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Apollo Group

Nir Levy
September 24, 2012

Apollo Group

Industry and competitive analysis with strategic recommendations for Emory University course taught by Jeff Denneen of Bain & Company.

Nir Levy

September 24, 2012
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  1. 1       Is  a  college  a  good  investment?

     Or  will  student  debt  bury  an  enAre  generaAon?       IntroducAon   Company  Analysis   RecommendaAons   Summary  
  2. 2 Higher  EducaAon  Today     More  students  than  ever

     before  are  enrolling  in  higher  educaAon  insAtuAons  despite  increased   tuiAon  rates  and  unemployment  rates  above  the  naAonal  average  for  recent  college  graduates.   „  $360  billion  industry   •  49.6%  of  high  school  graduates  (15-­‐24)  are   enrolled  in  a  higher  educaBon  insBtuBon   „  Enrollment  projected  to  increase  by  8%  through   2018   „  53.6%  of  recent  college  graduates  are  unemployed   or  underemployed   „  Average  student  loan  debt  (2011)  is  $25,250   „  InsBtuBons  now  rely  more  heavily  on  tuiBon  as  a   source  of  general  revenue   •  Average  endowment  dropped  20%  in  2009   Sources:  Huffington  Post,  Hoovers,  First  Research,  US  Bureau  of  Labor  StaBsBcs,  Economic  Policy  InsBtute,  CNN  money.  
  3. 3 Industry  SegmentaAon   Higher  EducaAon  is  segmented  into  several

     sub-­‐industries.  More  recently,  however,  these  once   disAnct  lines  have  blurred  as  student  needs  have  evolved.   Sources:  University  websites.     “Top”  TradiAonal  Colleges   “Other”  TradiAonal  Colleges   For-­‐Profit  UniversiAes  
  4. 4       Would  any  of  you  consider  pursuing

     a  degree  at  a  for-­‐profit  university?   Company  Analysis   IntroducAon   RecommendaAons   Summary  
  5. 5 Sub-­‐Industry:  “Non-­‐TradiAonal”  EducaAon   Source:  Digest  of  EducaBon  Studies,

     Apollo  Group  2011  10K,  NaBonal  Postsecondary  Student  Aid  Study.     The  Non-­‐TradiAonal,  or  For-­‐Profit,  sector  emerged  because  many  universiAes  and  colleges  failed  to   sufficiently  meet  the  needs  of  non-­‐tradiAonal  students.   TRADITIONAL   STUDENTS   NON-­‐TRADITIONAL   STUDENTS   Age  Range   18  –  21  years  old   Working  adults,   >24  years  old   Employment   Status   Generally   Unemployed   Part-­‐Bme  or  Full-­‐ Bme  Employees   Financial  Status   Dependent   Independent  &  may   have  dependents       EducaAonal   Status   Have  high  school   diploma,  seeking   4-­‐year  degree   Lack  high  school   diploma,  OR  have   completed  some   college  already   EducaAonal   MoAvaAons     Seek  “college   experience,”   expansive  course   offerings   Seek  immediately   applicable  skill  set/ cerBficaBon,  specific   courses  required   Technological  Shij   Demographic  Shij   Economic  Shij   MeeAng  Non-­‐TradiAonal  Needs   „  Year-­‐long  academic  calendar   „  Online  offerings  &  convenient  scheduling   „  Limited  course  selecBon,  mapped  out   „  Part-­‐Bme  faculty     „  “Customer  service”  oriented    
  6. 6 For-­‐Profits:  EvoluAon  of  an  Industry   For-­‐Profits  are  encroaching

     upon  the  territory  of  tradiAonal  insAtuAons  by  awarding  degree   programs  more  quickly  and  conveniently.     Sources:  The  Chronicle  of  Higher  EducaBon,  Simba  InformaBon  Career  College  Index.     <100,000     Non-­‐TradiBonal  Students   Market:  small,  highly  fragmented,   privately  owned   Focused  on  teaching  trade  skills   (secretarial,  cosmetology,  etc.)   Degree  Offering:  only  10%  of  firms   Then   >2.6  million     Non-­‐TradiBonal  Students   Market:  highly  concentrated,     13  firms  own  40%   Focus  on  degrees  for  high-­‐demand   jobs  (technology,  business,   healthcare,  etc)   Degree  Offering:  50%  of  firms   Now   From  2000  to  2006,  enrollment  in  for-­‐profit  insAtuAons  grew  200%,  while  total  enrollment  in  all   higher  educaAon  insAtuAons  grew  only  19%.    
  7. 7 Company  Overview   Apollo  Group  (“Apollo”  or  “The  Company”)

     is  the  world’s  largest  for-­‐profit  educaAon  provider  for   the  past  35  years.  The  Company  has  $4.4B  and  $1.0B  in  LTM  revenue  and  EBITDA,  respecAvely.     Source:  Equity  Research  and  Apollo  Group  10K   76   204   Campuses   Learning  FaciliBes   91%   9%   United  States   InternaBonal   Business  Lines   LocaAon  Breakdown   Revenue  Breakdown  
  8. 8 Company  Analysis:  The  Core   Apollo’s  core  was  simple

     –  to  provide  a  flexible  model  of  educaAon  that  was  tailored  to  meet  the   needs  of  its  students.   Source:  Apollo  2001  10K,  Group  1  Analysis.   “All  universi,es  teach  students.  Only  the  best  universi1es  learn  from  them.  At  Apollo  Group,  we’re   constantly  studying  our  students,  researching  their  needs,  audi,ng  their  learning  outcomes,  and   tracking  their  success  to  provide  an  educa,on  of  unsurpassed  relevance  and  value.”      -­‐-­‐  Apollo  Group’s  Annual  Report  from  2001   MeeAng  the   Students’   Needs   First Mover
  9. 9 Company  Analysis:  The  Core   Apollo’s  core  competency  of

     its  strong  network  uAlized  the  Company’s  core  capabiliAes  of   convenience,  specialized  degree  programs  and  wide  distribuAon  channels  to  lead  by  differenAaAon.   Source:    BUS  430  Class  .     Cost  PosiAon   DifferenAaAon   Industry  Influence   But  this  strategy  allows  compeAtors  to  “cherry  pick”  the  best  strategies  of  the  industry  leader  and   develop  a  niche.  These  companies  pose  a  significant  threat  to  Apollo.    
  10. 10 20%   22%   24%   26%   28%

      30%   32%   34%   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   Entry   Barriers:   High   •   AccreditaBon   •   Network  Effect   •   Government  Funding   Supplier   Power:   Low   • Fragmented  Supplier   Base  of  Professors   • Online  Textbooks   bypass  publishing   Buyer   Power:   Weak   •   Medium  Switch  Costs   •   Increasing  number  of   unconcentrated  buyers   Degree  of   Rivalry:  High   •   Historically  low  rivalry   due  to  the  segment’s   growth,  but  steadily   increasing   •   Low  Price  CompeBBon   Threat  of   SubsAtutes:   High   •   Many  avenues  for   educaBon   •   Not  necessary  –  pursue   low-­‐skilled  profession   Industry  Structure   The  For-­‐Profit  Higher  EducaAon  sector  is  extremely  compeAAve,  harming  overall  industry   profitability.     Source:  10K  of  Apollo  Group,  ITT  Technical  and  Group  1  Analysis.     Profit  Margin   Fiscal  Year  
  11. 11 Company  Analysis:  Shiking  Beyond  The  Core   Apollo  abandoned

     its  core  customer  and  capabiliAes  as  corporate  moAvaAon  for  profit  replaced   educaAonal  integrity.   Source:  U.S.  Senate,  Apollo  Internal  Memo,  Group.  Withdraw  rates  are  over  a  period  of  123  median  days.       “Five  Years,  Five  Million  Students,  and  Five  Billion  Dollars”     –  Apollo  Management   41%  of  student  body   2%  of  student   body   66.4%  withdraw   50.3%  withdraw   SupporAng  Evidence   SituaAon   Challenges   Key  QuesAons   „  High  growth  targets   „  Shij  away  from  core  customer   „  Low  compleBon  rates  across  the   board,  which  lead  to  uncommioed   enrolled  students.  Reflects  market   size  limits   „   Are  recruitment  pracBces  pushing   company  resources  away  from  the   core?  RecruiBng  from  separate   markets?   „   Is  market  share  growth  correctly   prioriBzed  over  service  quality  
  12. 12 CompeAtor  Analysis:  Enrollment  Growth   Apollo  has  lost  market

     share  to  innovaAve,  strategic  compeAtors  and  subsAtutes.   Source:  Washington  Post,  US  Senate  OPEN,  Slate  Magazine.     SupporAng  Evidence  –  Enrollment  Growth   SituaAon   Challenges   Key  QuesAons   „  Reduced  enrollment  growth  with   new  opBons  in  the  market     „  CompeBBon  from  free  online   providers   „  High  rivalry  space  drives  down   price  and  reduces  economies  of   scale     „  What  lessons  can  we  learn  from   high  growth  compeBtors?   „  Why  are  compeBtor  networks   growing?     „  Coursera  provides  free  courses  to  1.35  million  students  with   content  from  17  partner  universiBes   „  June  2012:  President  of  University  of  Virginia  disagrees  with  the   university  board  over  online  learning.  They  fire  him  “before  it’s   too  late”    
  13. 13 CompeAtor  Analysis:  TacAc  DifferenAaAon  in  Career  Services   A

     second  mover  advantage  can  propel  the  largest  network  in  the  industry.   Source:  US  Senate  OPEN,  Group  Analysis.     SupporAng  Evidence   SituaAon   Benefits   Risks  &  Hurdles   „  Career  services  lags  behind   compeBtors.  Flat  at  0  while   compeBtors  have  20%  year  over   year  growth  in  career  services  hires   „  Addresses  retenBon  issues  by   rewarding  student  compleBon     „  Avoid  first  mover  costs   „  DistribuBng  career  services  across   uniquely  large  network   „  EducaBng  the  market  and   establishing  best  in  class  career   service  pracBces  
  14. 14 CompeAtor  Analysis:  Share  of  Enrollment  and  Defaults   Withdrawal

     and  default  frequency  increase  compliance  costs  and  reduce  customer  lifeAme  value.   Source:  US  Senate  OPEN,  Group  Analysis.     SupporAng  Evidence   SituaAon   Challenges   OpportuniAes   Accelerated   growth  in   defaults   $32  billion  of  taxpayer  dollars  went  to  for-­‐profit   colleges  and  more  than  half  lej  without  degree  or   diploma  within  a  median  of  4  months   „  Taxpayer  value  destrucBon  à   increased  regulaBon  à  recruitment   procedures  determined  by  90/10   rule   „  Decreased  degree  value   „  ReputaBonal  impact  of  high  defaults   „  Student  understanding  of  debt   responsibiliBes   „  Is  student  financing  outside  our   core?     „  Best  return  from  increasing   customer  life  Bme  value?  
  15. 15 Profitability  Below  the  NormaAve  Band  –  RMS  /  ROS

     Chart   Apollo  has  thus  been  unable  to  capitalize  on  its  massive  market  share  to  generate  a  significant  profit   margin.   0%   5%   10%   15%   20%   25%   30%   35%   0.00   0.50   1.00   1.50   2.00   RMS / ROS – For-Profit Education ROS RMS
  16. 17 How  would  you  advise  Apollo  on  maximizing  the  value

     of  its  core?   RecommendaAons   IntroducAon   Company  Analysis   Summary  
  17. 18 CreaAng  a  DifferenAated  Strategy  for  Apollo     Source:

     Bain’s  survey  of  250+  sources  of  differenBaBon.   M&A,  JVs  and   partnering   Customer   relaAonships   Tied  Customer   Network   Brand   Scale   Strategic   partnerships   with  employers   Developing  a   referral  system   for  alumni   Strong  network   of  successful   alumni   Strong   reputa1on  of   mee1ng  needs   Countrywide   reach  to   maximize   convenience   Apollo:  A  reliable   pathway  to  student   employment  
  18. 19 RecommendaAon  #1  –  Benchmark  MarkeAng,  Reallocate  to  Career  Services

     &  Financial  Literacy   Decrease   MarkeBng   Expense   Increase   Career   Services   Spending   Create   Financial   Literacy   Courses   Apollo  should  meet  the  needs  of  its  students  by  improving  their  career  prospects,  while   benchmarking  the  Company’s  customer  acquisiAon  costs.  
  19. 20 RecommendaAon  #1  –  Emory  MBA  Case  Study    

    „  Raised  GMAT,  GPA  and  work  threshold  for  incoming   class   „  Enrollment  rates  decreased  markedly  iniBally  as  fewer   people  met  the  new  threshold   „  Ajer  a  few  years,  the  smaller,  strengthened  classes   boosted  average  entrance  staBsBcs  and  employment   rates   „  Emory’s  MBA  program  improved    in  ranking  and  has   aoracted  more  candidates     Takeaway:  Short-­‐term  dips  in  enrollment  can  be   outweighed  by  long-­‐term  increases  in  the   strength  of  a  network   Emory  University’s  MBA  program  followed  a  similar  model.  
  20. 21 RecommendaAon  #2:      Focus  Enrollment  to  3  Year

     Pre-­‐Professional  Program   Grow  the  core  and  reduce  customer  turnover  by  offering  joint  degree  programs  similar  to  Emory’s    3-­‐2  engineering  program  with  Georgia  Tech.   Source:  US  Senate  OPEN,  Group  1  Analysis.     •   Taxpayer  value  destrucBon  à   increased  regulaBon  à  recruitment   procedures  determined  by  90/10  rule   •   Decreased  degree  value   Structure   SituaAon   Benefits   •   FoundaBon  courses  with  subsequent  guaranteed  enrollment  in   partner  insBtuBons  upon  credit  compleBon     Risks  and  Hurdles   •   IniBal  cost  of  establishing   partnerships  and  programs   •   CannibalizaBon  of  associate   degree  investments   •   Increase  student  enrollment  in   Bachelor  degree  tracks   •   New  rewards  for  track  compleBon   Pre-­‐Engineering   Pre-­‐Law   Pre-­‐Dental   Pre-­‐Business   2  years     Phoenix  University   B.S.  or  B.A.   1  year   Partner   TradiBonal   InsBtuBon   Masters   1  year   Partner   TradiBonal   InsBtuBon  
  21. 22 RecommendaAon  #3  –  Strategic  Partnerships  for  Employment    

    Employer   Value   Apollo   Value   Joint   Value  
  22. 23 Results  –  A  Financial  Model     We  made

     several  conservaAve  assumpAons,  including  reducing  enrollment  rates  iniAally  and  decreased  growth  in   the  educaAonal  materials  sectors  due  to  subsAtutes.   Sources:  Group  1  Analysis.  
  23. 24 Results  –  A  Financial  Model     We  used

     these  assumpAons  in  a  discounted  cash  flow  model  to  find  the  value  of  the  firm’s  future  cash  flows  in  the   present  Ame  period.   Sources:  Group  1  Analysis.  
  24. 25 Results  –  A  Financial  Model     We  then

     sensiAzed  our  results,  thereby  yielding  the  amount  of  value  the  firm  could  expect  by  enacAng  these   recommendaAons.  In  all  but  the  very  worst  case  scenario,  our  recommendaAons  added  value.   $20   $25   $30   $35   $40   $45   $50   $55   $60   $65   Strategic   Recommen-­‐daBons   52-­‐Week  Trading   Range   Current  Trading  Price:   $29.31   Sources:  Group  1  Analysis.  
  25. 26 0%   5%   10%   15%   20%

      25%   30%   35%   0.00   0.50   1.00   1.50   2.00   Results  –  New  ROS/RMS  Chart   ROS RMS
  26. 27 What  do  you  think  of  our  recommendaAons  and  analysis?

      Summary   IntroducAon   Company  Analysis   RecommendaAons  
  27. 28 Summary   1   • Reallocate  markeBng  dollars  to  improve

     career  services  &  instrucBon   2   • Encourage  students  to  pursue  3-­‐year  degrees  in  the  most  high-­‐demand  fields   3   • Invest  in  corporate  partnerships  to  augment  post-­‐graduaBon  employment     Our  three  soluAons  generate  a  posiAve  cycle  that  reinforces  Apollo’s  core  strategy.   Career     Focus   Consistent     Job     Placement   Fewer   Defaults   Higher  Value     EducaBon   Higher     RetenBon   Greater   Enrollment   The  Core:   Meet    students’   needs  and   strengthen  the   network