Liverpool School of Geography and Planning Seminar

Transcript

1. Seminar delivered at the University of Liverpool 20 February 2018

   Ethnic population projections for post-Brexit Britain Nik Lomax School of Geography FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT n.m.lomax@leeds.ac.uk

2. What issues matter most to people? Data source: YouGov Political

   Tracker results (2016, 2017)

3. Perception vs reality Ipsos MORI Perils of Perception survey 2013:

   • What percentage of the United Kingdom population do you think are immigrants to this country (i.e. not born in the UK)? Public Perception 31%

4. Perception vs reality Ipsos MORI Perils of Perception survey 2013:

   • What percentage of the United Kingdom population do you think are immigrants to this country (i.e. not born in the UK)? Public Perception 31% Reality 13%

5. Perception vs reality Ipsos MORI Perils of Perception survey 2013:

   • Out of every 100 people in Britain, about how many do you think Are Black or Asian? Public Perception 30/100

6. Perception vs reality Ipsos MORI Perils of Perception survey 2013:

   • Out of every 100 people in Britain, about how many do you think Are Black or Asian? Public Perception 30/100 Reality 14/100

7. Post referendum survey Ipsos MORI Perils of Perception survey 2016:

   • Out of every 100 residents in the UK, about how many do you think were born in an EU member state other than the UK? Public Perception 15/100 Remain = 10 Leave = 20

8. Post referendum survey Ipsos MORI Perils of Perception survey 2016:

   • Out of every 100 residents in the UK, about how many do you think were born in an EU member state other than the UK? Reality 5/100 Public Perception 15/100 Remain = 10 Leave = 20

9. Context: Population trends 59 63 Source: ONS Population of the

   United Kingdom by Country of Birth and Nationality 80% 82% 84% 86% 88% 90% 92% 94% 96% 98% 100% 56,000 57,000 58,000 59,000 60,000 61,000 62,000 63,000 64,000 65,000 66,000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 % of population UK Born Population (000s) Year UK Population % UK Born CI

10. The impact of assumptions on projections

11. Variant projections "high population" variant assumes high fertility, life expectancy

    and net migration: 4.1 million above principal projection "low population" variant assumes low fertility, life expectancy and net migration: 4.9 million below principal projection

12. Evaluation, Revision and Extension of Ethnic Population Projections - ETHPOP

    Our overall aim is to understand and to forecast the ethnic composition, size and distribution of the United Kingdom’s population www.ethpop.org The research was supported by ESRC award ES/L013878/1 for the project Evaluation, Revision and Extension of Ethnic Population Projections – NewETHPOP

13. Why Ethnicity? • It is well established that demographic rates

    vary substantially by ethnic group: see Coleman (2006), Coleman (2010) Rees (2012). • Variation in service provision needs, e.g. – health care (Parliamentary office of Science and Technology 2007) – social care (Rees et al. 2009) – education (Penn, 2000) • Very important for monitoring ethnic advantage / disadvantage & segregation.

14. Why Ethnicity? • An ethnically disaggregated projection should perform better

    than one which is only disaggregated by age and sex because additional ethnic heterogeneity is taken in to account within the model.

15. What impact do international and internal migration have on the

    size, composition and distribution of the UK population by ethnicity? Method: Run a projection model which experiments with migration components Aim: To prepare us for what will be a new and different demographic future Key Question

16. How? A population projection model Pro Cohort component model Bi-regional

    Single year of age 2 genders 12 ethnicities 389 local authority areas 2011 base 50 year horizon Ethnic mixing

17. Contribution of migration to population change in the UK Natural

    change Fertility - Mortality Net Migration Immigration - Emigration

18. Fertility and Mortality 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

    140 160 <20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40+ ASFR, 2001 White Black-Caribbean Black-African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Other

19. Internal migration 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

    160 180 200 0to4 5to9 10to14 15to19 20to24 25to29 30to34 35to39 40to44 45to49 50to54 55to59 60to64 65to69 70to74 75+ BAN BLA BLC CHI IND MIX OAS OBL OTH PAK WBI WHO Rate per 1,000 Estimated from 2011 Census tables UKMIG003, MU01AUK_LA_All and MMo1_BUK_All

20. International migration Direct impact Indirect impact

21. Scenario assumptions Scenario International Migration No Brexit Net International Migration

    trended to = +252k in 2031-32, then constant. Annually, In = 621k, Out = 362k Soft Brexit Net International Migration trended to = +185k in 2031-32, then constant. Annually, In = 518k, Out = 333k Hard Brexit Net International Migration trended to = +100k in 2031-32, then constant. Annually, In = 349k, Out = 249k No International Migration Set to zero – Reference projection No Migration Set to zero – Reference projection Scenario Internal Migration No Brexit, Soft Brexit and Hard Brexit, No International Migration 5-year average rates from 2006-07 to 2010-11 period applied to population at risk (by age, sex and ethnicity) in each year No Migration Set to zero – Reference projection

22. Scenario assumptions No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit

23. Direct Impact of Migration Ethnicity No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard

    Brexit Immig. Emig. Balance Immig. Emig. Balance Immig. Emig. Balance White British & Irish 6,979 8,633 -1,655 5,924 8,009 -2,085 4,615 5,482 -867 Other White 11,242 4,052 7,189 9,617 3,764 5,853 7,857 3,701 4,156 Mixed 884 480 404 761 446 315 599 381 218 Indian 2,584 835 1,749 2,211 776 1,435 1,397 755 642 Pakistani 1,188 554 635 1,026 515 511 689 399 290 Bangladeshi 293 256 37 253 238 16 245 168 76 Chinese 2,281 855 1,425 1,943 794 1,149 868 402 465 Other Asian 2,054 870 1,185 1,762 808 954 1,275 668 607 Black African 1,508 461 1,046 1,290 428 862 1,295 692 603 Black Caribbean 196 333 -138 169 311 -142 211 177 34 Other Black 181 129 52 156 120 36 173 113 60 Other 1,364 463 900 1,163 429 734 849 433 416 All 30,754 17,922 12,831 26,277 16,638 9,639 20,072 13,370 6,702 The cumulative immigration, emigration and balance for the period 2011 to 2060

24. Indirect impact of migration No Brexit (business as usual) ‘Soft’

    Brexit No Migration Four Migration Scenarios ‘Hard’ Brexit No International Migration

25. Populations very reliant on international migration • Generally largest net

    migration groups • Indian – older population (34.1) • Chinese and Other have low fertility (1.26 / 1.77)

26. Populations very reliant on international migration • Generally largest net

    migration groups • Indian – older population (34.1) • Chinese and Other have low fertility (1.26 / 1.77)

27. Populations somewhat reliant on international migration Relatively young – BLA

    = 27.8 / OBL = 25.8 Black African have large starting –population and relatively high fertility (2.64)

28. Populations somewhat reliant on international migration Relatively young – BLA

    = 27.8 / OBL = 25.8 Black African have large starting –population and relatively high fertility (2.64)

29. Populations which continue to grow These groups have the demographic

    momentum to keep growing Very young populations: Pakistani = 27; Bangladeshi = 25.5; Mixed = 21.8 (youngest) Pakistani and Bangladeshi have very high fertility: TFR=3.2 and 3.47

30. Populations which continue to grow These groups have the demographic

    momentum to keep growing Very young populations: Pakistani = 27; Bangladeshi = 25.5; Mixed = 21.8 (youngest) Pakistani and Bangladeshi have very high fertility: TFR=3.2 and 3.47

31. Populations which are declining anyway These are the oldest groups

    who continue to age (WBI = 41.4; BLC = 38.7) They have relatively low fertility (WBI = 1.83; BLC = 1.75) They have net out-migration (except BLC under Hard Brexit)

32. Populations which are declining anyway These are the oldest groups

    who continue to age (WBI = 41.4; BLC = 38.7) They have relatively low fertility (WBI = 1.83; BLC = 1.75) They have net out-migration (except BLC under Hard Brexit)

33. Composition and diversity Ethnicity 2061 Population Scenario (%) 2011 Population

    (%) No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit No International Migration No Migration White British & Irish 82.4 57.9 59.6 64.5 75.6 75.2 Other White 4.5 12.9 11.8 10.0 4.0 3.9 Mixed 2.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.3 4.4 Indian 2.4 5.2 5.0 3.8 2.7 2.9 Pakistani 1.9 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.6 Bangladeshi 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 Chinese 0.7 2.6 2.4 1.4 0.6 0.6 Other Asian 1.4 3.1 3.0 2.5 1.6 1.7 Black African 1.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 2.5 2.7 Black Caribbean 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 Other Black 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 Other 0.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.8 0.8 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total Pop. 63,743 86,902 82,883 78,087 65,659 66,742 Diversity 0.32 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.42 0.43 Index of Diversity = 1 - S e re 2 where re = proportion of the population in ethnic group e

34. Sub-national changes (Soft Brexit)

35. Sub-national changes (Soft Brexit) Index of Diversity = 1 -

    S e r e 2 where r e = proportion of the population in ethnic group e

36. Population ageing Eth Year Scenario % 0-19 % 20-69 %

    70+ PSR Eth Year Scenario % 0-19 % 20-69 % 70+ PSR WBI 2011 Base pop 22.4 64.3 13.3 4.8 CHI 2011 Base pop 20.1 76.5 3.3 22.8 2061 No Brexit 22.9 53.7 23.3 2.2 2061 No Brexit 14.9 75.7 9.4 7.1 2061 Soft Brexit 22.7 53.7 23.6 2.2 2061 Soft Brexit 14.7 74.2 11 6.7 2061 Hard Brexit 20.8 55.4 23.8 2.2 2061 Hard Brexit 7.8 36.5 55.7 3.0 WHO 2011 Base pop 18.6 77 4.3 17.7 OAS 2011 Base pop 28.2 69.1 2.7 25.2 2061 No Brexit 12.8 72.2 15 4.5 2061 No Brexit 21.5 62.3 16.3 3.6 2061 Soft Brexit 12.7 70.5 16.8 4.0 2061 Soft Brexit 21.5 60.8 17.7 3.4 2061 Hard Brexit 10.7 42.7 46.6 3.2 2061 Hard Brexit 19 48.3 32.7 2.7 MIX 2011 Base pop 53.4 44.6 1.9 23.1 BLA 2011 Base pop 36.5 62.1 1.4 42.8 2061 No Brexit 35.5 56.7 7.7 7.0 2061 No Brexit 27.2 55.7 17.1 3.2 2061 Soft Brexit 34.8 57.1 8.1 6.9 2061 Soft Brexit 27.2 54.7 18.1 3.3 2061 Hard Brexit 28.7 59.6 11.7 6.4 2061 Hard Brexit 24.8 48.2 27 3.0 IND 2011 Base pop 24 70.6 5.4 13 BLC 2011 Base pop 22.8 66.7 10.5 6.4 2061 No Brexit 24.2 60.9 14.9 3.9 2061 No Brexit 25.1 43.8 31 1.4 2061 Soft Brexit 24.2 59.6 16.2 3.6 2061 Soft Brexit 24.7 43.7 31.7 1.5 2061 Hard Brexit 22 47.7 30.4 2.6 2061 Hard Brexit 19.7 50.8 29.5 1.9 PAK 2011 Base pop 39.3 57.5 3.1 18.3 BLO 2011 Base pop 44.7 53.2 2.1 25 2061 No Brexit 38.2 52.6 9.2 5.5 2061 No Brexit 25 59.1 15.9 3.6 2061 Soft Brexit 38.3 52.1 9.5 5.3 2061 Soft Brexit 24.6 58.8 16.6 3.6 2061 Hard Brexit 37.8 49.8 12.4 4.8 2061 Hard Brexit 19.6 59.1 21.3 3.6 BAN 2011 Base pop 41.5 55.9 2.7 21 OTH 2011 Base pop 29.4 67.7 2.9 23.2 2061 No Brexit 38 48.5 13.5 3.5 2061 No Brexit 14.1 66.4 19.5 3.2 2061 Soft Brexit 38 48.1 13.8 4.4 2061 Soft Brexit 13.8 64.7 21.5 3.0 2061 Hard Brexit 36.2 47.5 16.3 4.4 2061 Hard Brexit 9.6 46.4 44 2.3 PSR calculated by dividing the percentage of population aged 20-69 by the percentage of population aged 70+

37. Population Support Ratios (70+) PSR calculated by dividing the percentage

    of population aged 20-69 by the percentage of population aged 70+

38. Key message Ethnic groups affected differently by Brexit, but…

39. Key message The population will be more diverse The population

    is ageing Ethnic groups affected differently by Brexit, but… … under all scenarios

40. The latest ONS statistics* (to mid 2017) suggest: • A

    downturn in EU immigration, which is built into the Soft and Hard Brexit scenarios. • There was also a steep upturn in emigration, which we had not anticipated. • EU citizens are voting with their feet: they are not coming to work in the UK in as large numbers and are leaving to work elsewhere in larger numbers. *ONS (2017). Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: November 2017.

41. Down-scaling projections

42. ‘Down-scaling’ Pregnolato et al. A building stock and household composition

    model for the UK. GISRUK 2018.

43. Microsimulation approach Lomax, N. and Smith, A P. (2017) Microsimulation

    for demography. Australian Population Studies, 1(1): 73-85 • A simpler ‘static sequential’ projection and a more complex dynamic model • Still retains the ethnic dimension of projection

44. Seminar delivered at the University of Liverpool 20 February 2018

    Ethnic population projections for post-Brexit Britain Nik Lomax School of Geography FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENT n.m.lomax@leeds.ac.uk