Strategic Mobilization

Talk at the University at Buffalo (SUNY).

Transcript

1. Strategic Mobilization Why Disproportional Districts Encourage Partisan Mobilization Efforts Carlisle Rainey Ph.D. Candidate Florida State University
2. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)?
3. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes.
4. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
5. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts.
6. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere.
7. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No.
8. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No.
9. Does proportional representation (PR) give parties a greater incentive to mobilize voters than single- member districts with plurality rule (SMDP)? The Literature Yes. Parties only have an incentive to mobilize in competitive SMDP districts. On the other hand, PR creates a nationally-competitive district that gives parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. My Argument No. In fact, PR actually reduces the incentives to mobilize voters.
10. I'd Like to Convince You that...
11. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the incentive to mobilize.
12. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness.
13. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument
14. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example
15. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory
16. I'd Like to Convince You that... Proportionality actually decreases the incentive to mobilize. Proportionality reduces the effect of competitiveness. Three part argument • Example • Game-Theory • Empirical
17. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
18. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
19. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
20. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
21. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
22. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR Competitive SMDP
23. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% Competitive SMDP
24. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% Competitive SMDP
25. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% Competitive SMDP
26. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Competitive SMDP
27. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP
28. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49%
29. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0%
30. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51%
31. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100%
32. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
33. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
34. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% No (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% Yes Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% Yes
35. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
36. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
37. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
39.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.
40.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one
41.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one  Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition.
42.  Two political parties, P = {w, s} that want to win seats.  Compete over a seat or set of seats with value normalized to one  Party i chooses an amount of effort, ɛ i to exert in the competition.
45. Effort increases in competitiveness (in both types of systems).
46. Effort increases in competitiveness (in both types of systems).
47. Effort is higher in disproportional systems (across competitiveness).
48. Effort is higher in disproportional systems (across competitiveness).
49. The effect of competitiveness is larger in disproportional systems.
50. The effect of competitiveness is larger in disproportional systems.
52. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
53. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
54. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
55. Mobilization The rate of contact in electoral districts. This comes from a hierarchical model of self-reported data. Disproportionality An indicator for SMDP districts. Competitiveness A measure developed by Grofman and Selb (2009).
56. (1) The smallest percentage of votes the party could lose and lose a seat. (2) The smallest percentage of votes a party could gain and win an additional seat. (3) Take the minimum of the two above. For each party in a district, compute the following: Take the weighted average across each parties in the district.
57. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district.
58. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
59. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
60. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
61. Rules for Case Selection • Survey ◦ Question about contact from political parties. ◦ Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional ◦ No second-tier adjustments. ◦ No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
62. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
63. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
72. Effort increases in disproportionality.
73. Effort increases in disproportionality.
74. Effort increases in competitiveness.
75. Effort increases in competitiveness.
76. The effect of competitiveness is increasing in disproportionality.
77. The effect of competitiveness is increasing in disproportionality.
80. “Plurality rules only give a strong incentive to mobilize in competitive districts, but proportional rules give no strong incentive to mobilize anywhere.”
81. District Current Vote Share Current Seat Share Vote Share if Mobilize Seat Share if Mobilize Gain? Non-Competitive SMDP 20% 0% 22% 0% 0% (Perfect) PR 20% 20% 22% 22% 2% Competitive SMDP 49% 0% 51% 100% 100%
83. Rules for Case Selection • Survey • Question about contact from political parties. • Link each respondent to their electoral district. • Institutional • No second-tier adjustments. • No concurrent national-level elections. CSES (Module II) Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United States
87. Effort increases in disproportionality.
88. Effort increases in competitiveness.
89. The effect of competitiveness is increasing in disproportionality.