La sécurité dans l'IoT : difficultés, failles et contre-mesures @RivieraDev

Avec la multiplication des objets connectés dans notre quotidien, la sécurité de ces appareils électroniques, qui a été souvent négligée par le passé, devient une réelle problématique. Leur faible coût de conception, la négligence des fabricants ou même la notre, nous développeurs, en font des proies faciles pour les hackers.
Ce phénomène se constate bien dans l'actualité, où l'on parle de plus en plus d'attaques à grande échelles visant des cameras ou frigos connectés, mais également les serrures Bluetooth.
Au cours de ce talk nous verrons en détails le principe des dernières attaques qui ont fait la une. Nous parlerons ensuite des failles touchant les IoTs les plus courantes (le top 10 OWASP IoT), les solutions et contre-mesures.
Nous parlerons notamment des attaques par canaux auxiliaires pour lesquelles peu de solutions existent et qui donnent toujours du fil à retordre aux chercheurs.
Enfin, nous terminerons par une petite démo d’attaque de type Man-in-the-midle (MiTM) sur un objet Bluetooth.

Transcript

1. #DevoxxFR
   #RivieraDev
   La sécurité dans l'IoT :
   difficultés, failles et
   contre-mesures
   Alexis DUQUE @alexis0duque
   

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2. #RivieraDev
   About Me
   ALEXIS DUQUE
   Embedded Software engineer & R&D leader at Rtone
   PhD Student at CITI Lab, INSA de Lyon
   @alexis0duque
   alexisduque
   alexisd@rtone.fr
   alexisduque.me
   https://goo.gl/oNUWu6
   2
   

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3. #RivieraDev
   Roadmap
   ● THE INTERNET OF THINGS
   ● NEWS
   ● VULNERABILITIES & OWASP TOP 10
   ● BLUETOOTH LE (UN)SECURITY
   ● DEMO: BLUETOOTH LE (UN)SECURITY
   ● SIDE CHANNELS ATTACKS
   ● COUNTERMEASURES
   

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4. #RivieraDev
   Internet Of Things
   4
   

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5. #RivieraDev 5
   “20 billions
   interconnected
   devices by the
   year 2020”
   Gartner
   

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6. 6
   #RivieraDev
   Security ?
   6
   

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7. #RivieraDev
   IoT Security ?
   ● Uncontrolled Environment
   ● Heterogeneity
   ● Users and Manufacturers not aware of security risks
   ● Surface of attacks: hardware + software
   ● Scalability
   ● Constrained Resources
   7
   

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8. #RivieraDev
   IoT+Security Challenges
   • Objects are small and everywhere and connected
   • Prone to environmental influences
   • Weak calculation and memory (limited for crypto)
   • They are autonomous
   • Cyber attacks have real world consequences
   8
   

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9. #RivieraDev
   Attack Surface Area
   Around 20 attack surface areas on the OWASP IoT
   Project
   E.g. web Interfaces, physical interfaces, firmware,
   network, cloud, mobile, API, etc
   Each attack surface has multiple potential
   vulnerabilities
   Firmware packages use old and/or unsupported
   versions of 3rd party components
   

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10. #RivieraDev
    IoT Security Happens On 4
    Different Levels
    10
    

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11. #RivieraDev
    Firmware Update
    • Need to be able to update firmware
    • Automatic updates?
    • Needs to be tested on all hardware variants
    • Download path needs to be secure
    • Update path needs to be secure
    11
    

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12. #RivieraDev
    The Hacker’s Paradise!
    An Attacket Drem
    

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13. #RivieraDev
    IoT Privacy Challenges
    • How to obtain informed consent?
    • How can people have control over data?
    • Who is responsible?
    • How data can be safeguarded?
    • How do you detect attacks or leaks?
    

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14. #RivieraDev
    

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15. #RivieraDev
    Who Are IoT
    Hackers ?
    

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16. #RivieraDev
    Many of the vulnerabilities
    discovered are 10 years old!
    

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17. #RivieraDev
    SOUS-TITRE
    Est ut paucos caritas autem.
    

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18. #RivieraDev
    

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19. #RivieraDev
    The Mirai Botnet
    Over 200,000 devices in original botnet
    623 Gbps attack on Krebs
    1 Tbps attack on Dyn
    Source code released
    Default credentials
    Also Reaper (2016), Hajime, Okiru, ...
    

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20. #RivieraDev
    

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21. #RivieraDev
    Hackable
    Cardiac Devices
    Vulnerability in the transmitter that reads the
    device’s data
    Hackers could control a device
    465,000 Abbott pacemakers vulnerable to hacking
    Need a firmware fix
    

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22. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth Vulnerabilities
    BlueBorne
    https://www.armis.com/blueborne/
    Android, Windows, iOS & Linux
    Amazon Echo and Google Home
    8 vulnerabilities
    

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23. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth Vulnerabilities
    Heap-based Buffer Overflow
    Integer Underflow
    Memory Corruption + Privilege Escalation + Remote
    Code Execution
    Payload Injection + Remote Code Execution
    “Heartbleed Like” Data Leak
    Fake Ip Interface + Packets Interception
    

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24. #RivieraDev
    OS Vulnerability CVE Id. Description
    Android Remote Code Execution CVE-2017-0781 Furtive attack
    Android Remote Code Execution CVE-2017-0782 Furtive attack
    Android Data leak CVE-2017-0785 Heartbleed like
    Android "Man-In-The-Middle" (MiTM) CVE-2017-0783
    Bluetooth
    "Pineapple"
    Linux Remote Code Execution
    CVE-2017-
    1000251
    -
    Linux Data leak
    CVE-2017-
    1000250
    Heartbleed like
    iOS Remote Code Execution
    CVE-2017-
    14315
    -
    Windows "Man-In-The-Middle" (MiTM) CVE-2017-8628
    Bluetooth
    "Pineapple"
    

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25. #RivieraDev
    

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26. #RivieraDev
    OWASP IoT Top 10
    

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27. #RivieraDev
    What Is OWASP?
    [owasp.org] “The Open Web Application Security Project
    (OWASP) is a worldwide not-for-profit charitable
    organization focused on improving the security of software”
    [owasp.org] “The OWASP Internet of Things Project is
    designed to help manufacturers, developers, and consumers
    better understand the security issues associated with the
    Internet of Things, and to enable users in any context to make
    better security decisions when building, deploying, or
    assessing IoT technologies”
    

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28. #RivieraDev
    OWASP IoT Top 10
    1. Insecure Web Interface
    2. Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
    3. Insecure Network Services
    4. Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification
    5. Privacy Concerns
    6. Insecure Cloud Interface
    7. Insecure Mobile Interface
    8. Insufficient Security Configurability
    9. Insecure Software/Firmware
    10.Poor Physical Security
    

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29. #RivieraDev
    1. Insecure Web Interface
    “Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text
    credentials or enumerates accounts to access the web
    interface.”
    • A1:2017 Injection
    • A7:2017 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
    • A13:2017 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business
    Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    EASY
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business
    Specific
    

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30. #RivieraDev
    2. Insufficient Authentication
    “Attacker uses weak passwords, insecure password
    recovery mechanisms, poorly protected credentials or
    lack of granular access control to access a particular
    interface.”
    A2:2017 Broken Authentication (Mirai)
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business
    Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business
    Specific
    

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31. #RivieraDev
    Threat
    Agents
    Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical
    Impacts
    Business
    Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence Detectability
    AVERAGE
    Impact
    MODERATE
    Application /
    Business
    Specific
    3. Insecure Network Services
    “Attacker uses vulnerable network services to attack
    the device itself or bounce attacks off the device.”
    • Unnecessary open ports
    • Wifi access to network, e.g. iKettle
    

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32. #RivieraDev
    4. Lack of Transport
    Encryption/Integrity Verification
    “Attacker uses the lack of transport encryption to view
    data being passed over the network.”
    • A5:2017 Broken Access Control
    • Devices not always connected to internet
    • Certificates expire
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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33. #RivieraDev
    5. Privacy Concerns
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, lack of
    transport encryption or insecure network services to view personal data
    which is not being properly protected or is being collected unnecessarily.”
    • EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - 25th May 2018
    • Requirements for User Consent and Pseudonymisation.
    • Legal obligation to notify the Supervisory Authority of data breach
    without undue delay (72 hours?)
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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34. #RivieraDev
    6. Insecure Cloud Interface
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient
    authentication, lack of transport encryption and account
    enumeration to access data or controls via the cloud
    website.”
    • A1:2017 Injection
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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35. #RivieraDev
    7. Insecure Mobile Interface
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient
    authentication, lack of transport encryption and account
    enumeration to access data or controls via the mobile
    interface.”
    • No best practice?
    • National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
    “Guide to Bluetooth Security”
    Threat Agents Attack
    Vectors
    Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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36. #RivieraDev
    8. Insufficient Security
    Configurability
    “Attacker uses the lack of granular permissions to access
    data or controls on the device. The attacker could also us the
    lack of encryption options and lack of password options to
    perform other attacks which lead to compromise of the
    device and/or data.”
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical
    Impacts
    Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    MODERATE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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37. #RivieraDev
    9. Insecure Software/Firmware
    “Attacker uses multiple vectors such as capturing update files
    via unencrypted connections, the update file itself is not
    encrypted or they are able to perform their own malicious
    update via DNS hijacking.”
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical
    Impacts
    Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    DIFFICULT
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    EASY
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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38. #RivieraDev
    10. Poor Physical Security
    “Attacker uses vectors such as USB ports or other storage
    means to access the Operating System and potentially any
    data stored on the device.”
    • JTAG
    • Serial bus spy: BUS PIRATE
    • Oscilloscope
    Threat Agents Attack Vectors Security Weakness Technical Impacts Business Impacts
    Application
    Specific
    Exploitability
    AVERAGE
    Prevalence
    COMMON
    Detectability
    AVERAGE
    Impact
    SEVERE
    Application /
    Business Specific
    

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40. 4
    0
    #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth Low
    Energy
    

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41. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth LE
    Bluetooth Low Energy, BLE, Bluetooth 4/5,
    Bluetooth SMART
    One of most exploding recently IoT technologies
    Completely different than previous Bluetooth 2, 3
    (BR/EDR)
    Designed for low energy usage, simplicity rather
    than throughput
    

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42. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth LE
    3 devices roles: Peripheral / Central / Advertiser
    Read - Write - Notifications - Indication
    Bluetooth 4.0 has weak security mechanisms
    Bluetooth 4.2 adds strong encryption
    Bluetooth 5 increase throughput and range
    

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43. #RivieraDev
    BLE Security &
    Pairing
    Uses AES-128 with CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) encryption
    Uses Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution to share various keys
    • Identity Resolving Key is used for privacy (IRK)
    • Signing Resolving Key provides fast authentication without
    encryption (SRK)
    • Long Term Key is used (LTK)
    Pairing encrypts the link using a Temporary Key (TK)
    • Derived from passkey & then distribute keys
    

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44. #RivieraDev
    BLE Security &
    Pairing
    How to determine the temporary key (TK)?
    Just Works
    ● Devices without display cannot implement other
    ● It’s actually a key of zero
    6-digit PIN : In case the device has a display
    Out of band (OOB)
    ● Not common (understatement – haven’t seen one yet)
    

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45. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth Core Specification
    “None of the pairing methods
    provide protection against a
    passive eavesdropper”
    

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46. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth 4.2 Security
    4.2 brings strong encryption with Elliptic Curves
    Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with LE Secure Connection
    Numeric Comparison to determine the TK
    In practice, ~80% of tested devices do not
    implement BLE-layer encryption
    

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47. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth 4.2 Security
    Why?
    • Mobile apps cannot control the pairing (OS level)
    • Security is left behind (cost, time, etc.)
    • Multiple users/apps using the same devices
    • Hardware, software or even UX
    • Compatibilities/requirements
    

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48. #RivieraDev
    Hacking
    Bluetooth LE
    BLE USB dongle (CSR8510)
    Ubertooth
    nRF or TI Sniffer
    Wireshark
    

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49. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth
    MiTM Attack
    Btlejuice
    https://github.com/DigitalSecurity/btlejuice
    2 CSR BLE Dongles
    

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50. #RivieraDev
    Bluetooth MiTM Attack
    

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51. #RivieraDev
    Demo Time
    

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52. #RivieraDev
    

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53. #RivieraDev
    Side Channel
    Attacks
    

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54. #RivieraDev
    What is a “side channel”?
    • A source of information about secret information
    besides the actual communication channel
    • Side channels and side-channel analysis is very
    common – also in everyday life
    Personal identification system based on rotation of toilet
    paper rolls, Kurahashi et al. , IEEE PCC 2017
    

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55. #RivieraDev
    Side Channel Attacks Example: A PIN Code Check
    r = strcmp(secret_pwd, typed_pwd);
    if (r==0) {
    /* grant access */
    s = access_secret_data();
    } else {
    /* deny access */
    incorrect_password();
    }
    int strcmp(const char* s1, const char* s2)
    {
    while(*s1 && (*s1 == *s2))
    {
    s1++;
    s2++;
    }
    return *(const unsigned char*)s1 -
    *(const unsigned char*)s2;
    }
    The execution time of
    strcmp() is directly
    proportional to the number
    of correct PIN digits at the
    beginning of the PIN!
    

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56. #RivieraDev
    Side Channel Attacks
    Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on AES
    

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57. #RivieraDev
    EXAMPLE
    Meltdown & Spectre
    

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58. 5
    8
    #RivieraDev
    Countermeasures
    and best practices
    

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59. #RivieraDev
    IoT Security Best Practises
    Security objectives must be considered during the
    product life cycle!
    • Security “by design”
    • Risks analysis
    • Technologies choices and their threat
    • Architecture requirements for security
    • Integration in the project workflow
    • Security review during the project
    

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60. #RivieraDev
    IoT Security Best Practises
    Cover the main risks!
    • Security Upgrade
    • Communications encryption and authentication
    • Use standard crypto
    • Don’t shared key between devices!
    • Code integrity, data confidentiality
    • Restrict and control local access (hardware, …)
    

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61. #RivieraDev
    IoT Security Best Practises
    Cover the main risks!
    • Security Upgrade
    • Communications encryption and authentication
    • Use standard crypto
    • Don’t shared key between devices!
    • Code integrity, data confidentiality
    • Restrict and control local access (hardware, …)
    

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62. #RivieraDev
    What Is Coming?
    • Lightweight Crypto for the IoT (LWC)
    • Software Security
    • Code security and proof (standard, best practices,
    formal analysis)
    • Hardware Security
    • Side channel-attack and fault-injection
    • Secure boot and secure firmware update
    

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63. #RivieraDev
    PACLIDO
    Protocoles et Algorithmes Cryptographiques Légers
    pour l’Internet des Objets
    Consortium: Airbus, Loria-CNRS, Rtone, Université de
    Limoge, Trusted Object, Sophia Conseil, CEA
    Goals: Develop new and IoT compliant crypto
    primitives and protocols for domotics (BLE), Smart-
    Cities
    @fui_paclido
    paclido.fr
    

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64. #RivieraDev
    Secure Elements
    ● Tamper resistant hardware
    ● Secure firmware
    ● Secret keys storage, keys renewal
    ● Crypto. algorithm
    ● Data encryption & decryption
    

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65. #RivieraDev
    Conclusion
    

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66. #RivieraDev
    IoT is going to
    get worse before
    it gets better!
    84 billion devices out there.
    ● Devices deployed need to be updated
    Developers need help!
    ● Solutions already exist
    ● Researchers are designing future IoT security standards
    

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68. #RivieraDev
    Merci / Thanks you
    

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