Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance

Collective Intentionality VII, Basel, Switzerland, August 2010

Transcript

1. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at, Frankfurt a. M., Germany Collective Intentionality VII August 23-26, 2010 Basel Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
2. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Central Claim Central claim: The possibility of collective phenomena is a social achievement. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
3. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Structure of the Presentation 1 Normative, joint commitment is the central element of collective intentionality. 2 Joint commitments depend on implicit, practical normativity and collective normative self-governance. 3 Implicit normativity depends on plural subject phenomena. 4 Recognition as the constitutive element of both joint commitment and implicit normativity. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
4. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Collective Intentionality and Normativity Starting point: The intuition about the normative force of collective belief and intention. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
5. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Collective Intentionality and Normativity Starting point: The intuition about the normative force of collective belief and intention. Joint commitment hypothesis The best explanation for the legitimacy of normative reactions (punitive criticism, etc.) in the context of collective phenomena is to be achieved by understanding these phenomena as necessarily involving a joint commitment of the group as a whole to a attitude or goal. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
6. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Two Objections Two Objections: 1 The constitutive dilemma. 2 The dilemma of the relation between individual and joint commitment. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
7. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection I Emergence of joint commitments A joint commitment is created whenever the individual members are ready to enter into a joint commitment and this is publicly known. Either individual readiness and public knowledge fully explain JC, but then they also explain everything which is explained by JC. JC becomes explanatorily unnecessary. Or JC has additional explanatory power. But how does it come about given individual readiness and public knowledge? Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
8. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II The relation between the commitment and a group and reasons for individuals How are joint commitments and commitments of individual members related? How do individuals acquire an entitlement to assess co-members, if it is not them but a distinct, plural subject which is committed to the attitude in question? Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
9. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Membership Shockley’s dilemma: Principle of membership (M) Individual commitments derive from joint commitment: If Group A is (jointly) committed to some X and B is a member of Group A, then B is through B’s membership (individually) committed to some Y. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
10. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Membership Shockley’s dilemma: Principle of membership (M) Individual commitments derive from joint commitment: If Group A is (jointly) committed to some X and B is a member of Group A, then B is through B’s membership (individually) committed to some Y. The plausibility of M relies on the empirical evidence of the assessment interactions of individuals. Either the same phenomena provide the truth conditions of M, then plural subjects and joint commitments have no explanatory value, or M has different truth conditions (relation individual-group) but then the reasons it is plausible are not the reasons it is true. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
11. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Answer The dilemma can be solved: We can accept that individual-individual relations account for the truth of M. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
12. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Answer The dilemma can be solved: We can accept that individual-individual relations account for the truth of M. Two kinds of commitments involved: Commitments of the group, commitments of the members. Ordinary view: Joint commitment (of the group) and commitments of the members are straightfowardly related as whole and part. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
13. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Answer The dilemma can be solved: We can accept that individual-individual relations account for the truth of M. Two kinds of commitments involved: Commitments of the group, commitments of the members. Ordinary view: Joint commitment (of the group) and commitments of the members are straightfowardly related as whole and part. But: As a matter of social inquiry, the joint commitment and the members commitments may turn out to be independent (within limits). Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
14. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Plural Subjects and Individual Commitment The connection between joint commitment and individual commitment is not straightforward: (removed copyrighted image of football fans) For example: Collective belief in excellence of national soccer team ↔ individual commitment to wearing coloured make-up and waving coloured pieces of cloth. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
15. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Answer II The two sets of commitments are distinct and conceptually independent. Outsiders might only be able to learn about their connection as a result of substantial social inquiry because their connection is determined by non-trivial social norms. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
16. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint Commitment: Objection II - Answer II The two sets of commitments are distinct and conceptually independent. Outsiders might only be able to learn about their connection as a result of substantial social inquiry because their connection is determined by non-trivial social norms. In this case, the notion of “plural subjects” is needed, because the joint commitment is not in any understandable way the commitment of the members (even though constituted by these commitments). Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
17. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Plural Subjecthood as a Social Status Consider the following constitutive rule: Plural subject A set of persons P1 ..Pn that are committed to each other to assessing each other and accepting assessments from each other according to a norm N counts as plural subject with the intentional state Icoll (i.e. is jointly committed to a belief or goal as given by Icoll ). This constitutive rule refers to regulative standards of propriety (through N). Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
18. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Constitution and Norm Acceptance Constitutive rule: Plural subject A set of persons P1 ..Pn that are committed to each other to assessing each other and accepting assessments from each other according to a norm N counts as plural subject with the intentional state Icoll . Consequence: Each collective action type or intention type depends on the implicit acceptance of certain sets of norms regarding what members must do for a group to count as a specific kind of plural subject. This is not to be spelled out in collective belief terms. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
19. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Joint commitment and Implicit Normativity Implicit normativity: Post-Wittgensteinian accounts of implicit rule-following (e.g. Brandom). On this account, following a rule is explained via an account of how persons take each other as following rules. Self-understanding as norm-governed presupposes communal normative self-determination implied in capacity to make own rules explicit. Full understanding of ourselves as capable of joint commitment requires reflexive normative self-governance. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
20. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance Implicit Normativity and Joint Commitment Are normative interactions and implicit norms more basic than joint commitment? Normative assessment is only authoritative if it expresses shared norms. Brandom: Normative practices can be explained from I-thou-perspective. But this overlooks the significance of first-person-plural point of view. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
21. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance An Apparent Circularity On this account, social norms and joint commitment are interdependent. Both phenomena can be understood as aspects of a larger structure of mutual authority attributions that support each other. Both involve a basic form of authority attribution: mutual recognition. Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt
22. Joint Commitment and Collective Normative Self-Governance stahl@em.uni-frankfurt.de Titus Stahl Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt