
64. Browser 1. POST /login 3. JWT Token {"sub":"luciano"} user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" Server eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 4. GET /profile eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 Token says this is "luciano" Signature looks OK 5. verify Create Token for "luciano" Add signature 2. create JWT @loige 37
65. Browser 1. POST /login 3. JWT Token {"sub":"luciano"} user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 6. (page) <h1>hello luciano</h1> Server eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 4. GET /profile eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 Token says this is "luciano" Signature looks OK 5. verify Create Token for "luciano" Add signature 2. create JWT @loige 37
66. Browser 1. POST /login 3. JWT Token {"sub":"luciano"} user:"luciano" pass:"mariobros" 6. (page) <h1>hello luciano</h1> Server eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 4. GET /profile eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJz dWIiOiJsdWNpYW5vIn0.V92iQaqMrBUhkgEAyRaCY 7pezgH­Kls85DY8wHnFrk4 Token says this is "luciano" Signature looks OK 5. verify Create Token for "luciano" Add signature 2. create JWT Note: Only the server knows the secret @loige 37
67. Cookie/session Cookie/session Needs a database to store the session data The database is queried for every request to fetch the session A session is identified only by a randomly generated string (session ID) No data attached Sessions can be invalidated at any moment JWT JWT Doesn't need a session database The session data is embedded in the token For every request the token signature is verified Attached metadata is readable Sessions can't be invalidated, but tokens might have an expiry flag VS VS @loige 38
68. Another great JWT use case Another great JWT use case Creating Secure Password Reset Links Creating Secure Password Reset Links loige.link/jwt-pwd-reset @loige 39
69. JWT LOOKS GREAT! JWT LOOKS GREAT! But there are pitfalls... But there are pitfalls... @loige 40
70. Data is public! Data is public! @loige 41
71. Data is public! Data is public! If you have a token, If you have a token, you can easily read the claims! you can easily read the claims! @loige 41
72. Data is public! Data is public! If you have a token, If you have a token, you can easily read the claims! you can easily read the claims! You only have to Base64Url-decode the token header and payload and you have a readable JSON @loige 41
73. There's no token database... There's no token database... ...if I can forge a token ...if I can forge a token nobody will know it's not nobody will know it's not authentic! authentic! @loige 42
74. DEMO DEMO JWT based web app github.com/lmammino/sample-jwt-webapp BUILT WITH @loige 43
75. Given an HS256 signed JWT Given an HS256 signed JWT We can try to " We can try to "guess guess" the " the secret secret! ! @loige 44
76. How difficult can it be? How difficult can it be? @loige 45
77. Let's build a distributed Let's build a distributed JWT token cracker! JWT token cracker! npm.im/distributed-jwt-cracker npm.im/distributed-jwt-cracker @loige 46
78. The idea... The idea... @loige 47
79. The idea... The idea... Take a valid JWT token Take a valid JWT token @loige 47
80. The idea... The idea... try to "guess" the secret and validate the token against it try to "guess" the secret and validate the token against it Take a valid JWT token Take a valid JWT token @loige 47
81. The idea... The idea... if the token is validated, then you found the if the token is validated, then you found the secret secret! ! try to "guess" the secret and validate the token against it try to "guess" the secret and validate the token against it Take a valid JWT token Take a valid JWT token @loige 47
82. The idea... The idea... YOU CAN NOW YOU CAN NOW CREATE AND SIGN CREATE AND SIGN ANY JWT TOKEN ANY JWT TOKEN FOR THIS FOR THIS APPLICATION APPLICATION! ! if the token is validated, then you found the if the token is validated, then you found the secret secret! ! try to "guess" the secret and validate the token against it try to "guess" the secret and validate the token against it Take a valid JWT token Take a valid JWT token @loige 47
83. Magic weapons Magic weapons @loige 48
84. Magic weapons Magic weapons Node.js Node.js @loige 48
85. Magic weapons Magic weapons Node.js Node.js ZeroMQ ZeroMQ @loige 48
86. Magic weapons Magic weapons Node.js Node.js module module jsonwebtoken jsonwebtoken ZeroMQ ZeroMQ @loige 48
87. ZeroMQ ZeroMQ an open source embeddable an open source embeddable networking networking library library and a and a concurrency framework concurrency framework @loige 49
88. The brute force problem The brute force problem "virtually infinite" solutions space "virtually infinite" solutions space all the strings (of any length) that can be generated within a given alphabet (empty string), a, b, c, 1, aa, ab, ac, a1, ba, bb, bc, b1, ca, cb, cc, c1, 1a, 1b, 1c, 11, aaa, aab, aac, aa1, aba, ... @loige 50
89. bijection (int) ⇒ (string) bijection (int) ⇒ (string) if we sort all the possible strings over an alphabet Alphabet = [a,b] 0 ⟶ (empty string) 1 ⟶ a 2 ⟶ b 3 ⟶ aa 4 ⟶ ab 5 ⟶ ba 6 ⟶ bb 7 ⟶ aaa 8 ⟶ aab 9 ⟶ aba 10 ⟶ abb 11 ⟶ baa 12 ⟶ bab 13 ⟶ bba 14 ⟶ bbb 15 ⟶ aaaa 16 ⟶ aaab 17 ⟶ aaba 18 ⟶ aabb ... @loige 51
90. Architecture Architecture Server Server Client Client Initialised with a valid JWT token and an alphabet coordinates the brute force attempts among connected clients knows how to verify a token against a given secret receives ranges of secrets to check @loige 52
91. Networking patterns Networking patterns Router channels: dispatch jobs receive results Pub/Sub channel: termination signal @loige 53
92. Server state Server state the solution space can be sliced into the solution space can be sliced into chunks chunks of fixed length (batch size) of fixed length (batch size) @loige 54
93. Server state Server state the solution space can be sliced into the solution space can be sliced into chunks chunks of fixed length (batch size) of fixed length (batch size) 0 3 6 9 ... @loige 54
94. Server state Server state the solution space can be sliced into the solution space can be sliced into chunks chunks of fixed length (batch size) of fixed length (batch size) 0 batch 1 3 6 9 ... @loige 54
95. Server state Server state the solution space can be sliced into the solution space can be sliced into chunks chunks of fixed length (batch size) of fixed length (batch size) 0 batch 1 batch 2 3 6 9 ... @loige 54
96. Server state Server state the solution space can be sliced into the solution space can be sliced into chunks chunks of fixed length (batch size) of fixed length (batch size) 0 batch 1 batch 2 batch 3 3 6 9 ... @loige 54
97. Server state Server state the solution space can be sliced into the solution space can be sliced into chunks chunks of fixed length (batch size) of fixed length (batch size) 0 ... batch 1 batch 2 batch 3 3 6 9 ... @loige 54
98. Initial server state Initial server state { "cursor": 0, "clients": {} } @loige 55
99. The first client connects The first client connects { "cursor": 3, "clients": { "client1": [0,2] } } [0,2] @loige 56
100. { "cursor": 9, "clients": { "client1": [0,2], "client2": [3,5], "client3": [6,8] } } Other clients connect Other clients connect [0,2] [3,5] [6,8] @loige 57
101. Client 2 finishes its job Client 2 finishes its job { "cursor": 12, "clients": { "client1": [0,2], "client2": [9,11], "client3": [6,8] } } [0,2] [9,11] [6,8] @loige 58
102. let cursor = 0 const clients = new Map() const assignNextBatch = client => { const from = cursor const to = cursor + batchSize - 1 const batch = [from, to] cursor = cursor + batchSize client.currentBatch = batch client.currentBatchStartedAt = new Date() return batch } const addClient = channel => { const id = channel.toString('hex') const client = {id, channel, joinedAt: new Date()} assignNextBatch(client) clients.set(id, client) return client } Server @loige 59
103. Messages flow Messages flow @loige 60
104. Messages flow Messages flow JWT Cracker Server JWT Cracker Client @loige 60
105. Messages flow Messages flow JWT Cracker Server JWT Cracker Client 1. JOIN @loige 60
106. Messages flow Messages flow JWT Cracker Server JWT Cracker Client 1. JOIN 2. START {token, alphabet, firstBatch} @loige 60
107. Messages flow Messages flow JWT Cracker Server JWT Cracker Client 1. JOIN 2. START {token, alphabet, firstBatch} 3. NEXT @loige 60
108. Messages flow Messages flow JWT Cracker Server JWT Cracker Client 1. JOIN 2. START {token, alphabet, firstBatch} 3. NEXT 4. BATCH {nextBatch} @loige 60
109. Messages flow Messages flow JWT Cracker Server JWT Cracker Client 1. JOIN 2. START {token, alphabet, firstBatch} 3. NEXT 4. BATCH {nextBatch} 5. SUCCESS {secret} @loige 60
110. const router = (channel, rawMessage) => { const msg = JSON.parse(rawMessage.toString()) switch (msg.type) { case 'join': { const client = addClient(channel) const response = { type: 'start', id: client.id, batch: client.currentBatch, alphabet, token } batchSocket.send([channel, JSON.stringify(response)]) break } case 'next': { const batch = assignNextBatch(clients.get(channel.toString('hex'))) batchSocket.send([channel, JSON.stringify({type: 'batch', batch})]) break } case 'success': { const secret = msg.secret // publish exit signal and closes the app signalSocket.send(['exit', JSON.stringify({secret, client: channel.toString('hex')})], 0, () => { batchSocket.close() signalSocket.close() exit(0) }) break } } } Server @loige 61
111. let id, variations, token const dealer = rawMessage => { const msg = JSON.parse(rawMessage.toString()) const start = msg => { id = msg.id variations = generator(msg.alphabet) token = msg.token } const batch = msg => { processBatch(token, variations, msg.batch, (secret, index) => { if (typeof secret === 'undefined') { // request next batch batchSocket.send(JSON.stringify({type: 'next'})) } else { // propagate success batchSocket.send(JSON.stringify({type: 'success', secret, index})) exit(0) } }) } switch (msg.type) { case 'start': start(msg) batch(msg) break case 'batch': batch(msg) break } } Client @loige 62
112. How a chunk is processed How a chunk is processed Given chunk [3,6] over alphabet "ab" [3,6] ⇒ 3 ⟶ aa 4 ⟶ ab 5 ⟶ ba 6 ⟶ bb ⇠ check if one of the strings is the secret that validates the current token @loige 63
113. const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken') const generator = require('indexed-string-variation').generator; const variations = generator('someAlphabet') const processChunk = (token, from, to) => { let secret for (let i = from; i < to; i++) { try { secret = variations(i) jwt.verify(token, secret, { ignoreExpiration: true, ignoreNotBefore: true }) // finished, password found return ({found: secret}) } catch (err) {} // password not found, keep looping } // finished, password not found return null } Client @loige 64
114. Demo Demo @loige 65
115. Closing off Closing off @loige 66
116. Is JWT safe to use? Is JWT safe to use? @loige 67
117. Definitely Definitely YES! YES! Heavily used by: @loige 68
118. but... but... @loige 69
119. Use a strong (≃long) Use a strong (≃long) secret secret and keep it SAFE! and keep it SAFE! Or, even better Use RS256 (RSA public/private key pair) signature Use RS256 (RSA public/private key pair) signature Use it wisely! Use it wisely! @loige 70
120. But, what if I create But, what if I create only only short lived tokens short lived tokens... ... @loige 71
121. JWT is STATELESS! JWT is STATELESS! the expiry time is contained in the token... if you can edit tokens, you can extend the expiry time as needed! @loige 72
122. Should I be worried about Should I be worried about brute force brute force? ? @loige 73
123. Some benchmarks Some benchmarks Secret length Attempts Time* 5 26^5 = 12 mln 1m55.618s 6 26^6 = 310 mln 1h32m48.378s 7 26^7 = 8 Bln 3d18h22m10.231s 8 26^8 = 210 Bln ⏱ still running... 9 26^9 = 5.5 Tln I didn't even dare to try! * 8 clients on 4 t2.medium AWS machines, [a-z] alphabet ( ) loige.link/jwt-bench @loige 74
124. @loige 75
125. If you use If you use a 64 a 64 chars secret chars secret... ... @loige 75
126. If you use If you use a 64 a 64 chars secret chars secret... ... 26^64 = 3.616.548.304.479.297.085.365.330.736.464.680.499.909.051.89 5.704.748.593.486.634.912.486.670.341.490.423.472.351.870.976 @loige 75
127. If you use If you use a 64 a 64 chars secret chars secret... ... 26^64 = 3.616.548.304.479.297.085.365.330.736.464.680.499.909.051.89 5.704.748.593.486.634.912.486.670.341.490.423.472.351.870.976 3.6 3.6 GAZILLION GAZILLION attempts needed! attempts needed! @loige 75
128. If you use If you use a 64 a 64 chars secret chars secret... ... 26^64 = 3.616.548.304.479.297.085.365.330.736.464.680.499.909.051.89 5.704.748.593.486.634.912.486.670.341.490.423.472.351.870.976 3.6 3.6 GAZILLION GAZILLION attempts needed! attempts needed! @loige 75
129. TLDR; TLDR; JWT is a JWT is a cool & stateless™ cool & stateless™ way to way to transfer claims! transfer claims! Choose the right Algorithm With HS256, choose a good secret and keep it safe Don't disclose sensitive information in the payload Don't be too worried about brute force, but understand how it works! @loige 76
130. Thanks! @loige @loige https://loige.co https://loige.co loige.link/jwt-crack-london 77
131. an heartfelt thank you to: "the amazing" Paul Dolan @mariocasciaro @AlleviTommaso @andreaman87 @cirpo @katavic_d @Podgeypoos79 @quasi_modal Credits Credits vector images vector images designed by freepik designed by freepik @loige 78