Strategic Mobilization

Strategic Mobilization

Talk at the University at Buffalo (SUNY).

Bf99409063473973c7f9d3cf4f882492?s=128

Carlisle Rainey

November 30, 2012
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Transcript

  1. Strategic Mobilization Why Disproportional Districts Encourage Partisan Mobilization Efforts Carlisle

    Rainey Ph.D. Candidate Florida State University
  2. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
  3. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes.
  4. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
  5. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
  6. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere.
  7. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No.
  8. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No.
  9. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to

    mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No. In fact, PR actually reduces the incentives to mobilize voters.
  10. I'd Like to Convince You that...

  11. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize.
  12. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness.
  13. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument
  14. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example
  15. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory
  16. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the

    incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory • Empirical
  17. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  18. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  19. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  20. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  21. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  22. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
  23. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% Competitive SMDP
  24. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% Competitive SMDP
  25. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% Competitive SMDP
  26. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Competitive SMDP
  27. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP
  28. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49%
  29. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0%
  30. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51%
  31. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100%
  32. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
  33. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
  34. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
  35. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  36. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  37. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  38. None
  39.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.
  40.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one
  41.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one  Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition.
  42.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want

    to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one  Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition.
  43. None
  44. None
  45. Effort increases in competitiveness (in both types of systems).

  46. Effort increases in competitiveness (in both types of systems).

  47. Effort is higher in disproportional systems (across competitiveness).

  48. Effort is higher in disproportional systems (across competitiveness).

  49. The effect of competitiveness is larger in disproportional systems.

  50. The effect of competitiveness is larger in disproportional systems.

  51. None
  52. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  53. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  54. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  55. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes

    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
  56. (1) The smallest percentage of votes the party could lose

    and lose a seat. (2) The smallest percentage of votes a party could gain and win an additional seat. (3) Take the minimum of the two above. For each party in a district, compute the following: Take the weighted average across each parties in the district.
  57. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district.
  58. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  59. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  60. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  61. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact

    from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. ◦ No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  62. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact

    from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  63. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact

    from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  64. None
  65. None
  66. None
  67. None
  68. None
  69. None
  70. None
  71. None
  72. Effort increases in disproportionality.

  73. Effort increases in disproportionality.

  74. Effort increases in competitiveness.

  75. Effort increases in competitiveness.

  76. The effect of competitiveness is increasing in disproportionality.

  77. The effect of competitiveness is increasing in disproportionality.

  78. None
  79. None
  80. “Plurality rules only give a strong incentive to mobilize in

    competitive districts, but proportional rules give no strong incentive to mobilize anywhere.”
  81. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if

    Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
  82. None
  83. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact

    from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
  84. None
  85. None
  86. None
  87. Effort increases in disproportionality.

  88. Effort increases in competitiveness.

  89. The effect of competitiveness is increasing in disproportionality.