Upgrade to Pro — share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …

Strategic Mobilization

Strategic Mobilization

Talk at the University at Buffalo (SUNY).

Carlisle Rainey

November 30, 2012
Tweet

More Decks by Carlisle Rainey

Other Decks in Research

Transcript

  1. Strategic Mobilization
    Why Disproportional Districts Encourage Partisan
    Mobilization Efforts
    Carlisle Rainey
    Ph.D. Candidate
    Florida State University

    View Slide

  2. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?

    View Slide

  3. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes.

    View Slide

  4. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes. Parties only have an incentive to
    mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.

    View Slide

  5. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes. Parties only have an incentive to
    mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.

    View Slide

  6. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes. Parties only have an incentive to
    mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
    On the other hand, PR creates a
    nationally-competitive district that gives
    parties an incentive to mobilize
    everywhere.

    View Slide

  7. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes. Parties only have an incentive to
    mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
    On the other hand, PR creates a
    nationally-competitive district that gives
    parties an incentive to mobilize
    everywhere.
    My Argument
    No.

    View Slide

  8. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes. Parties only have an incentive to
    mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
    On the other hand, PR creates a
    nationally-competitive district that gives
    parties an incentive to mobilize
    everywhere.
    My Argument
    No.

    View Slide

  9. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a
    greater incentive to mobilize voters than single-
    member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
    The Literature
    Yes. Parties only have an incentive to
    mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
    On the other hand, PR creates a
    nationally-competitive district that gives
    parties an incentive to mobilize
    everywhere.
    My Argument
    No. In fact, PR actually reduces the
    incentives to mobilize voters.

    View Slide

  10. I'd Like to Convince You that...

    View Slide

  11. I'd Like to Convince You that...
    Proportionality actually decreases the
    incentive to mobilize.

    View Slide

  12. I'd Like to Convince You that...
    Proportionality actually decreases the
    incentive to mobilize.
    Proportionality reduces the effect of
    competitiveness.

    View Slide

  13. I'd Like to Convince You that...
    Proportionality actually decreases the
    incentive to mobilize.
    Proportionality reduces the effect of
    competitiveness.
    Three part argument

    View Slide

  14. I'd Like to Convince You that...
    Proportionality actually decreases the
    incentive to mobilize.
    Proportionality reduces the effect of
    competitiveness.
    Three part argument
    ● Example

    View Slide

  15. I'd Like to Convince You that...
    Proportionality actually decreases the
    incentive to mobilize.
    Proportionality reduces the effect of
    competitiveness.
    Three part argument
    ● Example
    ● Game-Theory

    View Slide

  16. I'd Like to Convince You that...
    Proportionality actually decreases the
    incentive to mobilize.
    Proportionality reduces the effect of
    competitiveness.
    Three part argument
    ● Example
    ● Game-Theory
    ● Empirical

    View Slide

  17. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP
    (Perfect) PR
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  18. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20%
    (Perfect) PR
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  19. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0%
    (Perfect) PR
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  20. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22%
    (Perfect) PR
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  21. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0%
    (Perfect) PR
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  22. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  23. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20%
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  24. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20%
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  25. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22%
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  26. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22%
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  27. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP

    View Slide

  28. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49%

    View Slide

  29. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0%

    View Slide

  30. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51%

    View Slide

  31. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100%

    View Slide

  32. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes

    View Slide

  33. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes

    View Slide

  34. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes

    View Slide

  35. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0%
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2%
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%

    View Slide

  36. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0%
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2%
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%

    View Slide

  37. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0%
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2%
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%

    View Slide

  38. View Slide

  39.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.

    View Slide

  40.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.
     Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one

    View Slide

  41.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.
     Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one

    Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ
    i
    to exert in the competition.

    View Slide

  42.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.
     Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one

    Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ
    i
    to exert in the competition.

    View Slide

  43. View Slide

  44. View Slide

  45. Effort increases in competitiveness
    (in both types of systems).

    View Slide

  46. Effort increases in competitiveness
    (in both types of systems).

    View Slide

  47. Effort is higher in disproportional systems
    (across competitiveness).

    View Slide

  48. Effort is higher in disproportional systems
    (across competitiveness).

    View Slide

  49. The effect of competitiveness is larger in
    disproportional systems.

    View Slide

  50. The effect of competitiveness is larger in
    disproportional systems.

    View Slide

  51. View Slide

  52. Mobilization
    The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data.
    Disproportionality
    An indicator for SMDP districts.
    Competitiveness
    A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).

    View Slide

  53. Mobilization
    The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data.
    Disproportionality
    An indicator for SMDP districts.
    Competitiveness
    A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).

    View Slide

  54. Mobilization
    The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data.
    Disproportionality
    An indicator for SMDP districts.
    Competitiveness
    A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).

    View Slide

  55. Mobilization
    The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes
    from a hierarchical model of self-reported data.
    Disproportionality
    An indicator for SMDP districts.
    Competitiveness
    A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).

    View Slide

  56. (1) The smallest percentage of votes the party could
    lose and lose a seat.
    (2) The smallest percentage of votes a party could
    gain and win an additional seat.
    (3) Take the minimum of the two above.
    For each party in a district, compute the
    following:
    Take the weighted average across each
    parties in the district.

    View Slide

  57. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey

    Question about contact from political parties.

    Link each respondent to their electoral district.

    View Slide

  58. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey

    Question about contact from political parties.

    Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  59. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey

    Question about contact from political parties.

    Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    ● Institutional

    No second-tier adjustments.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  60. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey

    Question about contact from political parties.

    Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    ● Institutional

    No second-tier adjustments.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  61. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey

    Question about contact from political parties.

    Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    ● Institutional

    No second-tier adjustments.

    No concurrent national-level elections.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  62. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey
    ● Question about contact from political parties.
    ● Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    ● Institutional
    ● No second-tier adjustments.
    ● No concurrent national-level elections.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  63. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey
    ● Question about contact from political parties.
    ● Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    ● Institutional
    ● No second-tier adjustments.
    ● No concurrent national-level elections.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  64. View Slide

  65. View Slide

  66. View Slide

  67. View Slide

  68. View Slide

  69. View Slide

  70. View Slide

  71. View Slide

  72. Effort increases in disproportionality.

    View Slide

  73. Effort increases in disproportionality.

    View Slide

  74. Effort increases in competitiveness.

    View Slide

  75. Effort increases in competitiveness.

    View Slide

  76. The effect of competitiveness is increasing
    in disproportionality.

    View Slide

  77. The effect of competitiveness is increasing
    in disproportionality.

    View Slide

  78. View Slide

  79. View Slide

  80. “Plurality rules only give a strong incentive to
    mobilize in competitive districts, but proportional rules
    give no strong incentive to mobilize anywhere.”

    View Slide

  81. District
    Current Vote
    Share
    Current Seat
    Share
    Vote Share
    if Mobilize
    Seat Share
    if Mobilize
    Gain?
    Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0%
    (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2%
    Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%

    View Slide

  82. View Slide

  83. Rules for Case Selection
    ● Survey
    ● Question about contact from political parties.
    ● Link each respondent to their electoral district.
    ● Institutional
    ● No second-tier adjustments.
    ● No concurrent national-level elections.
    CSES (Module II)
    Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems
    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
    Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
    Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
    Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States

    View Slide

  84. View Slide

  85. View Slide

  86. View Slide

  87. Effort increases in disproportionality.

    View Slide

  88. Effort increases in competitiveness.

    View Slide

  89. The effect of competitiveness is increasing
    in disproportionality.

    View Slide