ͷબ S ∪ {∅} ্ͷઢܗॱংʢݫີͳબॱংɺಉॱҐͳ͍ʣ ∅ɿΞϯϚονʢͲͷอҭॴͱϚονͤͣʣ s ≻c s′ ⇔ ࣇಐ c อҭॴ s′ ΑΓ s Λر s ≻c ∅ ⇔ ࣇಐ c ʹͱͬͯอҭॴ s Acceptableʢͦ͏Ͱͳ͚ Ε Unacceptableʣ 8 / 30
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