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Strategic Mobilization

Strategic Mobilization

Talk at the University at Buffalo (SUNY).

Carlisle Rainey

November 30, 2012
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  1. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
  2. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes.
  3. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
  4. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
  5. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere.
  6. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No.
  7. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No.
  8. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No. In fact, PR actually reduces the incentives to mobilize voters.
  9. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness.
  10. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument
  11. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example
  12. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory
  13. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory • Empirical
  14. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  15. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  16. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  17. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  18. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  19. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  20. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% Competitive SMDP
  21. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% Competitive SMDP
  22. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% Competitive SMDP
  23. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Competitive SMDP
  24. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP
  25. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49%
  26. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0%
  27. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51%
  28. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100%
  29. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
  30. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
  31. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
  32. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  33. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  34. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  35.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one
  36.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one  Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition.
  37.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one  Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition.
  38. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  39. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  40. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  41. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  42. (1) The smallest percentage of votes the party could lose

    and lose a seat. (2) The smallest percentage of votes a party could gain and win an additional seat. (3) Take the minimum of the two above. For each party in a district, compute the following: Take the weighted average across each parties in the district.
  43. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district.
  44. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  45. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  46. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  47. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. ◦ No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  48. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact

    from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  49. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact

    from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  50. “Plurality rules only give a strong incentive to mobilize in

    competitive districts, but proportional rules give no strong incentive to mobilize anywhere.”
  51. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  52. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact

    from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States