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Strategic Mobilization Why Disproportional Districts Encourage Partisan Mobilization Efforts Carlisle
Rainey Ph.D. Candidate Florida State University -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No. -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No. -
Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to
mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No. In fact, PR actually reduces the incentives to mobilize voters. -
I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the
incentive to mobilize. -
I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the
incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. -
I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the
incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument -
I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the
incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example -
I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the
incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory -
I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the
incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory • Empirical -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100% -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100% -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100% -
Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want
to win seats. -
Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want
to win seats. Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one -
Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want
to win seats. Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition. -
Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want
to win seats. Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition. -
Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009). -
Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009). -
Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009). -
Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009). -
(1) The smallest percentage of votes the party could lose
and lose a seat. (2) The smallest percentage of votes a party could gain and win an additional seat. (3) Take the minimum of the two above. For each party in a district, compute the following: Take the weighted average across each parties in the district. -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact
from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact
from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact
from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact
from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact
from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. ◦ No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact
from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact
from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States -
“Plurality rules only give a strong incentive to mobilize in
competitive districts, but proportional rules give no strong incentive to mobilize anywhere.” -
District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if
Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100% -
Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact
from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States